

POL 27
8-1-68

BIAFRA -NIGERIA

STATE DEPARTMENT SYSTEMATIC REVIEW
☐ Retain class'n ☐ Change/classify to
☒ Declassify on request
EO 12958, 25X
FPC/HDR by AS Date: 3/20/96
WFOGAWB 110: _____

0259

DECLASSIFIED
Authority: VND 959/503
By: MN NARA Date: 10/5/05

63
To: RS/AN-C:
Original (with courtesy
copy of the correspondence
was signed, dated & dispatched
direct from "H".

August 12, 1968

Honorable Allen J. Ellender
United States Senate
Washington, D.C. 20510

Dear Senator Ellender:

Secretary Rusk has asked me to reply to your recent inquiry regarding Mr. J. Ashton Greene's interest in the situation in Nigeria.

It is our understanding that all donations flown into the Biafran territory are clearly marked as relief supplies and the needy people know and are grateful to the sources of these donations. Observers have confirmed that supplies sent to the Federally-controlled areas are similarly well-marked.

As President Johnson stated on July 11, "the American people have watched with growing grief and horror the terrible loss of life and suffering in Nigeria." The United States Government has contributed \$5.3 million worth of food and money to Nigerian relief, including nearly 11,000 tons of food. More than one-third of this food is in the war area and the bulk of the rest will arrive before the end of September. We have provided the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) with a reserve fund of \$1 million to draw on in chartering airplanes and ships, purchasing or leasing vehicles, or otherwise financing the distribution of the relief supplies to the area of need.

In addition to United States government aid, private voluntary organizations in America have donated more than \$2 million from their own resources and European governments have given many millions of dollars worth of help.

The United States Government and most other donors are agreed that the International Red Cross, with its reputation as an impartial and non-political body, is in the best position to arrange and coordinate relief distribution to both Nigeria and Biafra. The ICRC has mounted a major relief effort with which we and many other governments are cooperating fully. The ICRC has so far been able to coordinate relief distribution in both Nigeria and Biafra without any implications which might cause either government to interfere with or restrict the relief operations. The ICRC has received the strong endorsement of UN Secretary U Thant and the Organization of African Unity in this work.

The central problem obstructing an adequate relief program has been political disagreement over the means of conveying the supplies into Biafra. Over the past few months donors, including the International Red Cross, have brought a small amount of relief supplies directly into Biafra.

fol 27 Biafra - Nigeria

RECORDED BY 15/8

P/PS/PCO L Rushfield

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By MN NARA Date 10/5/05

- 2 -

The International Committee of the Red Cross believes that an overland route into the affected area is the only way to move the large tonnages of food required by the population. In the past two weeks, it appears that the Nigerians and Biafrans have moved closer to an agreement on the problems of distribution, but both sides are afraid that the relief operations may somehow affect the settlement of the war. Since outside assistance cannot be provided without the agreement of the authorities on the spot, and many lives might be lost if this authority were to be flouted, it is essential that a mutually satisfactory agreement be reached soon.

On August 5, delegations from both sides resumed negotiations in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, under the chairmanship of Emperor Haile Selassie. The talks concern both the relief issue and the more general problem of ending the war. In a message to the Emperor on August 5, President Johnson called for a speedy solution to the relief impasse. He stated that "we in the United States remain ready to continue in every possible way to help in the humanitarian task of providing and moving supplies to the people who need them so desperately."

I hope the foregoing information will be helpful to you in replying to Mr. Greene.

Sincerely yours,

John P. White
Acting Assistant Secretary
for Congressional Relations

DMD

Enclosure:

Correspondence returned.

H. LEAHY

P/PS/PCD:LEHrushfield:rtg

SS#10 234

8/14/68

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Authority	VND 959503
By	MMNARA Date 10/5/03

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10231

ACTION
is assigned to

AF

United States Senate

The Honorable Dean Rusk
The Department of State
2201 C Street
Washington, D.C. 20520

The attached communication is referred to
you for such consideration as is warranted
and for a report on it.

I will appreciate your assistance in this
matter.

Yours truly,

Allen J. Ellender
ALLEN J. ELLENDER

UNITED STATES SENATOR

15993

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
39 JUL 18 AM 11 18

1968 JUL 18 AM 11 18

ANALYSIS BRANCH

ANALYSIS BRANCH

Letter From J. Ashton Greene
and Associates
Re: Packages For BIAFRA

POL 27 BIAFRA-NIGERIA

0262

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Authority VND 954503
By MVA Date 10/5/03

FORM DS-1583
12-83

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT

ACTION SLIP

(To Remain With Correspondence)

CONTROL NO.

10234

TO

AF - Mr. Heubeck

DATE

7/18/68

SUBJECT Ltr to S fm Ellender (USS) encl cable 7/11 fm Ashton Greene re
aid to Biafra.

ACTION

*Prompt handling is essential. Return basic correspondence with reply. If delayed call telephone extension below.

For appropriate action.

For direct reply. Comeback copy required

A response for signature by ~~the~~ **XXX H - Amb. Macomber**

Prepare reply.

Clear with

~~XXX~~

Prepare a to

Refer to White House request of

H

~~XX~~ Due in ~~XXX~~ by 7/22

For your information.

Extended to 7/23

REMARKS

hr

100

1968 JUL 22 AM 10 09

62

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

COPIES TO

S - Mr. Shlaudeman (w/att)
AID - Mr. Hummon (w/att)
H - Mr. Briggs (w/att)

U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE
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1200
09 JUL 1968
STATE DEPT

GLKelly

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
SECRETARIAT STAFF

EXT.

0263

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Authority: *VND959503*
By *MM* NARA Date *10/5/05*



PAGE 01 STATE: 231339

INFO /010 R

DRAFTED BY: IO - NFRISBIE
APPROVED BY: IO - MR. FRISBIE
S/S - DODONOHUE

R 311645Z AUG 68
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
INFO USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 5868

S E C R E T STATE 231339

EXDIS

FOLLOWING SENT ACTION TO SECSTATE, INFO ADDIS ABABA, LAGOS,
MOSCOW, PARIS, GENEVA, AUGUST 30. FROM LONDON REPEATED FOR
YOUR INFO

QUOTE

S E C R E T LONDON 12277

EXDIS

REF: LONDON 12078

1. TROXEL AND STEARNS MET WITH ERIC NORRIS, DONALD TEBBITT AND PATRICK MOBERLY OF COMMONWEALTH OFFICE, AND ROB YOUNG OF FONOFF THIS AFTERNOON.

2. BRITISH TABLED PAPER WHICH TROXEL CARRYING BACK WITH HIM COMMENTING ON US CONTINGENCY PROPOSAL. PAPER IS THOUGHTFUL AND CONSTRUCTIVE, WHILE SHOWING CONCERN TO AVOID "SITUATION IN WHICH NONE OF MEASURES WERE BEING ACTED UPON, EXCEPT SUGGESTED PROHIBITION OF ARMS SUPPLIES BY OURSELVES." IT ASSUMES FURTHER US-UK EXPLORATION FROM WHICH "AGREEMENT MIGHT EMERGE ON APPROACH TO EMPEROR FOR PURPOSE OF SECURING HIS VIEWS ON MOST EFFECTIVE ACTION HE MIGHT TAKE WITH SUPPORT OF US AND UK GOVERNMENTS."

SECRET

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POL 23-9 CONGO

Department of State **TELEGRAM**
XR POL 15-1 CAN
XR POL 27 BIAFRA/NIGERIA 20

CONFIDENTIAL 757

PAGE 01 YAOUNDE 02048 311014Z

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ACTION AF 15

INFO NSA 02, CIAE 00, DODE 00, GPM 04, H 02, INR 07, L 03, NSC 10, P 04,

RSC 01, SP 02, SS 25, USIA 12, EUR 15, AID 28, RSR 01/131 W

R 310920Z AUG 68
FM AMEMBASSY YAOUNDE
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 2373
INFO AMEMBASSY BANGUI
AMEMBASSY FORT LAMY
AMEMBASSY KINSHASA
AMEMBASSY LAGOS
AMEMBASSY LIBREVILLE
AMEMBASSY PARIS

CONFIDENTIAL YAOUNDE 2048

SUBJECT: COMMENTS BY FRENCH AMBASSADOR

1. FRENCH AMBASSADOR REBEYROL SAID HIS CONVERSATIONS WITH PRESIDENT AHIDJO AND FONMIN NKO'O ETOUNGOU HAVE REVEALED CONTRASTING OPINIONS. SAID PRESIDENT AHIDJO IS PESSIMISTIC ABOUT OUTCOME IN CONGO-B BUT THAT NKO'O ETOUNGOU THINKS SITUATION WILL STABILIZE, AND FOR THE BETTER. REBEYROL COMMENTED IT FIRST TIME NKO'O ETOUNGOU EVER DIFFERED WITH PRESIDENT ON ANYTHING. (REF: YAOUNDE 1938).

2. REBEYROL ALSO INDICATED HE HAD HAD DISCUSSIONS WITH AHIDJO ABOUT NIGERIAN SITUATION. EVIDENTLY AHIDJO MADE HIS STRONG FEELING ABOUT FRENCH ACTIONS VERY CLEAR TO REBEYROL. LATTER SAID AHIDJO IS REACTING COMPLETELY AS A MAN OF THE NORTH, LETTING HIS NORTHERN SENTIMENTS GUIDE HIS OPINIONS. (REF: YAOUNDE 1961).

(3) REBEYROL SAID THERE WERE RUMORS ABOUT CHANGES AT FONOFF, BUT NOT RPT NOT INVOLVING NKO'O ETOUNGOU. SAYS THERE ARE REPORTS SECGEN F.X.TCHOUNGUI ON WAY OUT, TO BE REPLACED BY UDEAC SECGEN MONA OWANA. COMMENTED THAT LATTER HAS INFLUENCE AMONG EWONDO, BUT THAT FORMER DOESN'T. (REF: YAOUNDE 1997).

4. COMMENT: REBEYROL PROVING TO BE QUITE FORTHCOMING, WILLING

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8-3168

2048

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By: MM/ARA Date: 10/5/05

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POL 15-1 NIGERIA
TR POL 27 BIAFRA-NIGERIA
Department of State **TELEGRAM**

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE 060

PAGE 01 LAGOS 12257 301822Z

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ACTION AF 15

INFO EUR 15, IO 13, CCO 00, CIAE 00, DODE 00, NSAE 00, NSCE 00, SSO 00,

USIE 00, AID 28, SR 01, ORM 03, PC 04, GPM 04, NSC 10, SP 02, SS 25,

RSC 01, L 03, H 02, P 04, INR 07, SAH 02, SA 01, ACDA 16, RSR 01, 157 W

P 311715Z AUG 68
FM AMEMBASSY LAGOS
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 2335
INFO AMEMBASSY ADDIS ABABA PRIORITY
USMISSION GENEVA
AMEMBASSY LONDON
USUN NY 416

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE LAGOS 12257

SUBJECT: FMG PROPOSALS ON BIAFRA

1. GOWON WILL ADDRESS NATION ON TELEVISION AT 9:00
P.M. LOCAL (2000Z) TONIGHT, AUGUST 31.

2. EMBASSY INFORMED HE WILL PROPOSE AIRSTRIP IN ULI/
IHIALA AREA FOR RELIEF OPERATIONS AND WILL DEMAND IRON-
CLAD GUARANTEES AGAINST MISUSE. HE WILL TACK ON TO THIS
CHARGE THAT ICRC HAS FAILED TO PUSH LAND CORRIDORS.

3. WE ALSO UNDERSTAND THAT GOWON WILL REITERATE FMG
CONDITIONS FOR MAKING PEACE INCLUDING RENUNCIATION OF
SECESSION BY BIAFRANS AND ACCEPTANCE OF TWELVE STATES.

4. ONLY NEW ASPECT WILL BE EXPRESSION OF WILLINGNESS
TO CONSIDER MODIFICATIONS IN PRESENT STATE BORDERS AL-
THOUGH GOWON WILL STATE FLATLY THAT PORT HARCOURT MUST
REMAIN CAPITAL OF RIVERS STATE.

5. FOREGOING OBTAINED FROM NEW YORK TIMES CORRESPONDENT,
FRIENDLY, WHO WAS ABLE TO TAKE NOTES FROM TAPE OF GOWON
SPEECH. SEPTEMBER 1 TIMES WILL THUS PROBABLY HAVE SOME.

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2-10-100 11-24

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By: MNARA Date: 10/3/05

PAGE(S) MISSING IN ORIGINAL

0268

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Authority	VND 959503
By	MVA
Date	10/5/05

DISTRIBUTION ACTION				DEPARTMENT OF STATE		AIRGRAM		POL 15-2 UK POL 27 BIAFRA-NIGERIA	
EUR-6*				Original to be Filed in _____ Decentralized Files.		FILE DESIGNATION			
LIMITED OFFICIAL USE				A-4482					
HANDLING INDICATOR				NOTE: Delayed due to London sending direct to Defense RS/AN 9-10-68					
TO : Department of State									
INFO : LAGOS									
FROM : Amembassy LONDON				DATE: August 31, 1968					
SUBJECT : Nigeria: Debate in House of Commons and House of Lords on August 23				RECEIVED ANALYSIS BRANCH 31 PM 1968					
REF : LONDON 12157									
<p>The Embassy is transmitting herewith for the Department's information, the Hansard text of the debate in the House of Commons August 27 on the Government's policy of supplying arms to the Federal Military Government of Nigeria. The debate occurred when Parliament was recalled for a two-day emergency session occasioned by the Czech crisis. Highlights of the debate have already been reported by cable.</p> <p>Although the Government's tactic of refusing to permit a vote caused considerable resentment among backbenchers on both sides of the House, Commonwealth Secretary Thomson and Parliamentary Undersecretary Whitlock managed to hold the line against extreme pressure both from the floor and the galleries. Their speeches were essentially repetitions of reasons the Government has often expressed in the past for maintaining the supply of arms to the FMG. Whitlock did amplify the Government's policy to the extent of saying that "however much we should regret any extension of the fighting, an offensive by itself would not necessarily breach the conditions which the Government laid down on 12th June." It will be recalled that Foreign Secretary Stewart stated in June that the Government would "reconsider and more than reconsider" its arms supply policy if the FMG rejected reasonable opportunities for peaceful settlement of the conflict or adopted a policy of punitive violence toward the Ibo people.</p>									
Enclosure: Hansard texts				LIMITED OFFICIAL USE					
Date: _____				For Department Use Only					
Initials: _____				In <input type="checkbox"/> Out <input type="checkbox"/>					
Drafted by: _____				Drafting Date: 8/29/68		Phone No.: _____		Contents and Classification Approved by: _____	
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Circumstances: _____									

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By: MNARA Date: 10/5/05

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LONDON A-4482

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Other statements in defense of the Government's policy which are also worth noting were delivered by Labour MP's Mackintosh and Johnson and by Conservatives Tilney and Sinclair. Despite the chaotic atmosphere in which the debate ended, these speeches represented a more thoughtful contribution to the Government's case than any elicited from the backbenches in previous two debates on Nigeria in June and July. From the Government's standpoint, it is unfortunate that they received little coverage in the press.

We are also transmitting herewith the Hansard text of the House of Lords debate on Nigeria which also took place on August 27.

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S/S <i>8, 9</i>		Classification SECRET	
S/S-Screener <i>27-29</i>		Post LONDON	Dpty
S/S-S-CMS <i>30, 31</i>		Serial No. 12277	Dpty
S/S-O <i>11</i>		Date Aug. 30, 1968	
PRINCIPALS		GEOGRAPHIC BUREAUS	
S ✓ <i>4</i>		AF ✓ <i>14, 15</i>	
U ✓ <i>5</i>		ARA	
M ✓ <i>6</i>		EA	
G ✓ <i>7</i>		EUR	
G/PM		NEA	
S/AH		OTHER AGENCIES	
S/AJ		White House ✓ <i>2, 3</i>	
S/C		Vice President	
S/P		Defense	
		CIA ✓ <i>16</i>	
		NSA	
FUNCTIONAL BUREAUS		Treasury	
E		State Rep	
H		ACDA	
INR ✓ <i>10</i>		AID	
IO ✓ <i>12, 13</i>		AID/VN	
L		USIA	
O			
P		OTHER	
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0271

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 Authority *VND954503*
 By *MM* NARA Date *10/5/05*

ORIGIN/ACTION			DEPARTMENT OF STATE		
A-2241			AIRGRAM		
NO.			CONFIDENTIAL		
TO :			DEPARTMENT OF STATE		
INFO :			ADDIS ABABA, LAGOS, LONDON		
FROM :			USUN, New York		
SUBJECT :			Conversation with Dr. Nwonye Otue, Biafran Representative to the U.S.		
REF :					
DATE :			August 30, 1968		
At the request of the Department, the Mission officer saw Dr. Nwonye Otue, Biafran representative to the U.S., and his Deputy, August 29, for lunch.					
Otue and his Deputy stated that the reason why they wanted to see the Secretary or somebody in the State Department was because they wanted to raise questions regarding U.S. policy in the Nigerian conflict. They stated they did not understand the U.S. position on this matter and wondered why the U.S.G. remained silent concerning the genocide being carried out against the Biafrans by the FMG. Otue stated in particular that he did not understand the statements expressed by Assistant Secretary Palmer on the Nigerian conflict which, according to him, were contradictory. He referred first to the statement made by Palmer during his recent trip in the Cameroon regarding recognition of self-determination and Palmer's later statement before the Foreign Relations Committee in Washington.					
explaining					
After reviewing U.S. policy, that the U.S.G. was interested in seeing both sides reach an agreement and that it was providing relief assistance to the victims of the civil war through the ICRC, the Mission officer queried Otue on what Biafra expected of the U.S. Both Otue and his Deputy stated that they were distressed to see the U.S. remain neutral in the civil war, particularly since this neutrality was negative and not positive. They cited as an example the fact that the U.S. seemed to believe everything the FMG was saying and that the U.S. supported, even though indirectly, the position of the FMG in the civil war. Both felt that the U.S. could be neutral in the positive sense, i.e., that the U.S. should exert pressure on the FMG to cease massacring the Ibos. They said that regardless of the					
Group 3					
Downgraded at 12-year intervals, not automatically declassified					
FORM 4-62 DS-323			CONFIDENTIAL		
Drafted by: ECGrigg:vmd 11/8/30/68			Contents and Classification Approved by: POLSEC		
Clearances:					

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Page 2 of A- 2241
from USUN

fact that the U.S.G. was providing relief assistance, such relief was not getting to the victims of the civil war and was being hoarded in Nigerian-controlled areas, specifically in Lagos. They thought that the U.S. should fly in its relief supplies in American planes since it was doubtful that the FMG would try to use anti-aircraft guns against them. The ICRC, although flying in two flights, was not able to really stand up against the FMG.

Otue stated that the U.K. was supplying arms and military advisers to the Federal Government and should be condemned. He also stated that the Soviets were supplying airplanes as well as technical assistance and training to the FMG and stated that Soviet teachers were infiltrating the secondary schools in Nigeria and, as a result, were indoctrinating the Nigerian children in Soviet propaganda. He also said that the Soviets had practically set up a naval base in Lagos. He stated that if the U.S. was not careful, the Soviets would have a foothold in Nigeria and consequently in Africa. In order for the U.S. to reinstate itself in Africa, it would have to sacrifice more to push the Soviets out of Nigeria. He stressed over and over the importance of the U.S. maintaining its influence in the area. In addition, Otue stated that he could not understand why the U.S.G. was reluctant to pronounce itself on the mass genocide that was going on which he compared with Hitler's eradication of the Jews. He said the Ibos were generally well disposed toward the U.S., due to the fact most of them were trained in the U.S. He stated that it was the Ibos who had promoted closer Nigerian relations with the U.S. The Ibo question was not of recent occurrence. The Federal Government had always sought to segregate the Ibos from the rest of Nigeria to the extent that there was segregated housing for the Ibos as well as a blockade of most of the traffic into Ibo-controlled territory. The Ibos, therefore, did not understand why the U.S.G. was silent on the civil war and why it had not spoken out against the massacre of their people. Otue stated that he and his Deputy were in the U.S. on a mission of mercy and wanted to put forward the Biafran case to the U.S.G. In addition to State Department reluctance to speak to him, he pointed out the difficulties he encountered in seeking to enter the U.S. His Deputy was more vociferous in this matter, saying that the U.S.G. was unwilling to allow Biafrans to enter the country. He went further to say that for the killing of "five Czechs", the U.S. called a Security Council, whereas for the killing of thousands of people, the U.S. was unwilling to lift a finger.

again
When queried/about what they expected from the U.S., both Otue and his Deputy said they expected the U.S. to exert pressure on the U.K. to cease supplying arms to the FMG. Once the U.K. stopped supplying arms, the FMG would no longer be in a position to continue the war. When asked about the position of the Soviets even if this occurred, Otue said that the Soviets would have to cease helping the FMG since the FMG would not want to be solely dependent on Soviet aid and thus be branded as a communist government. Secondly, Otue said that the U.S.G. should exert pressure on the FMG to agree to a ceasefire. When asked why the U.S.G. should exert this pressure, Otue said that the U.S.G. was the leader of the western world and only it could exert such pressure. It did not devolve on

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By: MNA Date: 10/5/05

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POL 27 BIAFRA-NIGERIA
Department of State **TELEGRAM**

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PAGE 01 ABIDJA 04182 301616Z

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ACTION AF 15

INFO EUR 15, IO 13, NSA 02, CIAE 00, DODE 00, GPM 04, H 02, INR 07, L 03,

NSC 10, P 04, RSC 01, SP 02, SS 25, USIA 12, SA 01, AID 20, PC 04, SR 01,

SCS 04, SCA 02, ACDA 16, RSR 01, /172 W

R 301447Z AUG 68
FM AMEMBASSY ABIDJAN
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 2890
INFO AMEMBASSY LAGOS
AMEMBASSY ADDIS ABABA
AMEMBASSY ALGIERS
AMEMBASSY LONDON
AMEMBASSY PARIS
USMISSION GENEVA
USMISSION USUN

C O N F I D E N T I A L ABIDJAN 4182

REF: STATE 203178

SUBJ: NIGERIA

IN TALK WITH FONMIN USHER BEFORE HIS DEPARTURE FOR ENTENTE AND
OAU MEETINGS, DREW ON PARA 4 REFUEL TO SHOW HIM WE KEEPING
UP OUR EFFORTS. INDUCE HIM ADOPT REASONABLE ATTITUDES MAKING
FOR PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT. HE EXPRESSED APPRECIATION. BELIEVE
USEFUL TO CONTINUE GIVING USHER CONCRETE DETAILS OUR EFFORTS
AS MEANS ENCOURAGING GOIC MAKE SIMILAR EFFORTS WITH BIAFRANS.
GP-3
MORGAN

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*Addition 4182
8-30-68*

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Pol -7 Nigeria
Department of State **TELEGRAM**

D. Pol 27 Biafra-Nigeria 47

UNCLASSIFIED 356

PAGE 01 KINSHA 11311 301801Z

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ACTION AF 15

INFO EUR 15, IO 13, SAH 02, ACDA 16, CIAE 00, DODE 00, GPM 04, H 02, INR 07,

L 03, NSC 10, P 04, RSC 01, SP 02, SS 25, USIA 12, NSA 02, SR 01, ORM 03,

AID 28, SCS 04, SCA 02, RSR 01, 172 W

R 301615Z AUG 68
FM AMEMBASSY KINSHASA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 8896
INFO AMEMBASSY ADDIS ABABA
USMISSION GENEVA
AMEMBASSY LAGOS
AMEMBASSY LONDON
USMISSION USUN NEW YORK

UNCLAS KINSHASA 11311

1. DURING VISIT TO KINSHASA NIGERIAN COMMISSIONER OF HEALTH ADETORO SAID IN PRESS CONFERENCE FRIDAY THAT NIGERIAN GOVERNMENT WAS ANGRY WITH INTERNATIONAL RED CROSS BECAUSE RED CROSS PLANES ARE CARRYING ARMS AS WELL AS FOOD TO BIAFRA. HE ALSO SAID THE PLANES WERE BEING SECRETLY FOLLOWED BY BIAFRAN PLANES.

2. ADETORO BLAMED THE PRESS FOR MISREPRESENTING RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN FMG AND VATICAN, WHOSE RELATIONS HE SAID WERE EXCELLENT. HE ALSO BLAMED PRESS FOR DEPICTING MAJOR ADEKUNLE AS A VERY CRUEL MAN. THIS WAS IN RESPONSE TO QUESTION CONCERNING ADEKUNLE'S ALLEGED DECLARATION THAT EVERYBODY STILL LIVING IN BIAFRA WOULD BE WIPED OUT.

3. NEWSPAPER SAID ADETORO WAS HERE WITH PERSONAL MESSAGE FROM GOWON TO MOBUTU. HE WAS RECEIVED, HOWEVER, ONLY BY VICE MINISTER OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS UMBA DI-LUTETBEM MCBRIDE

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POL 23-9 CHAD
Department of State **TELEGRAM**
TRPOL 27 BIAFRA-NIGERIA

CONFIDENTIAL: 438

PAGE 01 FORT L 02311 291729Z

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ACTION AF 15

INFO EUR 15, ACOA 16, E 15, CIAE 00, DODE 00, GPM 04, H 02, INR 07, L 03,

NSC 10, P 04, RSC 01, SP 02, SS 25, USIA 12, NSA 02, AID 28, PC 04, SR 01,

GRM 03, IO 13, RSR 01, 183 W

R 291500Z AUG 68
FM AMEMBASSY FORT LAMY
TO SECSTATE WASHOC 2167
INFO AMEMBASSY LAGOS
AMEMBASSY LIBREVILLE
AMEMBASSY PARIS
AMEMBASSY KINSHASA
AMEMBASSY BANGUI
AMEMBASSY YAOUNDE

C O N F I D E N T I A L FORT LAMY 2311

SUBJECT: FRENCH TROOPS IN CHAD

1. CALLED ON FRENCH AMBASSADOR WIBAUX THIS MORNING TO OBTAIN ANY DETAILS HE COULD GIVE OF FRENCH TROOP MOVEMENTS IN NORTH. HE BEGAN BY SAYING FRENCH INVOLVEMENT LIMITED TO "NOT MORE THAN A COMPANY, NO MORE THAN A HUNDRED (UNE CENTAINE)". HE SAID FRENCH PLANNED ONLY SECURE LANDING STRIPS, RESUPPLY BESIEGED CHADIAN GARRISON AT AOZOU AND FLY GROUND SUPPORT (ROCKETS, BOMBS) FOR RELIEF COLUMN GOING FROM BARDAI TO AOZOU.
2. IMMEDIATE OBJECTIVE IS TO PARACHUTE SUPPLIES TO GARRISON WHICH HAS BEEN UNDER SIEGE SINCE JUNE 30 (APPROX). TOUBOUS SAID TO CONTROL HILLSIDE SURROUNDING AOZOU AND PASSES LEADING TO IT AND HAVE BLOCKED ONE CHADIAN RELIEF COLUMN FROM BARDAI.
3. SHORTLY AFTER CONVERSATION BEGAN WIBAUX SAID HE FELT SOME CONCERN ON PART OF U.S. AT THIS OPERATION WOULD BE THE POSSIBILITY OF SUPPORT FOR BIAFRA WHICH HE HASTENED TO ASSURE ME WAS NOT THE CASE. I THANKED HIM FOR VOLUNTEERING THIS INFORMATION AND TOLD HIM THAT I PERSONALLY WAS CONVINCED IT WAS TRUE AND I WAS CERTAIN MY COLLEAGUES IN WASHINGTON WOULD BE GLAD TO RECEIVE THE DISCLAIMER.

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ACTION AF 15

INFO EUR 15,SSO 00,NSCE 00,IO 13,ACDA 16,SA 01,SAH 02,SR 01,ORM 03,
CIAE 00,DODE 00,GPM 04,H 02,INR 07,L 03,NSAE 00,NSC 10,P 04,
RSC 01,SP 02,SS 25,USIA 12,RSR 01/137 W

P 291510Z AUG 68
FM AMEMBASSY LONDON
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 5763
INFO AMEMBASSY LAGOS PRIORITY

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SUBJ: GOWON'S STATEMENT ON BBC

REF: STATE 228362 — *Pol 27 BIAFRA-NIGERIA*
XR TEL 8 UK

1. FOLLOWING IS EXTRACT FROM BBC-TV INTERVIEW WITH GOWON EVENING
OF AUG. 26 IN WHICH HE SPEAKS OF FINAL MILITARY OFFENSIVE
HAVING BEGUN:

TIBBENHAM: (INTERVIEWER)

IT'S REPORTED THAT YOUR FINAL MILI-
TARY PUSH HAS ALREADY STARTED, IS
THAT TRUE?

GOWON:

THAT'S CORRECT

TIBBENHAM:

WHEN DID IT START?

GOWON:

TODAY

TIBBENHAM:

AND WHERE'S IT TAKING PLACE?

GOWON:

ALL FRONTS FROM THE NORTH SOUTH-
WARDS, SOUTHWARDS NORTHWARD, NORTH
WESTERN PUSHING SOUTH EASTERN.

TIBBENHAM:

CAN YOU SAY HOW MANY TROOPS ARE
INVOLVED IN THIS PUSH?

GOWON:

NO, THIS IS A MILITARY SECRET WHICH
I WOULD NOT LIKE TO DIVULGE.


TIBBENHAM:

AND HOW LONG AS A SOLDIER, WOULD
YOU EXPECT IT TO TAKE TO TAKE OVER
WHAT'S LEFT OF THE EASTERN REGION?

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GOWON:

WELL IT'S USUALLY VERY DIFFICULT FOR ANY SOLDIER TO SAY IN THIS SORT OF OPERATION, TO SAY HOW LONG THAT IT WOULD TAKE BEFORE THE REMAINING AREA IS TAKEN. BUT IF ONE WOULD LIKE TO HAZARD A GUESS, WITHIN THE NEXT FOUR WEEKS.

2. GOWON'S STATEMENT WAS REFERRED TO BY SEVERAL MP'S DURING COMMONS DEBATE ON NIGERIA AUG. 27, FORCING GOVT SPOKESMAN WHITLOCK INTO PARTICULARLY LAME ATTEMPT TO CLARIFICATION WHICH WAS GREETED BY HOOTS AND JEERS FROM GOVT'S CRITICS. RELEVANT EXTRACT FROM HANSARD AS FOLLOWS: QUOTE-WHITLOCK: "WHILE THIS DEBATE HAS BEEN PROCEEDING WE HAVE BEEN IN TOUCH WITH LAGOS AND GENERAL GOWON HAS TOLD US PERSONALLY THAT WHEN HE SAID THAT THE FINAL PUSH IS NOW IN PROGRESS HE WAS REFERRING TO THE CONTINUING PREPARATORY OPERATIONS IN BOTH THE NORTHERN AND SOUTHERN SECTORS FOR A FINAL FEDERAL PUSH. GENERAL GOWON EXPLAINED THAT THE REBELS HAD SEIZED THE OPPORTUNITY WHILE THE ADDIS ABABA TALKS WERE GOING ON TO HARASS FEDERAL TROOPS ON ALL FRONTS AND THAT EXTREME RESTRAINT HAD BEEN EXERCISED BY ALL FEDERAL COMMANDERS. BUT IT IS EVIDENT THAT IN ONE AREA, IN PARTICULAR, THE ABA AREA, THERE WAS A VERY TROUBLESOME SALIENT WHICH FEDERAL TROOPS HAVE HAD TO STRIKE OUT. HE POINTS OUT THAT THAT IS IN RESPONSE TO THE ATTACKS MADE BY THE REBELS WHILE THE TALKS WERE GOING ON. WHAT IS HAPPENING IN THIS AREA, ONE CAN SEE, IS NOT ALWAYS WHAT IS SAID TO BE HAPPENING AND IS NOT ALWAYS IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE WORDS OF THE MILITARY COMMANDERS ON THE SPOT. UNQUOTE

3. DESPITE THIS CLARIFICATION, GOWON IS REPORTED TO HAVE REPEATED HIS CLAIM ABOUT FINAL PUSH IN ANOTHER INTERVIEW AUG. 27.

4. FULL TEXT OF BBC-TV INTERVIEW WITH GOWON (AND AZIKIWE), AND HANSARD TEXT OF DEBATE, BEING POUCHED DEPT AND LAGOS. BRUCE

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ACTION AF 15

INFO EUR 15, IO 13, CCO 00, SSO 00, NSCE 00, CIAE 00, DODE 00, GPM 04, H 02,

INR 07, L 03, NSAE 00, NSC 10, P 04, RSC 01, SP 02, SS 25, USIA 12, SA 01,

SAL 01, SAH 02, ACDA 16, SR 01, ORM 03, SCS 04, SCA 02, E 15, RSR 01,

/159 W

P 291722Z AUG 68
FM AMEMBASSY LONDON
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 5772
INFO AMEMBASSY ADDIS ABABA PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY LAGOS
AMEMBASSY PARIS
AMEMBASSY STOCKHOLM
AMEMBASSY WARSAW
USMISSION GENEVA
USMISSION USUN

C O N F I D E N T I A L LONDON 12223

SUBJECT: FMG APPEAL FOR FOREIGN OBSERVERS

REF: LAGOS 12144

POL 27 BIAFRA-NIGERIA

1. COMMONWEALTH OFFICE'S MOBERLY TELLS US THAT IN RESPONSE PRESS
QUERIES CO WILL STATE THAT HMG IS PREPARED IN PRINCIPLE TO
ARRANGE FOR BRITISH PARTICIPATION SUBJECT TO DISCUSSION AND
WORKING OUT OF SATISFACTORY ARRANGEMENTS WITH FMG AND OTHER
PARTICIPANTS.

2. MOBERLY (PROTECT) COMMENTED THAT HE DID NOT KNOW WHAT
REACTION OF OTHERS WOULD BE, BUT BRITISH WERE GIVING PROPOSAL
MILD PLUG WHEN TALKING TO UN AND SWEDES. IT WAS OBVIOUS THAT
FURTHER DISCUSSIONS WOULD BE NECESSARY WITH FMG. FOR ONE
THING, NIGERIANS SEEMED TO THINK EACH PARTICIPANT WOULD
CONTRIBUTE ONLY SINGLE OBSERVER. IN THESE CIRCUMSTANCES FORCE
WOULD OBVIOUSLY BE MUCH TOO SMALL TO ACCOMPLISH ANYTHING.
BRUCE

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ORIGIN SS 10

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DRAFTED BY: AF:AFW: RPSMITH
APPROVED BY: NIGERIA TASK FORCE: RMMELBOURNE
EUR: MR BEAUDRY (SUBSTANCE)
SIS: MR BROWN

P 270008Z AUG 68
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO AMEMBASSY ADDIS ABABA PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY LAGOS
AMEMBASSY LONDON
USMISSION GENEVA
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW

SECRET STATE 227876

EXDIS

FOLLOWING SENT ACTION SECSTATE FROM PARIS AUG 23:

QTE PARIS 19823

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DEPARTMENT PLEASE PASS TO:
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SUBJ: PROPOSED PLAN FOR NIGERIA

1. I STRONGLY ENDORSE PROPOSAL OUTLINED REFTTEL FOR BREAKING BIAFRA DEADLOCK. IN ADDITION TO WHAT COULD BE DECISIVE CONTRIBUTION TO SETTLEMENT OF PROBLEM, FACT OF UNITED STATES AGREEING TO PROPOSAL OF THIS NATURE WOULD BE WARMLY WELCOMED BY FRENCH PUBLIC AND OFFICIAL OPINION. SIMILAR FAVORABLE REACTION COULD PROBABLY BE EXPECTED FROM

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2. I BELIEVE WE COULD COUNT UPON POSITIVE FRENCH REACTION. IMMEDIATE OBJECTIVES OF RECENT FRENCH INITIATIVES IN SUPPORT OF BIAFRA ARE ESSENTIALLY SAME AS THOSE OUTLINED REFTEL: IMMEDIATE TRUCE AND FREE FLOW OF RELIEF SUPPLIES (PARIS 18948). FRANCE HAS ALREADY IMPOSED ITS OWN ARMS EMBARGO AND FRENCH OFFICIALS HAVE BEEN FREE TO CONDEMN BRITISH AND SOVIETS AS PRIMARILY RESPONSIBLE FOR CONTINUATION OF CONFLICT BECAUSE THEY HAVE REFUSED DO SAME (PARIS 19700). I BELIEVE FRANCE COULD BE COUNTED UPON TO PARTICIPATE ACTIVELY IN CREATION AND WORK OF INTERNATIONAL OBSERVER FORCE AND CONTROL OF RELIEF FLIGHTS, PROVIDED PLAN OFFERS REASONABLE PROSPECTS FOR SUCCESS. IF EMPEROR OF ETHIOPIA, WHO IS CLOSE TO DE GAULLE, SHOULD PUT TO HIM PROPOSALS OUTLINED REFTEL IN FOUR POWER CONTEXT, I THINK HE WOULD AGREE TO PROPOSAL AND USE HIS INFLUENCE WITH IVORY COAST, GABON, ET CETERA. WHILE RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN CZECHOSLOVAKIA HAVE COMPLICATED RELATIONS AMONG FOUR POWERS, THEY COULD CONCEIVABLY MAKE SOVIETS MORE RESPONSIVE TO PRESSURES FROM AFRICA AND WEST FOR BROADLY-BASED CEASEFIRE AND ARMS EMBARGO FOR BOTH SIDES OF NIGERIAN CONFLICT.

GP-3 SHRIVER UNQTE RUSK

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INFO: USUN

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August 21, 1968 to above addressee.

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28 AUG 68 20 55z

POL 27 BIAFRA -
NIGERIA
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RUSK

Drafted by:

IO:NHFrisbie:fw 8/28/68

Tel. Ext.
5248

Telegraphic transmission and

classification approved by: IO - Norman H. Frisbie

Clearances:

S/S - Mr. Brown

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FORM DS-322
8-65

0282

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POL 27 BIAFRA-NIGERIA
Department of State **TELEGRAM**

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PAGE 01 STATE 229075

84
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INFO /010 R

DRAFTED BY: IO NHFRISBIE
APPROVED BY: I O NORMAN H FRISBIE
S/S MR BROWN

R 282055Z AUG 68
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
INFO USMISSION USUN NY 5776

S E C R E T STATE 229075

EXDIS

FOLLOWING SENT ACTION SECSTATE INFO LONDON, GENEVA, MOSCOW,
PARIS, ADDIS ABABA FROM LAGOS AUG 21, QTE:

LAGOS 11910

EXDIS

NOFORN

EYES ONLY CHIEF OF MISSION

GENEVA FOR AMBASSADOR MOORE

1. I SHALL CONFINE MY COMMENTS ON OUTLINED PROPOSAL TO
PROBABLE REACTION OF FMG, IBO REBELS AND OTHER AFRICANS.

2. FMG WOULD TAKE IT FOR GRANTED THAT EMPEROR ACTING AT
BEHEST US, UK AND OTHER WESTERN POWERS. IT WOULD ACCORDINGLY
PUT BLAME ON THOSE POWERS EVEN IF USSR JOINED ARMS EMBARGO.
WHOLE PACKAGE WOULD BE BITTERLY RESENTED BY FMG AND MOST
NIGERIANS AS OVERT INTERVENTION IN INTERNAL AFFAIRS. IN
VIEW PAST EXPERIENCE FMG WOULD NOT BELIEVE US, PORTUGAL OR
FRANCE WOULD OR COULD JOIN EFFECTIVE EMBARGO ON ARMS TO REBELS.
FMG WOULD ACCORDINGLY REACT TO EMPEROR'S PROPOSED APPEAL BY
ALL OUT EFFORT TO TAKE OVER REMAINING REBEL TERRITORY AS

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QUICKLY AS POSSIBLE.

3. FMG IS DAILY BECOMING INCREASINGLY IMPERVIOUS TO FOREIGN CRITICISM AND PRESSURE. THERE IS ALSO DEVELOPING IN SOME NIGERIAN CIRCLES WHAT MIGHT BE DESCRIBED AS QTE BLACK POWER UNQTE REACTION. THIS REFLECTED IN SUCH QUESTIONS AS QTE DO AMERICANS AND EUROPEANS BELIEVE AFRICANS INCOMPETENT TO HANDLE OWN AFFAIRS UNQTE AND QTE WHY ARE WHITES SUDDENLY BECOMING SO CONCERNED ABOUT ALLEGED SUFFERINGS OF BLACKS UNQTE. IT IS PROBABLY NOW TRUE THAT AVERAGE EDUCATED NIGERIAN SUSPECTS THAT HUMANITARIAN OUTCRY ABOUT NIGERIAN SITUATION CLOAKS SINISTER QTE NEO-COLONIALIST UNQTE MANEUVERS.

4. I WOULD JUDGE THAT DJUKWU WOULD FIND PACKAGE ON BALANCE ACCEPTABLE. HE WOULD PROBABLY BELIEVE HE COULD STILL OBTAIN ABOUT PRESENT LEVEL ARMS SHIPMENTS BY CLANDESTINE MEANS WHILE SUPPLY TO FMG WOULD BE GREATLY REDUCED. IF HE THOUGHT ARMS EMBARGO WOULD BE FULLY EFFECTIVE AGAINST REBELS, HE MIGHT WELL JOIN FMG IN OPPOSITION TO PACKAGE.

5. IN VIEW PAST HISTORY AFRICAN REACTION TO NIGERIAN SITUATION, IT SEEMS HIGHLY UNLIKELY THERE WOULD BE UNIFORM OR ENTHUSIASTIC RESPONSE TO EMPEROR'S APPEAL BY OTHER AFRICAN GOVTS. MANY WOULD SHARE FMG VIEW THAT APPEAL RESULT OF WESTERN PRESSURE AND WOULD BE CHARY OF TAKING UNEQUIVOCAL STAND. EXISTING DIVISION OF OAU INTO PRO-FMG AND PRO-REBEL FACTIONS MIGHT BE SHARPENED.

6. AT THIS STAGE, NOTHING SHORT OF REBEL RENUNCIATION OF SECESSION OR FOREIGN MILITARY INTERVENTION WILL PREVENT FMG FROM ATTEMPT TO TAKE OVER REMAINING REBEL TERRITORY.

GP-1 MATHEWS UNQTE RUSK

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INFO: USUN

Info:

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NIGERIA

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Drafted by: IO:Norman H. Frisbie:fw

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8/28/68

Tel. Ext. 5248

Telegraphic transmission and classification approved by:

IO - Norman H. Frisbie

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S/S - Mr. Brown


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
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1. ACCOMPANIED BY MINISTER KAISER, TROXEL AND STEARNS, I HAD LENGTHY DISCUSSION THIS AFTERNOON WITH GROUP OF SENIOR FOREIGN OFFICE AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE OFFICIALS, HEADED BY SIR DENIS ALLEN AND SIR LESLIE MONSON. TROXEL AND I PRESENTED ESSENTIALS OF PROPOSAL FOR NEW INITIATIVE THROUGH EMPEROR (REFTEL). BRITISH STATED THEY TOO HAD BEEN GIVING THOUGHT TO PROBLEM OF CEASE FIRE AND POSSIBLE EMBARGO BUT HAD COME UP WITH NOTHING NEW. THEY WELCOMED OUR IDEAS ALTHOUGH IT WAS CLEAR THEY WERE MUCH PREOCCUPIED WITH UPCOMING COMMONS DEBATE ON NIGERIA AUG 27 WHEN PARLIAMENT RETURNS FOR TWO-DAY EMERGENCY SESSION ON

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MONDAY.

2. WE ARE LEAVING WITH THEM WRITTEN SUMMARY OF MAIN ELEMENTS OF PROPOSAL AND I EMPHASIZED THAT WE WOULD APPRECIATE THEIR CONSIDERED REACTION AND COMMENTS AS SOON AS POSSIBLE. ALLEN AND MONSON SAID THEY WOULD STUDY PROPOSAL CAREFULLY AFTER DEBATE WAS CONCLUDED AND HOPED DETAILED COMMENTS WOULD BE READY BY END OF NEXT WEEK. ALLEN OBSERVED THAT IN CONSIDERING PROPOSAL BRITISH WOULD WANT TO MAKE SURE THAT IN EFFECT BRITISH HANDS WOULD NOT BE TIED WHILE OTHERS (I.E. SOVIETS AND FRENCH) WERE FREE TO IGNORE OR CIRCUMVENT PUBLIC CALL FOR ARMS EMBARGO. BRITISH SUGGESTED THAT IF CONVENIENT TROXEL BE IN LONDON AUG 30 FOR FURTHER DISCUSSION ON BASIS THEIR CRITIQUE OF OUR PROPOSAL. I BELIEVE THIS WOULD BE MOST USEFUL AND HOPE DEPT CONCURS.

3. ON UPCOMING COMMONS DEBATE, ALLEN AND MONSON EMPHASIZED THAT THEY WERE STILL CONVINCED THAT BRITISH SHOULD CONTINUE SUPPLYING ARMS TO FMG AS MEANS OF MAINTAINING THEIR LEVERAGE IN LAGOS. MONSON SAID THAT "AS OF LAST NIGHT" WHEN BRITISH MINISTERS WENT HOME TO DRAFT THEIR SPEECHES FOR DEBATE THERE WAS NO DISPOSITION TO REVERSE BRITISH POLICY. NEITHER ALLEN OR MONSON BELIEVED CZECH DEVELOPMENTS WOULD HAVE MUCH EFFECT ON NIGERIAN DEBATE. THEY BELIEVED CRITICISM OF BRITISH POLICY WOULD CONTINUE TO BE PRIMARILY ON MORAL GROUNDS AND THAT GOVERNMENT WOULD CONTINUE TO DEFEND POLICY ON PRAGMATIC GROUNDS THAT IT WOULD BE FOLLY FOR BRITISH TO THROW AWAY THEIR POSITION IN LAGOS WITH UNILATERAL GESTURE AT VERY TIME WHEN MOST NECESSARY TO MOBILIZE ALL POSSIBLE LEVERAGE ON BOTH SIDES TO ACHIEVE PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT.

3. I BELIEVE THAT OUR MEETING WAS SUCCESSFUL IN FOCUSING BRITISH ATTENTION ON MAIN OUTLINES OF OUR PROPOSAL AND THAT, GIVEN THEIR NATURAL PREOCCUPATION WITH UPCOMING DEBATE, THEY APPRECIATED OPPORTUNITY FOR DISCUSSION. WE ARE TRANSMITTING TO ADDRESSEES BY SEPTEL TEXT OF SUMMARY PROPOSAL WHICH WE ARE SENDING TO BRITISH IN WRITING. WE ADAPTED IT SOMEWHAT IN LIGHT OUR DISCUSSIONS WITH THEM. BRUCE UNQTE. RUSKI

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TELEGRAM

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PAGE 01 STATE 228073

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DRAFTED BY: IO:HSTEIN
APPROVED BY: IO - NORMAN H. FRISBIE
S/S - MR. BROWN

R 271853Z AUG 68
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO USMISSION USUN NEW YORK

SECRET STATE 228073

EXDIS

FOLLOWING SENT ACTION SECSTATE INFO ADDIS ABABA, GENEVA,
LAGOS, PARIS, MOSCOW AUG 26 FROM LONDON

OTES SECRET LONDON 12080

EXDIS

REF/ LONDON 12078

FOLLOWING IS TEXT OF SUMMARY PROPOSAL AS SENT TO BRITISH
(REFTEL).

1. THE CONTINGENCY PROPOSAL IS FOR A VERY PRIVATE JOINT
UK-US DEMARCHE TO THE EMPEROR OF ETHIOPIA, DESIGNED TO PER-
SUADE THE EMPEROR IN HIS CAPACITY AS CHAIRMAN OF THE OAU
CONSULTATIVE COMMITTEE:

(A) TO CALL ON ALL AFRICAN GOVERNMENTS TO SUPPORT
A CEASEFIRE IN NIGERIA AND TO DESIST FROM ANY ACTIONS IN NIGERIA
THAT WOULD BE INCONSISTENT WITH THE CEASE-FIRE PROPOSALS, IN-
CLUDING THE DELIVERY OF WEAPONS TO EITHER SIDE;

(B) TO MAKE CLEAR THAT AFRICA'S OBJECTIVE IS TO BRING
ABOUT A PEACEFUL REINTEGRATION OF THE IBO PEOPLE INTO NIGERIA,
UNDER CONDITIONS GIVING THEM A LARGE MEASURE OF AUTONOMY AND

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THE CONTROL OF SOME OF THE MEANS TO HELP SECURE THEIR OWN PROTECTION. THE EMPEROR WOULD PROPOSE THAT ADEQUATE SAFEGUARDS, INCLUDING INTERNATIONAL OBSERVERS, BE PROVIDED TO ASURE THAT THIS OBJECTIVE IS CARRIED OUT.

(C) TO APPEAL AT THE APPROPRIATE TIME TO THE US, UK, FRANCE AND THE USSR TO SUPPORT HIS AFRICAN INITIATIVE, AND TO CALL UPON ALL STATES TO CEASE MILITARY SUPPLIES, TRANSPORTATION FACILITIES FOR MILITARY SUPPLIES AND THE USE OF THEIR TERRITORY FOR SUCH PURPOSES;

(D) TO WORK OUT ARRANGEMENTS FOR OBSERVERS ON THE TERRITORIES OF THE TWO PARTIES WITH VIEW TO PREVENTING THE IMPORT OF ARMS.

(E) AS AN ADDITIONAL REASSURANCE TO THE FMG THAT BIAFRA WILL NOT BE ABLE TO STRENGTHEN CLANDESTINELY ITS MILITARY POTENTIAL, TO APPEAL TO THE POPE TO USE HIS INFLUENCE TO OBTAIN PORTUGUESE COOPERATION, AND TO DE GAULLE TO OBTAIN THE COOPERATION OF THE IVORY COAST AND GABON, WITH RESPECT TO SIMILAR INSPECTIONS OF FLIGHTS TO BIAFRA FROM OR THROUGH BISSAU, SAO TOME, IVORY COAST AND GABON.

(F) TO CALL ON ALL GOVERNMENTS TO JOIN, UNDER THE AUSPICES OF THE ICRC, IN A MASSIVE AIR, SEA, AND LAND LIFT OF HUMANITARIAN SUPPLIES INTO THE AFFECTED AREAS ON BOTH SIDES OF THE CEASE-FIRE LINE. IT IS PROBABLE THAT ARRANGEMENTS WOULD NEED TO BE MADE TO CHANNEL ALL RELIEF FLIGHTS THROUGH WELL DESIGNATED CORRIDORS, SO THAT THE FMG COULD ITSELF MONITOR THE PASSAGE OF THE APPROVED FLIGHTS, AND TO GIVE THE FMG COMPLETE INFORMATION IN ADVANCE ON THE IDENTITY NUMBER, CALL SIGNS AND TIME OF PASSAGE OF EACH AIRCRAFT. TO ENABLE THE FMG TO DETECT UNAUTHORIZED OVERFLIGHTS, IT MIGHT BE NECESSARY TO PROVIDE THE FMG WITH PROBABLE RADAR, APPARATUS CAPABLE OF DETECTING AIRCRAFT BY SOUND, AND THE TECHNICAL PERSONNEL TO HELP RUN THEM.

2. THE SOVIETS ARE AT PRESENT PREOCCUPIED WITH CZECHOSLOVAKIA AND ARE BEING SUBJECTED TO SEVERE CRITICISM FROM ALL OVER THE WORLD-- INCLUDING AFRICA. THERE IS SOME POSSIBILITY THAT THEY MIGHT BE MORE THAN NORMALLY INCLINED TO AVOID CREATING ADDITIONAL PROBLEMS FOR THEMSELVES IN AFRICA. IN ANY EVENT, THE

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PAGE 01 LONDON 12157 271942Z

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ACTION: EUR 20

INFO: AF 09, IO 13, CIAE 00, DODE 00, GPM 04, HI 02, INR 07, LI 03, NSAE 00,

NSC 10, PI 04, RSC 01, SPI 02, SS 25, USIA 12, SR 01, ORM 03, SCS 04,

SCA 02, AID 28, ACDA 16, RSR 01, 167 W

PI 271818Z AUG 68
FMI AMEMBASSY LONDON
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 5725
INFO AMEMBASSY ADDIS ABABA PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY ACCRA
AMEMBASSY LAGOS
AMEMBASSY NIAMEY
AMEMBASSY PARIS
USMISSION GENEVA
AMCONSUL KADUNA
AMCONSUL IBADENI
USUN NEW YORK 1376

CONFIDENTIAL LONDON 12157

SUBJ: EMERGENCY DEBATE IN COMMONS ON NIGERIA.

1. FIVE-HOUR DEBATE IN HOUSE OF COMMONS TODAY (AUG 27) WAS CHARACTERIZED BY PRO-BIAFRAN DEMONSTRATIONS IN GALLERY, AND SHARP CLASHES OVER PROCEDURAL MATTERS BUT NEITHER GOVERNMENT NOR ITS CRITICS ON BOTH SIDES OF HOUSE CAST ANY NEW LIGHT ON PROBLEM OF HOW TO SETTLE NIGERIAN CONFLICT. COMMONWEALTH SECY THOMPSON FOR GOVERNMENT REAFFIRMED GOVT'S VIEW THAT BRIT INFLUENCE IN LAGOS COULD ONLY BE PRESERVED BY CONTINUING SUPPLY OF BRITISH ARMS TO FMG. REGINALD MAUDLING FOR CONSERVATIVES CONCEDED THAT BRITAIN SHOULD RETAIN WHAT INFLUENCE IT HAD BUT ARGUED THAT GOVT HAD FAILED TO MAKE CLEAR HOW ITS INFLUENCE WAS BEING USED AND WHAT KIND OF SETTLEMENT IT WOULD LIKE TO SEE EMERGE.

2. GOVT WAS DETERMINED TO AVOID VOTE AND SUCCESSFULLY RESISTED BACKBENCH LABOUR AND CONSERVATIVE PRESSURE TO DIVIDE HOUSE BY HOLDING FLOOR UNTIL TIME RAN OUT. DEBATE

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ENDED IN TUMULTUOUS ATMOSPHERE WITH CRIES OF "SHAME" DIRECTED AT GOVT FRONTBENCHERS. SEVERAL OBSTREPEROUS BIAFRANS WERE EJECTED FROM GALLERIES DURING COURSE OF DEBATE.

3. HOUSE WILL NOW RESUME ITS INTERRUPTED SUMMER RECESS UNTIL MID-OCTOBER.

4. DEBATE STARTED ON MODERATE AND CONSTRUCTIVE NOTE WITH SPEECHES BY THOMSON AND MAUDLING. C.W. SECT'Y ADMITTED THAT LITTLE PROGRESS HAD BEEN MADE TOWARD PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT SINCE HOUSE LAST DEBATED NIGERIAN CONFLICT IN JULY. HE BELIEVED, HOWEVER, THAT THERE WAS SOME PROSPECT FOR BREAKING DEADLOCK. CHANNELING OF RELIEF SUPPLIES AND CITED "AGREEMENT IN PRINCIPLE" ON LAND AND AIR CORRIDOR ANNOUNCED IN ADDIS. REFERRING TO REPEATED SETBACKS TO OAU AND COMMONWEALTH SECRETARIAT, PEACE EFFORTS, THOMSON STRONGLY CRITICIZED OUKWU FOR INTRANSIGENCE IN FACE OF DETERIORATING BIAFRAN MILITARY POSITION. HE AND PARLIAMENTARY UNDERSECT'Y WHITLOCK, WHO WOUND UP DEBATE FOR GOVT., BOTH TERMED FMG POSITION REASONABLE AND SAID THAT GENERAL GOWON CONSIDERED ALMOST ALL ELEMENTS OF FINAL SETTLEMENT TO BE NEGOTIABLE EXCEPT PRINCIPLE OF ONE NIGERIA.

5. RECALLING THAT FOREIGN SECRETARY STEWART IN JUNE HAD SAID GOVT WOULD "RECONSIDER" AND MORE THAN RECONSIDER ITS ARMS SUPPLY POLICY IF FMG REQUESTED REASONABLE OPPORTUNITY TO ACHIEVE PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT OR ADOPTED POLICY OF PUNITIVE VIOLENCE TOWARD IBOS, GOVT SPOKESMEN DENIED FMG WAS GUILTY OF EITHER OF THESE TWO CHARGES. GOVT WAS NOT, THEREFORE, RECONSIDERING ARMS SUPPLY POLICY AT PRESENT TIME. IN RESPONSE TO OPPOSITION QUESTION, WHITLOCK STATED THAT INVASION OF IBO HEARTLAND BY FMG FORCES WOULD NOT BY ITSELF BRING ABOUT HALT IN FLOW OF BRITISH ARMS.

6. OPPOSITION SPOKESMEN MAUDLING AND BERNARD BRAINE DID NOT ATTEMPT TO DEVELOPE FULL-SCALE ASSAULT ON GOVT POLICY. THEIR TACTIC WAS TO NOTE GOVT'S STATEMENTS ABOUT NEED TO PRESERVE ITS INFLUENCE IN LAGOS, TO CONCEDE THAT SUPPLY OF ARMS TO FMG PROBABLY ACCOMPLISHED THIS, BUT TO PUT GOVT ON NOTICE THAT IT WOULD HAVE TO DEMONSTRATE TO COUNTRY THAT IT WAS USING THIS INFLUENCE EFFECTIVELY. IMPLICATION WAS CLEAR THAT IF IMPASSE ON RELIEF SUPPLIES WAS NOT SOON RESOLVED AND IF NEW AND BLOODIER ROUND OF FIGHTING DESTROYED

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CHANCES FOR NEGOTIATED SETTLEMENT, OPPOSITION WOULD HOLD GOVT RESPONSIBLE, DENYING THAT GOVT WOULD BE IMMUNE FROM ACCOUNTABILITY UNTIL PARLIAMENT RETURNED IN OCT, BRAINEI SAID OPPOSITION WOULD KEEP IN CLOSE TOUCH WITH NIGERIAN DEVELOPMENTS DURING THE REMAINDER OF THE SUMMER RECESS.

7. COMMENT: GOVT HAS HELD LINE ON ITS ARMS SUPPLY POLICY BUT TACTIC OF DUCKING DIVISION HAS MADE IT LOOK BAD AND COULD EVENTUALLY PROVE COSTLY. PRO-BIAFRAN MPS WERE OUTRAGED BY GOVT'S PROCEDURAL MANEUVERS AND EVEN SOME MPS WHO SUPPORT GOVT'S NIGERIAN POLICY LOOKED UNCOMFORTABLE. WHITEHALL SOURCES TELL US GOVT WANTED TO AVOID VOTE BECAUSE NUMBER OF ITS SUPPORTERS EXPECTED BE ABSENT FROM DEBATE. BE THAT AS IT MAY, FRIENDS OF BIAFRA WILL CHARGE GOVT LEADERS WERE AFRAID TO PUT NIGERIA POLICY TO VOTE BECAUSE THEY KNEW IT DID NOT COMMAND POPULAR SUPPORT. THIS ARGUMENT, INCIDENTALLY WILL CONCEAL FACT THAT TODAY'S DEBATE, UNLIKE PREVIOUS TWO NIGERIAN DEBATES IN JUNE AND JULY, FEATURED SEVERAL UNUSUALLY EFFECTIVE BACKBENCH SPEECHES IN SUPPORT OF GOVT POLICY. THERE WERE NOTABLE CONTRIBUTIONS BY LABOR MP'S MACKINTOSH AND JOHNSON AND BY CONSERVATIVE MP TILNEY.

8. ADDITIONAL RESULT OF THIS DEBATE (WHICH WAS UNSOUGHT BY EITHER GOVT OR OPPOSITION FRONT BENCHES) MAY ALSO PROVE TO BE THAT GOVT IS MORE FIRMLY COMMITTED TO FMG POSITION THAN BEFORE. IN DEFENDING GOVT'S POLICY THOMSON AND WHITLOCK WENT FURTHER THAN BRITISH OFFICIALS HAVE IN PAST ON FLOOR OF HOUSE IN PRAISING FMG AND CONDEMNING OJUKWU. AT ONE POINT THE MILD-MANNERED THOMSON SAID HE SOMETIMES WONDERED WHETHER THE REAL ISSUE WAS GENOCIDE OR SUICIDE. BRUCE

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XR POL 27 BIAFRA-NIGERIA
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INFO NSA 02, CIAE 00, DODE 00, GPM 04, H 02, INR 07, L 03, NSC 10, P 04,

RSC 01, SP 02, SS 25, USIA 12, SAH 02, SA 01, IO 13, AID 28, PC 04, SR 01,

ORM 03, SCS 04, SCA 02, RSR 01, 146 W

R 261600Z AUG 68
FM AMEMBASSY FREETOWN
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 2761
INFO AMEMBASSY LAGOS

C O N F I D E N T I A L FREETOWN 2345

1. BIAFRAN DELEGATION, HEADED BY AZIKWE, VISITED FREETOWN AUG. 24-25. DEL WAS RECEIVED BY MINISTER EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, PRIME MINISTER AND ACTING GOVERNOR-GENERAL.
2. IN PRESS CONFERENCE, AZIKWE EMPHASIZED BIAFRA PINNING ITS HOPES ON FORTHCOMING OAU SUMMIT AND IN PRIVATE CONVERSATIONS WITH SL OFFICIALS, HE ASKED FOR GOSL SUPPORT AT ALGIERS MEETING.
3. PRIME MINISTER PROMISED AZIKWE ONLY THAT GOSL WOULD STUDY QUESTION. PRIOR TO VISIT, MINISTER EXTERNAL AFFAIRS TOLD EMB GOSL SUPPORTED MAINTENANCE NIGERIAN UNITY BUT COULD NOT REFUSE RECEIVE AFRICAN OF AZIKWE'S REPUTATION AND STANDING.

GP-3. MINER

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TR Jul 27 Biafra - Nigeria
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INFO IO 13, EUR 15, NSA 02, CIAE 00, DODE 00, GPM 04, H 02, INR 07, L 03,

NSC 10, P 04, RSC 01, SP 02, SS 25, USIA 12, SAM 02, AID 28, NIC 01,

SR 01, ACDA 16, RSR 01, 164 W

R 261102Z AUG 68
FM AMEMBASSY LIBREVILLE
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 1890
INFO AMEMBASSY LAGOS
AMEMBASSY LONDON
AMEMBASSY PARIS

SECRET LIBREVILLE 1658

NOFORN

(2) CAMEROONIAN CHARGE NKOUDY ALIYOU (PROTECT) WITH WHOM WE HAVE DISCUSSED BIAFRAN SITUATION TOLD ME MORNING AUG 23 THAT HE HAD PICKED UP REPORT FROM LOCAL CONTACTS TO EFFECT THAT BETWEEN AUG 14 AND 16 SOME 300 MILITARY PERSONNEL PRESUMABLY MERCENARIES AND OF FRENCH NATIONALITY PASSED THROUGH LIBREVILLE ENROUTE BIAFRA. HE ALSO OF OPINION ARMS MOVING THROUGH LIBREVILLE TO BIAFRA BUT CANNOT VERIFY. COMMENT: NKOUDY INTELLIGENT AND ABLE AND HAS EXCELLENT ENTREE LOCALLY PARTICULARLY THROUGH LARGE CAMEROONIAN COLONY. HIS REPORT OF POSSIBLE MOVEMENT OF MERCENARIES THROUGH LIBREVILLE OF INTEREST BECAUSE EVE OF AUG 14 DCM SAW LARGE COVERED TRUCK (WITHOUT MARKINGS) LOADED EUROPEANS ON AIRPORT ROAD. EARLY HOURS MORNING AUG 15 MEMBERS EMB STAFF LEAVING ON HUNTING TRIP PASSED SIMILARLY LOADED TRUCK IN VICINITY BARAKA ARMY CAMP. THIS COULD SUGGEST MERCENARIES HAVE PASSED THROUGH LIBREVILLE (RE LAGOS 115411). THIS CONNECTION IN DISCUSSION BIAFRAN SITUATION WITH ISRAELI AMB AUG 23. AVIMOR TOLD ME THAT FRENCH AMB DELAUNEY HINTED TO HIM RECENTLY THAT FRENCH MERCENARIES MIGHT BE PASSING THROUGH LIBREVILLE ENROUTE BIAFRA (RE PARA 4 PARIS 193451). GP. 1 BANE

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ORIGIN SS 10

INFO / 010 R

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O 262058Z AUG 68 ZFF4
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
INFO USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 5698 5699

SECRET STATE 224668

EXDIS

FOLLOWING SENT ACTION. ADDIS ABABA, LAGOS, LONDON, GENEVA,
MOSCOW, PARIS FROM SECSTATE AUG 21:

QTE STATE 224668

NOFORN

EYES ONLY CHIEF OF MISSION

GENEVA FOR AMBASSADOR MOORE

1. WE ARE BECOMING INCREASINGLY CONCERNED OVER SITUATION WE SHALL
FACE RE NIGERIA IF TALKS IN ADDIS ABABA SHOULD BREAK DOWN
AND GENERAL FMG OFFENSIVE SHOULD ENSUE. AMBASSADOR MOORE BEING
SEPARATELY INSTRUCTED TO PROCEED TO LONDON FROM GENEVA FOR TALKS
WITH BRITISH OFFICIALS IN THIS CONTEXT. SINCE HE HAS BEEN
DISCUSSING HUMANITARIAN RELIEF PROBLEMS IN GENEVA, THIS SHOULD
PROVIDE SUFFICIENT RATIONALE FOR HIS VISIT TO LONDON.
POSSIBLE ACTION HE WILL RAISE WITH BRITISH CONTAINED IN STAFF
STUDY PREPARED HERE, WHICH WILL BE CARRIED TO LONDON BY DEPARTMENT
OFFICER, OLIVER L. TROXEL, WHO WILL ASSIST AMBASSADOR MOORE IN TALKS

2. BEGIN SUMMARY OF STAFF STUDY: POSSIBLE BREAKDOWN OF NIGERIAN TALKS IN ADDIS, PARTICULARLY IN ABSENCE OF AGREEMENT ON HUMANITARIAN

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RELIEF AND CONSEQUENT PROBABILITY OF MAJOR FEDERAL OFFENSIVE, COULD CAUSE UK TO IMPOSE ARMS EMBARGO ON NIGERIA AND TO CALL FOR CEASEFIRE.

THIS WOULD UNDOUBTEDLY WRECK UK POSITION IN NIGERIA, DO CONSEQUENT DAMAGE TO OURS AND LEAD TO RETALIATION AGAINST US AND UK NATIONAL AND COMMERCIAL INTERESTS.

3. CONVERSELY, THIS WOULD PRESENT OPPORTUNITY FOR SOVIETS TO REITERATE FULL SUPPORT FOR FMG, TO REFUSE JOIN CALL FOR CEASEFIRE, AND TO STEP UP ARMS DELIVERIES. IN THESE CIRCUMSTANCES, MILITARY SITUATION WOULD NOT BE SUBSTANTIALLY CHANGED.

FMG WOULD STILL HAVE CAPABILITY -- AND PROBABLY INCREASED WILL -- TO TRY TO FINISH OFF INSURRECTION. ONLY CHANGE WOULD BE LOSS OF UK AND US POSITION AND ENHANCEMENT OF USSR. QUESTION THEREFORE ONE OF HOW US AND UK COULD ENDEAVOR, WITH ANY CHANCE OF SUCCESS, TO IMPOSE ON SOVIETS SAME RESTRAINTS THAT THEY MIGHT BE FORCED TO IMPOSE ON THEMSELVES.

4. ASSUMING SOVIETS UNLIKELY BE PERSUADED BY US AND UK THAT IT IN THEIR SELF-INTEREST TO BE SELF-DENYING IN NIGERIA IN CIRCUMSTANCES IN WHICH US AND UK ARE PREPARED TO BE, QUESTION ONE OF TRYING TO FIND CONTEXT THAT WILL PLACE GREATEST PRESSURE ON THEM TO ADOPT POSITIONS SIMILAR TO THOSE OF US AND UK. FOLLOWING SCENARIO MIGHT ACCOMPLISH THIS.

(A) US AND UK SHOULD URGENTLY CONSULT ON VERY PRIVATE JOINT DEMARCHE TO EMPEROR OF ETHIOPIA AND PERSUADE HIM IN HIS CAPACITY AS CHAIRMAN OAU CONSULTATIVE COMMITTEE TO APPEAL TO FOUR POWERS (1) TO SUPPORT AFRICAN INITIATIVE BY HIM TO BRING ABOUT CEASEFIRE, AND (2) TO CEASE AND DESIST FROM ANY ACTIONS IN NIGERIA INCONSISTENT WITH CEASE FIRE PROPOSAL, AND PARTICULARLY TO SUSPEND FURTHER DELIVERIES OF WEAPONS TO EITHER SIDE. US AND UK WOULD URGE HIM TO CALL AT SAME TIME UPON ALL OTHER AFRICAN STATES TO MAKE CLEAR IN THEIR BILATERAL RELATIONS WITH GREAT POWERS THAT THEY EXPECT GREAT-POWER COMPLIANCE AND WILL TAKE IT INTO ACCOUNT IN THEIR FUTURE RELATIONSHIPS WITH THEM.

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ACTION SS 30

INFO SSD 00, CCO 00, NSCE 00, /030 W

O P 260916Z AUG 68
FM AMEMBASSY LONDON
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 5671
INFO AMEMBASSY ADDIS ABABA PRIORITY
USMISSION GENEVA
AMEMBASSY LAGOS
AMEMBASSY PARIS
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW

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EXDIS

REF/ LONDON 12078

FOLLOWING IS TEXT OF SUMMARY PROPOSAL AS SENT TO BRITISH
(REFTEL).

1. THE CONTINGENCY PROPOSAL IS FOR A VERY PRIVATE, JOINT
UK-US DEMARCHE TO THE EMPEROR OF ETHIOPIA, DESIGNED TO PER-
SUADE THE EMPEROR IN HIS CAPACITY AS CHAIRMAN OF THE OAU
CONSULTATIVE COMMITTEE:

(A) TO CALL ON ALL AFRICAN GOVERNMENTS TO SUPPORT
A CEASEFIRE IN NIGERIA AND TO DESIST FROM ANY ACTIONS IN NIGERIA
THAT WOULD BE INCONSISTENT WITH THE CEASE-FIRE PROPOSALS, IN-
CLUDING THE DELIVERY OF WEAPONS TO EITHER SIDE;

(B) TO MAKE CLEAR THAT AFRICA'S OBJECTIVE IS TO BRING
ABOUT A PEACEFUL REINTEGRATION OF THE IBO PEOPLE INTO NIGERIA,
UNDER CONDITIONS GIVING THEM A LARGE MEASURE OF AUTONOMY AND
THE CONTROL OF SOME OF THE MEANS TO HELP SECURE THEIR OWN
PROTECTION. THE EMPEROR WOULD PROPOSE THAT ADEQUATE SAFEGUARDS,
INCLUDING INTERNATIONAL OBSERVERS, BE PROVIDED TO ASURE THAT
THIS OBJECTIVE IS CARRIED OUT.

(C) TO APPEAL AT THE APPROPRIATE TIME TO THE US,

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UK, FRANCE AND THE USSR TO SUPPORT HIS AFRICAN INITIATIVE, AND TO CALL UPON ALL STATES TO CEASE MILITARY SUPPLIES, TRANSPORTATION FACILITIES FOR MILITARY SUPPLIES AND THE USE OF THEIR TERRITORY FOR SUCH PURPOSES;

(D) TO WORK OUT ARRANGEMENTS FOR OBSERVERS ON THE TERRITORIES OF THE TWO PARTIES WITH VIEW TO PREVENTING THE IMPORT OF ARMS.

(E) AS AN ADDITIONAL REASSURANCE TO THE FMG THAT BIAFRA WILL NOT BE ABLE TO STRENGTHEN CLANDESTINELY ITS MILITARY POTENTIAL, TO APPEAL TO THE POPE TO USE HIS INFLUENCE TO OBTAIN PORTUGUESE COOPERATION, AND TO DE GAULLE TO OBTAIN THE COOPERATION OF THE IVORY COAST AND GABON, WITH RESPECT TO SIMILAR INSPECTIONS OF FLIGHTS TO BIAFRA FROM OR THROUGH BISSAU, SAO TOME, IVORY COAST AND GABON.

(F) TO CALL ON ALL GOVERNMENTS TO JOIN, UNDER THE AUSPICES OF THE ICRC, IN A MASSIVE AIR, SEA, AND LAND LIFT OF HUMANITARIAN SUPPLIES INTO THE AFFECTED AREAS ON BOTH SIDES OF THE CEASE-FIRE LINE. IT IS PROBABLE THAT ARRANGEMENTS WOULD NEED TO BE MADE TO CHANNEL ALL RELIEF FLIGHTS THROUGH WELL DESIGNATED CORRIDORS, SO THAT THE FMG COULD ITSELF MONITOR THE PASSAGE OF THE APPROVED FLIGHTS, AND TO GIVE THE FMG COMPLETE INFORMATION IN ADVANCE ON THE IDENTITY NUMBER, CALL SIGNS AND TIME OF PASSAGE OF EACH AIRCRAFT. TO ENABLE THE FMG TO DETECT UNAUTHORIZED OVERFLIGHTS, IT MIGHT BE NECESSARY TO PROVIDE THE FMG WITH PROBABLE RADAR, APPARATUS CAPABLE OF DETECTING AIRCRAFT BY SOUND, AND THE TECHNICAL PERSONNEL TO HELP RUN THEM.

2. THE SOVIETS ARE AT PRESENT PREOCCUPIED WITH CZECHOSLOVAKIA AND ARE BEING SUBJECTED TO SEVERE CRITICISM FROM ALL OVER THE WORLD-- INCLUDING AFRICA. THERE IS SOME POSSIBILITY THAT THEY MIGHT BE MORE THAN NORMALLY INCLINED TO AVOID CREATING ADDITIONAL PROBLEMS FOR THEMSELVES IN AFRICA. IN ANY EVENT, THE OBJECTIVE WOULD BE TO LEAD THEM TO CALCULATE THAT THEY WOULD GAIN BY GOING ALONG TACITLY WITH THE EMPEROR'S INITIATIVE. THE CHANCE OF A FAVORABLE CALCULATION WOULD BE MOST ENHANCED IF THE EMPEROR WERE ABLE TO PERSUADE A SUBSTANTIAL NUMBER OF AFRICAN STATES TO STAND FIRMLY IN FAVOR OF THE PROPOSAL. TACITICALLY, THEREFORE, THE BEST APPROACH WOULD PROBABLY BE A VERY QUIET

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ONE BY THE EMPEROR, WITH THE US AND UK INITIATIVE NOT APPARENT, AND WITH US AND UK RESTRAINT FROM ANY PRECIPITOUS ENDORSEMENT OF THE PROPOSAL. THE SOVIET VERBAL RESPONSE TO THE EMPEROR WOULD MOST LIKELY BE EQUIVOCAL, BUT WE MIGHT HOPE FOR A TACIT UNDERSTANDING IN WHICH, WITHOUT COMMITTING THEMSELVES, THEY WOULD IN FACT DESIST FROM SUPPLYING ARMS. AN UNDERSTANDING NO MORE DEFINITE THAN THIS WOULD CREATE PROBLEMS IN SECURING BIAFRAN COOPERATION, BUT THE ADVANTAGES OF A CEASEFIRE AND THE STOPPAGE OF ARMS IMPORTS INTO BIAFRA SHOULD MAKE THE BIAFRANS MORE TRACTABLE.

3. IF THE SOVIETS DO NOT RESPOND SATISFACTORILY TO THE EMPERORS PRIVATE INITIATIVE, THERE IS NO BAR TO A PUBLIC TEST OF THEIR INTENTIONS. GIVEN SUFFICIENT AFRICAN BACKING OF THE EMPEROR, THEY MIGHT CONCEIVABLY CHANGE THEIR MINDS WHEN PUT ON THE SPOT. IF THEY COMPLY WITH THE EMPERORS APPEAL, THEY PUT THEMSELVES IN THE SAME POSITION AS THE US AND UK. IF THEY DO NOT COMPLY, THEY RISK A SHARP INCREASE IN THE CRITICISM THAT IS ALREADY BEING LEVELLED AT THEM IN AFRICA FOR THEIR POLICY OF ARMS SUPPLY TO THE FMG.

4. ADMITTEDLY, THIS PROPOSAL WOULD BE DIFFICULT TO CARRY OUT, AND CAREFULLY MEASURED PRIVATE EFFORTS BY THE UK AND US WOULD ALMOST CERTAINLY BE NECESSARY. QUITE ASIDE FROM ANY MERITS OF THE PROPOSAL, IT HAS THE ADVANTAGE OF CLARIFYING FOR THE UK AND US POSITIONS THAT ARE NOW IN DOUBT, THEREBY SERVING AS THE BASIS FOR THE CONSIDERATION OF ALTERNATIVES.

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DATE: 8/26/68 MSG NO.: 12069 TYPE: TE

FROM: Lagos TO: State

SUBJECT: ... Conversation with Arakpo

DOCUMENT ORIGINATOR: DEPT. OF STATE: ☒ OTHER: ☐

BASIS FOR WITHDRAWAL:

☒ CONTAINS NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION

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POL 27 BIAFRA - NIGERIA



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PAGE 01 ADDIS 05380 241216Z

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ACTION AF 15

INFO EUR 15, IO 13, AID 28, SR 01, ORM 03, SCA 02, SCS 04, RSR 01, CIAE 00,

DODE 00, GPM 04, H 02, INR 07, L 03, NSAE 00, NSC 10, P 04, RSC 01, SP 02

SS 25, USIA 12, 152 W

P R 240900Z AUG 68
FM AMEMBASSY ADDIS ABABA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 6770
INFO AMEMBASSY ABIDJAN
AMEMBASSY ACCRA
USMISSION GENEVA
AMEMBASSY KINSHASA
JWALS/AMEMBASSY LAGOS 313
AMEMBASSY LONDON
AMEMBASSY MONROVIA
USMISSION USUN NEW YORK
AMEMBASSY NIAMEY
AMEMBASSY PARIS
AMEMBASSY YAOUNDE

MODIFIED BY 15/A

C O N F I D E N T I A L ADDIS ABABA 5380

SUBJ: NIGERIAN PEACE TALKS

1. MINSTATE MOFA TESFAYE TOLD ME THIS MORNING HIM MET SEPARATELY WITH TWO SIDES AT PALACE YESTERDAY, PLANS CONVEENE FULL MEETING BOTH SIDES 11:30 AM LOCAL TODAY TO CONTINUE DISCUSSION RELIEF PACKAGE.

2. TESFAYE SAID THERE WAS NO APPARENT PROGRESS YESTERDAY, NEITHER SIDE SHOWING WILLINGNESS GIVE IN ON ANY SUBSTANTIVE POINT. FMG APPEARS FEEL IT HAS POLITICAL-MILITARY ADVANTAGE AND THUS NEED NOT MAKE CONCESSIONS. BIAFRANS, ON OTHER HAND, FEEL THEY HAVE UPPER HAND ON PROPAGANDA AND RESPONSE OF WORLD OPINION, AND ARE NOT INTERESTED IN EARLY SETTLEMENT AT COST OF CONCESSIONS. BIAFRANS STILL APPEAR TO BE LOOKING TOWARD EXPOSURE OF NEGOTIATIONS IN BROADER FRAMEWORK OF ALGIERS.

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3. TEFAYE EXPRESSED PERSONAL DISCOURAGEMENT, BUT SAID HIM
STILL HAS HOPE OF ACHIEVING SETTLEMENT AT LEAST ON RELIEF
ISSUE AND PLANS GO ON WITH MEETINGS AS LONG AS POSSIBLE.

GP-3. HALL

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Lagos 19 098
8-24-68

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ACTION AF 15

INFO EUR 15, IO 13, AID 28, SR 01, ORM 03, SCSE 00, SCA 02, SAH 02, RSR 01,

NSA 02, PC 04, OPR 02, CIAE 00, GPM 04, H 02, INR 07, L 03, NSC 10, P 04,

RSC 01, SP 02, SS 25, USIA 12, /158 W

R 241248Z AUG 68
FM AMEMBASSY LAGOS
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 2201
INFO AMEMBASSY ACCRA
AMEMBASSY ADDIS ABABA
AMEMBASSY KINSHASA
AMEMBASSY LONDON
AMEMBASSY MONROVIA
AMEMBASSY NIAMEY
AMEMBASSY PARIS
AMEMBASSY YAOUNDE
USMISSION GENEVA
USMISSION USUN
AMCONSUL IBADAN
AMCONSUL KADUNA
CINSTRIKE UNN
DIA UNN
STATE GRNC

UNCLAS LAGOS 12028

SUBJECT: REBELS ALLEGEDLY ABANDON ABA.

1. FOLLOWING IS TEXT BROADCAST KADUNA RADIO AUGUST 23
(FBIS 240910), NON-ESSENTIAL WORDS OMITTED:

2. "ABA, ONE OF THREE REMAINING TOWNS IN REBEL-HELD AREAS
OFFNIGERIA, HAS BEEN DESERTED BY REBELS. TOWN HAS BEEN
CLEARED OF ALL CIVILIANS AND SOLDIERS AND THE TELEVISION
STATION HAS STOPPED ITS TRANSMISSION. A REPORT FROM
PORT HARCOURT SAID FEDERAL TROOPS NOW WITHIN ARTILLERY
RANGE OF THE TOWN WILL MOVE IN ANY TIME. REBEL ADMINISTRATORS
HAVE SHIFTED OFFICES TO UMUAHIA WHICH, WITH OWERRI,

RECEIVED BY 250

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ARE THE TWO TOWNS NOW IN REBEL HANDS. LAST OBSTACLE
BLOCKING THE FEDERAL ADVANCE ON ABA-- THE IMO RIVER
BRIDGE -- WAS OVERCOME A FEW DAYS AGO. THE FEDERAL TROOPS
CROSSED RIVER BY BOAT AND BRIDGE WAS REPAIRED ON THURSDAY."

3. "A REPORT FROM ISLAND OF SAO TOME SAID NIGERIAN
WARSHIPS TODAY OPENED FIRE ON A RELIEF PLANE ON ITS WAY
TO REBEL-HELD AREAS OF NIGERIA AND HIT IT SEVEN TIMES.
PORTUGUESE NEWS AGENCY, ENI, SAID PLANE, PILOTED BY A
CAPTAIN BENG LENDOWOR, MANAGED TO LAND AT ITS DESTINATION
SOMEWHERE IN REBEL-HELD AREAS. PLANE IS OWNED BY SWEDISH
COMPANY TRANSAIR. FMG HAS ORDERED ITS TROOPS TO SEEK AND
DESTROY ALL AIRCRAFT ON UNAPPROVED MISSIONS TO NIGERIA
MEANWHILE. ICRC HAS RESUMED ITS ILLEGAL RELIEF FLIGHTS TO
THE REBEL-HELD AREAS FROM FERNANDO PO. THIS COMES AFTER
A BREAK OF TWO WEEKS ORDERED BY RED CROSS AFTER FEDERAL
TROOPS FIRED ON ITS PLANES. SOURCES IN GENEVA SAID
THE ORGANIZATION WILL NOW BE SENDING A DC-6 TO REBEL-
HELD AREAS, FROM THE SPANISH ISLAND TWICE A
NIGHT."
MATHEWS

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PAGE 01 LAGOS 12030 241546Z

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ACTION AF 15

INFO EUR 15, IO 13, CIAE 00, GPM 04, H 02, INR 07, L 03, NSC 10, P 04, RSC 01

SP 02, SS 25, USIA 12, NSA 02, SR 01, ORM 03, SCS 04, SCA 02, AID 28,

SAH 02, ACDA 16, RSR 01, /172 W

R 241323Z AUG 68
FM AMEMBASSY LAGOS
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 2203
INFO AMEMBASSY ACCRA
AMEMBASSY ADDIS ABABA
AMEMBASSY KINSHASA
AMEMBASSY LONDON
AMEMBASSY MONROVIA
AMEMBASSY NIAMEY
AMEMBASSY PARIS
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USMISSION GENEVA
USMISSION USUN
AMCONSUL IBADAN
AMCONSUL KADUNA
CINCSRIKE UNN
DIA UNN

UNCLAS LAGOS 12030

SUBJECT: RADIO BIAFRA ALLEGES ABA STILL IN REBEL HANDS.

1. FOLLOWING IS TEXT OF RADIO BIAFRA BROADCAST (FBIS 241015)
LATE AUG. 23 (NON-ESSENTIAL WORDS OMITTED):

2. WITH BRITISH PERSONNEL, SALADINS, FERRETS, JET-
PROVOSTS, MORTAR BOMBS AND BULLETS, AND RUSSIAN
PERSONNEL, MIG AND ILYUSHIN FIGHTER-BOMBERS, NIGERIAN
VANDALS HAVE SUSTAINED THEIR AGGRESSION IN ALL SECTORS OF
THE WAR. THE MOST BITTER ENCOUNTER YESTERDAY TOOK PLACE
NEAR AKWETE. ON THIS AXIS ENEMY WAS PUSHED BACK A FEW
MILES. AFTER TWO DAYS SUSTAINED HEAVY OFFENSIVE,
NIGERIAN INVADERS DISLODGED BIAFRAN TROOPS AND GAINED

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SOME GROUND ON AFIKPO AXIS. THROUGHOUT YESTERDAY NIGERIANS NEAR ONITSHA MADE DESPERATE EFFORT TO LINK UP WITH THEIR COUNTERPARTS NORTH OF ABAGANA. THIS ENEMY ATTACK WAS BEATEN BACK WITH VERY HEAVY ENEMY CASUALTIES. IN CENTRAL ANNANG, NIGERIAN TROOPS HAVE LAUNCHED BIG OFFENSIVE IN THEIR ATTEMPT TO GET TO IKOT-EKPENE THROUGH ABAK. WITH FIERCE FIGHTING GOING ON IN ALL FRONTS, THE REFUGEES PROBLEM HAS ASSUMED FANTASTIC PROPORTIONS AS MORE PEOPLE RUN INTO THE HINTERLAND FROM THEIR NORMAL PLACES OF RESIDENCE. RADIO BIAFRA CORRESPONDENT REPORTING FROM ABA SAYS LIFE HAS NOW VIRTUALLY RETURNED TO NORMAL, FOLLOWING MARKED EXODUS OF CIVILIANS FROM TOWN LAST WEEKEND. MATHEWS

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PAGE 01 USUN N 06288 241753Z

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ACTION IO 15

INFO AF 09, EUR 15, NSA 02, CIAE 00, DODE 00, GPM 04, H 02, INR 07, L 03,

NSC 10, P 04, RSC 01, SP 02, SS 25, USIA 12, SAH 02, AID 28, NIC 01,

SR 01, ORM 03, SCA 02, SCS 04, RSR 01, /153 W

R 241634Z AUG 68
FM USMISSION USUN NY
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 2939
INFO AMEMBASSY LAGOS
AMEMBASSY ADDIS ABABA
USMISSION GENEVA
AMEMBASSY LONDON
AMEMBASSY COPENHAGEN

C O N F I D E N T I A L USUN 6288

SUBJ: BIAFRA

1. BORCH (DENMARK) TOLD PEDERSEN AND BUFFUM AUG 23 THAT MEMBERS OF DANISH PARLIAMENT ARE VERY CONCERNED AND AGITATED ABOUT SITUATION IN BIAFRA. AS RESULT, FONOFF IS CONSIDERING CALLING SC MEETING TO CONSIDER PROBLEM AND HAS ASKED FOR BORCH'S ADVICE.
2. IN EFFORT GET BORCH THINK ABOUT PROBLEMS CALL FOR SC MIGHT RAISE, PEDERSEN AND BUFFUM REVIEWED DISCUSSIONS WE HAVE HAD ON NIGERIAN PROBLEM OVER PAST 2 TO 3 WEEKS.
3. MISOFF INFORMED DANES AUGUST 24 OF FBIS REPORT FROM ADDIS RE AGREEMENT ON AIR AND LAND CORRIDORS FOR RELIEF SUPPLIES (FBIS 93 OF AUG 24).

GP=4.

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DE RUFNCX 1647HH 2361545
ZNY TTTT ZZH
R 231500Z AUG 68
FM AMEMBASSY MEMBASSY LIBREVILLE
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 1883
STATE GRNC
BT
T O P S E C R E T LIBREVILLE 1647

7 3 1 2 Q

1968 AUG 23 PM 12 27

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1. INCLINED BELIEVE THAT ZAMBIAN DC-3 WHICH WAS DUE ARRIVE HERE AUG 18 IS WHITE DC-3 WITH NO REGISTRATION OR OTHER MARKINGS EXCEPT FOR THIN GREEN STRIPE ALONG FUSELAGE JUST OVER WINDOWS. THAT AIRCRAFT SEEN FIRST TIME AT LIBREVILLE AIRPORT MORNING OF AUG 20 (PARA 2 LBVL 1634). IT DEPARTED SOMETIME DURING AUG 20 BUT AS OF 0730 THIS MORNING IT BACK IN LIBREVILLE.

2. WILL KEEP LOOKOUT FOR SECOND ZAMBIAN DC-3.

3. CAN DEPT IDENTIFY DC-4 WHICH ARRIVED HERE WITH GREEN, WHITE, RED VERTICAL STRIPES ON TAIL (NOW PAINTED OVER IN WHITE) AND LETTERS D-ADAR ON FUSELAGE (PARA 2 LIBREVILLE 1634)? DC-4 STILL BEING WORKED ON IN LIBREVILLE HANGAR AND TO OUR KNOWLEDGE HAS MADE NO FLIGHTS AS YET.

4. CAMEROONIAN CHARGE NKOUANDY ALIYOU WITH WHOM WE HAVE DISCUSSED BIAFRAN SITUATION TOLD ME THIS MORNING THAT HE HAD PICKED UP REPORT FROM LOCAL CONTACTS TO EFFECT THAT BETWEEN AUG 14 AND 16 SOME 300 MILITARY PERSONNEL PRESUMABLY MERCENAIRES AND OF FRENCH NATIONALITY PASSED THROUGH LIBREVILLE ENROUTE BIAFRA. HE ALSO OF OPINION ARMS MOVING THROUGH LIBREVILLE TO BIAFRA BUT CANNOT VERIFY. COMMENT: NKOUANDY INTELLIGENT AND ABLE AND HAS EXCELLENT ENTREE LOCALLY PARTICULARLY THROUGH LARGE CAMEROONIAN COLONY. HIS REPORT OF POSSIBLE MOVEMENT OF MERCENAIRES THROUGH LIBREVILLE OF INTEREST BECAUSE EVE OF AUG 14 DCM SAW LARGE COVERED TRUCK (WITHOUT MARKINGS) LOADED EUROPEANS ON AIRPORT ROAD. EARLY HOURS MORNING AUG 15 MEMBERS EMB STAFF LEAVING ON HUNTING TRIP PASSED SIMILARLY LOADED TRUCK IN VICINITY BARAKA ARMY CAMP. THIS COULD SUGGEST MERCENARIES HAVE PASSED THROUGH LIBREVILLE (RE LAGOS 11541). THIS CONNECTION IN DISCUSSION BIAFRAN SITUATION WITH ISRAELI AMB THIS MORNING, AVIMOR TELLS ME THAT FRENCH AMB DELAUNEY HINTED TO HIM RECENTLY THAT FRENCH MERCENARIES MIGHT BE PASSING THROUGH LIBREVILLE ENROUTE BIAFRA (RE PARA 4 PARIS 19345). GP 1 BANE

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SECRET 601

PAGE 01 LONDON 12078 232034Z

83
ACTION SS 30

INFO SSD 00,CCO 00,NSCE 00,1030 W

O.P. 232005Z AUG 68
FM AMEMBASSY LONDON
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 5664
INFO AMEMBASSY ADDIS ABABA PRIORITY
USMISSION GENEVA
AMEMBASSY LAGOS
AMEMBASSY PARIS
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW

SECRET LONDON 12078

EXDIS:

NOFORN

FROM: AMB-MOORE

REF: STATE 224668

1. ACCOMPANIED BY MINISTER KAISER, TROXEL AND STEARNS, I HAD LENGTHY DISCUSSION THIS AFTERNOON WITH GROUP OF SENIOR FOREIGN OFFICE AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE OFFICIALS, HEADED BY SIR DENIS ALLEN AND SIR LESLIE MONSON. TROXEL AND I PRESENTED ESSENTIALS OF PROPOSAL FOR NEW INITIATIVE THROUGH EMPEROR (REFTEL). BRITISH STATED THEY TOO HAD BEEN GIVING THOUGHT TO PROBLEM OF CEASE FIRE AND POSSIBLE EMBARGO BUT HAD COME UP WITH NOTHING NEW. THEY WELCOMED OUR IDEAS ALTHOUGH IT WAS CLEAR THEY WERE MUCH PREOCCUPIED WITH UPCOMING COMMONS' DEBATE ON NIGERIA AUG 27 WHEN PARLIAMENT RETURNS FOR TWO-DAY EMERGENCY SESSION ON MONDAY.

① 2. WE ARE LEAVING WITH THEM WRITTEN SUMMARY OF MAIN ELEMENTS OF PROPOSAL AND I EMPHASIZED THAT WE WOULD APPRECIATE THEIR CONSIDERED REACTION AND COMMENTS AS SOON AS POSSIBLE. ALLEN AND MONSON SAID THEY WOULD STUDY PROPOSAL CAREFULLY AFTER DEBATE WAS CONCLUDED AND HOPED DETAILED COMMENTS WOULD BE READY BY END OF NEXT WEEK. ALLEN OBSERVED THAT IN CONSIDERING

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PAGE 02 LONDON 12078 232034Z

PROPOSAL BRITISH WOULD WANT TO MAKE SURE THAT IN EFFECT BRITISH HANDS WOULD NOT BE TIED WHILE OTHERS (I.E. SOVIETS AND FRENCH) WERE FREE TO IGNORE OR CIRCUMVENT PUBLIC CALL FOR ARMS EMBARGO. BRITISH SUGGESTED THAT IF CONVENIENT TROXEL BE IN LONDON AUG 30 FOR FURTHER DISCUSSION ON BASIS THEIR CRITIQUE OF OUR PROPOSAL. I BELIEVE THIS WOULD BE MOST USEFUL AND HOPE DEPT CONCURS.

3. ON UPCOMING COMMONS' DEBATE, ALLEN AND MONSON EMPHASIZED THAT THEY WERE STILL CONVINCED THAT BRITISH SHOULD CONTINUE SUPPLYING ARMS TO FMG AS MEANS OF MAINTAINING THEIR LEVERAGE IN LAGOS. MONSON SAID THAT "AS OF LAST NIGHT" WHEN BRITISH MINISTERS WENT HOME TO DRAFT THEIR SPEECHES FOR DEBATE THERE WAS NO DISPOSITION TO REVERSE BRITISH POLICY. NEITHER ALLEN OR MONSON BELIEVED CZECH DEVELOPMENTS WOULD HAVE MUCH EFFECT ON NIGERIAN DEBATE. THEY BELIEVED CRITICISM OF BRITISH POLICY WOULD CONTINUE TO BE PRIMARILY ON MORAL GROUNDS AND THAT GOVERNMENT WOULD CONTINUE TO DEFEND POLICY ON PRAGMATIC GROUNDS THAT IT WOULD BE FOLLY FOR BRITISH TO THROW AWAY THEIR POSITION IN LAGOS WITH UNILATERAL GESTURE AT VERY TIME WHEN MOST NECESSARY TO MOBILIZE ALL POSSIBLE LEVERAGE ON BOTH SIDES TO ACHIEVE PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT.

3. I BELIEVE THAT OUR MEETING WAS SUCCESSFUL IN FOCUSING BRITISH ATTENTION ON MAIN OUTLINES OF OUR PROPOSAL AND THAT, GIVEN THEIR NATURAL PREOCCUPATION WITH UPCOMING DEBATE, THEY APPRECIATED OPPORTUNITY FOR DISCUSSION. WE ARE TRANSMITTING TO ADDRESSEES BY SEPTEL TEXT OF SUMMARY PROPOSAL WHICH WE ARE SENDING TO BRITISH IN WRITING. WE ADAPTED IT SOMEWHAT IN LIGHT OUR DISCUSSIONS WITH THEM. BRUCE

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SECRET 717

PAGE 01 PARIS 19823 231058Z

12
ACTION SS 30

INFO SSO 00, /030 W

P 231035Z AUG 68
FM AMEMBASSY PARIS
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 5383

SECRET PARIS 19823

EXDIS

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SUBJ: PROPOSED PLAN FOR NIGERIA

1. I STRONGLY ENDORSE PROPOSAL OUTLINED REFTEL FOR BREAKING BIAFRA DEADLOCK. IN ADDITION TO WHAT COULD BE DECISIVE CONTRIBUTION TO SETTLEMENT OF PROBLEM, FACT OF UNITED STATES AGREEING TO PROPOSAL OF THIS NATURE WOULD BE WARMLY WELCOMED BY FRENCH PUBLIC AND OFFICIAL OPINION. SIMILAR FAVORABLE REACTION COULD PROBABLY BE EXPECTED FROM ALMOST ALL WESTERN EUROPEAN COUNTRIES WHO, AS INDICATED IN INR REU-44, AUGUST 1, ARE BECOMING MORE AND MORE UPSET BY FATE OF IB0

2. I BELIEVE WE COULD COUNT UPON POSITIVE FRENCH REACTION. IMMEDIATE OBJECTIVES OF RECENT FRENCH INITIATIVES IN SUPPORT OF BIAFRA ARE ESSENTIALLY SAME AS THOSE OUTLINED REFTEL: IMMEDIATE TRUCE AND FREE FLOW OF RELIEF SUPPLIES (PARIS 18948). FRANCE HAS ALREADY IMPOSED ITS OWN ARMS EMBARGO AND FRENCH OFFICIALS HAVE BEEN FREE TO CONDEMN BRITISH AND SOVIETS AS PRIMARILY RESPONSIBLE FOR CONTINUATION OF CONFLICT BECAUSE THEY HAVE REFUSED DO SAME (PARIS 19700). I BELIEVE FRANCE COULD BE COUNTED UPON TO PARTICIPATE ACTIVELY IN CREATION AND WORK OF INTERNATIONAL OBSERVER FORCE AND CONTROL OF RELIEF FLIGHTS, PROVIDED PLAN OFFERS REASONABLE PROSPECTS

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PAGE 02 PARIS 19823 231058Z

FOR SUCCESS. IF EMPEROR OF ETHIOPIA, WHO IS CLOSE TO DE GAULLE, SHOULD PUT TO HIM PROPOSALS OUTLINED REFTEL IN FOUR POWER CONTEST I THINK HE WOULD AGREE TO PROPOSAL AND USE HIS INFLUENCE WITH IVORY COAST, GABON, ET CETERA. WHILE RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN CZECHOSLOVAKIA HAVE COMPLICATED RELATIONS AMONG FOUR POWERS, THEY COULD CONCEIVABLY MAKE SOVIETS MORE RESPONSIVE TO PRESSURES FROM AFRICA AND WEST FOR BROADLY-BASED CEASEFIRE AND ARMS EMBARGO FOR BOTH SIDES OF NIGERIAN CONFLICT.

GP-3 SHRIVER

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Pol 27 Biafra - Nigeria
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XX Df 12-5 NEW E.

SECRET 434

PAGE 01 TRIPOLI 04567 222000Z

85

ACTION SS 70

INFO CIAE 00, /070 W

P R 221445Z AUG 68
FM AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 3104
INFO AMEMBASSY LAGOS
AMEMBASSY LONDON
AMEMBASSY BENGHAZI
AMEMBASSY BAIDA

S E C R E T TRIPOLI 4567

LIMDIS

SUBJ: SUPPLY OF ARMS TO FEDERAL NIGERIAN GOVERNMENT

1. DURING MEETING CHARGE HAD AUGUST 22 WITH PRIME MINISTER BAKKUUSH AND FOREIGN MINISTER QAQHAafi ON SITUATION IN CZECHOSLOAKIA, PRIME MINISTER RAISED SUBJECT OF SITUATION IN NIGERIA.

2. HE SAID, AS WE WELL KNEW, LIBYA SUPPORTED THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT OF NIGERIA IN THE CURRENT WAR WITH BIAFRA. A SITUATION HAD ARISEN, HOWEVER, WHICH WORRIED HIM CONSIDERABLY AND BEFORE MAKING FINAL DECISION HE WOULD LIKE TO GET "AMERICAN REACTION".

3. LIBYAN GOERNMENT HAS BEEN REQUESTED TO SELL BRITISH ARMS FROM ITS OWN STOCK TO FEDERAL GOVERNMENT. BRITISH GOVERNMENT WOULD THEN REPLACE THESE ARMS BY SALE TO LIBYA. BRITISH GOERNMENT, ALTHOUGH TAKING NO DIRECT HAND IN TRANSACTION, IS ENCOURAGING IT IN ORDER TO AVOID ONUS OF DIRECT SALE BRITISH ARMS TO FEDERAL GOVERNMENT.

4. DELEGATION FROM NIGERIA WOULD SOON VISIT LIBYA TO MAKE FINAL ARRANGEMENTS. BEFORE GIVING FINAL AGREEMENT HE WISHED TO KNOW IF I THOUGHT THE US GOVERNMENT WOULD HAVE ANY REACTION TO IT. I TOLD HIM I WAS COMPLETELY UNPREPARED TO GIVE ANY SORT OF REACTION AT THIS TIME.

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47
tripoli 4567
8/22/68

STARTED AT 8:10

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Department of State **TELEGRAM**

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PAGE 02 TRIPOL 04567 222000Z

EXCEPT PERSONAL ONE THAT IS SEEMED RATHER KURIOUS WAY TO
CARRY OUT INTERNATIONAL TRADE IN ARMS. AS HE IS AWARE,
USG SUPPORTS FEDERAL GOVERNMENT OF NIGERIA AND MAINTAINS
FRIENDLY DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS WITH IT. IN GENERAL, HOWEVER,
USG OPPOSED TO ARMS BUILDUP IN UNDERDEVELOPED NATIONS. UAID
I WOULD SEEK FURTHER CLARIFICATION FROM WASHINGTON AND
INFORM HIM IF WASHINGTON WISHED REACT SPECIFICALLY TO
THIS DEMARCHE. CUNNINGHAM

SECRET

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226108

POL 27 Biafra-Nigeria

22 AUG 68 22 55Z

Origin

ACTION: AmEmbassy LIBREVILLE

Info:

STATE 226108

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~~REF: Your Tels 1632, 1634, 1637~~
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Ref: Your Tels 1632, 1634, 1637

1. Highly sensitive sources indicate Zambian Government has agreed transfer two rpt two DC-3 aircraft to Biafra. First aircraft, carrying Zambian registration, was scheduled arrive Libreville 18 August under command two expatriate Zambian Airways pilots: Captain Nash (Botswana passport) and Captain Tilney (US passport). Second DC-3 expected arrive Libreville between 26 and 28 August. Registration markings both aircraft likely be removed upon arrival.
2. Dept also has information, again from highly sensitive source, that at least some current flights from Gabon to Biafra may carry munitions as well as relief supplies. Biafrans also considering shift of their munitions supply base, now at Sao Tome, to Libreville.
3. Based on above, Department believes ex-Zambian planes may be used for munitions airlift to Biafra.

GP-1

End

RUSK

Drafted by:

INR/RAF/W:Shurtleff/MacLay;glf 8/22/68

Tel. Ext.

Telegraphic transmission and classification approved by:

INR - George C. Denney, Jr.

Clearances:

AF/AFW-Mr. Smith (in draft) *h*

S/S- Mr. Brown *h.c.d.*

AF/AFCM-Mr. Schaufele (in draft) *h*

INR-Mr. German (in draft)

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FORM 8-65 DS-322

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Department of State **TELEGRAM**

POL 16 BIAFRA
XR POL 27 BIAFRA-NIGERIA

CONFIDENTIAL 234

PAGE 01 OUAGAD 01670 221626Z

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ACTION AF 15

INFO EUR 15, IO 13, NSA 02, CIAE 00, DODE 00, GPM 04, H 02, INR 07, L 03,

NSC 10, P 04, RSC 01, SP 02, SS 25, USIA 12, RSR 01, 116 W

R 221125Z AUG 68
FM AMEMBASSY OUAGADOUGOU
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 1745
INFO AMEMBASSY ABIDJAN
AMEMBASSY COTONOU
AMEMBASSY LAGOS
AMEMBASSY PARIS

C O N F I D E N T I A L OUAGADOUGOU 1670

REF: COTONOU 1647 — *POL 16 BIAFRA*
XR POL 27 BIAFRA-NIGERIA

1. SURPRISED AT REPORT GOUV MIGHT RECOGNIZE BIAFRA, NO INDICATION HERE GOUV CONSIDERING CHANGE OF SUPPORT FOR FEDERAL GOVERNMENT.

2. PRESIDENT LAMIZANA CONCERNED OVER SUCCESS PRO-BIAFRAN PROPAGANDA BUT TOLD ME RECENTLY THAT IF HE WERE IN CHARGE OF NIGERIAN MILITARY OPERATIONS, HE WOULD FIGHT WAR TO RAPID CONCLUSION.

3. ALTHOUGH GOUV CONCERNED WITH SUFFERING IN CIVIL WAR, NIGERIAN (AND AFRICAN) UNITY IS OVERRIDING ISSUE.

00-3. SKINNER

MICROFILMED BY 1573

(2)

CONFIDENTIAL

Ouagadougou 1670
8-22-68

0327

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Pol 27-9 Biafra - Nigeria
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224651

Origin

ACTION: Amembassy LONDON PRIORITY

Info:

INFO: Amembassy ADDIS ABABA
LAGOS
UEmission GENEVA

STATE

FROM SECRETARY FOR AMBASSADOR BRUCE

EXDIS

1. Please deliver following personal message from me to Foreign Secretary
Michael Stewart:

QTE Dear Mr. Secretary: Since we share what we know to be your deep concern over the Nigerian conflict, I hope that it might be convenient if Deputy Assistant Secretary for African Affairs, Ambassador C. Robert Moore, visited London upon the imminent close of his talks in Geneva concerning international relief for Nigeria and Biafra. My thought is that Ambassador Moore might discuss in London actions which it might be possible for our governments to take in the event the talks between the conflicting parties at Addis Ababa should break down and if the Federal Military Government proceeds with a general offensive. This situation would cause most difficult problems for us domestically as well as internationally and I believe it would be useful and timely to exchange some views about this contingency.

Since Ambassador Moore is identified with the humanitarian aspects of the Nigerian problem, I would hope that this rationale for his visit could be

Drafted by: Nigerian Task Force: RMMetbourne
Clearances: 8/19/68

Tel. Ext. 2619

Telegraphic transmission and classification approved by:

The Secretary

AF - Mr. Palmer

S/S- Mr. Brown

EUR - Mr. Lead
White House - Mr. Hamilton

Mr. Rostow

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Page 2 of telegram to Amembassy LONDON PRIORITY

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maintained while he is in London. I also hope that the views he will express can receive the urgent consideration of Her Majesty's Government. UNQTE.

2. Would appreciate arrangements with British for Ambassador Moore to receive top level attention.

GP-1

END

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ACTION: Amembassy ADDIS ABABA PRIORITY
" LAGOS AmEmbassy MOSCOW
" LONDON AmEmbassy PARIS
USMission GENEVA

STATE

EXDIS
EYES ONLY CHIEF OF MISSION
GENEVA FOR AMBASSADOR MOORE

situation we shall face re

1. We are becoming increasingly concerned over/Nigeria if talks in Addis Ababa should break down and general FMG offensive should ensue. Ambassador Moore being separately instructed to proceed to London from Geneva for talks with British officials in this context. Since he has been discussing humanitarian relief problems in Geneva, this should provide sufficient rationale for his visit to London. Possible action he will raise with British contained in staff study prepared here, which will be carried to London by Department officer, Oliver L. Troxel, who will assist Ambassador Moore in talks.
of staff study:
2. Begin summary/ Possible breakdown of Nigerian peace talks in Addis, particularly in absence of agreement on humanitarian relief and consequent probability of major Federal offensive, could cause UK to impose arms embargo on Nigeria and to call for ceasefire. This would undoubtedly wreck UK position in US Nigeria, do consequent damage to ours and lead to retaliation against/UK and UK nationals and commercial interests.
3. Conversely, this would present opportunity for Soviets to reiterate full

Drafted by:

AFW:RPSmith:RM Melbourne:emb 8/19/68

Tel. Ext.

6402

Telegraphic transmission and

classification approved by:

AF - Joseph Palmer 2nd

Clearances:

EUR - Mr. Leddy (substance)

M - Mr. Row (substance)

S/S - Mr. Shepard

White House - Mr. Hamilton (substance)

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support for FMG, to refuse join call for ceasefire, and to step up arms deliveries.

In these circumstances, military situation would not be substantially changed. FMG would still have capability -- and probably increased will -- to try to finish off insurrection. Only change would be loss of UK and US ~~pos~~ position and enhancement of USSR. Question therefore one of how US and UK could endeavor, with any chance of success, to impose on Soviets same restraints that they might be forced to impose on themselves.

4. Assuming Soviets unlikely be persuaded by US and UK that it in their self-interest to be self-denying in Nigeria in circumstances in which US and UK are prepared to be, question one of trying to find context that will place greatest pressure on them to adopt positions similar to those of US and UK. Following scenario might accomplish this.

US
(a) ~~UK~~ and UK should urgently consult on very private joint demarche to Emperor of Ethiopia and persuade him in his capacity as Chairman OAU Consultative Committee to appeal to four powers (1) to support African initiative by him to bring about ceasefire, and (2) to cease and desist from any actions in Nigeria inconsistent with ceasefire proposal, and particularly to suspend further deliveries of weapons to either side. ~~UK~~ US and UK would urge him to call at same time upon all other African states to make clear in their bilateral relations with great powers that they expect great-power compliance and will take it into account in their future relationships with them.

5. Emperor would also call upon all other states to cease military supplies, transportation facilities for military supplies and use their territory for such purposes. Emperor would buttress foregoing appeals by private appeal to Pope to use his influence to assure Portuguese compliance ^{and} to deGaulle to gain compliance by Ivory Coast and Gabon.

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FORM DS-322A
8-63
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Page 4 of telegram to Amembassy ADDIS ABABA, LAGOS, LONDON, GENEVA

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tractable.

9. If Soviets do not respond satisfactorily to Emperor's private initiative, there is no bar to public test of their intentions. Given sufficient African backing of Emperor, they might conceivably change their minds when put on spot. If they comply with Emperor's appeal, they put themselves in same position as US and UK. If they do not comply, they risk escalation of criticism that is already being levelled at them in Africa for their policy of arms supply to FMG. End summary.

10. To all addressees: Your personal comments upon above outlined proposal are requested. Under no circumstances should it be discussed with any foreign nationals.

END

RUSK

FORM DS-322A
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P 211809Z AUG 68
FM AMEMBASSY LONDON
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 5623
INFO AMEMBASSY ADDIS ABABA PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
AMEMBASSY PARIS
USMISSION GENEVA

S E C R E T LONDON (12007)

EXDIS

REF: STATE 224668

1. DESPITE POLITICAL EMBARRASSMENT CAUSED HMG BY ITS CONTINUED SUPPLY OF ARMS TO NIGERIA (EVEN THOUGH THIS PERHAPS CONSTITUTES NO MORE THAN FIFTEEN PERCENT OF THOSE RECEIVED), WE BELIEVE BRITISH WOULD BE RELUCTANT TO CUT OFF ARMS TO NIGERIA IF: 1) NIGERIAN PUBLIC POSITION APPEARED DEFENSIBLE IN TERMS OF BRITISH POLITICS AND 2) IF HMG SATISFIED FMG FORCES WOULD NOT RESORT TO EXCESSES IF OFFENSIVE RESUMED. WE SAY THIS BEARING IN MIND RELUCTANCE OF HMG IN PAST WEEK OR SO TO COME DOWN HARD ON FMG AGAINST RESUMPTION OF OFFENSIVE. MOBERLY (PROTECT) TODAY TOLD US CO WAS THINKING OF PROPOSING TO FMG THAT ITS ARMED FORCES ACCEPT OBSERVERS IF ATTACK IS RESUMED IN ORDER ACT AS BRAKE ON TROOPS AND TO PUT FMG IN BETTER PUBLIC POSITION.

2. NEVERTHELESS, HMG MIGHT GO ALONG WITH PLAN OUTLINED REFTTEL IF IT HAD SOME GROUNDS FOR ASSUMING SOVIET UNION WOULD BE DISPOSED TO ACT SIMILARLY. MEANWHILE, CZECHOSLOVAKIA HAS PRECEDENCE OVER ALL OTHER ISSUES. PARLIAMENT RECONVENING FOR DEBATE ON CZECHOSLOVAKIA ON MONDAY AND WILL PROBABLY HOLD DEBATE ON NIGERIA TUESDAY.
BRUCE

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EXDIS EXDIS EXDIS EXDIS

*London - 12007
8-21-68*

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TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 2131
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AMEMBASSY PARIS
AMEMBASSY ADDIS ABABA

SECRET LAGOS 11910

EXDIS

NOFORN

EYES ONLY CHIEF OF MISSION

GENEVA FOR AMBASSADOR MOORE

1. I SHALL CONFINE MY COMMENTS ON OUTLINED PROPOSAL TO PROBABLE REACTION OF FMG, IBO REBELS AND OTHER AFRICANS.

2. FMG WOULD TAKE IT FOR GRANTED THAT EMPEROR ACTING AT BEHEST US, UK AND OTHER WESTERN POWERS. IT WOULD ACCORDINGLY PUT BLAME ON THOSE POWERS EVEN IF USSR JOINED ARMS EMBARGO. WHOLE PACKAGE WOULD BE BITTERLY RESENTED BY FMG AND MOST NIGERIANS AS OVERT INTERVENTION IN INTERNAL AFFAIRS. IN VIEW PAST EXPERIENCE FMG WOULD NOT BELIEVE US, PORTUGAL OR FRANCE WOULD OR COULD JOIN EFFECTIVE EMBARGO ON ARMS TO REBELS. FMG WOULD ACCORDINGLY REACT TO EMPEROR'S PROPOSED APPEAL BY ALL OUT EFFORT TO TAKE OVER REMAINING REBEL TERRITORY AS QUICKLY AS POSSIBLE.

3. FMG IS DAILY BECOMING INCREASINGLY IMPERVIOUS TO FOREIGN CRITICISM AND PRESSURE. THERE IS ALSO DEVELOPING IN SOME NIGERIAN CIRCLES WHAT MIGHT BE DESCRIBED AS QTE BLACK POWER UNQTE REACTION. THIS REFLECTED IN SUCH QUESTIONS AS QTE DO

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PAGE 02 LAGOS 11910 211242Z

AMERICANS AND EUROPEANS BELIEVE AFRICANS INCOMPETENT TO HANDLE OWN AFFAIRS UNQTE AND QTE WHY ARE WHITES SUDDENLY BECOMING SO CONCERNED ABOUT ALLEGED SUFFERINGS OF BLACKS UNQTE. IT IS PROBABLY NOW TRUE THAT AVERAGE EDUCATED NIGERIAN SUSPECTS THAT HUMANITARIAN OUTCRY ABOUT NIGERIAN SITUATION CLOAKS SINISTER QTE NEO-COLONIALIST UNQTE MANEUVERS.

4. I WOULD JUDGE THAT OJUKWU WOULD FIND PACKAGE ON BALANCE ACCEPTABLE. HE WOULD PROBABLY BELIEVE HE COULD STILL OBTAIN ABOUT PRESENT LEVEL ARMS SHIPMENTS BY CLANDESTINE MEANS WHILE SUPPLY TO FMG WOULD BE GREATLY REDUCED. IF HE THOUGHT ARMS EMBARGO WOULD BE FULLY EFFECTIVE AGAINST REBELS, HE MIGHT WELL JOIN FMG IN OPPOSITION TO PACKAGE.

5. IN VIEW PAST HISTORY AFRICAN REACTION TO NIGERIAN SITUATION, IT SEEMS HIGHLY UNLIKELY THERE WOULD BE UNIFORM OR ENTHUSIASTIC RESPONSE TO EMPEROR'S APPEAL BY OTHER AFRICAN GOVTS. MANY WOULD SHARE FMG VIEW THAT APPEAL RESULT OF WESTERN PRESSURE AND WOULD BE CHARY OF TAKING UNEQUIVOCAL STAND. EXISTING DIVISION OF OAU INTO PRO-FMG AND PRO-REBEL FACTIONS MIGHT BE SHARPENED.

6. AT THIS STAGE, NOTHING SHORT OF REBEL RENUNCIATION OF SECESSION OR FOREIGN MILITARY INTERVENTION WILL PREVENT FMG FROM ATTEMPT TO TAKE OVER REMAINING REBEL TERRITORY.

GP-1

MATHEWS

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
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DRAFTED BY: AFW:RPSMITH:RMMELBOURNE
APPROVED BY: AFI: JOSEPH PALMER: 2ND NIGERIAN TASK FORCE
EUR - MR. LEDDY (SUBSTANCE)
S/S - MR. SHEPARD
M - MR. ROSTOW (SUBSTANCE)
WHITE HOUSE - MR. HAMILTON (SUBSTANCE)

P 210140Z AUG 68
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO AMEMBASSY ADDIS ABABA PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY LAGOS
AMEMBASSY LONDON
USMISSION GENEVA
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
AMEMBASSY PARIS

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NOFORN

(C O R R E C T E D : C O P Y F O R L I N E L E N G T H) L

EYES ONLY CHIEF OF MISSION:

GENEVA FOR AMBASSADOR MOORE

1. WE ARE BECOMING INCREASINGLY CONCERNED OVER SITUATION WE SHALL FACE RE NIGERIA IF TALKS IN ADDIS ABABA SHOULD BREAK DOWN AND GENERAL FMG OFFENSIVE SHOULD ENSURE. AMBASSADOR MOORE BEING SEPARATELY INSTRUCTED TO PROCEED TO LONDON FROM GENEVA FOR TALKS WITH BRITISH OFFICIALS IN THIS CONTEXT. SINCE HE HAS BEEN DISCUSSING HUMANITARIAN RELIEF PROBLEMS IN GENEVA, THIS SHOULD PROVIDE SUFFICIENT RATIONALE FOR HIS VISIT TO LONDON. POSSIBLE ACTION HE WILL RAISE WITH BRITISH CONTAINED IN STAFF STUDY PREPARED HERE, WHICH WILL BE CARRIED

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TO LONDON BY DEPARTMENT OFFICER, OLIVER L. TROXEL, WHO WILL ASSIST AMBASSADOR MOORE IN TALKS.

2. BEGIN SUMMARY OF STAFF STUDY: POSSIBLE BREAKDOWN OF NIGERIAN PEACE TALKS IN ADDIS, PARTICULARLY IN ABSENCE OF AGREEMENT ON HUMANITARIAN RELIEF AND CONSEQUENT PROBABILITY OF MAJOR FEDERAL OFFENSIVE, COULD CAUSE UK TO IMPOSE ARMS EMBARGO ON NIGERIA AND TO CALL FOR CEASEFIRE. THIS WOULD UNDOUBTEDLY WRECK UK POSITION IN NIGERIA, DO CONSEQUENT DAMAGE TO OURS AND LEAD TO RETALIATION AGAINST US AND UK NATIONALS AND COMMERCIAL INTERESTS.

3. CONVERSELY, THIS WOULD PRESENT OPPORTUNITY FOR SOVIETS TO REITERATE FULL SUPPORT FOR FMG, TO REFUSE JOIN CALL FOR CEASEFIRE, AND TO STEP UP ARMS DELIVERIES. IN THESE CIRCUMSTANCES, MILITARY SITUATION WOULD NOT BE SUBSTANTIALLY CHANGED. FMG WOULD WILL HAVE CAPABILITY -- AND PROBABLY INCREASED WILL -- TO TRY TO FINISH OFF INSURRECTION. ONLY CHANGE WOULD BE LOSS OF UK AND US POSITION AND ENHANCEMENT OF USSR. QUESTION THEREFORE ONE OF HOW US AND UK COULD ENDEAVOR, WITH ANY CHANCE OF SUCCESS, TO IMPOSE ON SOVIETS SAME RESTRAINTS THAT THEY MIGHT BE FORCED TO IMPOSE ON THEMSELVES.

4. ASSUMING SOVIETS UNLIKELY BE PERSUADED BY US AND UK THAT IT IN THEIR SELF-INTEREST TO BE SELF-DENYING IN NIGERIA IN CIRCUMSTANCES IN WHICH US AND UK ARE PREPARED TO BE, QUESTION ONE OF TRYING TO FIND CONTEXT THAT WILL PLACE GREATEST PRESSURE ON THEM TO ADOPT POSITIONS SIMILAR TO THOSE OF US AND UK. FOLLOWING SCENARIO MIGHT ACCOMPLISH THIS.

((US AND UK SHOULD URGENTLY CONSULT ON VERY PRIVATE JOINT DEMARCHE TO EMPEROR OF ETHIOPIA AND PERSUADE HIM IN HIS CAPACITY AS CHAIRMAN OAU CONSULTATIVE COMMITTEE TO APPEAL TO FOUR POWERS (1) TO SUPPORT AFRICAN INITIATIVE BY HIM TO BRING ABOUT CEASEFIRE, AND (2) TO CEASE AND DESIST FROM ANY ACTIONS IN NIGERIA INCONSISTENT WITH CEASE FIRE PROPOSAL, AND PARTICULARLY TO SUSPEND FURTHER DELIVERIES OF WEAPONS TO EITHER SIDE. US AND UK WOULD URGE HIM TO CALL AT SAME TIME UPON ALL OTHER AFRICAN STATES TO MAKE CLEAR IN THEIR BILATERAL RELATIONS WITH GREAT POWERS THAT THEY EXPECT GREAT POWER COMPLIANCE AND WILL TAKE IT INTO ACCOUNT IN THEIR FUTURE RELATIONSHIPS))

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S
WITH THEM.

5. EMPEROR WOULD ALSO CALL UPON ALL OTHER STATES TO CEASE MILITARY SUPPLIES, TRANSPORTATION FACILITIES FOR MILITARY SUPPLIES, AND USE THEIR TERRITORY FOR SUCH PURPOSES. EMPEROR WOULD BUTTRESS FOREGOING APPEALS BY PRIVATE APPEAL TO POPE TO USE HIS INFLUENCE TO ASSURE PORTUGUESE COMPLIANCE AND TO DEGAULLE TO GAIN COMPLIANCE BY IVORY COAST AND GABON.

6. TO REASSURE FMG THERE WOULD BE NO CLANDESTINE STRENGTHENING OF BIAFRAJ MILITARY POTENTIAL. PORTUGAL WOULD BE REQUESTED BY VATICAN TO COOPERATE IN ENABLING INTERNATIONAL OBSERVERS TO INSPECT RELIEF FLIGHTS TO BIAFRA AT AIRPORTS OF BISSAU AND SAO TOME, IVORY COAST AND GABON WOULD BE ASKED TO FACILITATE SIMILAR INSPECTIONS AT THEIR PRINCIPAL AIRFIELDS. ARRANGEMENTS WOULD BE MADE TO CHANNEL ALL RELIEF FLIGHTS THROUGH WELL DESIGNATED CORRIDORS, SO THAT FMG COULD ITSELF MONITOR PASSAGE OF APPROVED FLIGHTS, AND GIVE FMG COMPLETE INFORMATION IN ADVANCE ON IDENTITY NUMBERS, CALL SIGNS AND TIME OF PASSAGE OF EACH AIRCRAFT. TO ENABLE FMG TO DETECT UNAUTHORIZED OVERFLIGHTS, IT MIGHT BE NECESSARY TO PROVIDE FMG WITH PORTABLE RADAR APPARATUS CAPABLE OF DETECTING AIRCRAFT BY SOUND, AND TECHNICAL PERSONNEL TO HELP RUN THEM.

7. IT MIGHT ALSO BE NECESSARY TO TRY TO WORK OUT-- MUCH MORE DIFFICULT MATTER-- SIMILAR OBSERVERS ON FEDERAL TERRITORY. ALL GOVERNMENTS WOULD BE ASKED TO JOIN, UNDER AUSPICES OF ICRC, IN MASSIVE AIR, SEA, AND LAND LIFT OF HUMANITARIAN SUPPLIES INTO AFFECTED AREAS ON BOTH SIDES OF CEASE-FIRE LINE. IN MAKING THIS APPEAL, EMPEROR WOULD MAKE CLEAR THAT AFRICA'S OBJECTIVE IS ONE TO BRING ABOUT PEACEFUL REINTEGRATION OF IBO PEOPLE INTO NIGERIA, UNDER CONDITIONS GIVING THEM LARGE MEASURE OF AUTONOMY AND CONTROL OF SOME OF MEANS TO HELP SECURE THEIR OWN PROTECTION. HE WOULD PROPOSE THAT ADEQUATE SAFEGUARDS, INCLUDING INTERNATIONAL OBSERVERS, BE PROVIDED TO ASSURE THAT THIS OBJECTIVE IS CARRIED OUT.

8. FOREGOING WOULD UNDOUBTEDLY BE DIFFICULT TO CARRY OUT, BUT SOVIETS MIGHT CALCULATE THAT THEY WOULD GAIN BY COOPERATING. CHANGE OF FAVORABLE CALCULATION WOULD BE MOST ENHANCED IF EMPEROR WERE ABLE PERSUADE SUBSTANTIAL NUMBER OF

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AFRICAN STATES TO STAND FIRMLY IN FAVOR OF PROPOSAL. TACTICALLY, BEST APPROACH WOULD PROBABLY BE VERY QUIET ONE BY EMPEROR, WITH US AND UK INITIATIVE NOT APPARENT, AND WITH US AND UK RESTRAINT FROM ANY PRECIPITOUS ENDORSEMENT OF PROPOSAL.

SOVIET VERBAL RESPONSE TO EMPEROR WOULD MOST LIKELY BE EQUITIVOCAL, BUT WE MIGHT HOPE FOR TACIT UNDERSTANDING IN WHICH, WITHOUT COMMITTING THEMSELVES, THEY WOULD IN FACT STOP SUPPLYING ARMS. AN UNDERSTANDING NO MORE DEFINITE THAN THIS WOULD CREATE PROBLEMS IN SECURING BIAFRA COOPERATION, BUT ADVANTAGES OF CEASE FIRE AND STOPPAGE OF ARMS IMPORTS TO BIAFRA SHOULD MAKE BIAFRANS MORE TRACTABLE.

9. IF SOVIETS DO NOT RESPOND SATISFACTORILY TO EMPEROR, PRIVATE INITIATIVE, HERE IS NO BAR TO PUBLIC TEST OF THEIR INTENTIONS. GIVEN SUFFICIENT AFRICAN BACKING OF EMPEROR, THEY MIGHT CONCEIVABLY CHANGE THEIR MINDS WHEN PUT ON SPOT. IF THEY COMPLY WITH EMPEROR'S APPEAL, THEY PUT THEMSELVES IN SAME POSITION AS US AND UK. IF THEY DO NOT COMPLY, THEY RISK ESCALATION OF CRITICISM THAT IS ALREADY BEING LEVELLED AT THEM IN AFRICA FOR THEIR POLICY OF ARMS SUPPLY TO FMG. END SUMMARY.

10. TO ALL ADDRESSEES: YOUR PERSONAL COMMENTS UPON ABOVE OUTLINED PROPOSAL ARE REQUESTED. UNDER NO CIRCUMSTANCES SHOULD IT BE DISCUSSED WITH ANY FOREIGN NATIONALS. RUSKI

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

AIRGRAM

POL 27 BIAFRA-NIGERIA

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UNP/8-26-68
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TO : DEPARTMENT OF STATE

INFO : U.S. Mission GENEVA, LAGOS, LONDON, USUN

FROM : Amembassy VIENNA

DATE: Aug 21, 1968 RM/R

SUBJECT : Austrian Foreign Minister on Biafra

REF :

The Austrian Foreign Minister, Dr. Kurt Waldheim, granted an interview to Sepp Gasser, diplomatic correspondent of the Vienna daily Express. In the article, appearing on August 18, 1968, the Foreign Minister is quoted as having said (responding to the question why he had appointed a special Ambassador):

"The facts appear to be as follows: Article II of the Charter of the United Nations prohibits interference in the internal affairs of a member nation. Nigeria has been a UN member for some time. Biafra is a genuine secessionist movement; a state of its own was created. Lagos is defending itself against this both militarily and diplomatically and is negotiating only on the basis of possible autonomy, but in no case on the independence of Biafra. On this basis U Thant could not involve himself in the tragic conflict. Until today, not a single nation has been prepared to seize the UN politically with this problem. However, the UN Human Rights Commission can indeed concern itself, for in Biafra it is a question of a racially disadvantaged minority.

"Now for the matter of the special Ambassador: the war in Biafra is by no means at an end. If the Nigerians occupy the country, the guerrilla war will last a long time, the Ibos will continue to fight. It is in order to ameliorate this terror

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Vienna's A-1409

that I named the special Ambassador on humanitarian grounds. Nobody can predict what will result, but I am convinced that this was right--above all, after my advance consultations with the powers and offices concerned."

The special Ambassador referred to above is Dr. Arthur Breycha-Vauthier who is designated as a special representative to expedite relief for Biafra and facilitate the end of fighting in Nigeria (USUN 6118).

MACARTHUR

BM

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INR 07, L 03, NSAE 00, NSC 10, P 04, RSC 01, SP 02, USIA 12, SAH 02,
AID 28, SCS 04, SCA 02, SR 01, ORM 03, RSR 01, /154 W

P. R. 211630Z AUG 68
FM AMEMBASSY ADDIS ABABA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 6235
INFO USMISSION GENEVA
AMEMBASSY LAGOS
USMISSION USUN NEW YORK

C O N F I D E N T I A L ADDIS ABABA 5337

SUBJECT: BIAFRAN APPROACH TO EMBASSY

1. AT 12:45 P.M. TODAY TWO MEN WHO SAID THEY REPRESENTED BIAFRA (IBE AND UNEGBU), ACCOMPANIED BY ETHIOPIAN (KESSETE), APPEARED AT EMBASSY UNANNOUNCED AND ASKED SEE COUNSELOR.
2. THEY HANDED POLCOUNS COPY OF TELEGRAM THEY SAID HAD BEEN SENT TO PRESIDENT JOHNSON AND ASKED THAT WE TRANSMIT SEPARATELY TO INSURE DELIVERY. THEY SAID IDENTICAL MESSAGES HAD BEEN SENT THIS MORNING TO UK, FRANCE AND USSR. BRITISH EMB REPORTS THEY CALLED THERE WITH SAME MESSAGE BEFORE ARRIVING HERE.

3. MESSAGE REPORTEDLY SENT TO PRESIDENT FOLLOWS:

QTE - PRESIDENT L.B. JOHNSON, WHITE HOUSE, WASHINGTON, U.S.A. WHILE EFFORTS FOR A NEGOTIATED SETTLEMENT PROCEED IN ADDIS ABABA, NIGERIA HAS INTENSIFIED ITS WAR OF EXTERMINATION BY EXTENDING FIERCEST ATTACKS INTO BIAFRA HEARTLAND. STOP NIGERIAN INTRANSIGENCE AND LACK OF FAITH IN NEGOTIATED SETTLEMENT ARE NOW QUITE CLEAR. STOP NIGERIA IS DOING EVERYTHING POSSIBLE TO FRUSTRATE RELIEF SUPPLIES TO BIAFRA AND HAS BEEN BOMBING TO DESTROY EVEN AN AIRFIELD SET ASIDE SOLELY FOR USE OF INTERNATIONAL RED CROSS. STOP PLEASE USE ALL YOUR INFLUENCE TO END WAR AND SUPPORT O.A.U. INITIATIVE FOR NEGOTIATED SETTLEMENT. STOP BIAFRA STANDS FOR NEGOTIATION AND THE RIGHTS OF SELF DETERMINATION. ENI NKOKU.

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Addis Ababa 5337

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LEADER BIAFRAN DELEGATION, ADDIS ABABA TALKS. 21/8/68. UNQTE.

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L 03, NSC 10, P 04, RSC 01, SP 02, SS 20, USIA 12, MCI 01, ACDA 16, AID 28

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R 211335Z AUG 68
FM AMEMBASSY PARIS
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 5304
INFO AMEMBASSY ABIDJAN
AMEMBASSY ACCRA
AMEMBASSY ADDIS ABABA
AMEMBASSY DAKAR
AMEMBASSY LAGOS
AMEMBASSY LIBREVILLE
AMEMBASSY LONDON
AMEMBASSY NIAMEY
AMEMBASSY YAOUNDE
USMISSION USUN
USMISSION GENEVA

CONFIDENTIAL PARIS 19700

SUBJ: FRANCE AND BIAFRA

REF: PARIS 19345

1. CURRENT FRENCH THINKING ON BIAFRA QUESTION WAS EXPRESSED AUGUST 20 IN CONVENTION BETWEEN AMBASSADOR AND SECSTATE FOR COOPERATION YVON BOURGES AND TALK BETWEEN EMBOFF AND ACTING QUAI DIRECTOR FOR AFRICAN AFFAIRS (MORIZET). BOTH MEN VERY GLOOMY ABOUT FUTURE OF BIAFRA IN LIGHT FAILURE ADDIS TALKS AND STEPPED-UP FMG MILITARY EFFORT. THEY PLACED BLAME FOR WHAT IS HAPPENING TO PEOPLE OF BIAFRA ON USSR AND UK WHO BY CONTINUING ARMS DELIVERIES ENABLED FMG OPT FOR MILITARY RATHER THAN POLITICAL SOLUTION. BOTH MAINTAINED THAT ONLY REAL SOLUTION MUST BE POLITICAL. EVEN IF FMG OCCUPIES BIAFRA THERE WILL REMAIN MAJOR LONG-RANGE PROBLEM OF INTRANSIGENT IBO HOSTILITY. HOWEVER, BOTH MEN ALSO STRESSED THAT JULY 31 AND AUGUST 13 DECLARATIONS

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BY FRENCH COUNCIL OF MINISTERS DO NOT IMPLY RECOGNITION OF BIAFRA, ALTHOUGH THEY HAVE BEEN WIDELY MISINTERPRETED AS SO DOING.

2. MORIZET MAY HAVE REVEALED FRENCH IDEAS ABOUT POSSIBLE MEANS FOR TRYING ONCE AGAIN TO FIND SETTLEMENT (ALBEIT WITH LITTLE HOPE). HE SAID CHIEFS OF STATE OF OAU CONSULTATIVE COMMITTEE WHO REFUSED GO TO ADDIS MIGHT AGREE MEET SOMEWHERE IN WEST AFRICA. HE INDICATED FRANCE PRESENTLY THINKING IN TERMS OF OAU AND CONCEIVABLY OCAM AS PROPER INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS TO AID IN SOLUTION. NO REAL HOPE OF SEIZING UNITED NATIONS SECURITY COUNCIL WITH QUESTION BECAUSE OF UK AND USSR POSITIONS PLUS RELUCTANCE OTHER MEMBERS. ACTION BY UNGA INSPIRED BY AFRICA DELS SUCH AS TANZANIA IS POSSIBLE BUT THIS STILL MONTH AWAY AND FMG APPARENTLY INTENDS OCCUPY BIAFRA BY THEM.

3. ON HUMANITARIAN SIDE, AGENCE FRANCE PRESSE CARRIED AUGUST 20 STORY RE SUCCESSFUL EFFORTS FRENCH RED CROSS SEND RELIEF TO BIAFRA. IT REPORTS THAT OVER 40 TONS FOOD AND MEDICINE ALREADY STOCKED AT LIBREVILLE PLUS SHIPOAD OF FISH, MILK AND MEAT PLUS 17 TONS OF MILK BEING FLOWN TO LIBREVILLE AUGUST 20 FROM PARIS. FRENCH RED CROSS REPRESENTATIVE QUOTED AS SAYING: "OUR ACTIONS TAKE PLACE OPENLY AND WE HAVE ESTABLISHED LIGHT AIRCRAFT SHUTTLE TO BIAFRA (FROM LIBREVILLE) IN FULL DAYLIGHT. IT IS QUESTION OF SAVING LIVES, NOT FORCING BLOCKADE. FRENCH HAD MEANS TO ACT AND THEY HAVE ACTED." AFP SPECULATES THAT FMG MUST BE AT LEAST TOLERATING FRENCH RED CROSS FLIGHTS.

4. SENEGALESE PRESIDENT SENGHOR IS QUOTED BY AFP AS SAYING AUGUST 20 IN PARIS THAT NIGERIA SHOULD END UP AS "SOMETHING BETWEEN FEDERATION AND CONFEDERATION." THAT IS REASON WE HAVE NOT RECOGNIZED BIAFRA DESPITE HUMANITARIAN PROBLEM POSED BY THAT PART OF NIGERIA."

(COMMENT: QUAI ATTRIBUTES SENEGALESE NON-RECOGNITION PRIMARILY TO PROBABLY UNFAVORABLE REACTION FROM SENEGALESE MOSLEMS AT TIME WHEN COUNTRY HAS SERIOUS INTERNAL POLITICAL PROBLEMS.)

5. FRENCH PRESS AND RADIO/TV ARE CONTINUING DEVOTE HEAVY COVERAGE TO BIAFRA WITH MOST PAPERS AUGUST 20 CARRYING FIRST-PAGE ARTICLES AND EDITORIALS ATTACKING FMG FOR BLOCKING ICRC EFFORTS FLY IN RELIEF SUPPLIES AND FOR LAUNCHING MAJOR OFFENSIVE. UK AND USSR ALSO CAUGHT LARGE SHARE OF EDITORIAL CRITICISM WHILE US CHIDED FOR ITS PRO-FMG PASSIVITY. ONE PAPER (COMBAT) WENT SO FAR AS TO

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CRITICIZE FRENCH GOVT FOR NOT HAVING DONE MORE.

GP-3 SHRIVER

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ACTION: The Honorable

Info:

John W. McCormack,

Speaker of the House,

1408 Federal Building,

Boston, Massachusetts.

Dear Mr. Speaker:

I very much appreciate your message of August 19 and deeply share your concern with the tragic situation in Biafra.

Let me assure you that the United States Government is currently and heavily engaged in supplying material and diplomatic support for the efforts of the International Committee of the Red Cross to bring relief to the unfortunate victims of this tragic conflict.

To fly these victims out of the area would, of course, require the cooperation of both sides, an element which is now lacking. We intend, however, to continue to support the Organization of African Unity and others to induce both parties to authorize the land and air corridors that are so badly needed to alleviate the suffering of the population in Biafra, and to encourage greater relief efforts to assist those now in the area controlled by the Federal Nigerian Government.

Sincerely,

Dean Rusk

~~XXXXXXXXXXXX~~

Drafted by: AF/AFW:FM Tucker:ncs:8/20/68

Tel. Ext. 7704

Telegraphic transmission and classification approved by The Secretary

Clearances:

AFW - Mr. Melbourne H - Mr. Leahy AF - Mr. Palmer S/S - Mr. Brown

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R 211307Z AUG 68
FM AMEMBASSY COTONOU
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 1573
INFO AMEMBASSY ABIOJAN
AMEMBASSY PARIS
AMEMBASSY OUAGADOUGOU
AMEMBASSY LAGOS

C O N F I D E N T I A L COTONO 1647

1. IN AUGUST 20 CONVERSATION WITH ZINSOU RE PUEBLO AFFAIR, TOOK OCCASION TO CALL HIS ATTENTION TO REPORT IN AUGUST 9 AFRICA CONFIDENTIAL THAT DAHOMEY AND UPPER VOLTA POSSIBLY MIGHT RECOGNIZE BIAFRA. ZINSOU REPLIED THIS MIGHT WELL BE TRUE OF UPPER VOLTA BUT CERTAINLY NOT OF DAHOMEY. STRESSED THAT THIS AT LEAST WAS ONE AREA IN WHICH DAHOMEY PREPARED TO EXERCISE INDEPENDENT JUDGMENT IN ITS OWN INTERESTS. HAD NO REPEAT NO INTENTION OF RECOGNIZING BIAFRA. INFORMED ME HE HAD RECEIVED REPRESENTATIVE OF GENERAL GOWON SOME TWO WEEKS AGO AND HAD INFORMED HIM GRD WAS OPPOSED TO BREAK-UP OF BIAFRA AND ALSO OPPOSED TO WAR. WHEN I OPINED THAT THIS WAS RATHER NEGATIVE RESPONSE, GIVING NO INDICATION OF POSITIVE THINKING OF DAHOMEY ON PROBLEM, ZINSOU REMINDED ME HE HAD INFORMED ME OF HIS OWN POSITION TWO YEARS AGO, NAMELY, THAT WHILE BIAFRA SHOULD BE GIVEN A CERTAIN AUTONOMOUS STATUS WITHIN A FEDERATION OR CONFEDERATION, IT WOULD BE DAMAGING TO BREAK THE UNITY OF THE NIGERIAN STATE.

2. IN CONVERSATION WITH FONMIN BADAROU AUGUST 9 FONMIN TOOK MUCH STRONGER POSITION STATING DAHOMEY, FACED AS IT WAS WITH ITS OWN REGIONAL PROBLEMS, COULD ONLY SUPPORT MAINTENANCE OF UNITY IN NIGERIA. MOREOVER, LONG FRONTIER WITH WESTERN AND NORTHERN NIGERIA TOGETHER WITH CLOSE DAHOMEAN COMMERCIAL RELATIONS WITH THESE AREAS COULD ONLY DICTATE GRD SUPPORT FOR FEDERAL GOVERNMENT.

CONFIDENTIAL

(2)

0354

DECLASSIFIED
Authority: VND 954503
By: MNARA Date: 10/5/05



Department of State **TELEGRAM**

Sol 27 Biafra Nigeria 47

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE 859

(35) PAGE 01 DAKAR 03699 232253Z

89

ACTION AF 15

INFO EUR 15, IO 13, CIAE 00, GPM 04, H 02, INR 07, L 03, NSC 10, P 04, RSC 01

SP 02, SS 25, USIA 12, NSA 02, DOD 01, AID 28, RSR 01, SR 01, ORM 03,

SCS 04, SCA 02, /155 W

R 211030Z AUG 68
FM AMEMBASSY DAKAR
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 2828
INFO AMEMBASSY ADDIS ABABA
AMEMBASSY BAMAKO
AMEMBASSY CONAKRY
AMEMBASSY LAGOS
AMEMBASSY LONDON
AMEMBASSY PARIS

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE DAKAR 3699

RE: DAKAR 3661 *Sol 27 Biafra Nigeria*

1. IN AIRPORT STATEMENT UPON RETURN FROM FRANCE LAST NIGHT, SENGHOR STATED: "I HAVE ALWAYS THOUGHT IT NECESSARY PROCEED AS QUICKLY AS POSSIBLE TO CEASE-FIRE AND THEN NEGOTIATE ON BASIS INTEGRITY NIGERIA UNDER FORM FEDERATION OR CONFEDERATION. I HAVE ALWAYS BELIEVED FUTURE NIGERIA SHOULD FIND ITS MOST REASONABLE FORM IN INTERMEDIATE SOLUTION BETWEEN FEDERATION AND CONFEDERATION. THAT IS WHY WE HAVE NOT RECOGNIZED BIAFRA, DESPITE THE EMOTION AW FEEL OVER HUMANITARIAN PROBLEMS IN THAT PART OF NIGERIA."

2. COMMENT: ABOVE STATEMENT SEEMS STEP BACK A BIT FROM PROSPECTIVE RECOGNITION BIAFRA. ON OTHER HAND, DOOR LEFT OPEN FOR SUCH MOVE, IF CEASE FIRE NOT ACHIEVED AND NEGOTIATIONS UNSUCCESSFUL.
BROWN

RECEIVED BY 85/5

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0355

DECLASSIFIED
Authority: VND 950503
By: MNARA Date: 10/3/05

66



DOL 27 BIAFRA-NIGERIA
Department of State **TELEGRAM**

32

UNCLASSIFIED 442

PAGE 01 LAGOS 11862 201610Z

53
ACTION AF 15

INFO EUR 15, IO 13, NSA 02, CIAE 00, DODE 00, GPM 04, H 02, INR 07, L 03,
NSC 10, P 04, RSC 01, SP 02, SS 20, USIA 12, SA 01, SAH 02, SR 01, ORM 03,
SCS 04, SCA 02, AID 28, RSR 01, ACDA 16, /168 W

R 201306Z AUG 68
FM AMEMBASSY LAGOS
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 2103
INFO AMEMBASSY ACCRA
AMEMBASSY ADDIS ABABA
AMEMBASSY KINSHASA
AMEMBASSY LONDON
AMEMBASSY MONROVIA
AMEMBASSY NIAMEY
AMEMBASSY PARIS
AMEMBASSY YAOUNDE
USMISSION GENEVA
USUN NEW YORK 366
CINCSRIKE/CINCMCAFSA
DIA
AMCONSUL IBADAN
AMCONSUL KADUNA

RECEIVED 11 25/7

UNCLAS LAGOS 11862

SUBJECT:- RADIO BIAFRA MISCELLANY

1. RADIO BIAFRA AUGUST 19 BROADCAST SHARP ATTACKS AGAINST FMG AND CALLED ON UK TO HALT ARMS SUPPLIES TO NIGERIA.
2. ACCORDING TO QTE BIAFRAN SENIOR OFFICIAL OF OFFICE OF HEAD OF STATE UNQTE (FBIS N190945) OJUKWU WISHES ATTEND ADDIS ABABA CONFERENCE BUT CEASE-FIRE MUST FIRST GO INTO EFFECT AND OTHER FIVE HEADS OF STATE OF OAU CONSULTATIVE COMMITTEE AND GOWON MUST ALSO ATTEND.
3. REFERRING TO CEASE-FIRE, BROADCAST STATED IT WOULD:

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0356

DECLASSIFIED	
Authority	VND 954503
By	MM NARA Date 10/5/05



Department of State

TELEGRAM

32

UNCLASSIFIED

PAGE 02. LAGOS 11862 201610Z

- A. ENABLE REBEL DELEGATION TRAVEL IN GREATER SAFETY;
 - B. MAKE POSSIBLE MOVEMENT OF RELIEF SUPPLIES;
 - C. CREATE BEST CONDITION FOR NEGOTIATED SETTLEMENT.
4. BIAFRA MININFO STATEMENT (FBIS N190910 AND N190925) ASKS BRITAIN STOP ARMS SHIPMENT. STATEMENT REFERS TO LORD SHEPHERD'S WORDS TO EFFECT THAT, IF THERE UNNECESSARY LOSS OF LIFE UK POSITION WOULD LIKELY CHANGE, AND TO STEWART'S PARLIAMENTARY SPEECH IN WHICH HE STATED IF FMG PROCEEDS QTE WITHOUT MERCY OR WITH SLAUGHTER AND STARVATION OF IBOS UNQTE UK WOULD HAVE TO RECONSIDER POLICY. STATEMENT CONCLUDED BRITAIN MUST REVISE ITS POLICY SINCE CIVILIANS STILL BEING BOMBED AND NIGERIA QTE INVOLVED IN SYSTEMATIC SLAUGHTER IN IBO HEARTLAND. UNQTE
5. STATEMENT ASSERTED ADEKUNLE'S DIVISION HAD MASSACRED 2,600 CIVILIANS AUGUST 15 IN ITS RECENT ADVANCE AND CALLED THIS QTE UNNECESSARY LOSS OF LIFE WHICH COULD HAVE BEEN AVOIDED. UNQTE (NEW NIGERIAN AUGUST 19 CARRIED DENIAL BY ADEKUNLE OF ALLEGED MASSACRE.)
6. BIAFRAN MININFO STATEMENT ATTACKED GOWON FOR REJECTING OJUKWU'S CEASE-FIRE AND NIAMEY PRINCIPLES ON ESTABLISHMENT OF LAND CORRIDOR.
7. IT IS ALSO SAID FMG LAUNCHING QTE MAJOR MILITARY OFFENSIVE UNQTE AND ACCUSED FEDERAL SOLDIERS OF USING RED CROSS FOOD SUPPLIES AND VEHICLES. MATHEWS

UNCLASSIFIED

0357

DECLASSIFIED	
Authority	VND959503
By	MMARA Date 10/5/05



POL 27 BIAFRA- NIGERIA
Department of State **TELEGRAM**

CONFIDENTIAL 477

PAGE: 01 LAGOS 11882 201654Z

53

ACTION: AF 15

INFO: EUR 15, IO 13, CIAE 00, DODE 00, GPM 04, H 02, INR 07, L 03, NSAE 00,

NSC 10, P 04, RSC 01, SP 02, SS 20, USIA 12, SAH 02, SA 01, SR 01, ORM 03,

SCS 04, SCA 02, AID 28, RSR 01, /150 W
.....

P 201640Z AUG 68

FM AMEMBASSY LAGOS

TO USMISSION GENEVA PRIORITY

SECSTATE WASHDC 2118

INFO AMEMBASSY LONDON PRIORITY

AMEMBASSY ADDIS ABABA

USMISSION USUN NEW YORK

C O N F I D E N T I A L LAGOS 11882

REF: GENEVA 4507

SUBJ: NIGERIA RELIEF

SWISS AMB CALL ON EDW. ENAHORO AND INFORMED HIM OF PLANNED
RESUMPTION RELIEF FLIGHTS TONIGHT. ENAHORO'S ONLY REACTION
WAS: "GOOD LUCK. I HOPE NOTHING HAPPENS."

GP-3

MATHEWS

RECEIVED BY 05/0

CONFIDENTIAL

0350

DECLASSIFIED
Authority: VND 959503
By: MVA/ARA Date: 10/5/05

RS/R ~~55~~

August 20, 1968

Dear Lieutenant Onwunali:

The President and Secretary Rusk have asked me to respond to your letters to them on the tragic situation in Biafra and expressing your concern about your family.

At the present time there are no United States officials in the Biafran held territory and only limited numbers of representatives of the International Committee of the Red Cross. Nevertheless, if you will send us further information on your family, including their names and any other useful information you may have, we will send it to our Embassy in Lagos. Unless there is an early and significant movement toward peace in the area, however, it may be some time before your family can be located.

Let me assure you that we are doing everything possible to work with the International Red Cross and others in establishing the badly needed ground and air relief corridors into the Biafran territory. I am enclosing a statement which gives some details on United States relief contribution to the area.

I hope that all goes well with you in Viet-Nam. We will be waiting to receive from you more details about your family.

Sincerely yours,

Joseph Palmer 2nd

Enclosure:

The Nigerian Relief Problem

First Lieutenant James U. Onwunali, 05336112,
228th Signal Company,
APO 96240,
San Francisco, California.

AFW:FMTucker:ncs:8/19/68

Clearance: AFW - Mr. Smith

Pol. 27 Barbara - Singapore

0359

DECLASSIFIED
Authority: VND959503
By: MNARA Date: 10/5/05

AM DS-1563
2-63

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT
ACTION SLIP
(To Remain With Correspondence)

CONTROL NO.

AFW
11366

TO
AF - Mr. Heubeck

DATE
August 14, 1968

SUBJECT
Ltr. to S from James U. Onwunali, 8/8, req. S's support for Biafra and also some help in contacting his family in Nigeria

ACTION

*Prompt handling is essential. Return basic correspondence with reply. If delayed call telephone extension below.

For appropriate action.

~~XXX~~ For direct reply. Cameback copy required

A response for signature by the _____

Prepare reply.

Clear with _____

Prepare a _____ to _____

Refer to White House request of _____

Due in S/S by _____

For your information.

REMARKS

COPIES TO

SCA - Mr. Luppi (w/att)

OFFICE OF THE ASST.
SECRETARY - AF

1968 AUG 15 PM 12 38

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

WSShepard
WSShepard X4735
SECRETARIAT STAFF

EXT.

0360

DECLASSIFIED
Authority VMD 954503
By MWA Date 10/5/05

11366

1LT. James U. Onwunali, 05336112
228TH SIGNAL COMPANY,
APO San Francisco, 96240.
8th August, 1968.

30

Hon. Dean Rusk
Secretary of State
State Department
Washington D.C.

Dear Sir,

Towards the end of December last year, I applied (while stationed in Western Germany) to go on leave to Nigeria to see my parents who were then living in the self-independent Biafra. I was advised by you through the American Embassy in Bonn, West Germany not to make the trip, primarily due to its political implications, like someone misinterpreting my presence (though a Nigerian citizen) as a military official and the possible danger to my life due to the situation and the Nigerian Government blockade. I dropped my plans and did not make the trip as I planned.

Unfortunately, I have not been able to hear from my parents or know of their whereabouts since the start of the conflict over a year ago. My parents live in Aba in the Biafra held territory, which was my home and still the home of my father, his three wives and over eighteen children whom I left in 1965 to come to the United States. My parents (especially my mother and her four children) depends on me for support and were adequately been supported by me up till the beginning of the crisis when I lost contact, due to the territory being cut off from the outside world. I made several attempts to get in touch with my family while in Germany and finally gave up after many tries (official and non-official). When I volunteered to come to Viet Nam and upon arrival in Viet Nam, I made several attempts but failed to accomplish anything. Then the territory ran out of food and people started dying by the thousands.

Sir, I know that there might be some exaggeration to what is actually happening out there, but there is no disputing of the fact that many a dying of starvation as the press reports are quoting often and on. I am fully aware of the fact that secession is a political crime. It is an act that gives nobody any strength to interfere in any development no matter how concerned he may be about what is happening. But it is also a fact from what is been going on that "Politics is taking the humanitarian touch out of life" in this respect. Culturally (as an Ibo man) I know that the Biafrans have a strong case, but the political approach to solving the problem, was not stepped in right. This tied the hand of both friends and wellwishers alike.

①
MICROFILMED BY BS/R

Pol 27 Biafra - Nigeria

0361

DECLASSIFIED
Authority: VND 959503
By: MN NARA Date: 10/5/05


I appreciate and admire the non-interference policy of your government in this case, but Sir, isn't there a difference between humanitarian and political act? The fact that many in that little patch of land can make a good decision is undisputable, but a hungry man does not think right and the more they starve the more the fear that has been implanted on them grows. Sir, I am therefore appealing to you to do all you can either through the International Red Cross or any other means available to your good offices to help others to make way through the thoughtful diplomatic reasoning that has saved a lot of people in this world, to see if the Nigerian Government will allow a mercy corridor to be established to supply food to the starving people. Nigerians or Biafrans, dead, they will not be able to make up their mind or change it in regard to changing their proclaimed Biafran citizenship. Most like my illiterate family, do not understand the complexity of the daily happening, but will not be able to be made to understand while starving to death. I therefore join among other people, the Vice-President of the United States in urging you to do all you and your government can do to help the starving people in Biafrans which includes my unfortunate family.

I will also appreciate it if there is anyway the State Department will help me to find out if my family members are living or not. I do not have the authority to make a direct request of this nature to the embassy in Lagos, knowing the political implications and cannot get any help from the military, because this is more political than it is military. I have tried the Red Cross but did not achieve any result, because the Nigerian government will not let the Red Cross to make any useful enquires.

I have always had high hopes (even when home in Nigeria) on the ability of the United States to help the needy people of the world (though some do not due to their misunderstanding, appreciate the humanitarian intent behind it) and I hope that your government will help to solve this "unfortunate incident" in that part of the world. My tour in VietNam has given me a great idea of the advantages of "freedom" and I am proud to be a member of this "elite and loyal" group of freedom fighters. I hope that one day it will dawn in the mind of people that you cannot forcefully take what is not yours and get away with it that easy. History will remember those that made it.

I remain, Sir

Yours Sincerely,



James Uwasomba Onwunali
1LT. Signal Corps
United States Army (VietNam)

0362

DECLASSIFIED	
Authority	VND 959503
By	MM NARA Date 10/5/05

1LT. James U. Onwunali, 05336112

228th Signal Company

APO San Francisco, 96240



RETURN RECEIPT REQUESTED
DELIVER TO ADDRESSEE ONLY

Honorable Dean Rusk,
Secretary of State,
State Department,
WASHINGTON D.C.

CERTIFIED

No. 563121


MAIL

AIR MAIL

UNITED STATES ARMED FORCES - VIETNAM

0363

DECLASSIFIED
Authority VND 959503
By MVA Date 10/3/05



0364

DECLASSIFIED
Authority VMD 950503
By MN NARA Date 10/5/05

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT
ACTION SLIP
WHITE HOUSE REFERRAL

CONTROL NO.
AFW
X11325

TO P/PCD - Mr. Coates

DATE 8/13/68

SUBJECT Memo ref to S fm Shoemaker. 8/4/68 Ltr fm Lt. James U. Onwunali to Pres re Biafra.

AFW: See SLIP # 11365

Prepare a Read to _____
memo enclosing or containing:
_____ Draft reply for President's
signature.
_____ Draft reply for signature by
_____.
_____ Memo for use as enclosure to reply
by White House.
_____ Comment or recommendation.

Direct reply:

_____ Furnish information copy under
cover of a Read to _____
memo.

_____ Comeback copy required for S/S.

XXXXX Suitable acknowledgment or other
appropriate handling.

_____ Furnish information copy of
reply, if any, under cover of
a Read to _____ memo.

_____ Refer to White House request of
_____.

_____ FYI

_____ Due in S/S by _____.

NOTES

1. White House referrals must be answered within 48 hours unless otherwise noted. If deadline cannot be met, inform S/S immediately at extension given below.
2. Direct replies to White House mail must be signed at the Assistant or Acting Assistant Secretary level.
3. Unless otherwise noted, direct replies, depending upon the addressee of the incoming letter, must begin: "The President has asked me to reply" or "Mr. _____ has asked me to reply".
4. Basic correspondence should be returned when draft reply, memorandum or comment or comeback copy for the White House is requested.

REMARKS

Trans AF per Alan Parker
8/14 Called by B. G. Hester

COPIES TO:

AF - Mr. Garland (w/att)

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

68 AUG 15 PM 5 07

OFFICE OF THE ASST.
SECRETARY OF STATE

Alan Parker 5130
Secretariat Staff
Ext.

0365

DECLASSIFIED
Authority: VND 954503
By: MVA Date: 10/5/05

THE WHITE HOUSE OFFICE

REFERRAL

11325

To: The Secretary of State

Date: August 9, 1968

ACTION REQUESTED

- ☐ Draft reply for:
☐ President's signature.
☐ Undersigned's signature.

☐ Memorandum for use as enclosure to reply.

☒ Direct reply.
☐ Furnish information copy.

☐ Suitable acknowledgment or other appropriate handling.
☐ Furnish copy of reply, if any.

☐ For your information.
☐ For comment.

NOTE

Prompt action is essential.

If more than 48 hours' delay is encountered, please telephone the undersigned immediately, Code 1450.

Basic correspondence should be returned when draft reply, memorandum, or comment is requested.

REMARKS:

(2) Dr. James H. Duvall
 Description:

1 Letter: _____ Telegram: _____ Other: _____

To:

From:

Date:

Subject: Correspondence from servicemen in Viet Nam or their families.

By direction of the President:

Whitney Shoemaker

Whitney Shoemaker
Assistant to the President

(Copy to remain with correspondence)

MICROFILMED BY 85/A

Pol 27. Briefs - Inspira

0366

DECLASSIFIED
Authority: VND 959/503
By: MNARA Date: 10/5/05

22
m.g.
State
AAGS
Direct reply

Urgent aid to Ibo

11325

1LT. James Uwasomba Onwunali, 05336112,
228th Signal Company
APO San Francisco, 96240.
4th August, 1968.

President Lyndon B. Johnson
White House
Washington D.C.

Sir,

The war between Nigeria and Biafra is gone to such an extent that one of the ways of bringing peace to this distant land is for the world powers to show a little interest in the starving Biafrans. The innocent civilians, should be given the food to survive and muster enough strength to make up their mind about their citizenship.

Speaking as a Nigerian citizen, an Ibo man (though presently a United States Army Officer), I think that what is happening in Nigerian is a matter of miscalculation and series of bad decisions. If the Ibo people in Biafra die of starvation, there will be no whole Nigeria. Secession is a political crime that makes it hard for any one no matter how interested to interfere in matters like this, but Sir, politics is taking the humanitarian touch out of life and innocent civilians are left to die for something that is to them, like an entangled delima. They do not understand what is going on other than the fact that to fight is the only way to survive. Do they have all the nature's ingredient of thought, not while they are hungry.

I dropped my plan to go Aba in Biafra in January, 1968, while stationed in Germany to go and see my parents on the advice of the Secretary of State Hon Dean Rusk, through the American Embassy in Bonn, West Germany. I was able to understand the fact that even if I get through the Nigerian government blockade, my visit as an American military man will be subject to misinterpretation. Sir, I am appealing to you to use your good offices in making it possible through any channel available to you for this people not to die due to starvation in that little community. I was born and raised there and left home only in the spring of 1965 and I know that they do not stand any chance unless some body does some thing to help them by all means. Eighty percent of the people do not know what is going on, other than what is fed them through their local leaders. Though there is a cultural backing behind the claims of cruelty by the Biafrans, like I said before Sir, it is now what in my opinion is a miscalculated tactics.

Nigerians or Biafrans those people, including my parents and their children are innocent civilians dying of hunger and need some help.

0367

DECLASSIFIED	
Authority	VND 954503
By	MM NARA Date 10/5/05


-2-

I understand and appreciate the attitude of non-interference and neutrality which you have taken in this issue, but Sir, I appeal to you to do all within your power to help this suffering civilians. They are innocent. There is no doubting of the fact that there might be some exaggeration of the facts of what is actually happening there, but still, it is evident that this section of the country will perish and there will be nothing to make that part a part of one country like it is always have been.

The Ibo man is afraid and hunger increases his fear and if nothing is done to help him he will be so afraid that solution to a simple problem will be great job. This is a different war, a war where the tactics are tribally instead of military oriented. The other man fights the other man not as a fellow soldier, but with the hate his forefathers had in the others way of living or organization. It is an internal conflict, I will agree with out hesitation Sir, but without quidance, it will exceed that and innocent people will continue to dye like rats in a smoke hole.

Sir, for many years since my mind started to function by itself, I have always had confidence in the American people and I hope that you will do your best in the name of the American people and help the starving Biafrans in that huge dark continent "Africa".

Sincerely Yours,



JAMES UWASOMBA ONWUNALI
1LT. SigC
US Army VietNam


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0368

DECLASSIFIED
Authority: VND 954503
By: MNARA Date: 10/5/05

James O. Onwunali, 05336112
Federal Express Company
2284 Francisco, 96240.



President Lyndon B. Johnson,
White House
WASHINGTON, D.C.

UNITED STATES ARMED FORCES - VIETNAM

0369

DECLASSIFIED
Authority: VND 959503
By: MWA/ARA Date: 10/3/05

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

SYSTEMATIC REVIEW WITHDRAWAL CARD NO. POL 50-24

DATE: 8/19/68 MSG NO.: 11820 TYPE: TE
FROM: Lagos TO: State
SUBJECT: Nigerian Relief Grenville Activity
DOCUMENT ORIGINATOR: DEPT. OF STATE: ✓ OTHER:

BASIS FOR WITHDRAWAL:

✓ CONTAINS NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION
 OTHER LAW OR REGULATION

W
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0370

DECLASSIFIED
Authority VND 959503
By MV NARA Date 10/5/05



63 Po/27 Biafra-Nigeria
Department of State **TELEGRAM**
& Po/15-1 The Congo²⁷

CONFIDENTIAL 752

PAGE 01 KINSHA 11041 191609Z

50

ACTION AF 15

INFO EUR 15, IO 13, NSA 02, CIAE 00, DODE 00, GPM 04, H 02, INR 07, L 03,

NSC 10, P 04, RSC 01, SP 02, SS 20, USIA 12, SA 01, SAH 02, RSR 01, 114 W

R 191010Z AUG 68

FM AMEMBASSY KINSHASA

TO SECSTATE WASHDC 8769

INFO AMEMBASSY LAGOS

AMEMBASSY ADDIS ABABA

AMEMBASSY PARIS

AMEMBASSY LONDON

USMISSION USUN NEW YORK

C O N F I D E N T I A L KINSHASA 11041

1. I DISCUSSED NIGERIAN SITUATION WITH MOBUTU AND BOMBOKO SUNDAY. MOBUTU REITERATED HIS POSITION THAT HE WOULD NOT ATTEND ANY MEETINGS UNLESS IT WERE CLEAR GOWON AND OJUKWU WOULD BE PRESENT. HE EXPRESSED CONSIDERABLE PESSIMISM ON ANY EARLY SETTLEMENT AND DID NOT REALLY SEEM VERY INTERESTED IN NIGERIA.

2. MOBUTU ALSO EXPRESSED CONTINUED SUPPORT OF GOWON AND WAS CRITICAL OF GENERAL DEGAULLE FOR HAVING COME TO AID OF BIAFRA. MOBUTU SAID DEGAULLE HAD ALWAYS SUPPORTED SECESSIONIST MOVEMENTS AND CITED OBVIOUS EXAMPLE OF FRENCH SUPPORT FOR TSHOMBE WHEN HE WAS SECESSIONIST LEADER OF KATANGA.

3. MOBUTU PARENTHETICALLY REMARKED THAT DEGAULLE LIKED HIM WELL ENOUGH BUT THAT OTHER FRENCH LEADERS DISLIKED HIM. HE SAID FOCCART HAD MENTIONED TO BOKASSA THAT MOBUTU WOULD PROBABLY BE ASSASSINATED. MCBRIDE

MODIFIED BY NS/R

CONFIDENTIAL

0371

DECLASSIFIED	
Authority	VND 959503
By	MM/ARA Date 10/5/05

ORIGIN/ACTION

AIR 6

(18)

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

AIRGRAM

*POL 27 BIAFRA
NIGERIA*

FOR RM USE ONLY

RM/R	REP	AF
1		5
ARA	EUR	FE
NEA	CU	INR
		5
E	P	IO
	3	✓
L	FBO	AID
AGR	COM	FRB
INT	LAB	TAR
TR	XMB	AIR
ARMY	CIA	NAVY
3	20	5
OSD	USIA	NSA
34	10	3
NSC		
6		

A-753
NO.

UNCLASSIFIED

HANDLING INDICATOR

TO : Department of State

INFO : HELSINKI, LAGOS, MADRID, OSLO, REYKJAVIK; STOCKHOLM

RECEIVED

AUG 21 4 08 PM 1968

FROM : Amembassy COPENHAGEN

DATE: August 19, 1968

SUBJECT : Joint Nordic Statement re Biafran Aid

REF :

On the initiative of Danish Foreign Minister Poul Hartling, officials from the Nordic countries met in Copenhagen on August 13 to prepare a joint statement on aid to Biafra. Hartling then undertook to clear the statement by telephone with the other Nordic Foreign Ministers. Publication was held up, however, until late August 14 awaiting the clearance of Swedish Foreign Minister Torsten Nilsson, who reportedly was on a fishing trip.

The statement, translated in Enclosure 1, avoids substantive comment on the Nigerian conflict, and urges both sides to open the way for relief supplies to reach the needy.

Comment. There has been reasonably wide coverage of the plight of Biafrans in the Danish media, and much concern. But the Danish public, confused by not being able to determine which side is more responsible for holding up relief supplies, has not yet mustered the fevered indignation with which it usually confronts such tragedies. There is less pressure than one would normally predict, therefore, for the Danish Government to do something politically about the conflict. A Social Democratic suggestion that Denmark raise the question in the United Nations Security Council was rejected by Hartling on the grounds that the conflict was African, that there are African countries on the Security Council, and that the suggested measure would do no good.

WHITE

Enclosure:
Translation of Joint Nordic Statement

FORM DS-323

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Drafted by: POL:BCBarr:lz 8/16/68

Contents and Classification Approved by: DCM:BEBlankinship

Clearances:

0372

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Authority: VNP959503
By: MW NARA Date: 10/5/05

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Page 1 of 2
Encl. No. 1
A-753 from Copenhagen

The Governments of the Nordic Countries have to-day issued the following declaration:

1. The sufferings of the civilian victims of the conflict in Nigeria are causing increasing compassion and concern in all sections of the population in the Nordic Countries. Private organizations as well as the Governments have on a humanitarian basis already taken action to participate in the world wide efforts to bring relief to the affected areas.
2. The Nordic Governments have followed with great sympathy the efforts to bring the conflict to an end. They have noted that concrete proposals for the transportation of relief supplies to the civilian victims of the war were placed on the agenda for the negotiations in Addis Ababa under the auspices of the OAU. It is the urgent hope of the Nordic Governments that the humanitarian aspects will be given the highest priority during the negotiations in order that immediate relief be brought to the innocent victims of the hostilities.
3. While conscious of the role of the parties directly concerned and of the responsibility which OAU has taken upon itself the Nordic countries feel that the human tragedy which has assumed proportions as to arouse the conscience of the world is becoming a matter of grave international concern.
4. The Nordic Governments warmly support the initiative taken by the Secretary General of the United Nations in sending a special representative to Nigeria. Likewise they fervently hope for the success of the endeavours of the ICRC and other international and national humanitarian bodies and societies engaged in relief operations in Nigeria.
5. Large emergency supplies have already been put at the disposal of relief organizations through unselfish contributions. The Nordic Governments urge both sides in the conflict to do their utmost to find ways and means for supplies intended for those in need to reach them without further delay.
6. The Nordic Governments express the hope that such endeavours will lead to realistic results. On this basis - and convinced

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Page 2 of 2
Encl. 1
A-753 from Copenhagen

that this appeal will be met with a positive and constructive attitude by all those who have a responsibility to exercise in this matter - the Nordic Countries are prepared to render any help they may be able to offer to alleviate the human sufferings the reports of which have appalled the world.

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(52)



20 L 27 Biafra - Nigeria
Department of State **TELEGRAM**

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PAGE 01 BONN 15758 191741Z

45
ACTION EUR 20

INFO AF 09, SAH 02, SAL 01, SA 01, IO 13, CIAE 00, DODE 00, GPM 04, H 02,
INR 07, L 03, NSC 10, P 04, RSC 01, SP 02, SS 20, USIA 12, AID 28, RSR 01,
/140 W

R 191625Z AUG 68
FM AMEMBASSY BONN
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 9557
INFO AMEMBASSY LAGOS
AMEMBASSY LONDON

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE BONN 15758

SUBJECT: THE FRG AND THE NIGERIAN WAR


REF: BONN 15664

1. THE NIGERIAN SITUATION CONTINUES TO BE THE SUBJECT OF GREAT ATTENTION IN THE FEDREP. OVER THE WEEKEND APPROXIMATELY 4,000 DEMONSTRATED IN BONN AGAINST THE WAR AND DELIVERED PROTESTS AGAINST ARMS AID TO NIGERIA AT BOTH THE BRITISH AND SOVIET EMBASSIES. SIMILAR, BUT SMALLER, DEMONSTRATIONS TOOK PLACE IN OTHER CITIES, INCLUDING ONE IN FRANKFURT WHICH MARKED THE BEGINNING OF A PRO-BIAFRAN PROTEST MARCH ON BONN.

2. ON THE GOVERNMENT SIDE, CHANCELLOR KIESINGER, SPEAKING TO THE PRESS AUGUST 18, CALLED FOR A COMMON AID EFFORT BY EUROPEANS TO HELP EASE SUFFERING IN BIAFRA. AT THE AUGUST 19 PRESS BRIEFING, FRG DEPUTY PRESS CHIEF AHLERS SAID THAT WHILE BIAFRA WAS NOT ON THE OFFICIAL AGENDA FOR THE AUGUST 21 CABINET MEETING, IT WOULD COME UP IN CONNECTION WITH THE CHANCELLOR'S PROPOSAL. IN ANOTHER DEVELOPMENT, THE FONOFF REPORTEDLY EXPRESSED ITS DISAPPROVAL AUGUST 16 TO THE NIGERIAN EMBASSY OVER AN INTERVIEW IN LAST WEEK'S WEEKLY ILLUSTRATED STERN IN WHICH BENJAMIN ADEKUNLE, THE COMMANDER OF NIGERIAN TROOPS ON THE SOUTH BIAFRAN FRONT, MADE SOME ESPECIALLY

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Department of State **TELEGRAM**

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PAGE 02 BONN 15758 191741Z

COLD-BLOODED STATEMENTS ABOUT TREATMENT OF BIAFRANS.

3. COMMENT: THE WEEKEND DEMONSTRATIONS, IN WHICH CHURCH GROUPS PLAYED A PROMINENT ROLE, UNDERLINE THE DEPTH OF HUMANITARIAN CONCERN WHICH THE NIGERIAN SITUATION IS CAUSING IN THE FEDREP. KIESINGER'S STATEMENT TO THE PRESS SEEMS DIRECTED AT PLACATING PUBLIC OPINION IN THIS REGARD. LODGE

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Authority	VND 959503
By	MNARA Date 10/5/05

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5-C-121

This document released to
public per *J. Bishop AF*
9/11/88

27 Biafra - Nigeria

PS/P

August 19, 1968

Dear Taylor:

The President has asked me to reply to your letter of August 8 concerning the Biafran situation. I appreciated your courtesy in sending me your letter enclosing a copy of that communication.

I know that you will understand how deeply this Government shares your concern over this tragic conflict and I am enclosing a statement summarizing our position.

With respect to your specific recommendation, the consistent position of this Government has been that the political aspects of the Nigerian conflict are primarily ones for the parties to the conflict to solve themselves, with the assistance of their African - and Commonwealth - brothers who are doing their utmost to assist. With regard to the humanitarian aspects of the conflict, the United States is doing everything possible to support and assist the efforts of the International Committee of the Red Cross, the Organization of African Unity and other international and voluntary agencies to bring effective assistance to the needy on both sides. We do not believe that a unilateral political intervention by the United States, of the kind that you suggest, would be either appropriate or effective under the circumstances.

PL 27 Biafra - Nigeria

With warm personal regards.

Sincerely,

Joseph Palmer 2nd

Enclosure

Mr. F. Taylor Ostrander
American Metal Climax, Inc.
1270 Avenue of the Americas
New York, New York

AF:JPalmer:gm

Nigerian Task Force

0377

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Authority: *VND954503*
By: *MM* NARA Date: *10/5/05*

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT
ACTION SLIP
WHITE HOUSE REFERRAL

CONTROL NO.

S/S 11245

TO P/PCD - Mr. Coates

DATE 8/12/68

SUBJECT Ref to Sfm WESHOEMAKER dtd 8/10 re 8/8 ltr to Pres fm F. Taylor
OSTRANDER re BIAFRA.

LR

Prepare a Read to _____
memo enclosing or containing:
_____ Draft reply for President's
signature.
_____ Draft reply for signature by
_____.
_____ Memo for use as enclosure to reply
by White House.
_____ Comment or recommendation.

Direct reply:

_____ Furnish information copy under
cover of a Read to _____
memo.
_____ Comeback copy required for S/S.

XXXX Suitable acknowledgment or other
appropriate handling:
_____ Furnish information copy of
reply, if any, under cover of
a Read to _____ memo.

_____ Refer to White House request of
_____.

_____ FYI

_____ Due in S/S by _____.

NOTES

1. White House referrals must be answered within 48 hours unless otherwise noted. If deadline cannot be met, inform S/S immediately at extension given below.
2. Direct replies to White House mail must be signed at the Assistant or Acting Assistant Secretary level.
3. Unless otherwise noted, direct replies, depending upon the addressee of the incoming letter, must begin: "The President has asked me to reply" or "Mr. _____ has asked me to reply."
4. Basic correspondence should be returned when draft reply, memorandum or comment or comeback copy for the White House is requested.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
OFFICE OF THE ASST
SECRETARY - AF
1968 AUG 15 PM 5 08

REMARKS

COPIES TO:

AF - Mr. Heubert (w/att)

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
1968 AUG 15 PM 5 08

OFFICE OF THE ASST
SECRETARY - AF

1968 AUG 15 PM 5 08
PUBLIC SECRETARY - AF

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Alan Parker x7552
Secretariat Staff
Ext.

0378

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Authority: VND 954503
By: MNA Date: 10/5/05

THE WHITE HOUSE OFFICE

REFERRAL

11245

To: The Secretary of State

Date: August 10, 1968

ACTION REQUESTED

- ☐ Draft reply for:
☐ President's signature.
☐ Undersigned's signature.
☐ Memorandum for use as enclosure to reply.
☐ Direct reply.
☐ Furnish information copy.
☒ Suitable acknowledgment or other appropriate handling.
☐ Furnish copy of reply, if any.
☐ For your information.
☐ For comment.

NOTE

Prompt action is essential.

If more than 48 hours' delay is encountered, please telephone the undersigned immediately, Code 1450.

Basic correspondence should be returned when draft reply, memorandum, or comment is requested.

REMARKS:

Description:

Letter: ☒ Telegram: ☐ Other: Several Letters

To: The President

From: (See other side)

Date:

Subject: Disaster in Biafra - Urging support by United States and United Nations.

F. Taylor Bottrander

By direction of the President:

Whitney Shoemaker

Assistant to the President

(Copy to remain with correspondence)

Pol 27 Biafra - Nigeria

0379

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 Authority: VND 959503
 By: MVA Date: 10/5/05

(Also President, African-American
Chamber of Commerce, Inc.)

F. TAYLOR OSTRANDER

ASSISTANT TO THE PRESIDENT
AMERICAN METAL CLIMAX, INC.
1270 AVENUE OF THE AMERICAS

NEW YORK, N.Y. 10020
757-9700

1270 AVENUE OF THE AMERICAS
NEW YORK 20, N.Y.

11245

August 8, 1968

H
Honorable Lyndon B. Johnson
President of the United States
The White House
Washington, D. C.

Dear Mr. President:

I write to you with the highest esteem for your policies and your personal efforts to deal with all the complexities of the domestic and international scenes.

The Nigerian situation is becoming intolerable. It challenges the consciences of everyone, particularly those like myself who have tried to understand and support African independence.

Ever since the word "genocide" was invented after World War II it has been bandied about with remarkable abandon in a wide variety of inapplicable circumstances of which I need not remind you.

Now, however, for the first time, the world is confronted with an all too obvious case of actual mass genocide perpetrated by the Nigerian Federal Government against the Ibo people. In my view, the cruel arrogance of the Federal Nigerian authorities has gone beyond any acceptable limits.

I am not close to any Biafran leaders and I have not participated in any pro-Biafran activities. Mine is the reaction of an informed citizen.

Courageous as is the action of the five governments that have publicly proclaimed their support of Biafra, this has had no practical effect. Accordingly, the time has come for the world community of civilized nations to show its repugnance for Federal Nigerian policies by withdrawing diplomatic recognition of that government. This will be the only effective way of shocking the self-appointed leaders of that formerly promising nation out of their present cynical disregard of world opinion and forcing them to end their policy and practice of deliberate mass starvation of the Ibo.

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By: MN NARA Date: 10/5/05

August 8, 1968

Honorable Lyndon B. Johnson

-2-

I urge that the United States take the lead in a concerted campaign of diplomatic isolation of the present Federal Nigerian Government.

Sincerely,

F. Taylor Ostrander
F. Taylor Ostrander

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By	MVA Date 10/5/03

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

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Col 27 Biafra-nigeria

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NEA CU INR

E P IO

L FBO AID

ORM S/R SCS

AGR COM FRB

INT LAB TAR

TR XMB AIR

ARMY CIA NAVY

OSD USIA NSA

WSE

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A-799

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RR Pol 27-9 Nigeria

HANDLING INDICATOR

TO : Department of State

RECEIVED
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

AUG 20 12 01 PM 1968

RS/AN
ANALYSIS BRANCH

DATE: August 18, 1968

FROM : U. S. Mission GENEVA

SUBJECT : Nigeria Relief

REF :

At a public meeting called by the ICRC which was attended by representatives of the national Red Cross societies, the UN agencies, and international voluntary agencies, the ICRC gave out the enclosed material consisting of a map of the former Biafran areas and the key place names in the re-occupied areas and the central Biafran area. The two lists and the addendum cover donations in kind and in cash from governments, international organizations, and Red Cross societies throughout the world.

TUBBY

RW

✓ at 7:4

ENCLOSURES:

1. Map
2. List of merchandise donated
3. List of cash donations
4. Addendum

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FORM 4-62 DS-323

Drafted by:

SRTripp:jc 8-14-68

Contents and Classification Approved by:


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Authority: VNP 954503
By: MNARA Date: 10/5/05

Encl 2


Annex A-799

NIGERIA/BIAFRA

Dons en nature - Situation au 12.8.68

Donateurs	Marchandises	Valeur	Destination	
<u>Allemagne</u>	26 tonnes conserves de boeuf	70.000.-	Lagos	arrivé
"	25 tonnes camions, vivres, médicaments	675.000.-	Lagos	annoncé
(Hessen)	15 tonnes médicaments	214.000.-	Lagos	annoncé
<u>Autriche</u>	35 tonnes lait multivitamines, et Biomalz	43.000.- ---	Stisab ---	annoncé
	6 caisses médicaments	10.000.-	Stisab	arrivé
<u>Belgique</u>	425 kg médicaments	31.250.-	Stisab	arrivé
	1.800 kg médicaments	70.000.-	Stisab	annoncé
<u>Canada</u>	25 tonnes pommes de terre déshydratées	50.000.-	Lagos	annoncé
	2 tonnes potages déshydratés	10.000.-	Stisab	annoncé
	14 tonnes codfish, médicaments	20.000.-	Lagos	arrivé
<u>Etats-Unis</u>	115.200 capsules de multivitamines	---	Lagos	arrivé
	400 bouteilles Thia-benzole	---	Lagos	arrivé
	150 kg antibiotiques	10.000.-	Lagos	arrivé
	médicaments	12.500.-	Lagos	arrivé
<u>Finlande</u>	200 trousses premier secours	17.460.-	Stisab	arrivé
	3 tonnes lait	6.100.-	Stisab	arrivé
	200 trousses premier secours	20.000.-	Lagos	arrivé
	208 kg médicaments	---	Stisab	arrivé


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Pg - 2 - Encl 2 *Genève* A 799

Donateurs	Marchandise	Valeur	Destination	
<u>Finlande</u> (suite)	75 kgs médicaments	---	Stisab	arrivé
	580 kg antibiotiques	---	Stisab	arrivé
	428 kg multivitamines	---	Stisab	arrivé
	7,3 tonnes extrait de viande, 300 trousses premier secours	---	Stisab	arrivé
<u>Grande Bretagne</u>	300 kg médicaments	5.000.-	Stisab	arrivé
	100 havresacs premier secours	102.500.-	Lagos	arrivé
<u>Inde</u>	335 kg tissus et médicaments	1.400.-	Stisab	arrivé
	250 kg tissus	---	Stisab	arrivé
<u>Irlande</u>	2 tonnes lait, vitamines, vêtements	4.720.-	Stisab	arrivé
	1 tonne désinfectant, viande, couvertures	1.925.-	Lagos	arrivé
	500 kg médicaments	6.200.-	Stisab	arrivé
	3 tonnes lait, viande, sel	5.280.-	Stisab	arrivé
	médicaments	4.820.-	Stisab	arrivé
	580 tonnes lait, viande, vêtements	630.000.-	Stisab	arrivé
<u>Islande</u>	84 tonnes stockfish et lait	---	Stisab	arrivé
	70 tonnes stockfish, huile	---	Lagos	arrivé
<u>Israel</u>	500 kgs protéines	---	Stisab	arrivé
	1500 kgs vivres et médicaments	40.000.-	Stisab	arrivé
	250 kgs vêtements	---	Stisab	arrivé
<u>Norvège</u>	390 kg vitamines	8.000.-	Stisab	arrivé
	foie de morue, vitamines	30.000.-	Stisab	arrivé

0385



Pg - 3 -

Pg 3 Encl 2 Geneva 17 799

Donateurs	Marchandise	Valeur	Destination	
<u>Norvège</u> (suite)	20 tonnes stockfish	70.000.-	Stisab	arrivé
	8 tonnes fishpowder et lait	10.000.-	Stisab	annoncé
<u>Pays-Bas</u>	2300 kg draps et antibiotiques	15.000.-	Lagos	arrivé
	1 tonne draps, baby food	20.000.-	Lagos	arrivé
	9 kg vaccins et instruments médicaux	1.350.-	Lagos	arrivé
	500 tonnes lait et vaccins anti-tétanique	300.000.-	Stisab	arrivé
<u>Pologne</u>	1 tonne couvertures	1.250.-	Lagos	arrivé
	2 tonnes lait et couvertures	3.000.-	Lagos	arrivé
<u>Suède</u>	96.000 capsules de chloroquine	8.200.-	Stisab	arrivé
	408 kgs médicaments	30.000.-	Stisab	arrivé
	couvertures, draps, tissus, trousses de premier secours	48.000.-	Lagos	arrivé
<u>Suisse</u>	70 tonnes conserves de viande	30.000.-	Stisab	arrivé
	6 tonnes Pelargon et Biomalz	30.000.-	Stisab	arrivé
	18 tonnes Nido et Adapta	150.000.-	Stisab	annoncé
	7420 kg potages	8.000.-	Stisab	arrivé
<u>URSS</u>	sucres, lait, médica- ments	72.000.-	Lagos	arrivé
<u>Tchécoslovaquie</u>	5.500 kgs milkpowder			
	2.200 kgs couvertures			
	500 kgs médicaments	---	Stisab	annoncé

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Pg- 4 - Encl 2 General A 799
8-18-68

Donateurs	Marchandise	Valeur	Destination		
<u>Unicef</u>	101 tonnes lait en poudre, 25 caisses de multivitamines	140.000.-	Lagos	arrivé	
	101 tonnes lait en poudre, 90 caisses de multivitamines	150.000.-	Stisab	arrivé	
	2,9 tonnes médicaments	30.000.-	Stisab	arrivé	
	43 kg vaccins anti-varioliqes	20.000.-	Stisab	arrivé	
	5,3 tonnes médicaments	45.000.-	Lagos	arrivé	
	3 tonnes médicaments	45.000.-	Stisab	arrivé	
	155 tonnes CSM + 350 tonnes CSM	1.000.000.-	Lagos Calabar	annoncé	
	3.000 tonnes CSM				
	500 tonnes butteroil				
	1500 tonnes lait plastiques, huile, lits	11.000.000.- 20.000.-	Lagos	annoncé	
	10 Landrovers, 19 camions	300.000.-	Lagos	annoncé	
	30 tonnes médicaments	200.000.-	{ 1/2 1/2 } Stisab	arrivé annoncé	
	2100 tonnes vivres et médicaments	5.000.000.-	---	annoncé	
	<u>Oxfam</u> *	1000 tonnes lait	1.000.000.-	Stisab	arrivé
		22 tonnes médicaments et vivres	100.000.-	Lagos	arrivé
44 tonnes vivres, baby-food, plastiques		110.000.-	Stisab	arrivé	
27 tonnes protéines, baby-food		45.000.-	Lagos	annoncé	
<u>Shell-BP</u>		15 tonnes médicaments et vivres	73.000.-	Stisab	arrivé
	15 tonnes médicaments et vivres	73.000.-	Lagos	arrivé	
* Oxfam	20 camions	500.000.-	Lagos	annoncé	

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Authority VND 954503
By MN NARA Date 10/5/05

Encl 3 Genena A 799
NIGERIA/BIAFRA
8-18-68

Dons en espèces - Situation au 12.8.68 -

Donateurs	Annoncé	Reçu
	Frs	Frs
<u>Afrique du Sud</u>	4.755.--	4.755.--
<u>Allemagne</u> *	64.536.--	64.536.--
<u>Australie</u>	31.756.--	31.756.--
<u>Belgique</u>	16.800.--	
<u>Cameroun</u>	1.000.--	1.000.--
<u>Autriche</u>	43.000.--	43.000.--
<u>Canada</u>		
1) Croix-Rouge	502.871.--	100.691.--
2) Gouvernement	241.600.--	241.600.--
<u>Danemark</u>		
1) Croix-Rouge	40.222.--	40.222.--
2) Gouvernement	57.264.--	57.264.--
<u>Espagne</u>	1.541.--	1.541.--
<u>Etats-Unis</u>		
1) Croix-Rouge	43.000.--	43.000.--
2) Gouvernement	4.730.000.--	1.515.000.--
<u>Ethiopie</u>		
1) Croix-Rouge	63.100.--	63.100.--
2) Gouvernement	172.500.--	172.500.--
<u>Finlande</u>		
1) Croix-Rouge	163.973.--	163.973.--
2) Gouvernement	154.000.--	154.000.--
<u>Grande Bretagne</u>	133.310.--	133.310.--
<u>Irlande</u>	157.108.--	157.108.--
 * <u>Allemagne</u>		
Gouvernement	38.825.--	38.825.--

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 Authority: VND 959503
 By: MN NARA Date: 10/5/05

Pg - 2 -

Encl 3

Geneva 17 799

Donateurs

Annoncé

Reçu

	Frs	Frs
<u>Italie</u>	1.380.000.--	
<u>Japon</u>	43.000.--	43.000.--
<u>Liban</u>	400.--	400.--
<u>Libéria</u>	107.000.--	107.000.--
<u>Liechtenstein</u>	5.000.--	5.000.--
<u>Luxembourg</u>		
1) Croix-Rouge	4.200.--	4.200.--
2) Gouvernement	6.300.--	6.300.--
<u>Monaco</u>	4.304.--	1.724.--
<u>Nouvelle-Zélande</u>	5.353.--	5.353.--
<u>Pays-Bas</u>	68.559.--	68.559.--
<u>Phillipines</u>	1.080.--	1.080.--
<u>Suède</u>		
1) Croix-Rouge	562.584.--	562.584.--
2) Gouvernement	830.000.--	380.000.--
<u>Suisse</u>	185.000.--	185.000.--
<u>Syrie</u>	1.023.--	1.023.--
<u>Tanzanie</u>	11.948.--	11.948.--
<u>Zambie</u>	1.480.--	1.480.--
<hr/>		
Oxfam	430.000.-	
Etat de Genève	10.000.-	10.000.-
Union Int. Prot. de l'Enfance	87.866.-	87.866.-
Particuliers	20.000.-	20.000.-

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DECLASSIFIED
 Authority: VND 959503
 By: M. NARA Date: 10/5/05

ADDENDUM

Encl 4
Genève A 799
8-18-68

Gouvernement Grande Bretagne

Programme d'assistance selon proposition de Lord Hunt:

45 trucks and 5 land rovers (Oxfam contributing up to £ 50,000 towards the cost). £ 45,000.-
the civilian equivalent of 3 light aid detachments for essential maintenance of transport engaged in relief operations £ 45,000.-
allocation for river craft £ 20,000.-

It was represented to us that there was a real need for some or all of the following:

- 5 shallow draught powered boats having carrying capacity of a land rover for the distribution of relief in the waterways and creeks in the rivers state
 - a simple pontoon ferry with engine, with two qualified personnel to man it, capable of crossing the river Niger at Idah or elsewhere, capable of carrying one 5-ton lorry
 - an LCM type landing-craft for use on the river Niger or in the waters of the river state
 - 6 land rover ambulances £ 10,000.-
 - 4 medico-social teams consisting of a doctor, 2 nurses, and one all-purpose maintenance man £ 90,000.-
 - civilian drivers and mechanics for transports and maintenance with medico-social teams £ 13,000.-
 - food and medical supplies in categories and quantities as advised by the ICRC £ 15,000.-
- Total £238,000.-


Par la Croix-Rouge britannique

- vivres et médicaments Lagos annoncé £ 20,000.-

Etats-Unis , Gouvernement

- USAID, via Catholic Relief Services and World Council of Churches, vivres - quantités et valeur non encore déterminées

0390



(11)



POL 27 BIAFRA-NIGERIA
xr POL 7 NIGER
Department of State TELEGRAM

CONFIDENTIAL 320

PAGE 01 NIAMEY 02414 190919Z

10

ACTION: AF 15

INFO: EUR 15, IO 13, CIAE 00, DODE 00, GPM 04, H 02, INR 07, L 03, NSAE 00,

NSC 10, P 04, RSC 01, SP 02, SS 20, USIA 12, RSR 01, / 109 W

R 180930Z AUG 68
FM AMEMBASSY NIAMEY
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 2173
INFO: AMEMBASSY ABIDJAN
AMEMBASSY ACCRA
AMEMBASSY ADDIS ABABA
AMEMBASSY COTONOU
RUQSUC/AMEMBASSY KINSHASA 138
AMEMBASSY LOME
AMEMBASSY LONDON
AMEMBASSY MONROVIA
AMEMBASSY OUAGADOUGOU
AMEMBASSY PARIS
AMEMBASSY YAOUNDE
USMISSION GENEVA
USMISSION USUN NY

C O N F I D E N T I A L NIAMEY 2414

SUBJ: DIORI VERSUS FRENCH ON BIAFRA
/ CUL 6 NIGER
REF: NIAMEY A-137 OF AUG 10 1968 (NOTAL)

1. DIORI'S ARRIVAL STATEMENT TO PARIS PRESS AUGUST 12 HAS CAUSED CONSIDERABLE COMMENT IN FRENCH COMMUNITY NIAMEY.
2. DIORI'S STATEMENT THAT QTE IF THERE HAD NOT RPT NOT BEEN EXTERNAL INTERFERENCE IN AFRICA, THE NIGERIA PROBLEM MIGHT HAVE BEEN SETTLED UNQTE AND QTE PROBLEM OF NIGERIA CAN AND MUST BE SETTELED BY AFRICANS UNQTE CONSIDERED BY FRENCH HERE EVEN HARDER SLAP AT DEGAULLE POLICY THAN AUGUST 3 INDEPENDENCE DAY SPEECH (SEE REPAIR).
3. FRENCH FEEL DIORI GOING BIT TOO FAR SAYING THIS ON FRENCH TERRITORY AND SPECULATE DIORI MIGHT HAVE DIFFICULTIES GETTING

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(2)

NIAMEY 2414
8-18-68

0391

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By: MW NARA Date: 10/5/05



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PAGE 02 NIAMEY 02414 190919Z

APPOINTMENT DEGAULLE THIS TRIP.

4. COMMENT: DIORI DEFINITELY TAKING INCREASINGLY INDEPENDENT
STAND VIS-A-VIS FRANCH ON NIGERIA QUESTION.

GP-3 RYAN

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0392

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Ref Biafra
re Pol 27 Biafra-Nigeria
Department of State **TELEGRAM**

CONFIDENTIAL 751

PAGE 01 DOUALA 00173 241055Z

20

ACTION AF 15

INFO EUR 15, IO 13, AID 28, SRI 01, ORMI 03, SCA 02, SCS 04, SRI 01, CIAE 00,

DODE 00, GPM 04, H 02, INRI 07, LI 03, NSC 10, P 04, RSC 01, SP 02, SS 25,

USIA 12, NSA 02, SAH 02, /156 W

R 170800Z AUG 68
FM AMCONSULATE DOUALA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 82
INFO USMISSION GENEVA
AMEMBASSY LAGOS
AMEMBASSY LONDON
AMEMBASSY YAOUNDE

C O N F I D E N T I A L DOUALA 173

SUBJECT: NIGERIANS IN CAMEROON

1. EXTENSIVE INVESTIGATIONS REVEAL THAT NUMBER REFUGEES FROM NIGERIA IN THIS CONSULAR DISTRICT CAMEROON VIRTUALLY INSIGNIFICANT. SUBSTANTIAL NUMBER IBOS LIVE IN WEST CAMEROON BUT ALMOST ALL HAVE BEEN THERE NUMBER OF YEARS AND CANNOT BE CONSIDERED REFUGEES. SMALL NUMBER IBOS REFUGEES THAT CAME TO CAMEROON AFTER DECLARATION BIAFRA HAVE BEEN ABSORBED INTO IBOS COMMUNITY. IBOS AND HAUSSA LIVE IN APPARENT HARMONY. COMMUNICATION WITH BIAFRA EFFECTIVELY CUT OFF BY FEDERAL TROOPS ON BORDER BUT CERTAIN AMOUNT OF MAIL GOES TO LISBON FOR EVENTUAL POSTING VIA FERNANDO POO. RECENT INDICATIONS ARE THAT BORDER NOT RPT NOT PRESENTLY HEAVILY COVERED BY FEDS.

2. NEW NIGERIAN CONSUL IN BUEA, OKPOKAN, FROM IKOM, SAID HIS PRINCIPAL TASK IS TO PERSUADE IBOS IN WEST CAMEROON THAT THEIR PEOPLE DO NOT FACE EXTINCTION IN NIGERIA. WHILE NO LOVE LOST ON IBOS, GENERAL SENTIMENT IN WEST CAMEROON IS SYMPATHETIC TOWARDS THEIR PLIGHT, BUT THIS DOES NOT EXTEND TO ANY VISIBLE ACTIVE SUPPORT OF BIAFRAN SUCCESSION.

3. POSSIBILITY MASS OR PARTIAL EXODUS OF IBOS FROM BIAFRA TO CAMEROON DISCUSSED WITH AMERICAN FRIENDS SERVICE COMMITTEE REP

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0393

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By: MN/ARA Date: 10/5/05

37



POL 27 BIAFRA NIGERIA
Department of State
XR TELEGRAM
POL 3 OAU

CONFIDENTIAL 348

PAGE 01 ABIDJA 04060 191120Z

19

ACTION SS 70

INFO SSO 00, NSCE 00, USIE 00, CCO 00, CIAE 00, /070 W

O 172100Z AUG 68

FM AMEMBASSY ABIDJAN

TO AMEMBASSY ADDIS ABABA IMMEDIATE

INFO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 2840

AMEMBASSY LAGOS IMMEDIATE

CONFIDENTIAL ABIDJAN 4060

CORRECTED COPY (DATE-TIME GROUP AND JULIAN TIME
IN HEADING)

LIMDIS

1. PLEASE DELIVER FOLLOWING MESSAGE FROM PRESIDENT HOUPHOUET.
BOIGNY TO EMPEROR HAILE SELASSIE:

QUOTE: PRESIREPUBLIQUE A SA MAJESTE HAILE SELASSIE, EMPEREUR
D'ETHIOPIE, ADDIS-ABABA. REPOSE DU COLONEL OJUKWU A SA
MAJESTE HAILE SELASSIE. CITATION:

2. YOUR IMPERIAL MAJESTY,

3. I AM MOST GRATEFUL TO YOU FOR YOUR RECENT INVITATION TO ME, AS
WELL AS TO THE NIGERIAN LEADER AND THE HEADS OF THE FIVE MEMBER
STATES OF THE ORGANIZATION OF AFRICAN UNITY CONSULTATIVE COMMITTEE,
TO ATTEND A PEACE MEETING AT ADDIS ABABA ON MONDAY 19TH
AUGUST.

4. AS YOUR IMPERIAL MAJESTY IS AWARE, NOTHING WILL GIVE ME
GREATER PLEASURE THAN THE OPPORTUNITY OF ANOTHER MEETING WITH
YOU TO DISCUSS OUR AFFAIRS AND BENEFIT FROM YOUR GREAT EXPERIENCE.

5. IT IS BECAUSE OF THE IMPORTANCE I ATTACH TO THIS TYPE OF
DIALOGUE AND AN NEGOTIATED SETTLEMENT OF OUR CONFLICT WITH
NIGERIA THAT I IGNORED THE MILITARY SITUATION AT HOME SO AS TO
BE PRESENT AT THE LAST MEETING ON AUGUST FIFTH. I DECLARED A
TRUCE WHICH WAS ONLY ANSWERED FROM THE OTHER SIDE BY AN INTENSIFICA-

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Abidjan 4060
8-17-68

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Department of State **TELEGRAM**

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PAGE 02 ABIDJA 04060 191120Z

CATION OF THE FIGHTING. ATTEMPTS WERE EVEN MADE TO INCREASE GROUND FIRE ON THE ROUTE AND TO MAKE IT IMPOSSIBLE FOR ME TO TRAVEL IN SAFETY. IN THIS SITUATION, YOUR IMPERIAL MAJESTY, I THINK IT IS ONLY FAIR FOR ME TO ASK THAT THERE SHOULD BE AT LEAST A TEMPORARY TRUCE BY THE OTHER SIDE FOR THE DURATION OF OUR MEETING AT ADDIS ABABA, IF THEY ARE GENUINELY SERIOUS ABOUT A NEGOTIATED SETTLEMENT. I NEED NOT SAY, OF COURSE, THAT IT WOULD BE A REPETITION OF THE AUGUST FIFTH MEETING IF NEITHER COLONEL GOWON NOR THE LEADERS OF THE ORGANIZATION OF AFRICAN UNITY COMMITTEE MEMBER STATES ATTEND AND I PRESUME THEREFORE THAT YOUR INVITATION IS CONDITIONED BY ALL OF US BEING PRESENT.

6. AGAIN ON BEHALF OF THE GOVERNMENT AND PEOPLE OF BIAFRA I OFFER TO YOUR IMPERIAL MAJESTY OUR APPRECIATION FOR YOUR CONTINUED INTEREST IN OUR FORTUNES AND FOR YOUR NUMEROUS EFFORTS, ALTHOUGH NOT RECIPROCATED BY THE OTHER SIDE, TO OBTAIN A CEASE-FIRE, A SPEEDY MOVEMENT OF RELIEF TO THE VICTIMS OF THE WAR, AND AN HONOURABLE SETTLEMENT OF OUR DISPUTE WITH NIGERIA. LT.-COLONEL C. O. OJUKWU. FIN CITATION. UNQUOTE.

GP-3. MORGAN

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By	MV NARA Date 10/5/05

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Summary
Task Force

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ES 2
S 1
U 1
M 2
G
SIG 1
S/AH 3
S/AL
SA
S/CPR
S/GOV
S/IL
S/P
S/R
S/FW
S/PM
M/WP
G/PM

Geographic

AF5 5
ARA 9
EA 11
EUR 9
NEA 7

Functional

CU
E 2
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IGA
INR 6
IO 4
L 2
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OPR
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OTHER AGENCIES

WH 10
CIA 1
DOD
USIA 4
NSA

Other

ACDA 5
AID/EXSEC 3
AA/AFR 2
AA/VN 2
AA/EA 3
AA/NESA 2

PC
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AEC 3
AGR 3
COM 2
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ES 2 ✓
S ✓
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M 2
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Geographic

AF5 X 5
ARA 9
EA 11
EUR 9
NEA 7

Functional

CU
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OTHER AGENCIES

WH 10 ✓
CIA ✓
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USIA 4
NSA

Other

ACDA 5
AID/EXSEC 3
AA/AFR2
AA/VN 2
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AA/NESA 2
PC
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AEC 3
AGR 3
COM 2
EXIM
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POL 27 BIAFRA-NIGERIA
Department of State **TELEGRAM**

38

CONFIDENTIAL 827

PAGE 01 ABIDJA 04059 171333Z

50
ACTION SS: 70

INFO SSO 00, /070 W

O 171230Z AUG 68
FM AMEMBASSY ABIDJAN
TO AMEMBASSY ADDIS ABABA IMMEDIATE
INFO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 2839
AMEMBASSY LAGOS

Nigerian Situation

C O N F I D E N T I A L ABIDJAN 4059

LIMDIS

1° PLEASE PASS FOLLOWING MESSAGE TO EMPEROR HAILE SELASSIE:
QUOTE: PRESIREPUBLIQUE A SA MAJESTE HAILE SELASSIE, EMPEREUR
D'ETHIOPIE, ADDIS-ABABA. ME PERMETS D'INSISTER AUPRES VOTRE
MAJESTE AFIN QUSGARANTIE DE SECURITE SOIT DONNEE POUR LE SURVOL
PAR AVION DELEGUES BIAFRAIS, DE LA ZONE BIAFRAISE OCCUPEE PAR
TROUPES FEDERALES ET SOUMISE A TIR D.C.A. STOP JE NE POURRAI
INTERVENIR AUPRES DU COLONEL OJUKWU QUE SI LA GARANTIE DE
SECURITE EST DONNEE PAR LE GOUVERNEMENT FEDERAL. STOP. HAUTE ET
FRATERNELLE CONSIDERATION. FELIX HOUPHOUET-BOIGNY. UNQUOTE

2. EMPEROR'S MESSAGE (ADDIS 5275) RECEIVED AFTER HOUPHOUET
DELIVERED HIS TO US. EMPEROR'S MESSAGE DELIVERED PRESIDENCY NOON
AUGUST 17 BY US, AFTER CONSULTATION ETHIOPIAN EMBOFF, AS
ETHIOPIAN AMBASSADOR OUT OF TOWN. MORGAN

*Abidjan 4059
8-17-68*

①

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By MVA Date 10/5/03

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S/GOV
S/IL
S/P
S/R
S/FW
S/PM
M/WP
G/PM

Geographic

AF5 X 5
ARA 9
EA 11
EUR 9
NEA 7

Functional

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IO 4
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POK 27 BIAFRA-NIGERIA
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Department of State **TELEGRAM**

SECRET 816

PAGE 01 PARIS 19565 171255Z

52
ACTION AF 15

INFO EUR 15, IO 13, ACDA 16, AID 28, SR 01, ORM 03, SCG 04, SCA 02, NSA 02,
CIAE 00, DODE 00, GPM 04, H 02, INR 07, L 03, NSC 10, P 04, RSC 01, SP 02,
SS 20, USIA 12, SA 01, SAL 01, SAH 02, RSR 01, 169 W

R 171200Z AUG 68
FM AMEMBASSY PARIS
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 5213
INFO AMEMBASSY LAGOS
AMEMBASSY OSLO

SECRET PARIS 19565

SUBJ: FRENCH MILITARY AID TO BIAFRA

REF: PARIS 19345

1. NORWEGIAN CHARGE D'AFFAIRES BJORN BLAKSTAD ASKED TO CALL AT EMBASSY AUG 16 WITH REGARD TO URGENT MATTER CONCERNING BIAFRA. WHEN HE CAME HE READ PORTION OF TELEGRAM FROM NORWEGAIN MISSION IN GENEVA SAYING THAT RED CROSS CHIEF LINDT HAD TOLD NORWEGIANS THAT FRENCH WERE FLYING ARMS INTO BIAFRA. BLAKSTAD THOUGHT THIS WOULD CAUSE CONSIDERABLY STIR IN OSLO, WHERE FEELINGS WERE RUNNING HIGH ABOUT BIAFRA, AND ASKED IF EMBASSY HAD ANY INFORMATION. EMBOFF TOLD HIM THAT WE HAD HEARD THIS RUMOR PREVIOUSLY BUT HAD GONE ON RECORD (REFTEL) THAT WE HAD NO INFORMATION TO CONFIRM OR DENY IT HERE IN PARIS. BLAKSTAD SAID HE SUPPOSED EVEN IF FRENCH WERE DOING THIS THEY WOULD COVER THEIR TRAIL CAREFULLY. EMBOFF SAID HE DID NOT THINK PARIS WAS MOST LIKELY SPOT FOR UNCOVERING FACTS BEHIND THIS RUMOR, AND SAID NORWEGIAN EMBASSY WASHINGTON MIGHT WISH CONSULT DEPARTMENT WHERE FULLER BACKGROUND WOULD BE AVAILABLE. EMBOFF SHOWED BLAKSTAD STATE 219396 FOR US PUBLIC POSITION.
GP 3 WALLNER

PARIS-19565
8-17-68

POK 27 BIAFRA-NIGERIA
DEF 19-8 FR-BIAFRA

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TO : Department of State

INFO : ADDIS ABABA, DAR ES SALAAM, LAGOS, LIBREVILLE, PARIS, LONDON, USUN New York, U.S. Mission Geneva

FROM : Amembassy ABIDJAN

SUBJECT : Ethiopian Ambassador's Views on the Nigerian War.

REF :

In a recent conversation, the Ethiopian Ambassador outlined his views on the Nigerian war to an Embassy officer, including his commitment to Nigerian Unity, his hopes for a compromise, his suggestions for treating the FMG, and his belief that Ivory Coast and Gabon's policies were being directed from France.

Comment: We are not convinced, as is Ambassador MECHECHA, that Houphouet-Boigny's position on Biafra is dictated from Paris. Though the attitude of France certainly meshes conveniently with his own, and may well have influenced it, Houphouet appears sincere in believing that the humanitarian results of the Nigerian war require him to exercise an active role.

att MORGAN
Enclosure: Memorandum of Conversation.

Group 3 - Downgraded at 12-yr. intervals.
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FORM 10-64 DS-323

Drafting Date: 8-14-68

Phone No.:

Contents and Classification Approved by:

ADCM:WFMiller

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Authority: VND 95/503
By: MN/ARA Date: 10/5/95

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Page 1 of 2
Enclosure to Abidjan A- 430

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

Participants: Ato Haile MECHECHA, Ambassador of Ethiopia in
Ivory Coast
Hugh C. MacDOUGALL, Political Officer, Amembassy Abidjan.

Time and Place: Ethiopian Embassy, Abidjan, August 14, 1968.

Subject: The Nigerian War.

After some social conversation, I asked Ambassador Mechecha his views as to the progress of the Addis Ababa talks. He expressed general pessimism, since the two sides remained adamantly attached to irreconcilable positions on the question of Biafran secession. Nevertheless, the talks were continuing, and there was hope in that. Ethiopian policy was based on the "sacred charters" of the UN and the OAU, and their commitment to non-interference in the internal affairs of other countries. The OAU Charter specifically agreed to respect the frontiers left to Africa by the former imperialist powers. This being the case, there is only one Nigeria, with only one capital, at Lagos.

Nevertheless, the Ambassador said, the humanitarian problem was a compelling one, because of the reports of massacres (if they were not propaganda) and human suffering. He hoped that a compromise could be reached, with the Ibo area receiving a certain amount of autonomy, and a certain amount of protection by international observers, for a limited time until passions had cooled.

The Ambassador said he could not understand why Tanzania had recognized Biafra. As for Ivory Coast and Gabon, it was perfectly obvious that they were obeying instructions from De Gaulle. Houphouet's great protestations of humanitarian concern would not be made without French suggestion. However, a second - if less likely - interpretation of the support given Biafra by small African states might be their hope to split up Nigeria and thus cut it down to their own size and influence. But such splitting up would simply mean a scramble by the big powers, such as had happened in the Katanga affair.

As for the FMG, the Ambassador said that he thought it should perhaps be chastised (he implied, by HIM) for a total lack of maturity. The FMG had let what should have been a minor rebellion get completely out of hand, and it should be reminded - in the form of an ultimatum or a threat - that it was in no position to act stubbornly.

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Page 2 of 2

Enclosure to Abidjan A-430

Ambassador Mechecha did not know what Houphouet had told Ojukwu when the latter was here, but hoped (with some skepticism, he implied) that it had been useful.

The reporting officer reminded the Ambassador that the United States, a century ago, had fought a bitter civil war on the issue of national unity. He expressed his personal view that a compromise of the sort the Ambassador had suggested might be the best way out, but that although both sides seemed to be making some concessions, there was as yet no indication that they would be able to bridge the gap between them. We were therefore very hopeful that the Emperor, who had done so much for peace for so many years, would be able to lead the talks to success.

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POL 27 BIAFRA-NIGERIA
Department of State **TELEGRAM**

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PAGE 01 LAGOS 11762 161844Z

40
ACTION AF 15

INFO EUR 15, IO 13, AID 28, SR 01, ORM 03, SCA 02, SCS 04, RSR 01, NSA 02,

CIAE 00, GPM 04, H 02, INR 07, L 03, NSC 10, P 04, RSC 01, SP 02, SS 20,

USIA 12, /149 W

R 161605Z AUG 68
FM AMEMBASSY LAGOS
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 2038
INFO AMEMBASSY ACCRA
AMEMBASSY ADDIS ABABA
AMEMBASSY KINSHASA
RUTAMA/AMEMBASSY MONROVIA 999
AMEMBASSY NIAMEY
AMEMBASSY LONDON
AMEMBASSY PARIS
USMISSION GENEVA
USMISSION USUN NY
CINCSRIKE/CINCMFAFS
DIA
AMCONSUL IBADAN
AMCONSUL KADUNA

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SUBJECT: BIAFRAN REACTION TO FMG LEAFLETS

REF: LAGOS 11648

1. THE FOLLOWING WAS BROADCAST AUGUST 15 OVER BIAFRAN
RADIO (FBIS N160820):

2. QTE LAGOS REGIME OF FORCE HAS CHANGED TACTICS. ON
10 AUGUST 1968 NIGERIAN JET BOMBER MENACED BIAFRAN AIRSPACE
FOR SEVERAL MINUTES. IN END IT DROPPED BOMB IN VILLAGE
18 MILES SOUTHWEST OF ABA. ONE CIVILIAN KILLED AND THREE
OTHER INJURED.

1
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PAGE 02 LAGOS 11762 161844Z

3. QTE NOT FAR FROM THE SCENE OF BOMBING, THE NIGERIANS ALSO DROPPED A CONTAINER WITH THE FOLLOWING PICTURES:

- A) WOMEN DRESSED LIKE BIAFRAN WOMEN CARRYING PORTMANTEAUS AND SAID TO BE GOING TO MARKET IN ONE OF NIGERIA'S SO CALLED LIBERATED AREAS,
- B) THREE FAMISHED CHILDREN BEING FED BY NIGERIAN VANDAL IN ARMY UNIFORM,
- C) HORROR STRICKEN AGONIZED AND DEJECTED WOMEN SAID TO BE LIBERATED PEOPLE WITH ARMED NIGERIAN VANDAL BY THEIR SIDE
- D) SOME IMPORTANT BIAFRAN BUILDINGS WHICH HAD BEEN DESTROYED BY NIGERIAN VANDALS.

4. QTE VANDALS LISTED NUMBER OF PLACES IN BIAFRA WHICH VANDAL TROOPS HAVE PURPORTEDLY OVERRUN. AND CALLED ON OUR COURAGEOUS CITIZENS TO SURRENDER. THEY SAID PEOPLE OF SO CALLED LIBERATED AREAS ARE HAPPY AND CONTENTED.

5. QTE ONE MUST ASK WHAT NIGERIANS WANT TO ACHIEVE BY THIS NONSENSICAL PROPAGANDA STUNT. DO NASTY PICTURES THEY SHOWED HELP THEIR CASE? OR DO THEY CONFIRM THEIR GENOCIDAL INTENTIONS? NO MATTER WHAT PICTURES LAGOS CRIMINAL CLIQUE AND THEIR COLLABORATORS WOULD LIKE TO SHOW TO OUTSIDE WORLD, WE IN BIAFRAN CAN NEVER FALL VICTIM TO THEIR PSYCHOLOGICAL WAR OFFENSIVE. WE ARE ALL BIAFRANS. WE KNOW THAT WOMEN DO NOT GO TO MARKET WITH PORTMANTEAUS. WE KNOW WHAT THEY CARRY TO THE MARKET. WE ALSO KNOW NIGERIAN VANDAL IN ARMY UNIFORM IS TOO BUSY FIGHTING WITH OUR GALLANT TROOPS ON WAR FRONT TO HAVE TIME TO FEED BIAFRAN CHILDREN.

6. QTE NOBODY IN BIAFRA WANTS GOWON'S BRAND OF LIBERATION. IN FACT EVERY BIAFRAN PRAYS FOR LIBERATION OF THOSE PLACES FORCIBLY OCCUPIED BY VANDAL TROOPS, WHERE LIFE IS VERY DIFFICULT FOR OUR PEOPLE. THOSE PLACES MUST BE LIBERATED BECAUSE PROUD AND COURAGEOUS BIAFRANS CANNOT AGREE TO BE SLAVES TO HAUSA FULANI HEGEMONY IN THIS 20TH CENTURY. BIAFRA CAN NEVER BE AN IMPERIALIST STOOGES. UNQTE

7. COMMENT: DISCRIPTION IS OBVIOUSLY OF LEAFLET REPORTED REFTEL. PRELIMINARY BUT UNCONFIRMED REPORTS HERE INDICATE

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By	MN NARA Date 10/5/05



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PAGE 03 LAGOS 11762 161844Z

FMG HAS THUS FAR CONCENTRATED ON ABA REGION WITH SOME
SUCCESS. FMG POLICY REPORTEDLY TO DROP LEAFLETS JUST
AHEAD OF ADVANCING TROOPS.
MATHEWS

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POL 27 BIAFRA-NIGERIA
TR PET 6 BIAFRA
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PAGE 01 LAGOS 11763 161821Z

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ACTION AF 15

INFO EUR 15, NSA 02, CIAE 00, DODE 00, GPM 04, H 02, INR 07, L 03, NSC 10,

P 04, RSC 01, SP 02, SS 20, USIA 12, AID 28, PC 04, NIC 01, E 15, COM 08,

TRSY 11, INT 06, FRB 02, RSR 01, /173 W

R 161630Z AUG 68
FM AMEMBASSY LAGOS
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 2039
INFO AMEMBASSY LONDON
AMEMBASSY PARIS
AMCONSUL IBA DAN
AMCONSUL KADUNA

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SUBJECT: DAMAGES TO PORT HARCOURT REFINERY

1. ACCORDING TO RELIABLE INDUSTRY SOURCES, RECENT SHELL BP SURVEY TEAM TO PORT HARCOURT DISCOVERED THAT REFINERY SUFFERED EXTENSIVE DAMAGES, CONTRARY TO EARLIER IMPRESSION THAT DAMAGE CONFINED MAINLY TO A FEW STORAGE TANKS. CURRENT ESTIMATES ARE THAT REFINERY CANNOT BE OPERATED AGAIN BEFORE APRIL 1970 AT EARLIEST, APPROXIMATELY ONE YEAR LATER THAN PREVIOUSLY ESTIMATED.

2. WORST LOSS WAS IN CONTROL SYSTEM, THE BRAIN OF THE REFINERY, WHICH SYSTEMICALLY DESTROYED BY PERSONS WHO KNEW WHAT THEY WERE DOING, PRESUMABLY BIAFRAN REFINERY OPERATORS JUST BEFORE PORT HARCOURT RETAKEN BY FEDERALS. ALL INSTRUMENTS AND LEADS RIPPED OUT OF CONTROL PANEL AND DESTROYED. GASOLINE OR KEROSENE WAS POURED INTO TRENCH CONDUIT WHICH CARRIES INSTRUMENTATION LEADS FROM CONTROL PANEL TO VARIOUS PROCESS UNITS AND BURNED. CONTROL SYSTEM WAS SPECIFICALLY DESIGNED FOR THIS REFINERY AND NOT SOMETHING THAT CAN BE REPLACED OFF SHELF LIKE VALVES OR PUMPS. REPLACEMENT WILL BE CONTROLLING FACTOR IN WHEN REFINERY CAN OPERATE AGAIN.

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3. VARIOUS PUMPS, VALVES, AND MOTORS IN PROCESS UNITS WERE REMOVED AND WRENCHES STILL ON NUTS IN SOME LOCATIONS, INDICATING LAST MINUTE OPERATION. THESE ITEMS FAIRLY EASILY REPLACEABLE. BUTANE AND PROPANE PRODUCTION UNIT SAID TO BE SEVERELY DAMAGED. STORAGE TANKS LOSS PLACED AT FIVE WITH TWO MORE DAMAGED. APPARENTLY NO SEVERE INTERNAL DAMAGES TO FURNACES, REACTORS, DISTILLATION TOWERS, ETC. OF CRUDE STILL AND REFORMER UNITS.

4. SHELL BP REPORTEDLY HAS PROPOSED TO GOVERNMENT TO SEND TEAM OF 60 EXPERTS TO PORT HARCOURT AT BEGINNING OF OCTOBER, WHO WOULD LIVE ON BOAT TIED UP AT REFINERY JETTY, TO SURVEY DAMAGES IN DETAIL AND PREPARE ORDERS FOR REPLACEMENT EQUIPMENT AND PLAN RECONSTRUCTION WORK. SUCCESS IN MEETING APRIL 1970 TARGET STARTUP DATE WILL DEPEND ON GOVERNMENT'S WILLINGNESS TO BE LENIENT IN LETTING IN EXPATRIATES FOR THIS EARLY PHASE, FOR LATER REBUILDING, AND FOR SUBSEQUENT STARTUP AND OPERATION OF PLANT WHILE TRAINING NEW NIGERIAN OPERATOR FORCE. SINCE REFINERY 50 PER CENT GOVERNMENT OWNED, SOME REASON TO HOPE GOVERNMENT MAY TAKE QUICKER DECISIONS IN THESE MATTERS THAT HAS RECENTLY BEEN THE CASE IN EXPLORATION AND DEVELOPMENT PROJECTS REQUIRING GOVERNMENT APPROVAL. IF NORMAL SLOWNESS PREVAILS APRIL 1970 DATE IS OPTIMISTIC.

5. ASIDE FORM REPAIR COSTS, WE ESTIMATE EXTRA YEAR THAT REFINERY OUT OF SERVICE WILL COST GOVERNMENT SOME 40 MILLION DOLLARS FOREIGN EXCHANGE OUTLAY FOR IMPORTING PETROLEUM PRODUCTS WHICH OTHERWISE WOULD HAVE BEEN LOCAL CURRENCY ITEM.
EXEMPT
MATHEWS

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PAGE 01 ADDIS 05251 161519Z

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ACTION: AF 15

INFO: EUR 15, IO 13, SAH 02, SR 01, ORM 03, SCS 04, SCA 02, AID 28, CIAE 00,

DODE 00, GPM 04, H 02, INR 07, LI 03, NSAE 00, NSC 10, P 04, RSC 01, SP 02

SS 20, USIA 12, RSRI 01, 149 W

P R 161055Z AUG 68
FM AMEMBASSY ADDIS ABABA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 6659
INFO USMISSION GENEVA
AMEMBASSY LAGOS
AMEMBASSY LONDON
USUN 359

CONFIDENTIAL ADDIS ABABA 5251

REF: STATE 221355 LAGOS 11748

1. WE INFORMED MOFA AND BRITISH IMMEDIATELY THIS MORNING
OF PRESIDENT'S APPEAL AND OF FMG'S APPARENT REJECTION OF
ICRC PROPOSALS PRIOR TO RECEIPT PRESIDENT'S MESSAGE. WORD
PASSED IMMEDIATELY TO PALACE.

2. BRIT, CHARGE SAID HE CABLED LONDON TO SUPPORT STRONG
UK APPROACH TO FMG.

HALL

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Addis Ababa 5251
8/16/68

POL 27-9 Biafra Nig.
POL 15-1 25/ Johnson
POL 15-1 Nigeria

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POL 27 BIAFRA-NIGERIA

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PAGE 01 LAGOS 11782 161951Z

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ACTION AF 15

INFO EUR 15, IO 13, GPM 04, SP 02, L 03, H 02, CIAE 00, DODE 00, INR 07, PI 04,

RSC 01, USIA 12, NSA 02, AID 28, PC 04, SS 20, SAH 02, SCSE 00, SCA 02,

ORM 03, SR 01, NSC 10, RSR 01, /151 W

R 161814Z AUG 68
FM AMEMBASSY LAGOS
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 2052
INFO AMEMBASSY ACCRA
AMEMBASSY ADDIS ABABA
AMEMBASSY KINSHASA
AMEMBASSY LONDON
AMEMBASSY MONROVIA
AMEMBASSY NIAMEY
AMEMBASSY YAOUNDE
USMISSION GENEVA
AMCONSUL IBADAN
AMCONSUL KADUNA

UNCLAS LAGOS 11782

1. RADIO BIAFRA AUGUST 16 (FBIS 161115) CALLS ON "ANGLO-NIGERIAN CLIQUE: HEED VOICE OF HUMANITY". PRAISES ICRC EFFORTS AND SAYS ICRC HAS MADE IT CLEAR TRUCE IS NECESSARY IF RELIEF OPERATIONS TO BE EFFECTIVE. STATES THAT "SENIOR OFFICIAL MR. HARGREAVE" OF ICRC HAS SAID FOR EFFECTIVE RELIEF OPERATIONS PORT HARCOURT OUGHT TO BE DEMILITARIZED.

2. BROADCAST ASSERTS BIAFRA DEMONSTRATED CONCERN FOR INNOCENT VICTIMS OF "GOWON'S WAR" BY DECLARING TRUCE BEFORE ADDIS TALKS. NIGERIAN REPLY WAS TO LAUNCH MASSIVE MILITARY OFFENSIVE. THIS WAS REPLY OF GOWON AND "BRITISH GOVERNMENT WHICH MANIPULATES GOWON" TO "REPEATED CALL FOR CEASE-FIRE BY ICRC AND OTHER HUMANITARIAN ORGANIZATIONS." BROADCAST CONCLUDES BY DENOUNCING "INFLUENCE FOR EVIL" OF BRITISH ON GOWON.

MATHEWS

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OSD	USIA	NSA
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AIRGRAM

POL 27 BIAFRA-NIGERIA

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A-115 NO. CONFIDENTIAL

TO : Department of State

INFO : KADUNA, LAGOS

FROM : Amconsul IBADAN

DATE: August 15, 1968

SUBJECT : WESTERN NIGERIA: Western Leaders Comment on the Future.

REF :

On August 9, 1968, during a dinner given by the Consul in honor of U.S. Leader Grantee Mr. Justice Kayode Eso (Ibadan's A-1142 and A-1146), of the Western State Court of Appeal, a number of prominent Yorubas commented on the prospects for an early settlement of the Nigerian Civil War. These comments took place during a several hour "floating" conversation in which various Yorubas gave their opinions based on the reports that the "Biafran" delegation had just reiterated their "hard" line on not renouncing secession at the Addis Ababa peace talks. The participants included the following prominent Yorubas: Mr. Michael Omisade, Western State Commissioner of Lands and Housing; Mr. Justice Fatayi-Williams, Western State Justice of Appeal; Mr. Justice Kayode Eso, Western State Justice of Appeal; Mr. Justice M.O. Oyemade, Western State Justice of Appeal; Mr. A.F.O. Dabiri, Western State Solicitor-General and Permanent Secretary in the Ministry of Justice; Mr. S.O. Agbaje-Williams, Principal Legal Draftsman and Dr. Tol Asuni, Psychiatrist in Charge of the Aro Mental Hospital.

Of some significance is the fact that, with the exception of Mr. Justice Fatayi-Williams, all of the participants believed that the Ibos would not voluntarily compromise on the principle of maintaining an independent state of "Biafra" separate from the federation of Nigeria. Again, with the same exception, none could suggest any technique to "break through" the 'siege mentality' of the Ibos" in order to assure them that they had a future inside the federation. Dr. Asuni, a psychiatrist, admitted that he knew of no way to break through this mentality once it had become firmly established. He observed that no matter what happened, such a frame of mind seemed to feed upon itself and constantly make the situation worse. Once this mentality had taken hold in the Ibos, whatever action the FMG took, whether punitive or conciliatory, the sense of persecution seemed to increase.

GROUP-3

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FORM 4-62 DS-323

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Contents and Classification Approved by: CCStrong

Drafted by: WCM:thoefer, Jr.:gor 8/15/68

Clearances:

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Authority: VMD 959503
By: MMNARA Date: 10/5/03

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There were two possibilities as to the future mentioned. First, the FMG could push through a military "solution" to the Ibo problem and capture the OAU (Owerri, Aba and Umuahia). Most agreed that this was the more likely possibility, especially because of the "impatience" of Colonel Adekunle. They believed that the FMG could probably capture and hold the larger towns and perhaps maintain daylight road communications between them. However, they also believe that the Ibos would continue the war through guerrilla action and would still refuse to return to their homes in the towns. They were in virtual agreement that as long as any "unconquered" Ibos remained, then the idea of "Biafra" would remain alive. In short, they felt that the Ibos apparently have passed the stage where they can or will be reintegrated into the federation of Nigeria.

The other and more remote possibility of the future course of events was that the FMG might agree to some sort of special constitutional relationship between the Ibos and the rest of Nigeria. However unlikely this may be, it was made clear that whatever concessions might be made to the Ibos would also have to apply to the other constituent parts of the federation, particularly the West.

When asked if it was felt that Colonel Adekunle would play a role in the future of Nigeria, the general consensus was that he would emerge as the strongest of the three battlefield commanders. When queried as to whether they looked upon him as a Yoruba or not, Justice Eso capsulized the responses by saying the more significant question was "what does Adekunle consider himself?"

Mr. Justice Fatayi-Williams did not deviate from "the Yoruba FMG line." The same can be said for a similar conversation with Mr. Justice Candide Johnson the next evening. This "line" can be stated briefly as follows: "I know the Ibo man well. I have worked with him and I have lived with him. He is a person of inordinate ambition. As soon as he feels that there is a place for him within the federation, he will return. He must return because his own country is too small to contain him and because his inordinate ambition will cause him to come out of his homeland to try and again control the federation. After all, that is why we had this civil war in the first place, because on January 15 the Ibo man tried to take over the federation. The Ironsi unity decrees of May 1966 tried to continue the process. Then, when the rest of the country objected and took reprisals against their 'oppressors,' the Ibo man decided to leave the federation he could not control. The whole thing is partly connected with the control of the oil, but far more important is the control of the federation" etc.

Comment:

Thus, there are hawks as well as doves among the Western Yorubas. However,

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By	MW NARA Date 10/5/03

Ibadan A-145

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the majority of the Yorubas talked to are obviously dismayed with the lack of progress of the peace negotiations and with the resumption of military action. They would far prefer a negotiated settlement, but see the military "solution" as more and more inevitable. However, they also see the military solution as no solution at all. They are fearful as to the future of Nigeria as a whole and the West in particular. The statement heard most as to the future is that the problems only begin with the end of the war.

STRONG *lls*

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By	MW NARA Date 10/5/03

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OUTGOING TELEGRAM Department of State

INDICATE: ☐ COLLECT
☐ CHARGE TO

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Origin ACTION: Amembassy LAGOS PRIORITY
Info: INFO: Amconsul IBADAN PRIORITY
" KADUNA PRIORITY

STATE

REF: Ibadan 577

1. We have been supporting OAU efforts to work for peaceful negotiated solution to Nigerian problem. Under circumstances US officials should avoid giving any impression that we would understand if FMG should seek military solution.

END

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Drafted by: AFW:RMMelbourne:emb 8/15/68
Tel. Ext. 2619
Telegraphic transmission and classification approved by: AFW - Roy M. Melbourne
Clearances: Nigerian Task Force

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FORM DS-322
8-65

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By: MVA Date: 10/5/05

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Department of State **TELEGRAM**

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PAGE 01 OSLO 06058 151116Z

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ACTION AF 15

INFO EUR 15, IO 13, SR 01, ORM 03, SCS 04, SCA 02, NSA 02, CIAE 00, DODE 00,
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RSR 01, 121 W

R 151015Z AUG 68
FM AMEMBASSY OSLO
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 1880
INFO AMEMBASSY COPENHAGEN
AMEMBASSY STOCKHOLM
AMEMBASSY LAGOS

OSLO 6058
8-15-68

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SUBJECT: GOVERNMENT FACES INCREASING PRESSURES ON NIGERIAN SITUATION

REF: OSLO 5699W

1. NORWEGIAN FRUSTRATION OVER CONTINUING FAILURE OPEN AID CHANNELS TO BIAFRA APPROACHING LEVEL PUBLIC HYSTERIA AND PRESSURES ON GOVT TAKE SOME (READ ANY) INITIATIVE INCREASING.

2. AS EXAMPLE, BISHOP OF OSLO IN BEHALF NORWEGIAN CHURCH, AUGUST 14 CALLED ON GOVT DO ALL IN ITS POWER THROUGH UN OR DIRECT TO ADDIS ABABA TO 1) PERSUADE NIGERIA/BIAFRA NEGOTIATORS TAKE UP QUESTION OF HUMANITARIAN AID; 2) INCREASE DIPLOMATIC PRESSURE ON PARTIES TO CONFLICT; 3) TAKE STEPS STOP ARMS SHIPMENTS TO BOTH SIDES. NUMBER NORWEGIAN VOLUNTARY ORGANIZATIONS COLLECTING SIGNATURES FOR NORWEGIAN APPEAL TO WORLD OPINION TO STOP SUFFERING WHICH BEING DRAMATICALLY PORTRAYED NIGHTLY TV.

3. GENEVA MEETING ON HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE AND COPENHAGEN SPECIAL NORDIC MEETING ON SITUATION AND NORDIC APPEAL TO BOTH PARTIES ALSO RECEIVING FRONT PAGE ATTENTION ALL PAPERS. CONCRETE RESULTS LATTER SESSION STILL UNKNOWN, WITH

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LATEST WORD HERE THAT NORDIC REPS STILL CONSULTING AT
FONOFF LEVEL, BUT HOPES ARE KEEN AMONG NORWEGIAN PUBLIC.

4. GOVT FULLY AWARE OF LIMITATIONS ON NORWEGIAN INFLUENCE
BUT PRESSURES ARE GREAT AND GROWING GREATER. MOST LIKELY
AS RESPONSE TO PUBLIC CRY THAT GOVT DO SOMETHING AND AS
FURTHER EARNEST OF OFFICIAL NORWEGIAN WILLINGNESS CONTRIBUTE,
DEFENSE MINISTER TIDEMAND ANNOUNCED AUGUST 14 THAT NORWAY
HAS OFFERED ICRC 70-MAN FIELD HOSPITAL WHICH COULD BE PLACED
ANYWHERE IN CONFLICT AREA. TIDEMAND SAID FIELD HOSPITAL
READY TO GO WITHIN 14 DAYS OR SOONER IF NECESSARY ONCE
ICRC GIVES OKAY.

5. COMMENT: SOME NORWEGIANS EVEN SAY THEY HAVE NOT SEEN
SUCH PUBLIC OUTCRY AND CONCERN SINCE SPANISH CIVIL WAR.
CLEAR TO EVEN THOSE WHO DID NOT LIVE THROUGH CONVULSIONS
OF THOSE DAYS, HOWEVER, THAT NORWEGIANS ARE UP IN ARMS AND
PRESENTING GOVT WITH EXTREMELY DIFFICULT SITUATION, WHICH
INCREASES POLITICAL PROBLEMS INDICATED REFTEL.

EXEMPT. BOVEY

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ACTION EUR 20

INFO AF 09, IO 13, CIAE 00, DODE 00, GPM 04, H 02, INR 07, L 03, NSC 10, P 04, RSC 01, SP 02, SS 20, USIA 12, NSA 02, AID 28, SR 01, ORM 03, SA 01, SAL 01, E 15, COM 08, INT 06, ACDA 16, MC 01, TRSY 11, SCS 04, SCA 02, RSR 01, /207 W

R 151935Z AUG 68
FM AMEMBASSY BONN
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 9524
INFO USBER BERLIN 3159
USMISSION GENEVA
AMEMBASSY BRUSSELS
AMEMBASSY LAGOS
AMEMBASSY LONDON
AMEMBASSY PARIS

CONFIDENTIAL BONN 15664

SUBJ: THE FRG AND THE NIGERIAN WAR

THE FONOFF (POSADOWSKY-WEHNER, CHIEF AFRICA SECTION) MADE THE FOLLOWING COMMENTS TO US IN A REVIEW OF NIGERIAN DEVELOPMENTS AUG 14:

1. POSADOWSKY WAS HIGHLY CRITICAL OF RECENT FRENCH MOVES REGARDING NIGERIA, WHICH HE TERMED AS PURE SELF-INTEREST. POSADOWSKY ASSUMED THAT DE GAULLE'S PRIMARY MOTIVE WAS A DESIRE TO OBTAIN NEW OIL CONCESSIONS IN BIAFRA AT THE EXPENSE OF THE BRITISH. POSADOWSKY ADDED IN CONFIDENCE THAT A BIAFRAN REP. HAD TOLD HIM THAT AN OIL DEAL BETWEEN THE FRENCH AND THE BIAFRANS HAD ALREADY BEEN CONCLUDED AND THAT THE FRENCH WERE NOW PROVIDING COVERT FINANCIAL AID TO BIAFRA. POSADOWSKY COMMENTED THAT HE HAD NO WAY OF ASSESSING THIS STORY, BUT THOUGHT IT NOT INCONCEIVABLE.

2. PUBLIC OPINION IN THE FRG WAS, IN POSADOWSKY'S VIEW, BEGINNING TO APPRAISE THE NIGERIAN SITUATION MORE REALISTICALLY AND WAS NO LONGER ENTIRELY BEING TAKEN IN BY PRO-BIAFRAN PROPAGANDA

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EFFORTS. INTERESTED POLITICAL FIGURES IN THE BUNDESTAG AND THE PROTESTANT AND CATHOLIC CHURCH REPS SEEMED MORE AWARE OF THE COMPLEXITIES OF THE SITUATION AND OF THE NEED FOR CAUTION TO ASSURE THAT HUMANITARIAN AID REACHED THE VICTIMS AND ALSO TO MINIMIZE POTENTIAL FOREIGN POLICY DAMAGE TO THE FRG. IN THIS CONNECTION, POSADOWSKY SAID THE FONOFF WAS ESPECIALLY PLEASED THAT THE AFRICA SUBCOMMITTEE OF THE BUNDESTAG FOREIGN AFFAIRS COMMITTEE HAD UNANIMOUSLY DECIDED AUG 13 TO POSTPONE THE PROPOSED VISIT TO NIGERIA AND BIAFRA BY BUNDESTAG DEPUTIES.


3. NONETHELESS, POSADOWSKY FEARED THAT THE WEST GERMAN POSITION IN NIGERIA HAD BEEN CONSIDERABLY DAMAGED AS A RESULT OF PRO-BIAFRAN OUTCRIES IN THE FEDREP. THE FONOFF HAD NOTED WITH CONCERN A RECENT EAST GERMAN MISSION TO NIGERIA. WHILE IT WAS NOT YET INFORMED REGARDING THE SUBSTANCE OF GDR DISCUSSIONS WITH THE LAGOS AUTHORITIES, THE FONOFF WAS WORRIED THAT SOME COMMITMENT FOR ARMS ASSISTANCE MAY HAVE BEEN MADE. SO FAR THERE HAVE BEEN NO INDICATIONS OF GDR MILITARY AID.

4. POSADOWSKY SAID THAT GERMAN HUMANITARIAN AID COMMITMENTS TO NIGERIA NOW TOTALLED DM 8.6 MILLION. DM 4.3 MILLION OF THIS HAD ALREADY BEEN PAID OUT TO THE RED CROSS AND THE CATHOLIC AND PROTESTANT RELIEF AGENCIES WHICH WERE ACTING AS AGENTS FOR THE GOVT IN DISBURSING AID. WHILE POSADOWSKY WAS REASONABLY OPTIMISTIC THAT BETTER ARRANGEMENTS WOULD BE WORKED OUT TO ASSURE THAT AID REACHED THE NEEDY, HE WAS VERY PESSIMISTIC ABOUT THE PROSPECTS FOR A POLITICAL SETTLEMENT. HE FEARED THE CURRENT PEACE TALKS WOULD FAIL SINCE NEITHER SIDE SEEMED PREPARED TO GIVE GROUND ON THE KEY ISSUE OF SECESSION. POSADOWSKY EXPECTED THAT THIS WOULD BE FOLLOWED BY A FINAL AND SUCCESSFUL MILITARY ASSAULT BY THE CENTRAL GOVT AGAINST THE REMAINING BIAFRAN TERRITORY.

5. COMMENT: FROM OUR VANTAGE POINT, WE QUESTION WHETHER PUBLIC OPINION HAS SWUNG AROUND AS MUCH AS POSADOWSKY BELIEVES. WE HAVE THE IMPRESSION THAT GERMANS STILL CONTINUE TO EVALUATE THE WAR LESS IN TERMS OF POLITICAL THAN HUMANITARIAN ISSUES. ILLUSTRATIVE OF THIS ARE THE AUG 13 STATEMENT BY BUNDESTAG AFRICA SUBCOMMITTEE CHAIRMAN VON WRANGEL, A CONSERVATIVE CDU DEPUTY, TERMING THE FAILURE OF THE USSR AND THE US TO STOP THE WAR A "SCANDAL" AND THE LEAD STORY IN THE LIBERAL WEEKLY DIE ZEIT'S AUG 9 ISSUE, CRITICIZING THE UN FOR ITS FAILURE TO INTERVENE. THE MEDIA IN GENERAL HAVE BEEN FOLLOWING A SIMILAR EDITORIAL LINE. LODGE

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

SYSTEMATIC REVIEW WITHDRAWAL CARD NO. POL 50-25

DATE: 8/15/68 MSG NO.: 1281 TYPE: TE

FROM: Kaduna TO: State

SUBJECT: Kaduna Protest March Against French....

DOCUMENT ORIGINATOR: DEPT. OF STATE: ☒ OTHER: ☐


BASIS FOR WITHDRAWAL:

☒ CONTAINS NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION
☐ OTHER LAW OR REGULATION

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TO SECSTATE WASHDC 2850
INFO AMEMBASSY ADDIS ABABA
USMISSION GENEVA
AMEMBASSY LAGOS
AMEMBASSY LONDON
AMEMBASSY VIENNA

C O N F I D E N T I A L USUN 6207

SUBJECT: NIGERIA AT UN

1. BACKES (AUSTRIA) TOLD FINGER THAT HE HAD BEEN CONSULTING WITH SCANS RE POSSIBLE UN ACTION ON NIGERIA SHOULD OAU PEACE TALKS FAIL. AUSTRIANS BELIEVE THAT, IF MATTER TO BE TAKEN UP IN UN, GA WOULD BE BETTER THAN SECURITY COUNCIL OR ECOSOC, AND SCANS APPEARED TO AGREE.

2. RE POSSIBLE AUSTRIAN INITIATIVE IN UN, BACKES SAID AUSTRIAN FOREIGN MINISTER WOULD PROBABLY INCLUDE PASSAGE ON NIGERIA IN HIS GENERAL DEBATE SPEECH IN GA.

3. BACKES THOUGHT NIGERIAN PROBLEM COULD BEST BE RAISED IN THIRD COMMITTEE DURING GA RATHER THAN ELSEWHERE SINCE THERE EXISTS ITEM ON HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS UNDER WHICH SITUATION OF CIVILIANS AFFECTED BY NIGERIAN HOSTILITIES COULD BE DISCUSSED. FOLLOWING HIS SOUNDINGS WITH FRANCOPHONE AF DELS, HE THINKS MOST WOULD BE READY TO DISCUSS HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS ON BOTH SIDES IN THIRD COMMITTEE.

4. COMMENT: WHILE IT POSSIBLE SOME FRANCOPHONE AFRICANS MIGHT BE WILLING DISCUSS NIGERIAN PROBLEM AT THIS JUNCTURE, IT APPEARS DOUBTFUL "MOST" WOULD, SINCE MANY OF THEM ARE CONFRONTED WITH POSSIBLE SEPARATIST MOVEMENTS WITHIN THEIR OWN COUNTRIES.

GP-4. BALL

CONFIDENTIAL

0420

DECLASSIFIED
Authority: VND 959503
By: MNARA Date: 10/5/03

34N/ACTION		
AF-5		
RM/R	REP	AF
1		
ARA	EUR	FE
NEA	CU	INR
		5
IAH	P	IO
1	2	
IAH	IAH	AIO
1	2	20
SCA	SCS	S/P
2	1	1
AGR	COM	FRB
	3	
INT	LAB	TAR
TR	XMB	AIR
		5
ARMY	CIA	NAVY
3	20	5
OSO	USIA	NSA
34	10	3
NSC	HEW	
6	7	

AIRGRAM

POL 27 BIAFRA-NIGERIA
XR SOC 12-2 US
FOR RM USE ONLY

A-147 LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

TO : Department of State

INFO : KADUNA, LAGOS

FROM : Amconsul IBADAN

DATE: August 15, 1968

SUBJECT: WESTERN NIGERIA: British Missionary Visits Enugu

REF : Ibadan's A-141
POL 27 BIAFRA-NIGERIA
XR POL 27-9 BIAFRA
XR POL 18 NIGERIA

The referenced airgram transmitted the comments of the Reverend Gerald L. Falley of the Assemblies of God Mission on his July 29 to August 2, 1968 trip to Enugu. The Reverend William Sikes of the Anglican All Saints Church in Ibadan accompanied the Reverend Falley. He gave a mimeographed copy of an informal report on his visit to the British Deputy High Commission, which in turn passed a copy to the Consulate. This report is transmitted as an unclassified enclosure to this airgram (enclosure 1).

Mr. Anthony Ingledow, First Secretary in the British Deputy High Commission, temporarily stationed in Ibadan and a several-time visitor to Enugu, said that he agreed with the report submitted by Falley with the exception of two minor details. First, he had the impression that the engine of the Lokoja ferry still worked, but that the tug boat was used as the engine was not very strong. He also had seen one of the Idah ferries mortared when he was visiting Asaba. It was set on fire and sank on a sand bar, so the parts which had arrived must be for only one of the two ferries, unless, of course, they have been able to raise the stranded ferry, which he very much doubted.

Report JEC

STRONG

Enclosure:

Report on Visit to Enugu, 29th July - 2nd August, 1968, by Rev. Sikes.

FORM 4-62 DS-323

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☒ In ☐ Out

Drafted by: WCMithoefer, Jr.:gor 8/15/68

Contents and Classification Approved by: CCStrong

Clearances:

EMB:POL:EERamsaun Jr

0421

DECLASSIFIED
Authority: VMD959503
By: MNARA Date: 10/5/05

UNCLASSIFIED

Page 1 of 2
Enclosure No. 1
A-147 from Ibadan

VISIT TO ENUGU - 29TH JULY - 2ND AUGUST, 1968

As soon as you cross the border into the breakaway East you notice a difference. The road you have been travelling on has been mined and hastily repaired. The grass and the bush on both sides of the road has been uncut for a year and it has grown and continues to grow at an alarming rate. The atmosphere is strangely quiet. The Schools at the side of the main road are all deserted, shut up and closed, the bush reclaiming the playing fields. The villages are empty, some of the houses badly damaged as a result of shell-fire. Soon you come across a wrecked army lorry beside the road showing the results of a successful ambush. You pass through a village whose market place is gutted by fire. You pass through several military road checks. At one a drunken soldier solemnly presents arms, and then as an after-thought realising you are not one of his superior officers, he cheerfully waves you through. The long straight narrow road to Enugu is deserted, apart from the occasional army three-tonner carrying stores. You come across more wrecked vehicles by the side of the road, and just before you make the downhill drive to Enugu, you see some improvised armoured cars lying by the side of the road, now out of the fight, and their guns removed.

So much for the journey. We called in at a village on the outskirts of the City. At first we think it is deserted, but we find an elderly lady and a young boy, and before long a crowd of about twenty gather round. We learn that Enugu is still deserted, and that a few women and children are living in the villages round about, keeping the houses and farms going. The rest of the population are either dead or they have fled to the bush, frightened to return. We give them a few supplies, salt, milk, and tinned meat, which they promise to distribute and hand on to their friends and dependents. We proceed to Enugu and find it just as they said. The telephone wires are down; there is litter all over the place; apart from the soldiers we see very few civilians, to all intents and purposes, it is deserted; the buildings have all been broken into and looted, and a lot of the windows have been smashed; in brief, it's a ghost town. We move to my friend's house. He had been to his house two months ago to check his property and to hide some personal possessions from being looted. However, we found the house had been looted again and some of his things were strewn about the garden. We spent two days searching through the rubble finding things to bring back. By and large, the larger appliances were still there, but most of the smaller moveable things had gone. Mattress covers had been removed, furniture smashed, and papers scattered; it was a real mess. Three times whilst we were in his house, looters tried to come in but seeing us there, they went away to other houses nearby. There was no water and electricity supply, so we camped in the house and made do with the water we had brought and candles. Looking out on the City we could only see two lights from where we were, but power cables were down in places where the Army, and we got the impression that they were supplied with water too.

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Authority	VND 954503
By	MVA Date 10/5/05

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Page 2 of 2
Enclosure No. 1
A-147 from Ibadan

Towards the end of our short stay, we made a tour of the City. Pretty well all the houses and public buildings have been looted. We see scores of wrecked cars by the side of the roads, and many hundreds of empty beer bottles. We see a few women and children, possibly a hundred, though we were led to understand that there are probably five or six hundred now living in Enugu. We see a few men but these are traders from the north who have come to do business with the soldiers. We got a puncture from broken glass in the road, an ever present hazard. The beautiful buildings - Parliament, The Presidential Hotel, and The University - are all abandoned and deserted.

We call in and see the International Red Cross Team. They are running a series of clinics in the villages surrounding Enugu and in the Refugee Camp within the precincts of the City. We handed in what remained of our half-ton of food supplies. They were grateful as nothing had come through to them for the last ten days, and they were running out of stocks. Salt was particularly short.

Next day we reported to the Army Headquarters in order to obtain a pass for leaving Enugu, and to get permission to take a vanload of our personal belongings out of the City. The Army kindly mended our punctured tyre, sold us some petrol, and gave us a pass which ensured a safe passage through the check points. We take a last look at Enugu, check out, and proceed westwards left alone with our thoughts. It has been a depressing few days. This is a City which is being completely wasted. It must have been a beautiful City in peace time, now it is a ghost town.

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DECLASSIFIED	
Authority	VND 959503
By	MV NARA Date 10/5/95

66

POL 27 BIAFRA-NIGERIA
220572

OUTGOING TELEGRAM Department of State

INDICATE: ☐ COLLECT
☐ CHARGE TO

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

Classification

14 AUG 68 16 08z

FOR OC/T USE ONLY

Origin
ACTION: Amembassy ADDIS ABABA
" ABIDJAN
Info: " ACCRA
" KINSHASA
" LAGOS
" MONROVIA
" NIAMEY
" YAOUNDE

INFO: Amembassy LONDON
USMISSION GENEVA
USMISSION USUN

STATE

Addresses should repeat significant messages re Nigerian crisis to London, USUN
~~XXXXXXXXXX~~
and Geneva.

END

220572

RECEIVED BY 10/1

RUSK

11

Drafted by: AF/AFW:RPSmith:ncs:8/14/68

Tel. Ext. 6402

Telegraphic transmission and
classification approved by: Nigerian Task Force - Roy M. Melbourne

Clearances:

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

Classification

FORM 8-65 DS-322

0424

DECLASSIFIED
Authority: VND 950503
By: MNARA Date: 10/5/03

ORIGIN/ACTION			DEPARTMENT OF STATE		POL: 27 B, MFR A- N 19 2014	
<div style="display: flex; justify-content: space-between;"> AF 5 2 </div>			<h1 style="margin: 0;">AIRGRAM</h1>		FOR RM USE ONLY	
RM/R	REP	OPM	A-143		CONFIDENTIAL	
1	5	2	NO.		(Unclassified enclosure)	
SCA	EUR	SCS	TO : Department of State		HANDLING INDICATOR	
2	5	1	INFO : KADUNA, LAGOS (Enclosure to Dept. only.)		R. Smith R/R	
NEA	5/5	10	FROM : Amconsul IBADAN		DATE: August 14, 1968	
6/11	2	5	SUBJECT: WESTERN NIGERIA: Rivers Man Comments on Recent Events in his State.			
3	5/10	20	REF :			
5/10	6/10	5/11	SUMMARY			
AGR	COM	FRB	<p>This airgram presents the substance of three conversations which the reporting officer had with Dr. T. Ona Oruwariye (protect) on August 8, 10, and 13, 1968. Dr. Oruwariye is a local medical practitioner who runs his own hospital, is the Ibadan city coroner, the surgeon to the Nigerian Police, the U.S. visa doctor, and president of the Mbari Club. He has been closely associated with the creation of the Rivers State. In this airgram Dr. Oruwariye comments on an article by a fellow Rivers man (see enclosure 1), conditions in his home state, relations between the Military Governor and Colonel Adekunle and on the relations between the Western and Eastern Ijaws.</p>			
INT	LAB	TAR	*****			
TR	XMB	AIR	<p>Dr. Oruwariye is an Eastern Ijaw from Abonnema. He was asked to comment on an article which appeared in the Western State-owned <u>Daily Sketch</u> of August 6, 1968 (enclosure 1) and the Lagos-based <u>Daily Times</u> of August 5. Dr. Oruwariye identified the author, Dr. Tam David-West, as a microbiologist at the University College Hospital in Ibadan and a fellow Eastern Ijaw from the town of Buguma. Dr. Oruwariye explained that Abonnema, Buguma and Bakana were towns that were traditional rivals among his particular sub-tribal grouping of the Ijaws. The Buguma, for example, now had the present Ibo-supported Paramount Chief of the Kalabari.</p>			
ARMY	CIA	NAVY	Enclosure:			
3	20	5	"Putting the Rivers State on a Sound Footing," by Dr. Tam David-West, <u>Daily Sketch</u> , August 6, 1968. (To Department only.)			
OSO	USIA	NSA	GROUP-3			
34	10	3	Downgraded at 12-year intervals, not automatically declassified.			
	NSC	6	CONFIDENTIAL			
			FORM 4-62 DS-323		FOR DEPT. USE ONLY	
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Drafted by: WCMithoefer, Jr.:gor 8/14/68			Contents and Classification Approved by: CCStrong			
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C. WILKINSON

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Authority: VND 959503
By: MNARA Date: 10/5/05

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He said that no one associated with the historic struggle for the establishment of a Rivers State had ever heard of Tam-West. He characterized him as a "johnny-come-lately" who now wanted to share the benefits of what others had worked so hard to bring about.

The article itself he characterized as a "bunch of rubbish." He said that David-West and his supporters from Buguma had brought the charges of favoritism toward the people from Abonnema before the Rivers Military Governor, Lt. Commander Diete-Spiff (whose hometown is Brass) some three weeks ago. Diete-Spiff dismissed the charges as without foundation.

According to Oruwariye there have been few definite appointments made to the top Rivers State governmental positions. He mentioned W.P. Daniel-Kalio, an Orika man, who returned last year from the Western State Civil Service to become Head of Service and Secretary to the Rivers State Military Governor. He also mentioned K.B. Tsaro-Wiwa, an Ogoni man, a former lecturer at the University of Lagos, who is the civilian administrator of Bonny. Dr. Oruwariye said that it was especially difficult to establish a civil service in the Rivers State as the Rivers people have been traditionally discriminated against in all areas of the federation, particularly by the Ibos, and therefore have had limited opportunities to obtain administrative experience. He mentioned as an example Daniel-Kalio, who only became a permanent secretary shortly before he retired. While he thought that Daniel-Kalio had had limited experience in administration, he said that his long service in the Western Ministry of Local Government and Chieftaincy Affairs would be a great asset in helping to sort out the problems of the relationships between the various clans and sub-tribal groupings in the Rivers State.

Returning to the David-West article, he said that the author wanted the Rivers civil service to have a quota for each sub-tribal area. However, he thought this was impossible due precisely to the fact that the areas had experienced uneven development. He admitted that he has been under consideration for the position as Chairman of the Public Service Commission (which is, in garbled form, point three in the enclosure), although he had not as yet made up his mind as to whether or not to accept. He also observed that the four Graham Douglas brothers were his cousins and were also from Abonnema. One is a doctor in Lagos (point one in the enclosure) while two of the brothers are lawyers (point two in the enclosure). Oruwariye said that no final decisions had yet been taken on any of the appointments mentioned by David-West.

Oruwariye said that the major problem in establishing a civilian administration "on the ground" in the Rivers State lay in the relationship between the Military Governor and the Field Commander in the area. He said that Colonel Adekunle "despises silk jackets who are trying to be

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Authority	VND959503
By	NARA Date 10/5/05

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3

administrators." He observed that Esuene had a difficult time in establishing the South-Eastern State capital in Calabar. However, Diète-Spiff "is only a twenty-five year old boy who Adekunle expects to kneel down before him." Adekunle's wife is an Eastern Ijaw from the Wilcox family in Bonny and so the military field commander has a special interest in seeing who gets what position, i.e., he wants to see that his in-laws are taken care of. Oruwariye observed that the various Rivers politicians "will have to be palmed off with some patronage," but no judgments could yet be made about the Diète-Spiff government as "you can't judge a government in exile."

Oruwariye had a number of comments to make on the progress of the civil war. He said that he had received an eye-witness account of the liberation of his town of Abonnema from another doctor. Two days before the Federal forces liberated the town, the Ibos decided to raze it to the ground. They evacuated the entire population and put petrol tins around the town preparatory to burning it. However, the Federal forces entered at 3 a.m. and thus caught the Ibos by surprise before they could set the town ablaze. Some 600 people were dispersed by the Ibos at that time and they are still trickling back.

Oruwariye said that the Ibos had carried off a good number of hostages from his town and other parts of the state, particularly in the Ogoni area. He observed that these people were probably some of those who are now starving in the refugee camps in the unliberated parts of the East Central State.

Oruwariye said that the Rivers people were content to maintain their own borders. He discounted talk of reuniting the Eastern and Western Ijaw people (Mrs. Helen Eso, wife of Western Justice of Appeal Kayode Eso, a Western Ijaw, had previously told the reporting officer of the great desire, largely on the basis of controlling the oil, of the Ijaws to be reunited). Oruwariye said that a Pandora's box would be opened if the Ijaws tried to become united. He observed that there are Ijaws all of the way from the Cameroons to the Ivory Coast. There were even whole towns of them near Okitipupa, Lagos and Badagry, so union of all Ijaws was not practicable. He said that the other tribes in the Mid-West would never agree and the other Rivers people would not like to see the Ijaws constitute any larger group.

Comment: While Dr. Oruwariye is not exactly a disinterested party as regards Rivers State politics, both his comments and those of Dr. David-West suggest that the Rivers State is not immune from the kind of sub-tribal jockeying for public positions that afflicts other Nigerian states.

STRONG CONFIDENTIAL

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Authority	VND 959503
By	MNARA
Date	10/5/05

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Page 1 of 3
Enclosure No. 1
A-143 from Ibadan

DAILY SKETCH Tuesday, August 6, 1968

Putting the Rivers State on a sound footing

By
Dr. TAM DAVID - WEST

ANYONE who considers the splitting of Nigeria into at least the present twelve-state structure without bias, prejudice or any selfish ulterior motives, would come to the inescapable conclusion that this is a big commendable stride towards the correction of one of the obvious and most obnoxious faults of our First Republic.

It needed a penetrating foresight, a firm belief in justice and fair play and, above all, a tremendous courage on the part of the Commander-in-Chief, Major-General Yakubu Gowon and his team of advisers to bring this about.

To Nigeria, 1967 was therefore an epoch-making year in our march towards a new Nigeria envisaged in our choicest dreams, of peace, stability and harmony.

And to the minority ethnic groups in the country in particular, who have long been despised and trodden upon by bigger groups, it was an "annus mirabilis," in which our self-determination was guaranteed and assured.

The above considerations, and some special reasons have compelled me to write this spotlight on the Rivers State, my own state. However, while this communication refers particularly to the Rivers State, it is my suspicion that some of the faults and ills spotlighted here are also true of some of the other states. Thus it is my hope and my belief that the sentiments here expressed, if constructively criticized, and thoroughly analysed, would save us all from future troubles with their obvious entrenched embarrassment in the eyes of the world, especially those who are cynical about the creation of states in the country.

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Authority: VND 959503
By: MN NARA Date: 10/5/05

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Page 2 of 3
Enclosure No. 1
A-143 from Ibadan

My impelling motives for this spotlight? A belief in correcting any faults before they become chronic and so lead to greater consequences. It is a well-known medical principle that an early diagnosis of any ailment, would increase the chances of an ultimate cure.

Secondly, a recurrence in the new states, of the ills that resulted in the welcomed collapse of our First Republic, would negate all the efforts put into the present civil war, and make one huge farce of our cherished slogan "To Keep Nigeria One."

These ills and shortcomings are known to all; the most prominent amongst which were GREED, AVARICE, NEPOTISM, FAVOURITISM, MANIPULATIONS and INJUSTICE. And all these were superimposed on that demon superstructure that like a cancerous leison slowly but surely eats into the very fabric of our nation — TRIBALISM cum SECTONALISM.

Thirdly, it is my strong conviction that if in these new states we make the mistake to continue to dispense new wines into old wine skins, we would only succeed to fan new troubles and dissatisfaction and frustration that would plunge us all into more sectional disturbances and national upheavals and cataclysms.

For the past six months I have been informally investigating certain allegations of appointments and projected appointments to positions in the administration of the Rivers State.

At first I tended to dismiss those allegations even though some of my information sources are very respectable.

Moreover, I felt it would be unwise, to jump to rash conclusions.

However, after due study I have regrettably come to the decision that I should speak out on these matters.

Disquieting manipulations

I have interviewed over fifty Rivers citizens drawn from Ibadan and Lagos, and covered both civil servants and academic men.

The allegations were confirmed by over 95% of these persons. And of course statistically or otherwise, such a response must be considered SIGNIFICANT, and so demand some attention.

This must not be seen as washing our dirty linens in the public. The allegations under reference seem to be known by so many, that they are therefore no longer secret.

I do not believe in glossing over wrongs. Furthermore, I feel that sometimes "linens" are better washed in the open, where they would have wider space, and so increased chances of getting dried better and faster.

There are allegations:

1. That a Lagos-based Abonnema doctor has been tipped for the post of Director of the Rivers State Medical Services.
2. That a close relation of the same doctor is likely to be the Attorney-General for the state.
3. That an Ibadan-based doctor, also of Abonnema, has been earmarked to head the Rivers State Civil Service.
4. That an Abonnema gentleman, working for an information department, has been tipped for a top position in the Rivers State Information Department.
5. That a very young Abonnema man has been appointed Administrator for Degema in the Rivers State.
6. That because of these and similar suspected disquieting manipulations in the Rivers State office, several Rivers young men and women are growing to be frustrated, disillusioned and dissatisfied.
7. That some well-meaning Rivers sons who disagreed and could speak out were arrested under the pretext of labelling them rebel sympathizers, or were being 'rebellized.'

I do not want to convey the impression at all that our illustrious Governor has any hand in this reign of MacCarthyism! However, I would like to ask humbly that the Governor takes a special interest in this matter, and insulate himself from dubious so-called advisers.

We are all looking up to him. His fall will be our fall. His success will be our success. By all means and for goodness sake let us keep what we have.

We are so few! I personally do not subscribe to the view that any Rivers man or woman would prefer slavery and oppression to freedom and self-determination.

If there be such a person or persons, we should feel sorry for him: send him to a mental hospital and later rehabilitate him.

I suggest that an "Appointments Committee", comprising representatives from all the different Rivers groups be set up to advise the Governor on such matters.

All Rivers sons and daughters should be given an EQUAL chance to compete. The criteria for all appointments must be QUALIFICATION, EXPERIENCE and COMPETENCE.

I also suggest that the present set-up in our state office be revised to allay existing fears among certain sectors of our Rivers society. This suggestion should also apply to the "inner circle" of advisers.

The Rivers State office should clear the air on these allegations, since the allegations and manipulations if proved true would certainly be an affront to the widely acclaimed integrity of the Rivers people.

Complete liberation

Moreover, it would be the beginning of lots of trouble. The Rivers State is not made up of Abonnema or Buguma alone; not even the Kalabaris alone.

We have the Okirikas, Bonnys, Nembes, Yenagoas, Ikweres (about one-seventh of the Rivers population), etc. And in each of these places we undoubtedly have very trained and highly competent men and women, whose talents we must tap if we want a progressive, stable and well-managed Rivers State.

Readers unfamiliar with my background would erroneously tend to feel that I am picking on Abonnema for one reason or the other. Let me emphatically stress here that I am as much of Abonnema as I am of Buguma.

I have much of Abonnema blood running in my veins from my mother's side. In fact, one of my sons is named BENIBO.

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0429

DECLASSIFIED
Authority VND 95/503
By MW NARA Date 10/5/05

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Page 3 of 3
Enclosure No. 1
A-1143 from Ibadan

after one of my Abonnema great grandfathers (Chief Benibo) — the naming ceremony having been performed according to Kalabari tradition, before the "shrine" of the family at Abonnema.

Also in 1963, when some group of people conspired against me in a certain issue, my entire family in Abonnema demonstrated in a big way to correct the injustice and protect my interest.

They won decidedly! I am reminded that the effects of that demonstration are still lingering to the present day. In conclusion, I say that I do not love Abonnema less. However, I naturally have the interest of the whole Rivers State at heart in these matters.

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0430

DECLASSIFIED	
Authority	VND 959503
By	MW NARA Date 10/5/03

OUTGOING TELEGRAM Department of State

INDICATE: ☐ COLLECT
☐ CHARGE TO

CONFIDENTIAL

Classification

Origin ACTION: Amembassy LUSAKA PRIORITY

Info: INFO: Amembassy LAGOS

Amembassy LONDON

STATE

SUBJECT: Nigerian Policy

REF: Lusaka 2379

1. US policy described previous circulars basically unchanged. Recent events requiring special mention have delayed issuance new circular, which will be forthcoming very shortly and will provide background info helpful for discussions with Zambian officials.

2. Fear of poisoning has not been factor in relief operations to date, although poison is traditional method of disposing of enemies in West Africa and can be real fear. Since all the various methods of relief shipments suggested by Biafra or Nigeria include participation by Red Cross or other reliable voluntary agency in which both sides have confidence, it unlikely that poison or fear of poison will be serious problem. Biafran leadership has not made point of it for some time.

Drafted by: AFW:RWach) AFW:DFSmith 6402
AFSE:MTLorimer chr 8/14/68 3519

Telegraphic transmission and
classification approved by: AFSE-Edward W. Holmes

Clearances:

CONFIDENTIAL

Classification

FORM DS-322
8-65

Pol 27 Biafra - Nigeria
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Pol 27 - g Biafra - Nigeria
14 AUG 68 20 47Z

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0431

DECLASSIFIED
Authority: VND 959503
By: M/NARA Date: 10/5/05

CONFIDENTIAL

Classification

3. Following are principal logistical difficulties involved in conveying relief supplies:

A. To Biafra:

(1) Disagreement of two sides: FMG basically wants land corridor across FMG territory; Biafra basically wants direct airlift. Both sides have indicated some flexibility on ICRC supervised land corridor plus airlift to ICRC controlled airstrip in Biafra, but no agreement reached as of 8/13.

(2) Biafra has only about 3 airstrips. The one probably designated for ICRC use has been under shell fire and is damaged, requiring repairs. Biafra has no airports with regular facilities.

(3) For most part FMG controls Biafran air space in daytime. Thus daytime flights without FMG consent extremely hazardous.

(4) Biafra has no access to sea. Shipments by water would have to traverse FMG territory, with possible exception of Niger River route.

(5) Absence thus far of adequate Red Cross distribution personnel in Biafra.

(6) Rainy season.

B. To FMG-held areas:

CONFIDENTIAL

Classification

0432

Page 3 of telegram to Amembassy LUSAKA PRIORITY

CONFIDENTIAL
Classification

(1) Inability of relief teams to operate in areas of greatest need, which continue to be combat zones.

(2) Absence of adequate number of trucks in South-east State.

(3) Deterioration of roads, destruction of bridges and ferry facilities.

(4) Questionable capability of Enugu and ~~Calabar~~ ^{Calabar} ~~airfields~~ airfields for receiving aircraft of C-130 size.

(5) Rainy season.

4. Details concerning ~~xx~~ logistical problems to be pouched August 15.

GP-3.

END

RUSK

CONFIDENTIAL

Classification

FORM DS-322A
8-63
CONTINUATION SHEET

0433

DECLASSIFIED
Authority: VND 959503
By: MVA Date: 10/5/05



71- POL 27 BIAFRA - NIGERIA
Department of State

TELEGRAM

SECRET 815

ACTION COPY

PAGE 01 GENEVA 04431 141745Z

43

ACTION SS 30

INFO CCD 00,SSO 00,NSCE 00,1030 W

O P 141720Z AUG 68 ZFF-4

FM USMISSION GENEVA

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 8528

INFO AMEMBASSY LAGOS PRIORITY

AMEMBASSY LONDON

S E C R E T GENEVA 4431

EXDIS

SUBJ: NIGERIA

FOR PALMER FROM MOORE

LORD HUNT TOLD ME AT LUNCH TODAY THAT PRIME MINISTER WILSON
HAD TOLD HIM BEFORE HE LEFT LONDON THAT HMG WILL STOP ARMS
SHIPMENTS TO NIGERIA IF FMG RESUMES OFFENSIVE. HUNT DID NOT
KNOW WHETHER GOWON HAD BEEN INFORMED, BUT ASSUMED GOWON WELL
AWARE THAT THIS WOULD HAPPEN. TUBBY

SECRET

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S/S-S-CMS <u>30-31</u>		Serial No. <u>4431</u>	Dpty
S/S-O <u>11</u>		Date <u>14 AUG 68</u>	<u>(62)</u>
PRINCIPALS		GEOGRAPHIC BUREAUS	
S	<u>4 1</u>	AF	<u>11 (a) 14/15</u>
U	<u>5 1</u>	ARA	
M	<u>6 1</u>	EA	
G	<u>7 1</u>	EUR	<u>1 16</u>
G/PM		NEA	
S/AH		OTHER AGENCIES	
S/AL		White House	<u>11 2-3</u>
S/C		Vice President	
S/P		Defense	<u>1 17</u>
		CIA	<u>1 18</u>
		NSA	
FUNCTIONAL BUREAUS		Treasury	
E		State Rep	<u>1 19</u>
H		ACDA	
INR	<u>10 1</u>	AID	
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O			
P		OTHER	
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POL 27 BIAFRA-NIGERIA
TR DEF 19-8 FR BIAFRA
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PAGE 01 LAGOS 11677 141127Z

16
ACTION AF 15

INFO EUR 15, IO 13, NSA 02, CIAE 00, GPM 04, H 02, INR 07, L 03, NSC 10, P 04,

RSC 01, SP 02, SS 20, USIA 12, SAH 02, SR 01, ORM 03, SCS 04, SCA 02,

AID 28, RSR 01, ACDA 16, MC 01, 168 W

R 141000Z AUG 68
FM AMEMBASSY LAGOS
TO: SECSTATE WASHDC 1990
INFO: AMEMBASSY ACCRA
AMEMBASSY ADDIS ABABA
AMEMBASSY KINSHASA
AMEMBASSY PARIS
AMEMBASSY LIBREVILLE
AMEMBASSY LONDON
AMEMBASSY MONROVIA
AMEMBASSY NIAMEY
AMEMBASSY YAOUNDE
USMISSION GENEVA
AMCONSUL IBADAN
AMCONSUL KADUNA
CINCSSTRIKE/CINCMCAFSA
DIA
STATE GRNC

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE LAGOS 11677

SUBJECT: ACCUSATIONS OF FRENCH INVOLVEMENT IN NIGERIA


REF: LAGOS 115471(NOTALI)

1. SINCE FRENCH STATEMENT JULY 31 SUPPORTING SELF-
DETERMINATION PRINCIPLE IN NIGERIAN CIVIL WAR, NIGERIAN
PRESS AND RADIO HAVE BEEN FINDING FRENCH PARATROOPS
BEHIND EVERY TREE.

2. RADIO KADUNA AUGUST 12 (FBIS 130915) BROADCAST QUOTED
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23

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PAGE 02 LAGOS 11677 141127Z

TRANSPORT TARKA AS HAVING SAID IN ROME THAT "MANY FRENCH MERCENARIES FIGHTING ON THE SIDE OF THE NIGERIAN REBEL FORCES HAVE BEEN CAPTURED BY FEDERAL TROOPS".

3. AUGUST 11 SUNDAY TIMES CARRIED FRONT PAGE STORY CAPTIONED "NOW, FRENCH TROOPS LAND". AUGUST 10 ARTICLE BY LAGOS TIMES CORRESPONDENT IN PORT HARCOURT BEGINS "FRANCE HAS AIRLIFTED SOME TROOPS INTO REBEL-HELD TERRITORY TO FIGHT FOR THE SECESSIONISTS IN THE CURRENT WAR". ON CLOSE EXAMINATION, STORY BASED PURELY ON SPECULATIONS AND RUMORS.

4. MAJOR ARTICLE LAST PAGE AUGUST 10 DAILY TIMES UNDER HEADLINE "FRENCH MILITARY AID FOR OJUKWU" STATED "AUTHORITATIVE SOURCES INDICATED THAT FRENCH AIRCRAFT, CARRYING WEAPONS AND AMMUNITION, HAD BEEN FLYING WEAPONS INTO REBEL-HELD AREAS BETWEEN 8:30 P.M. AND 10:30 P.M." REFERENCE ALSO MADE TO ALLEGED BIAFRAN PLAN TO BUY TEN JET FIGHTER PLANES AND LAUNCH AIR ATTACKS ON LAGOS AND OTHER CITIES WITH HELP OF FRENCH MERCENARIES.

5. STEPPED-UP ROAD-BLOCK ACTIVITY IN PAST TWO WEEKS IS ATTRIBUTED BY SOME TO FEAR OF FRENCH INFILTRATION. DECON ON RECEIPT. MATHEWS.

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Pol 27 Biafra Nigeria 27

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(35)

PAGE 01 DAKAR 03661 141245Z

46

ACTION AF 15

INFO EUR 15, IO 13, NSA 02, CIAE 00, DODE 00, GPM 04, H 02, INR 07, L 03,

NSC 10, P 04, RSC 01, SP 02, SS 20, USIA 12, AID 28, RSR 01, SR 01,

ORM 03, SCS 04, SCA 02, /149 W

R 141150Z AUG 68
FM AMEMBASSY DAKAR
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 2807
INFO AMEMBASSY ADDIS ABABA
AMEMBASSY BAMAKO
AMEMBASSY CONAKRY
AMEMBASSY LAGOS
AMEMBASSY LONDON
AMEMBASSY PARIS

C O N F I D E N T I A L DAKAR 3661

1. NOTE THAT DE GAULLE, AT COUNCIL OF MINISTERS MEETING YESTERDAY, MADE FURTHER STATEMENT ON BIAFRA.


2. NO DEFINITE INFORMATION AVAILABLE THAT BIAFRA DISCUSSED IN SENGHOR'S RECENT TALK WITH DE GAULLE IN PARIS. HOWEVER, GIVEN PRECEDENT OF HOUPHOUET'S RECOGNITION OF BIAFRA FOLLOWING HIS TRIP TO PARIS, WOULD NOT BE SURPRISED IF SENGHOR AFTER HIS RETURN FROM FRANCE NEXT WEEK SHOULD ANNOUNCE RECOGNITION BIAFRA, IF ADDIS MEETING STILL UNPRODUCTIVE. PRESS CONTINUES GIVE HEAVY PLAY TO SUBJECT, WITH PARTICULAR EMPHASIS ON SUFFERING IN BIAFRA.
BROWN

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0438





Pol 27 BIAFRA-NIGERIA
*R Pol BIAFRA-FR
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PAGE 01 PARIS 19491 141907Z

83:

ACTION: EUR 20

INFO: AF 09, IO 13, CIAE 00, DODE 00, GPM 04, H 02, INR 07, L 03, NSC 10, PI 04,

RSC 01, SP 02, SS 20, USIA 12, NSA 02, AID 28, SR 01, ORM 03, NIC 01,

(RSR) 01, /143: W

R 141735Z AUG 68
FM AMEMBASSY PARIS
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 5173
INFO AMEMBASSY ADDIS ABABA
USMISSION GENEVA
AMCONSUL IBADAN
AMCONSUL KADUNA
AMEMBASSY LAGOS
AMEMBASSY LONDON
AMEMBASSY YAOUNDE
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
SUBJ: DEGAULLE DECLARATION ON "BIAFRA"

1. WHILE STILL HOLDING SHORT OF FORMAL RECOGNITION BIAFRA, AUGUST 13 COUNCIL OF MINISTERS STATEMENTS REGARDING NIGERIAN WAR LEAVE LITTLE DOUBT WHERE GOV SYMPATHIES LIE.
2. FOLLOWING FONMIN DEBRE'S EXPOSE OF FRENCH INTEREST IN ADDIS NEGOTIATIONS AND FRENCH EFFORTS TO EASE SUFFERING OF BIAFRAN POPULATION, DE GAULLE DECLARED THAT GIVEN WHAT HAS TAKEN PLACE TO DATE PLUS "POPULAR DETERMINATION" AS SHOWN BY CURRENT SITUATION, IT APPEARED IMPOSSIBLE FOR PROBLEM TO BE RESOLVED BY MILITARY SOLUTION. DE GAULLE NOTED THAT IN HIS OPINION, ONLY ANSWER WAS A POLITICAL SOLUTION WHICH TOOK INTO ACCOUNT THE "PERSONALITY OF THE BIAFRAN PEOPLE."
3. FRENCH PRESS AND RADIO/TELEVISION CONTINUE BEAT BIAFRAN DRUM WITH INCREASINGLY HEAVY TEMPO. "FIGARO" COMMENTARY OF AUGUST 14 OBSERVES, "FOR THE MOMENT, THE THREE YALTA POWERS - THE USSR,

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0439





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PAGE 02 PARIS 19491 141907Z

THE UNITED STATES, AND GREAT BRITAIN - ARE UNCONDITIONALLY SUPPORTING LAGOS SO AS NOT TO UPSET THE HAUSAS, AND IN A MORE GENERAL FASHION THE MUSLIMS, A POLICY WHICH IS LEADING THESE POWERS TO SUPPORT THE POLITICAL STATUS QUO IN AFRICA, EVEN WHEN IT INVOLVES AN UNTENABLE SITUATION."

4. INTERESTING TO NOTE THAT COMMUNIST "HUMANITE" HAS AVOIDED TAKING ANY POSITION WHATEVER ON NIGERIAN ISSUE, POSSIBLY AS BEING UNABLE TO BRING ITSELF TO TAKE SIDES WITH EITHER DE GAULLE OR THE UNITED STATES AND GREAT BRITAIN.

GP-3 WALLNER

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POL 27 BIAFRA-NIGERIA
Department of State **TELEGRAM**

23

SECRET 290

PAGE 01 ABIDJA 04036 141136Z

18
ACTION SS 70

INFO CIAE 00, /070 W

P 141105Z AUG 68
FM AMEMBASSY ABIDJAN
TO AMEMBASSY ADDIS ABABA PRIORITY
INFO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 2825
AMEMBASSY LAGOS

S E C R E T ABIDJAN 4036

LIMDIS

REF: ADDIS 5176; LAGOS 11672

1. MESSAGE DELIVERED HOUPHOUET MORNING AUGUST 14, AS REQUESTED, WITH COPY TO ETHIOPIAN AMBASSADOR.
 2. RE LAGOS 11672, THOUGH MATTER LESS SENSITIVE HERE, I TOO WOULD PREFER ROUTING MESSAGES FROM HIM THROUGH ETHIOPIAN EMBASSY WHEN TIME PERMITS.
- GP-3
MORGAN

*Abidjan 4036
8-14-68*

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1968 AUG 14 AM 10 01

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Geographic

Other

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S/S-O 1
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S/S-EX
S/S-CMS
S/S-O DIR
MilRep
Summary
Task Force

AF5 X
ARA 9
EA 11
EUR 9
NEA 7

ACDA 5
AID/EXSEC 3
AA/AFR 2
AA/VN 2
AA/EA 3
AA/NESA 2

Functional

CU
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INR 6
IO 4
L 2
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P 2
SCA
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SCI

PC
VP
AEC 3
AGR 3
COM 2
EXIM
FRB
LAB
NASA
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TRANS
TRSY 6
JUS
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FBI
CEA
FAA

Principals

ES 2
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G
SIG 1
S/AH 3
S/AL
SA
S/CPR
S/GOV
S/IL
S/P 11
S/R 11
S/FW
S/PM
M/WP
G/PM

OTHER AGENCIES

WH 10
CIA
DOD
USIA 4
NSA

File
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47

SECRET 440

PAGE 01 ABIDJA 04041 150025Z

82

ACTION SS 70

INFO /070 W

P 142105Z AUG 68
FM AMEMBASSY ABIDJAN
TO AMEMBASSY ADDIS ABABA PRIORITY
INFO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 2828
AMEMBASSY LAGOS

SECRET ABIDJAN 4041

LIMDIS:

RWF: ADDIS 5176 *pl 27 Bifra - niger**Nigerian Peace Talks**Abidjan 4041
8-14-68*

1. PLEASE TRANSMIT FOLLOWING MESSAGE TO EMPEROR HAILE SELASSIE
IN REPLY MESSAGE SENT REFTEL:

1. QUOTE: QUITE VOTRE TELEGRAMME DU 14 AOUT 1968, J'AI
L'HONNEUR DE FAIRE CONNAITRE A VOTRE MAJESTE QUE J'AI TRAVSMIS
CE JOUR VOTRE MESSAGE AU COLONEL OJUKWU. MAIS JE VOUS DEMANDE
INSTZMMENT OBTENIR DU GOUVERNEMENT FEDERAL NIGERIAN QUE DURANT
EVENTUEL DEPLACEMENT DU COLONEL OJUKWU OU SES REPRESENTANTS,
UNE TREVE PUISSE INZERVENIR OU A DEFAUT QU'UNE GARANTING
ABFQOLUE DE SECURITW SOIT DONNEE POUR SURVOLI DE LA ZONE BIAFRAISE
OCCUPEE PAR LES TRRUPES FEDERALES ET SOUMISES A TIR D'C.A.
HAUTE ET FRATERNALLE CONSIDERATION. FELIX HOUPHOUET-BOIGNY.

UNQUOTE.

GP-3


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S/S-CMS 3
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MilRep ✓
Summary ✓
Task Force ✓

Principals

ES 2 ✓ 4
S ✓
U ✓
M 2
G ✓
SIG ✓ 1
S/AH 3
S/AL ✓
SA ✓
S/CPR ✓
S/GOV ✓
S/IL ✓
S/P ✓ 1
S/R ✓ 1
S/FW ✓
S/PM ✓
M/WP ✓
G/PM ✓

Geographic

AF5 ✓ 5
ARA 9
EA 11
EUR 9
NEA 7

Functional

CU ✓
E 2
H ✓
IGA ✓
INR 6 ✓ 6
IO 4
L 2
O 3
OPR ✓
OC ✓
SY ✓
WLG ✓
P 2 ✓ 2
SCA ✓
SCS ✓
SCI ✓

OTHER AGENCIES

WH 10 ✓ 10
CIA ✓
DOD ✓
USIA 4
NSA ✓

Other

ACDA 5
AID/EXSEC 3
AA/AFR 2
AA/VN 2
AA/EA 3
AA/NEA 2

PC ✓
VP ✓
AEC 3
AGR 3
COM 2
EXIM ✓
FRB ✓
LAB ✓
NASA ✓
NIC ✓
STR ✓
TRANS ✓
TRSY 6
JUS ✓
IRS ✓
INT ✓
BOB ✓
FBI ✓
CEA ✓
FAA ✓
File ✓
Burned ✓

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TELEGRAM

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PAGE 01 LUSAKA 02409 150940Z.

14

ACTION AF 15

INFO EUR 15, NSA 02, CIAE 00, DODE 00, GPM 04, H 02, INRI 07, LI 03, NSC 10,

P 04, RSC 01, SP 02, SS 20, USIA 12, SAH 02, IO 13, AID 28, E 15, RSR 01

/156 W

R 141426Z AUG 68 ZFG
FM AMEMBASSY LUSAKA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 3071
INFO AMEMBASSY DAR ES SALAAM
AMEMBASSY LAGOS
AMEMBASSY LONDON

C O N F I D E N T I A L LUSAKA 2409

SUBJECT: NIGERIA

1. DURING HOUR-LONG TOUR D'HORIZON WITH FONMIN KAMANGA THIS MORNING HE TURNED CONVERSATION TO NIGERIA, INFORMING ME THAT AFTER ASST SECTY PALMER DISCUSSED NIGERIAN IMPASSE WITH PRESIDENTKANUDA IN LONDON, LATTER MET WITH BIAFRANI REPRESENTATIVE AND IMPRESSED ON HIM NEED TO OPEN TALKS WITH NIGERIA. KAMANGA WISHED TO KNOW CURRENT US VIEWS. I GAVE HIM COLLECTION RECENT STATEMENTS BY US OFFICIALS AND SAID I WAS NOW AWAITING UPDATED BRIEFING ON OUR POSITION (LUSAKA 2379).

2. HE SAID "SOMEONE" (PRESUMABLY EITHER SOVIETS OR UAR) HAD ARGUED WITH HIM THAT "THEIR" INVOLVEMENT IN NIGERIA WAS NECESSARY TO PRE-EMPT US EFFORT TO GAIN CONTROL OF BIAFRAN OIL. KAMANGA MADE MY SUBSEQUENT REFUTATION EASY BY SAYING HE COULD SEE NO EVIDENCE TO SUBSTANTIATE THIS CHARGE.

3. COMMENT: IF SOVIETS ARE PUSHING THIS STORY IT IS TYPICAL OF BELOW-THE-BELT TACTICS CURRENTLY BEING EMPLOYED BY THEM, WHICH NONETHELESS HAVE VIRTUE FROM OUR POINT OF VIEW OF SERIOUSLY STRAINING CREDIBILITY.

GP-4
GOOD

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PAGE 01 ACCRA 04559 140948Z

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ACTION: AF 15

INFO: IO 13, RSR 01, EUR 15, SS 20, GPM 04, NSC 10, INR 07, DODE 00, CIAE 00,

NSA 02, SAH 02, RSC 01, SP 02, L 03, /095 W

P R 140925Z AUG 68
FM AMEMBASSY ACCRA
TO AMEMBASSY ADDIS ABABA PRIORITY
INFO SECSTATE WASHDC 4561

SECRET ACCRA 4559

SUBJECT: NIGERIAN PEACE TALKS

REF: ADDIS 5179

H.I.M. MESSAGE DELIVERED TO ANKRAH AT 0850Z THIS
MORNING JUST PRIOR TO COMMENCEMENT OF WEEKLY NLC MEETING.
FOLEY

ACCRA 4559
8-14-68

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POL 27 BIAFRA NIGERA
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POL 3 0 A U 47

SECRET 445

PAGE 01 ADDIS 05176 132330Z

83

ACTION SS 70

INFO CIAE 00,7070 W

O P 131830Z AUG 68
FM AMEMBASSY ADDIS ABABA
TO AMEMBASSY ABIDJAN IMMEDIATE
INFO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 6593
AMEMBASSY LAGOS

SECRET ADDIS ABABA 5176

CORRECTED COPY

LIMDIS

SUBJECT: NIGERIAN PEACE TALKS

1. HIM THROUGH MINSTATE FONAFFAIRS TESFAYE HAS ASKED ME TO REQUEST YOU TRANSMIT FOLLOWING MESSAGE TO PRESIDENT HOUPHOUET-BOIGNY. HE ASKS MESSAGE BE DELIVERED PERSONALLY BY U.S. AMBASSADOR WITH COPY TO ETHIOPIAN AMBASSADOR. MESSAGE SHOULD BE MARKED CONFIDENTIAL. FYI TESFAYE REQUESTED US TO USE OUR CRYPTOGRAPHIC FACILITIES TO AVOID LEAKAGE WHICH HE SAID USE IEG FACILITIES WOULD INVOLVE. END FYI.

2. TEXT FOLLOWS "I WOULD BE MUCH OBLIGED IF YOUR EXCELLENCY WOULD CONVEY THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE TO H.E. LT. COLONEL OHUKWU, EASTERN NIGERIA.

"YOUR EXCELLENCY, I HAVE THE HONOUR TO INFORM YOU THAT THE CONSULTATIVE COMMITTEE OF THE ORGANIZATION OF AFRICAN UNITY ON THE NIGERIAN CRISIS WILL BE CONVENED MONDAY, AUGUST 19, 1968. ACCORDINGLY I HAVE THE HONOUR TO REQUEST YOU TO BE PRESENT IN PERSON TO WAD YOUR DELEGATION AT THE NEGOTIATION AND TO INFORM ME THE TIME OF YOUR ARRIVAL. AS I HAVE REQUESTED HEADS OF STATE MEMBERS OF THE CONSULTATIVE COMMITTEE TO BE PRESENT, I HOPE IT IS POSSIBLE FOR YOUR EXCELLENCY TO JOIN THE LEADERS IN ADDIS ABABA BEFORE THE OPENING OF THE SESSION."

PLEASE ACKSPT YOUR EXCELLENCY OUR HIGHEST CONSIDERATION AND

*Addis Ababa 5176
8-13-68*

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PAGE 02 ADDIS 05176 132330Z

FRATERNAL ESTEEM.

YOUR GOOD FRIEND,
HAILE SELASSIE I, EMPEROR"

HALL

SECRET

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Summary
Task Force

Geographic

AF5
ARA 9
EA 11
EUR 9
NEA 7

Other

ACDA 5
AID/EXSEC 3
AA/AFR 2
AA/VN 2
AA/EA 3
AA/NESA 2

Functional

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Principals

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OTHER AGENCIES

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NSA

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POL 27 BIAFRA-NIGERIA

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8-13-68

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ACTION AF 15

INFO EUR 15, IO 13, SR 01, ORM 03, AID 28, SCA 02, SCG 04, NSA 02, CIAE 00,

GPM 04, H 02, INR 07, LI 03, NSC 10, P 04, RSC 01, SP 02, SS 20, USIA 12

RSR 01, /149 W

R 130905Z AUG 68
FM AMEMBASSY LAGOS
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 1959
INFO AMEMBASSY ACCRA
AMEMBASSY ADDIS ABABA
AMEMBASSY KINSHASA
AMEMBASSY MONROVIA
AMEMBASSY NIAMEY
AMEMBASSY YAOUNDE
AMEMBASSY LONDON
AMEMBASSY PARIS
USMISSION GENEVA
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DIA
AMCONSUL IBADAN
AMCONSUL KADUNA

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SUBJECT: LEAFLET DROP IN BIAFRA

REF: LAGOS 11564 *Pol 27 Biafra Nigeria*

1. LEAFLET DROP DESCRIBED REFTEL APPARENTLY BEGAN ON
AUGUST 11. BIAFRAN RADIO AUGUST 11 WARNED AGAINST IT,
AND BBC REPORTED 1 AUGUST 12.

2. WE HAVE SEEN SAMPLE OF LEAFLET AND WILL TRY TO OBTAIN
COPIES. IT IS PRINTED ON STIFF PAPER IN FOUR LANGUAGES--
ENGLISH, IBO, IBIBIO, EFIK. EACH LEAFLET HAS TWO TEAR-OF
SAFE CONDUCT PASSES.

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3. WE HAVE NO REPORTS YET ON MAGNITUDE OF DROP OR
INITIAL RESULTS.
MATHEWS

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POL 27 BIAFRA-NIGERIA
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ACTION AF 15

INFO EUR 15, IO 13, AID 28, SR 01, ORM 03, SCA 02, SCS 04, RSR 01, CIAE 00,
GPM 04, H 02, INR 07, LI 03, NSC 10, P 04, RSC 01, SP 02, SS 20, USIA 12, W
NSA 02, /149 W

R 131004Z AUG 68
FM AMEMBASSY LAGOS
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 1960
INFO AMEMBASSY ACCRA
AMEMBASSY ADDIS ABABA
AMEMBASSY KINSHASA
AMEMBASSY LISBON
AMEMBASSY LONDON
AMEMBASSY MONROVIA
AMEMBASSY NIAMEY
AMEMBASSY PARIS
AMEMBASSY YAOUNDE
US MISSION GENEVA 359
CINCSRIKE/CINCMERFSA
DIA
AMCONSUL IBADAN
AMCONSUL KADUNA

UNCLAS LAGOS 11623

SUBJECT: - OJUKWU THANKS MCCARTHY

1. FBIS ITEM N130640, AUGUST 12, 1968. CARRIES RADIO BIAFRA
REPORT OF MESSAGE FROM OJUKWU TO SENATOR MCCARTHY. OJUKWU
EMPHASIZED POLITICAL REUNIFICATION OF NIGERIA IMPOSSIBLE AND
SAID IN FACE OF BITTERNESS AND MUTUAL DISTRUST BETWEEN
BIAFRA AND NIGERIA, TO SAVE LIFE AND RESTORE PEACE, THERE IS
IMPERATIVE NEED TO RECOGNIZE EXISTING POLITICAL REALITIES AS
THEY NOW STAND. HOPE TIME MAY HEAL OLD WOUNDS AND CREATE
BETTER CONDITIONS FOR FUTURE CLOSER UNION. OJUKWU
THANKS MCCARTHY FOR "JUDICIOUS AND FRANK STATEMENT" ON
NIGERIA-BIAFRA CONFLICT. LAST PARAGRAPH OF STATEMENT, UN-
NECESSARY WORDS OMITTED, READS:

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By: MWA Date: 10/5/05



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WM "WE HAVE NOTHING BUT GRATITUDE FOR THOSE WHO HAVE GENUINELY TRIED TO HELP. AND I TAKE THIS OPPORTUNITY TO AFFIRM OUR READINESS TO RECEIVE ALL HONEST RELIEF AID BY AIR, LAND, AND SEA CORRIDORS THROUGH MUTUALLY AGREED CENTERS APPROPRIATELY DEMILITARIZED FOR SAFETY OF RELIEF PERSONNEL. I HOPE THAT YOU WILL CONTINUE IN THE NOBLE TASK WHICH YOU HAVE UNDERTAKEN UNTIL THE AMERICAN PEOPLE AND THE AMERICAN GOVERNMENT LEND THEIR INFLUENCE TO THE ACHIEVEMENT OF A CEASE-FIRE AND A LASTING SETTLEMENT." MATHEWS

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Authority VND954503
By MM NARA Date 10/5/05



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INFO EUR 15, IO 13, AID 28, SR 01, ORM 03, SCA 02, SCS 04, RSR 01, NSA 02,

CIAE 00, GPM 04, H 02, INR 07, L 03, NSC 10, P 04, RBC 01, SP 02, SS 20,

USIA 12, 149 W

R 131540Z AUG 68
FM AMEMBASSY LAGOS
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 1975
INFO AMEMBASSY ACCRA
AMEMBASSY ADDIS ABABA
AMEMBASSY KINSHASA
AMEMBASSY MONROVIA
AMEMBASSY NIAMEY
AMEMBASSY YAOUNDE
AMEMBASSY LONDON
AMEMBASSY PARIS
US MISSION GENEVA 362
CINCSTRIKE/CINCMEAFSA
DIA
AMCONSUL IBADAN
AMCONSUL KADUNA

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SUBJ: LEAFLET DROP IN BIAFRA

REF: LAGOS 11622

1. FOLLOWING IS ENGLISH TEXT ON LEAFLET DESCRIBED REFTEL:

"AN INVITATION THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT INVITES YOU TO RETURN TO YOUR HOMES THIS IS AN INVITATION, A CALL TO ALL OF YOU - MEN, WOMEN AND CHILDREN OF THE EAST CENTRAL STATE STILL RUNNING AND HIDING IN THE BUSH OUT OF FEAR- TO RETURN TO YOUR HOMES IN THE LIBERATED AREAS OF ENUGU, ONITSHA, AGWU, AWKA, ABAKALIKI, CALABAR, PORT HARCOURT, DEGEMA, YENAGOA, BONNY, UYO, ETC. THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT PLEADS WITH YOU TO RETURN

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TO YOUR HOMES TODAY IN THE INTEREST OF YOUR SAFETY AND WELLBEING.

2. "MANY OF YOUR KITH AND KIN (BROTHERS AND RELATIONS) HAVE ALREADY RETURNED TO THEIR HOMES, UNMOLESTED, HAPPY AND FREE. THEY ARE ADEQUATELY FED DAILY, AND GIVEN MEDICAL ATTENTION REGULARLY AS THE PICTURES ON THESE PAGES SHOW.

3. "PLEASE RETURN TO YOUR HOMES TODAY FOR YOUR OWN SAFETY, HAPPINESS AND WELLBEING. THE 'SAFE CONDUCT PASS' HERE WILL MAKE THE RETURN TO YOUR HOMES QUICK AND EASY.

4. "THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT GUARANTEES: -

- A. SAFETY FOR YOUR LIVES AND PROPERTY
- B. MEDICAL CARE FOR YOUR AILMENTS
- C. FOOD FOR THOSE WHO ARE HUNGRY
- D. NEW HOMES FOR DISPLACED PERSONS
- E. HAPPINESS AND PROSPERITY FOR YOU AND YOUR CHILDREN."

5. SAFE-CONDUCT PASS IS SO LABELLED AND BEARS WORDING:

"I WANT TO RETURN TO MY HOME !".

6. COPY POUCHED DEPARTMENT.

DECON 9/16/68.

MATHEWS

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PAGE 01 ADDIS 05174 140446Z

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ACTION AF 15

INFO EUR 15, IO 13, CIAE 00, DODE 00, GPM 04, H 02, INR 07, L 03, NSC 10, P 04

RSC 01, SP 02, SS 20, USIA 12, NSA 02, SAH 02, SAL 01, AID 28, SR 01,

ORM 03, RSR 01, 146 W

R 131530Z AUG 68
FM AMEMBASSY ADDIS ABABA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 6591
INFO AMEMBASSY LAGOS
AMEMBASSY LUSAKA
USUN NEW YORK 350

C O N F I D E N T I A L ADDIS ABABA 5174

SUBJECT: NIGERIAN QUESTION AND UN

1. ZAMBIAN AMB MUTTI TOLD ME YESTERDAY THERE HAS BEEN SOME TALK IN ADDIS ABOUT POSSIBILITY OF TAKING NIGERIAN PROBLEM TO UN, BUT BOTH BIAFRANS AND FM OPPOSE ON GROUNDS PAN-AFRICANISM AND DESIRE NOT TO "INTERNATIONALIZE" WAR. MUTTI THOUGHT THIS IRONIC SINCE BOTH SIDES HAVE INVOLVED STATES OUTSIDE AFRICA BY ARMED PURCHASES AND DIPLOMATIC EFFORTS. HE THOUGHT IF ADDIS TALKS FAIL SOME STATE, POSSIBLY AFRICAN, WILL RAISE QUESTION AT UN.

2. COMMENT: ZAMBIANS MAY BE CONSIDERING UN INITIATIVE.

HALLI

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☐ CHARGE TO

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Pok 27-14 VIET
XR Pol 27-7 VIET 9485
Pol 27 BIAFRA-NIGERIA

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Origin
Index

ACTION: Amembassy PARIS PRIORITY
Amembassy SAIGON PRIORITY
INFO: Amembassy BANGKOK
Amembassy VIENTIANE
USUN N.Y. YOKO
US MISSION GENEVA
CINCPAC POLAD

STATE

TODEL 870

TODEL FOR JORDEN

EXCERPTS FROM PRESS BRIEFING August 12:

QUOTE: Q. Does Mr. Sieverts going along on this trip (Deputy Asst. Secretary C. Robert Moore) indicate that there is going to be talks also in Geneva on the status of U.S. and Viet-Nam prisoners?

A. MR. BARTCH - There's no plan that I know of for that. His trip is connected with Ambassador Moore's mission.

Q. Strictly with the Biafran, Nigerian situation?

A. As far as I know, yes.

Q. Can you say that serious talks are going on in Paris?

A. Pardon?

Q. Can you say that the talks in Paris have reached a serious stage?

Drafted by: P/VN- DNARZAG, Jr./hfo 8/12 2507
Telegraphic transmission and classification approved by: P - Daniel N. Arzac, Jr.
Clearances: S/S- Mr. Brown

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X R DEF 19-8 FR-BIAFRA
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INFO EUR 15, IO 13, ACDA 16, AID 28, SR 01, ORM 03, SCS 04, SCA 02, CIAE 00,

DODE 00, GPM 04, H 02, INR 07, L 03, NSC 10, P 04, RSC 01, SP 02, SS 20,

USIA 12, NSA 02, RSR 01, /165 W

R 121327Z AUG 68
FM AMEMBASSY PARIS
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 5074
INFO AMEMBASSY ABIDJAN
AMEMBASSY LAGOS
AMEMBASSY LIBREVILLE
AMEMBASSY LISBON
AMEMBASSY YAOUNDE

SECRET PARIS 19345

SUBJ: FRENCH MILITARY AID TO BIAFRA

REF: LAGOS 11541 AND 11550 AND LIBREVILLE 1607

1. WE ARE REMAINING ALERT TO POSSIBILITY THAT FRANCE SUPPLYING ARMS TO BIAFRA, POSSIBLY DIRECTLY FROM FRANCE, OR INDIRECTLY THROUGH "COMMERCIAL" MIDDLEMEN IN PORTUGAL OR MORE PROBABLY VIA IVORY COAST AND GABON. WE HAVE NO INFORMATION TO CONFIRM OR DENY REPORTS CONTAINED REFTEL AND OUR ONLY REASONABLY FORTH-COMING QUAI SOURCE ON PAST ACTIVITIES OF THIS NATURE IS ON LEAVE UNTIL SEPTEMBER.

2. WE WOULD REGARD IT AS LIKELY THAT ARMS OF FRENCH ORIGIN ARE ARRIVING IN BIAFRA FROM FRENCH STOCKS IN IVORY COAST VIA SAO THOME OR

LIBREVILLE TO BIA RANS DIRECT FROM LIBREVILLE. THIS IS RECONCILABLE WITH FRENCH EMBARGO SINCE FRANCE CAN ALWAYS CLAIM THAT AFRICAN COUNTRIES ACTING INDEPENDENTLY. (THIS COULD ACTUALLY BE CASE, ALTHOUGH IT WOULD OBVIOUSLY BE VIRTUALLY IMPOSSIBLE FOR GABON OR IVORY COAST TO SUPPORT BIAFRA AGAINST FRENCH WISHES GIVEN FRENCH CONTROL OVER MILITARY OF THESE TWO COUNTRIES.

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AND, PERHAPS MORE IMPORTANT, OVER AIR TRAFFIC WITH OTHER COUNTRIES, E.G. TRANSGABON AIRWAYS.)

3. LARGE AMOUNTS OF MONEY HAVE APPARENTLY BEEN RAISED FOR BIAFRA VIA FRENCH RED CROSS AS RESULT OF ALMOST UNPRECEDENTED HIGH-POWER APPEAL TO FRENCH PUBLIC OVER GOVERNMENT-CONTROLLED RADIO AND TV PLUS LOCAL PRESS WHICH BEGAN IMMEDIATELY FOLLOWING COUNCIL OF MINISTERS STATEMENT ON SELF-DETERMINATION FOR BIAFRA.

THERE HAVE BEEN NEWS REPORTS OF AIRPLANES BEING CHARTERED FOR TRANSPORT OF RELIEF SUPPLIES THUS COLLECTED BUT NO INDICATION AS TO WHAT ROUTE THEY MIGHT USE INTO BIAFRA. REPORTS FROM LIBREVILLE CYPUL#STRIKE US AS LOGICAL RESULT OF FRENCH EFFORT AID BIAFRA, ESPECIALLY SINCE SAO THOME ROUTE IS REPORTEDLY TROUBLED BY FMG ANTI-AIRCRAFT AND LIBREVILLE-BIAFRA ROUTE HAS BEEN OPEN SINCE OJUKWU CAME OUT THAT WAY TO ATTEND NIGER MEETING OAU COMMITTEE ON NIGERIA.

4. ALTHOUGH ANYTHING IS POSSIBLE, PARTICULARLY IF ELYSEE ORDERS IT, WE INCLINED TO DOUBT THAT FRENCH WOULD ENCOURAGE MERCENARY OPERATION IN SUPPORT OF BIAFRA, AT LEAST NOT AT PRESENT TIME. PAST EXPERIENCE WITH MERCENARIES AND RATHER CAUTIOUS NATURE OF FRENCH SUPPORT FOR BIAFRA ARGUE AGAINST USE OF MERCENARIES UNTIL SITUATION HAS EVOLVED FURTHER, MILITARILY AND/OR DIPLOMATICALLY. WE FIND IT


ALMOST IMPOSSIBLE TO CONCEIVE OF SITUATION IN WHICH REGULAR FRENCH TROOPS WOULD INTERVENE IN NIGERIAN CONFLICT UNLESS THEY WERE TO DO SO AS PART OF SOME INTERNATIONAL PEACE FORCE.

GP-3 SHRIVER

NOTE: # AS RECEIVED.
WILL BE SERVICED UPON REQUEST.

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0459





DEPARTMENT OF STATE
WASHINGTON

8/12/68
rec'd
11283

IN REPLY REFER TO:

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MEMORANDUM TO: The Under Secretary

THROUGH: S/S

FROM: IO Joseph J. Sisco

SUBJECT: Appointment with British Ambassador Dean,
Monday, August 12, 4:30 P.M.: BRIEFING
MEMORANDUM

Ambassador Dean has asked to call on you to discuss possible UN consideration of the Nigerian problem. The UK Mission to the UN, on instructions, raised the matter last week on a purely exploratory basis with USUN and the Canadian Mission but has asked that we not inform others of these consultations "for fear of starting rumors that we are in favor of UN action." The British are viewing the question from the standpoint of an appeal to the Security Council from Biafra or its supporters in the event of a breakdown in the OAU peace efforts and the threat of an all-out Federal attack on Biafra.

In light of growing concern in this country over the Nigerian situation, we had been reviewing the possibilities for UN action prior to the British approach and have prepared the enclosed paper covering various contingencies, including that which the British envisage. Unlike the British, the focus of our concern has been on whether the UN was doing everything feasible to help resolve the problems in Nigeria, both political and, especially, in the relief field. Since the principal stumbling block to a breakthrough on the relief problem is the political dispute, and since the OAU is actively pursuing both this aspect and the question of an overall political settlement, with OAU-sponsored talks between the parties now in progress in Addis Ababa, we have concluded that the best course for us to follow for the present is to support the OAU efforts. To do otherwise would run

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counter to African wishes, which we believe are a crucial element. Should the Addis talks break down, we may wish to consider whether a UN initiative would then be desirable. However, even in this case there might be difficulties due to the fact that most UN members regard the Nigerian conflict as a civil war, and the Federal Government could be expected to resist any move appearing to constitute interference in its internal affairs.

Should there be a request for UN consideration of this problem, the political aspects would probably be dealt with in the Security Council, while a request for action on the purely relief or humanitarian aspects might go to the General Assembly or Economic and Social Council. The attached contingency paper discusses the various factors involved in these alternatives.

Talking Points

1. I suggest you treat your discussion with Ambassador Dean as purely exploratory and make no commitments concerning our position on the desirability of UN consideration of the Nigerian question or the position we might take once the issue or certain aspects of it were taken to the UN.

2. You may wish to point out that one possible advantage of UN discussion of this question would be a better public understanding of the situation, the news media's portrayal of which has been heavily biased in favor of Biafra.

3. You will probably find that the British share our view that the attitude of the African states on UN consideration of this problem would be crucial in determining the success or failure of any initiative. Since the Africans prefer to solve the problem in an African context, and since the OAU is now seized with the question, I suggest you indicate our belief that UN action on Nigeria is not feasible at this time, with the exception of intensification of the activities in which it is already engaged in the relief field. The situation might be quite different, however, should the OAU peace efforts break down.

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4. The British may be interested in our assessment of the likelihood that the Council would agree to inscription of the problem if Biafra requested it and the Nigerian Government opposed. As we spell out in more detail in the attached paper, we think many governments would find it difficult to oppose inscription. We ourselves have traditionally taken a liberal view of article 2 (7) and on the inscription of agenda items. While it is possible that inscription would be successfully opposed, and while much would depend on the precise circumstances, we believe the Council would be somewhat more likely to agree to inscription.

Attachment:

Possibilities for UN Action on Nigeria

IO/UNP:BJJones:JFC

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Possibilities for UN Action on Nigeria

The United Nations is already involved in a limited way in the Nigerian situation through the appeals to the parties and public statements issued by the Secretary-General and his informal consultations with African leaders, as well as through its efforts to assist in relief activities, including the recent appointment of Nils-Goran Gussing as the Secretary-General's personal representative for this purpose.

More far-reaching UN action could be taken in the Security Council (SC), the General Assembly (GA), or the Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC). Any initiative to deal with the political aspects of the problem would be taken most properly by the Security Council, at least in the first instance, while the General Assembly or a special session of ECOSOC would be the appropriate place to deal with the strictly relief or humanitarian aspects.

In considering what further action the UN could or should take there is one factor which is crucial -- the attitude of the Africans, including but not limited to that of the parties to the Nigerian dispute. The Africans seem anxious to resolve this problem in an African context. The OAU is seized of the problem and its Consultative Committee on Nigeria is sponsoring talks between the parties which are in progress in Addis Ababa under the Chairmanship of Haile Selassie. Nigeria is a member of the UN, and the Federal Government (FMG), which we and most other members of the international community regard as the only legal government in Nigeria, is bound to resist any attempt to obtain UN action that could be regarded as interference in its internal affairs. Many African governments, fearful of the precedent a successful Biafran secession would set for other potential separatist movements in Africa, could be expected to support the FMG position in this regard. The prospects for a UN initiative, particularly on the political aspects of the Nigerian problem, and for its success or failure, would depend to a large extent, therefore, not only on the attitudes of the two sides to the dispute but also on the degree to which the move stemmed from the Africans themselves and had their support.

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Security Council - The Security Council could take action on the Nigerian question under either Chapter VI or VII of the Charter. A request for SC consideration could be made by a member state or group of states or by the Secretary-General (Art. 99). Whether Biafra could request a meeting would depend on whether it were considered a "state which is not a member of the United Nations" under paragraph 2 of Article 35 of the Charter.

Given the considerations concerning African attitudes set forth above and the political complexities of the issue, along with the Secretary-General's own view of his proper role, it is most unlikely that U Thant would himself take the initiative in seeking SC consideration of the Nigerian problem. An initiative by Biafra acting alone also would appear unlikely because of the problems this would raise with regard to the status of Biafra and the fact that these could be circumvented in some degree by having the initiative come from one or more of the UN member states which recognize Biafra (i.e., Gabon, Ivory Coast, Tanzania, Zambia) or support its position. Because the success of any initiative would hinge so critically on support of African states, it would seem virtually essential that a request for SC action be made, or at a minimum be strongly supported by a substantial number of these states. Such a development seems most improbable as long as the OAU is actively engaged in helping the parties to find a settlement. In present circumstances, therefore, it is highly doubtful that there would be a move for SC action or, if such a move were made, that it would be successful. A U.S. attempt to encourage an SC initiative now would not be desirable, therefore; support for the OAU efforts would appear to have more promise.

Should the OAU efforts break down, however, there would appear to be two sets of circumstances that could lead to SC consideration of the matter. Having failed through their regional organization, the African states, or a majority of them, might decide to seek UN action, or certain other UN members with some African support might consider it necessary to take action. (It is doubtful this would be done without the acquiescence of the FMG and probably the Biafrans as well.) There would be a somewhat different situation if, fearing an all-out Federal military attack following the breakdown of the Addis talks, Biafra or its supporters appealed to the SC.

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Date	10/5/95

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In the first set of circumstances, if the FMG and Biafra acquiesced there would be no difficulty in having the item inscribed on the agenda. If such acquiescence were lacking, as would presumably be the case with regard to the Federal Government in the second set of circumstances, it is conceivable that the nine votes required for inscription could not be obtained, or that a substantial debate (as we had in February 1966 on Viet-Nam) would precede the vote. A legal argument could be made against inscription, based on the domestic jurisdiction provision in Article 2 (7) of the Charter and the fact that the FMG and practically all UN members regard the Nigerian conflict as a civil war. In light of past borderline cases (e.g. Rhodesia) and world-wide concern over what is happening in Nigeria, however, many governments would find it difficult to oppose inscription under the circumstances envisaged. The U.S. has always interpreted Article 2 (7) liberally and has taken a broad view on inscription of agenda items. Given these facts and the degree of feeling on the question in this country, it is difficult to see how we could oppose inscription. All Council members would be influenced by the attitude of the African members, particularly Ethiopia and Senegal. France could be expected to support any move designed to help Biafra. The British would be inclined not to support inscription over the objections of the FMG, but they would also be influenced in their final decisions by the factors noted above that would influence us. Canada might have special difficulties in having the SC take up the case of a separatist movement, but, for reasons similar to our own, it too would find it difficult to oppose inscription. The Soviets and Hungarians would probably be opposed in principle, but they might not wish to stand out in opposition if the action envisaged for the Council were not too far-reaching. The positions of other Council members would probably depend primarily on that of the Africans.

Once an item were inscribed, it is almost certain a hearing would be granted to the Biafrans. This has been done in many similar cases without judgment being passed on the precise status of those being heard or of what they represent (e.g. Chicoms on Korea, both factions during Dominican Republic case). In taking a position on this matter we would wish to keep in mind any precedent in the event of future SC consideration of Viet-Nam.

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It is of particular importance in determining whether we wish to encourage SC consideration of this question to review what alternative courses of action would be open to the Council and the degree of support there might be for each. The most obvious thing would be for the Council to call on the parties to settle their differences through peaceful means. Particularly if fighting had resumed on a major scale, this would probably be coupled with a call for an immediate ceasefire. Members which had supported inscription of the item would almost certainly support action of this nature, and it is doubtful that any permanent member would veto anything as innocuous as this. What effect it would have on the conflict is dubious, but the debate would at least provide an opportunity to set the facts before the public in a manner that would command world attention. This could be useful in this country in particular in helping to balance the heavily pro-Biafran picture being presented in the news media. We would also be able through the debate to give US efforts greater publicity.

Beyond exhortations to the parties, the Council might ask the Secretary-General or a special representative (a la Jarring) or a state or group of states to offer good offices or act as a mediatory in the dispute. It might even simply turn the matter back to the OAU. Inasmuch as we do not envisage SC consideration except in the wake of a breakdown in the OAU efforts, it is hard to see that any of these steps would be very effective in bringing about a peaceful settlement, although the mobilization of world opinion that such action would reflect might influence the parties where OAU efforts alone, without such explicit support, had not succeeded. There might also be a move to call on states to refrain from supplying arms to either side. Many, including the UK and USSR would have difficulty with such a proposal, however.

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Under Article 39 of the Charter the Security Council could find the existence of a threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression and thus provide the basis for mandatory enforcement measures. The Council has traditionally been extremely reluctant to take this type of action, however, and it does not seem likely that there would be support for it in this case in which there is a fair amount of resistance even to UN consideration of the question. It would certainly not be taken without African support, and given the precedent this could set for other potential cases of African secession, such support seems very improbable. The permanent members of the SC, including ourselves, would certainly also have great reservations about such action, especially in view of the degree to which they would probably be expected to be involved in implementation of enforcement measures.

As with the question of a hearing for the Biafrans, the U.S. would wish to keep in mind what precedents various SC decisions might set in this case that would be applicable in the event the Council should take up Viet-Nam at some future time. We would also wish to consider how our position in the SC would affect our future interests in Nigeria and elsewhere in Africa several months hence when Biafra may have collapsed and the Federal Government have regained full control. Another factor to consider would be the desirability of avoiding a situation in which we might be pictured, with France, as supporting Biafra, with the Soviets, and probably the UK, supporting the FMG.

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General Assembly - A state or group of states could also request General Assembly consideration of one or more aspects of the Nigerian situation. If the political aspects were to be taken up, many of the same considerations would apply as in the Security Council, as discussed above. The principal difference would be that the action would be more unpredictable and harder to control in the 124-nation Assembly, than in the 15-nation Security Council. Moreover, it seems more likely that the UN membership in general would consider it more appropriate for the Security Council, rather than the General Assembly, to deal with the political aspects of the problem, at least in the first instance.

In light of the growing world awareness and concern over the suffering in Nigeria it seems more likely that the General Assembly would be asked to deal with the relief problem on a humanitarian basis. This would not encounter, at least in the same degree, the problems of an attempt to take action on the political dispute, assuming there were no significant African opposition.

The most obvious action in this case would be a call for governments, specialized agencies and other organizations to assist in the relief effort by contributing funds and supplies and in other ways. The Assembly might also seek to establish some coordinating body, but it is more likely that it would endorse the ICRC or a similar organization to perform this function. By focussing attention on the tragic situation in Nigeria, General Assembly consideration of this matter might result in sufficient pressure on the parties to cause a breakthrough on the problem of moving relief supplies into Biafra. Only if the parties do agree to put aside their political differences with respect to this problem can there be such a breakthrough, which makes it difficult to divorce the relief problem entirely from the political dispute and to deal with the former on a purely humanitarian basis in the UN. A General Assembly debate would also have the public educational benefits that a Security Council debate would provide, as already noted.

Since the 22nd General Assembly is still in existence, it could be called into session very quickly to consider whether to add

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this problem to its agenda and take it up immediately. Alternatively, the 23rd General Assembly will convene September 24, and the item could be placed on the agenda of that Assembly session. In light of these circumstances there would be no need to call a special or emergency General Assembly session. Inscription of the item would probably be no problem unless there were general African opposition.

Economic and Social Council - If the Economic and Social Council were to deal with the relief problem at an early date, it would be necessary for a special session to be convened. The Council President, with the concurrence of the three Vice Presidents, may call a special session, and this would seem to be the simplest procedure to follow. A Venezuelan is President now, and the Vice Presidents are Bulgarian, Swedish, and Tanzanian. Any UN member can also request a special session with the agreement of the President and Vice Presidents or, alternatively, a majority of the 27 ECOSOC members. Under its rules a special session of ECOSOC shall also be held at the request of the Security Council or General Assembly. Conceivably one of these bodies might refer the relief aspects of the Nigerian question to a special ECOSOC session. A special session is convened within six weeks of a request on a date fixed by the President.

The nature of ECOSOC's action would be similar to that which the General Assembly might take on the relief question, as set forth above. There might be some advantage in dealing with the matter in a smaller body like ECOSOC instead of the unwieldy General Assembly, however. Once again the views of the Africans would be critical and in this case particularly those of the following ECOSOC members: Chad, Congo (B), Sierra Leone, Tanzania, and Upper Volta.

CONFIDENTIAL

0469

DECLASSIFIED	
Authority	VND 959503
By	MV NARA Date 10/5/05

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

11320

Approved in U:
8/14/68

Memorandum of Conversation

PART II OF II

DATE: August 12, 1968
Time: 4:30 p.m.
Place: Under Secretary's
Office

SUBJECT: Biafra

PARTICIPANTS: Sir Patrick Dean, British Ambassador
Robert Owen, Second Secretary, British Embassy
Under Secretary Katzenbach
Mortimer D. Goldstein, EUR/BMI

COPIES TO: S/S^{cc} CIA^{cc} Amembassy, LONDON, LAGOS^{cc}
S/P^{cc} AF^{cc}
G^{cc} EUR^{cc}
INR/OD^{cc} USUN^{cc}
WH^{cc} TO^{cc}

Ambassador Dean inquired whether there was anything that could be done to get better progress in solving the Biafra problem.

The Under Secretary said that Robert Moore (Deputy Assistant Secretary for African Affairs) was being sent to Geneva to work on the problem. The Under Secretary thought that some progress was being made to combat the idea that all Biafrans wear white hats and all Nigerians wear black hats. At the moment, the Emperor of Ethiopia seems to be the best channel for influencing the Biafrans. He noted that American public opinion is deeply concerned with the question of starvation; Americans could not accept the idea that children should starve for political reasons.

Ambassador Dean asked whether the International Red Cross would be the right organization to do the relief job and whether it would be able to handle it by itself. The Under Secretary thought that the International Red Cross should be able to do the job, but, if more help were needed, the U.S. and other countries should be able to provide what was necessary. He noted that there seems to be no shortage of charter aircraft.

EUR/BMI:MDGoldstein:mf 8/13/68

(Drafting Office and Officer)

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By: MWA Date: 10/3/05

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The Under Secretary said that there is not much point in putting pressure on the Nigerians when the Biafrans are at fault, but unfortunately we do not have much leverage on the Biafrans. If Biafra turns more cooperative, we should be prepared to put pressure on Nigeria if necessary.

Ambassador Dean wondered whether it would be justifiable for Nigeria to take forceful measures if current talks break down. The Under Secretary said that the Nigerians seem to have done a relatively good job by African standards in avoiding atrocities; he was bearish, however, about "unleashing" the Nigerians.

Ambassador Dean turned to the UN aspects of the question and observed that, if Biafra proposed that the question be considered by the Security Council, it would be difficult to say no. The Under Secretary thought that this was correct, but he emphasized that in those circumstances the African countries would have to take the lead in finding a solution. Ambassador Dean wondered whether the major countries would have to follow an African lead; the Under Secretary hazarded the guess that this might well be the case.

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By	MN NARA Date 10/5/05

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POL 27 BIAFRA-NIGERIA

Department of State

TELEGRAM

2-1

SECRET 246

PAGE 01 LONDON 11704 121715Z

54

ACTION AF 15

INFO EUR 15, IO 13, ACDA 16, SA 01, SAH 02, NSA 02, CIAE 00, DODE 00, GPM 04,

H 02, INR 07, L 03, NSC 10, P 04, RSC 01, SP 02, SS 20, USIA 12, RSR 01,

/130 W

R 121535Z AUG 68
FM AMEMBASSY LONDON
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 5417
INFO AMEMBASSY ADDIS ABABA
AMEMBASSY LAGOS
AMEMBASSY PARIS

SECRET LONDON 11704

POL 27 BIAFRA NIGERIA

REF: ADDIS 5114, STATE 217255, LONDON 11651

1. MOBERLY, CRO, TOLD US REPLY FROM HIGH COMMISSIONER IN LAGOS WAS MUCH ALONG LINES EXPRESSED TO US BY MONSON AND NORRIS ON AUGUST 9, VIZ, HE WAS SKEPTICAL ABOUT UTILITY OF MAKING ANY INTERVENTION AT THIS POINT TO DISSUADE NIGERIA FROM TAKING ANY MILITARY ACTION.

2. WE ASKED WHAT INDICATIONS HMG HAD OF FMG ATTACK AGAINST BIAFRA HEARTLAND. MOBERLY SAID UK DID NOT EXPECT ANY IMPORTANT MILITARY ACTION BEFORE AUGUST 20 AT THE EARLIEST IN EVENT TALKS FAILED, SINCE FMG NEEDED TIME FOR MILITARY BUILDUP. HE ALSO DOUBTED WHETHER IMMEDIATE MILITARY ACTION COULD FOLLOW TOP LEVEL MILITARY CONFERENCE AUGUST 13-14.

BRUCE

London 11704
8/12-68

REPROFILMED BY 25/13

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Authority	VND 959503
By	MV NARA Date 10/5/05



POL 27 BIAFRA-NIGERIA
Department of State **TELEGRAM**

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PAGE 01 ADDIS 05124 121807Z

4.
ACTION AF 15

INFO EUR 15, IO 13, SR 01, ORM 03, SCS 04, SCA 02, AID 28, CIAE 00, DODE 00

GPM 04, H 02, INR 07, L 03, NSAE 00, NSC 10, P 04, RSC 01, SP 02, SS 20

USIA 12, RSR 01, SSO 00, /147 W

P R 121300Z AUG 68
FM AMEMBASSY ADDIS ABABA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 6554
AMEMBASSY LAGOS
INFO AMEMBASSY ACCRA
AMEMBASSY KINSHASA
AMEMBASSY LONDON
AMEMBASSY MONROVIA
AMEMBASSY NIAMEY
AMEMBASSY PARIS
AMEMBASSY YAOUNDE
USMISSION GENEVA
USUN NEW YORK 347

SECRET ADDIS ABABA 5124

REF STATE 218847

1. I DELIVERED SECRETARY'S MESSAGE TO FONMIN KETEMA THIS MORNING. AFTER READING MESSAGE HE ASKED ME TO CONVEY HIS APPRECIATION TO THE SECRETARY FOR MESSAGE AND CONTINGENCY APPEAL. IF INITIATIVES ETHIOPIANS HAVE NOW TAKEN ARE UNSUCCESSFUL, HE WOULD LIKE TO USE APPEAL AS FINAL FALL BACK TO PREVENT BREAKUP OF TALKS. USE NOW HE THOUGHT WOULD BE PREMATURE. HE WILL KEEP ME INFORMED OF STATUS OF NEGOTIATIONS AND WILL ADVISE ME IF H.I.M. WISHES TO USE APPEAL. IF IT IS USED TO HAVE MAJOR EFFECT HE BELIEVES IT SHOULD BE RELEASED TO PRESS.

2. KETEMA SAID IEG HAD CONCLUDED FRIDAY THAT POLITICAL NEGOTIATION AND RELIEF QUESTION SHOULD BE SEPARATED. TO ACCOMPLISH THIS EMPEROR DIRECTED APPEAL FRIDAY TO GOWON TO PERMIT RELIEF SHIPMENTS TO BE MADE TO BIAFRA AND TO

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By: MVA Date: 10/5/05



Department of State **TELEGRAM**

SECRET

PAGE 02 ADDIS 05124 121807Z

INSTRUCT HIS DELEGATION TO DISCUSS SPECIFIC ARRANGEMENTS THIS PURPOSE WITH IEG AND BIAFRANS. HE ALSO SPOKE TO BIAFRANS ALONG SAME LINES. BIAFRANS RESPONDED THIS MORNING ENDORSING SEPARATE DISCUSSIONS OF SPECIFIC MEASURES TO PROVIDE RELIEF. CHIEF ENAHORO (FMG) HAS ASKED FOR AUDIENCE WITH EMPEROR FOLLOWING FIVE O'CLOCK MEETING THIS AFTERNOON. KETEMA PRESUMES HE WILL DELIVER GOWON'S REPLY. KETEMA EXPECTS AFTERNOON MEETING TO LAST UNTIL AT LEAST 9 PM. AUDIENCE WITH EMPEROR THUS WILL NOT BE UNTIL 10:00 TONIGHT.

3. H.I.M. INTENDS TO PRESS FMG HARD FOR CEASEFIRE AND INITIATION OF RELIEF MEASURES. HE WILL UTILIZE HIS OWN INFLUENCE INITIALLY BUT KETEMA PLEASED TO HAVE U.S. APPEAL AS FALLBACK SHOULD HE FAIL PERSUADE FMG.

4. ON POLITICAL SIDE KETEMA SAID EMPEROR INTENDS BEGIN TAKE UP SPECIFIC POINTS ON BOTH BRIEFS AND ASK FOR AMPLIFICATION. FOR EXAMPLE, HE WILL ASK FMG WHAT SPECIFIC SECURITY MEASURES THEY PLAN TO PROTECT IBO NON-COMBATTANTS, WHAT THEY SPECIFICALLY ARE NOW DOING IN TERRITORIES THEY PRESENTLY HOLD. ON BIAFRAN SIDE, HE INTENDS TO ASK EXPLANATION WHY THEY CAME TO ADDIS MEETING WHICH CLEARLY HAD AS ITS OBJECTIVE UNITY OF NIGERIA, IF THEY INTENDED TO INSIST ON INDEPENDENCE AND WHAT THEIR SECURITY NEEDS WOULD BE IN UNITED NIGERIA. HE HOPES THUS MOVE EACH SIDE TOWARD COMPROMISE.


5. KETEMA NOTED BIAFRAN'S FRIENDS WERE FLOATING RETURN TO FOUR NIGERIAN STATES. HE WONDERED WHETHER THIS AT ALL FEASIBLE FOR FMG BUT NOTED AT SAME TIME THAT ARRANGEMENTS WITH RESPECT TO NORTHERN NIGERIA STILL RETAINED ELEMENT OF COORDINATION AMONG SIX NEW STATES. THUS HE THOUGHT PRESENT POSITION MIGHT BE REVERSED IF PRICE FOR REUNIFICATION.

6. KETEMA EXPECTS POLITICAL TALKS TO GO ON FOR SOME TIME, MAKING VERY SLOW PROGRESS. H.I.M. HAS CONCLUDED THAT ONLY THROUGH PATIENT PRODDING WILL HE BE ABLE TO ACHIEVE ANY KIND OF COMPROMISE.

7. IT IS FOR THIS REASON THAT HE ANXIOUS TO HAVE AGREED OR DE FACTO CEASEFIRE AND SEPARATE RELIEF DISCUSSIONS. IF HE IS ABLE TO ACHIEVE THIS, H.I.M. THINKS THERE THEN GOOD.

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Department of State **TELEGRAM**

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PAGE 03 ADDIS 05124 121807Z

C INCE OF EVENTUAL POLITICAL COMPROMISE.

HALL

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Authority	VND959503
By	MMNARA Date 10/5/05

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POL 27 BIAFRA-NIGERIA

218958

OUTGOING TELEGRAM Department of State

INDICATE: ☐ COLLECT
☐ CHARGE TO

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE
Classification

FAC

11 Aug 68 18 10z

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Origin
Info:

ACTION: Embassy Addis Ababa

Info Embassy Lagos

Ref: Addis Ababa 5112

*Pol 27 BIAFRA-NIGERIA
TK POL 15-1 Eth*

Message contained reftel passed August 11 to

Morris Abram, who will inform other members of group.

218958

RUSK!

2

Drafted by: AFW:RPSmith

Tel. Ext. 7573

Telegraphic transmission and classification approved by:

Robert P. Smith
Nigeria Task Force

Clearance:

Classification

FORM DS-322
8-65

0476

DECLASSIFIED
Authority: VNI 959503
By: MVA Date: 10/5/03

OUTGOING TELEGRAM Department of State

INDICATE: ☐ COLLECT
☐ CHARGE TO

UNCLASSIFIED
Classification

218957

11 AUG 68 18 10Z

FOR OCIT USE ONLY

Origin: ACTION: To: Morris B. Abram
Info: President, American Jewish Committee
165 East 56 Street
New York 22, N. Y.

1. Have received following message from His Imperial Majesty, Emperor Haile Selassie, for transmission to you and other members of group which sent recent cable on Nigerian crisis. Would you please inform other members of text.

2. Text follows: QUOTE I am deeply grateful for your message in which you have expressed deep concern regarding the Nigerian crisis, a matter which has pre-occupied the thoughts of men and women everywhere. The OAU Heads of State Consultative Committee on Nigeria which I am chairing has and will continue to do its utmost in finding ways and means of alleviating the present suffering in Nigeria and in bringing about lasting peace in this sister African country so that a new era will emerge where all Nigerians could work together in love and harmony. I further wish to say that the present crucial talks on Nigeria which are being held in Addis Ababa could bear fruitful results only if the Almighty God guides the deliberations in this regard which are being followed with great concern and deepest hopes by all. Remember us all in your prayers. Signed

POI 27 8144-11444

Drafted by:

ATW:RPSmith

Tel. Ext. 7573

Telegraphic transmission and classification approved by:

Robert P. Smith
Nigeria Task Force

Clearances:

AF:JPalmer (subs)

Classification

FORM DS-322
8-65

0477

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Authority: VNP 954503
By: MVA Date: 10/5/05

Page 2 of telegram to Morris B. Abram, President, American Jewish Committee


Classification

Haile Selassie I, Emperor UNQUOTE

Joseph Palmer II
Assistant Secretary of State
Department of State

Classification

0478



DEPARTMENT OF STATE

SYSTEMATIC REVIEW WITHDRAWAL CARD NO. POL 50-26

DATE: 8/10/68 MSG NO.: A-769 TYPE: AI

FROM: Lagos TO: State

SUBJECT: Assessment of French Statement on Biafra

DOCUMENT ORIGINATOR: DEPT. OF STATE: ☒ OTHER: ☐

BASIS FOR WITHDRAWAL:

☒ CONTAINS NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION
☐ OTHER LAW OR REGULATION

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Authority	VND 954503
By	MNARA Date 10/5/05

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

SYSTEMATIC REVIEW WITHDRAWAL CARD NO. POL 50-27

DATE: 8/10/68 MSG NO.: A-765 TYPE: AI

FROM: Lagos TO: State

SUBJECT: British Colonial Governor's Attitude re Ogunwole

DOCUMENT ORIGINATOR: DEPT. OF STATE: ☒ OTHER: ☐

BASIS FOR WITHDRAWAL:

☒ CONTAINS NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION

☐ OTHER LAW OR REGULATION

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Authority: VND 959503
By: MNARA Date: 10/5/05

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POL 27 BIAFRA-NIGERIA

OUTGOING TELEGRAM Department of State

INDICATE: ☐ COLLECT
☐ CHARGE TO

SECRET
Classification

218847

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10 AUG 68 00 09z

Origin
Info:

ACTION: Amembassy ADDIS ABABA - PRIORITY
Amembassy LONDON - PRIORITY

-INFO: Amembassy LAGOS
Amembassy PARIS
Amembassy ACCRA
Amembassy MONROVIA
Amembassy YAOUNDE
Amembassy KINSHASA
Amembassy NIAMEY
U. S. Mission USUN NY
U. S. Mission GENEVA

218847

1. Please deliver following message from Secretary to FonMin Ketema.

2. Text: qte. Dear Mr. Minister: We appreciate and admire the states-
man-like efforts of HIM to assist in bringing the tragic Nigerian conflict
to an end as quickly as possible. Our hopes and prayers are for the success
of those efforts.

If however, despite those valiant efforts, agreement is not reached
between the parties on a negotiated settlement of the war, I believe it
would be a terrible tragedy for Nigeria, for Africa and for all mankind
if the negotiators left without reaching agreement on the urgent problem
of getting relief assistance to the starving on both sides.

We have hoped in the past, and continue to hope now that the two sides
could at least draw a distinction between the political and humanitarian
questions and, in the final analysis, find a solution to the latter--if
necessary, without prejudice to the outcome of the political items on

Drafted by:

AFW:RPSmith/AF:JPalmer:mm:8/8/68

Tel. Ext.

Telegraphic transmission and
classification approved by:

BRUSK The Secretary

Clearances:

AF:JPalmer

S/S- Mr. Kell

M-M. Rostow

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FORM DS-322
8-65

0481

DECLASSIFIED
Authority VND959503
By MNARA Date 10/5/03

Page 2 of telegram to ADDIS ABABA LONDON

SECRET
Classification

the agenda.

We are reluctant while the talks are in process to make any demarche directly to the parties, since we would not wish to risk complicating further HIM's already arduous task. Nevertheless, we fervently hope that the talks will not end without some agreement on the humanitarian question. I am therefore providing to Ambassador Hall two contingency messages addressed to the heads of the two delegations which he will discuss with you. If HIM believes they would be helpful, our hope is that Ambassador Hall might be able to use them with maximum effect if the talks appear to be in danger of breaking down.

We would, of course, wish to rely on HIM's judgment as to the timing of the delivery of these messages and would also appreciate his advice on whether and how they should be made public. I should like to emphasize, Mr. Minister, that these messages are purely contingency and that we continue to hope fervently that they will not be required. ~~XXXXXXXXXXXX~~. The President joins me in underlining the importance we attach to prompt and effective humanitarian assistance to both sides and in wishing HIM and yourself every success in your statesman-like endeavors. unqte. end text.

2. Following is text of proposed contingency messages which, after consultation with HIM or FonMin, could be utilized as described above. Begin text: qte. As President Johnson stated in his message of August 5 to HIM, the political aspects of the Nigerian conflict must be settled by the parties concerned, with the help of their African neighbors. We have no intention of interfering in the political aspects of the current discussions in Addis Ababa.

0482

Page 3 of telegram to ADDIS ABABA LONDON

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At the same time, we, in common with the rest of mankind have a legitimate concern with the humanitarian problem of feeding the starving and succoring the needy. For too long now, the efforts of the ICRC and other humanitarian agencies have been frustrated in their efforts to reach the suffering civilian victims of the war with relief assistance which is readily available.

At the President's request, I am therefore addressing this identical appeal to the heads of both delegations as citizens of the world to reach an agreement before leaving Addis Ababa which would permit food and other urgently needed supplies to start to flow at once to the innocent victims of the conflict. I join all friends of Africa in hoping for an early peaceful settlement of the conflict. But the humanitarian task of alleviating the suffering must surely take ~~XXXXXXXX~~ precedence over all other consideration. unqte. end text.

3. Since our objective is to obtain maximum effectiveness and make messages matter of record, we would prefer your delivering them personally. We recognize, however, that the atmosphere of the talks may change rapidly and that HIM may strongly prefer handle himself. We therefore leave to your discretion, in consultation with IEG, means and timing of delivery.

4. For London: Inform HMG of above and express hope British might consider making similar demarche.

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DECLASSIFIED
Authority VND 959503
By MV NARA Date 10/5/05

OUTGOING TELEGRAM Department of State

INDICATE: ☐ COLLECT
☐ CHARGE TO

SECRET

Classification

218908

10 AUG 68 17 51z

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Origin: ACTION: Amembassy ADDIS ABABA IMMEIDATE
" " LAGOS " " " " " " LONDON " " " "

Info: INFO: Amembassy PARIS PRIORITY
" " ACCRA " " " " " " MONROVIA " " " " " " YACOUNDE " " " " " " KINSHASA " " " " " " NIAMEY " " " " " " USMISSION USUN NY " " " " " " USMISSION GENEVA " " " " " "

STATE

REF: A. Lagos 11570, B. Addis 5107, C. State 218847

1. In light concern expressed Lagos 11570 Ambassador Hall should not address or deliver contingency message to either delegation. Unless IEG has valid objection, he should send text of appeal through appropriate channels to HIM with request that it be conveyed to both delegations. Ambassador should consult with K IEG on timing of delivery and possible public release.
2. Accordingly, last two sentences of fourth para Secretary's message to FONMIN Ketema (State 218847) should be revised as follows: QTE I am therefore providing to Amb. Hall a contingency appeal addressed to members of both delegations which he will discuss with you. If HIM believes this appeal would be helpful, our hope is that it could be used with maximum effect if talks appear to be in danger of breaking down. UNQTE. Wherever else the word QTE messages UNQTE appears in Secretary's message it should be changed to QTE appeal UNQTE.

Drafted by: AF:CRMoore:ncs:8/10/68

Tel. Ext. 5209

Telegraphic transmission and classification approved by:

The Under Secretary

Clearances:

AF - Mr. Palmer

AFW - Mr. Melbourne

SECRET

Classification

FORM 8-65 DS-322

0484

DECLASSIFIED
Authority: VMD 959503
By: MVA Date: 10/5/05

Page 2 of telegram to Amembassy ADDIS ABABA

SECRET
Classification

Re Addis 5107

3. /Second sentence of second para of text contingency appeal should read as follows:

QTE. For too long now, the ICRC and other humanitarian agencies have been frustrated in their efforts to reach the suffering civilian victims of the war with relief assistance which is readily available. UNQTE.

4. First sentence third para of contingency appeal should read: QTE at the President's request I am therefore addressing this appeal to members of both delegations as citizens of the world etc. UNQTE.

END

RUSK

FORM DS-322A
8-63
CONTINUATION SHEET

SECRET
Classification

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Authority VND 959503
By MVA Date 10/5/05

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POL 27 BIAFRA-NIGERIA

Department of State

TELEGRAM

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PAGE 01 LAGOS 11564 101247Z

52
ACTION AF 15

INFO EUR 15, IO 13, SR 01, ORM 03, GPM 04, NSC 10, SP 02, SS 20, RSC 01, L 03

H 02, P 04, USIE 00, INR 07, CIAE 00, NSA 02, AID 28, SCS 04, SCA 02,

RSR 01//137 W

R 101032Z AUG 68
FM AMEMBASSY LAGOS
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 1931
INFO AMEMBASSY ACCRA
AMEMBASSY ADDIS ABABA
AMEMBASSY KINSHASA
AMEMBASSY MONROVIA
AMEMBASSY NIAMEY
AMEMBASSY YAOUNDE
AMEMBASSY LONDON
AMEMBASSY PARIS
USMISSION GENEVA
CINCSRIKE/CINCMCAFSA
DIA
AMCONSUL IBADAN
AMCONSUL KADUNA

RECEIVED BY 15.3

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JOINT STATE/USIS MESSAGE

SUBJ: REPORT OF LEAFLET DROP IN "BIAFRA"

1. USIS OFFICER HAS BEEN INFORMED BY LOCAL BBC CORRESPONDENT (PROTECT) THAT FMG PREPARING LAUNCH MASSIVE AIR-DROP OF LEAFLETS IN "BIAFRA" NEXT WEEK.

2. LEAFLETS DESCRIBED AS BEARING SAFE-CONDUCT ON ONE SIDE AND INSTRUCTIONS TO FMG TROOPS ON OTHER. LEAFLETS SAID TO BE IN ENGLISH, IBO, HAUSA.

3. INFORMANT UNDERSTANDS LEAFLETS WILL BE DROPPED IN

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15-10-68

(1)

0486

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Authority VND 959503
By MVA Date 10/5/05



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PAGE 02 LAGOS 11564 101247Z

SATURATION QUANTITIES IN AREA CONSIDERABLY LARGER THAN
IBO HEARTLAND.

EXEMPT

MATHEWS

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0487

DECLASSIFIED	
Authority	VND 959503
By	MV NARA Date 10/5/09



Pol 27 Biafra - Nigeria
TR DEF 19-6 USSR Nigeria
Department of State **TELEGRAM**

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PAGE 01 LAGOS 11566 101247Z

54
ACTION AF 15

INFO EUR 15, IO 13, AID 28, NIC 01, SA 01, SAH 02, SR 01, ORM 03, CIAE 00,

GPM 04, H 02, INR 07, L 03, NSC 10, P 04, RSC 01, SP 02, SS 20, USIA 12,

RSR 01, /145 W

R 101040Z AUG 68
FM AMEMBASSY LAGOS
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 1932
AMEMBASSY ACCRA
AMEMBASSY ADDIS ABABA
AMEMBASSY KINSHASA
AMEMBASSY LISBON
AMEMBASSY LONDON
AMEMBASSY MONROVIA
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
AMEMBASSY NIAMEY
AMEMBASSY PARIS
AMEMBASSY YAOUNDE
USMISSION GENEVA
CINCSSTRIKE/CINCMCAFSA
DIA
AMCONSUL KADUNA
AMCONSUL IBADAN

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE LAGOS 11566

SUBJ: "BIAFRAN" RADIO IDENTIFIES U.S. AS COMMON ENEMY
WITH FMG, BRITISH, SOVIETS

REF: LAGOS 11387

1. REBEL RADIO BROADCAST ON QUOTE: PEOPLE'S ARMY UNQUOTE ON
AUGUST 9 STATES QUOTE EVERY BIAFRAN SOLDIER ENGAGED IN THIS
MORTAL CONFLICT WITH NIGERIA, WITH BRITAIN, WITH UNITED
STATES AND WITH SOVIET UNION KNOWS THAT NO SACRIFICE TOO
GREAT TO MAKE TO ACHIEVE SUCCESS UNQUOTE.

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By: MVA Date: 10/5/05



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PAGE 02 LAGOS 11566 101247Z

2. BROADCAST IN GENERAL DEALS WITH UNITY OF PEOPLE AND ARMY OF BIAFRA STATING THAT ARMY IS VOLUNTEER ARMY SUSTAINED BY VOLUNTARY CONTRIBUTIONS OF PEOPLE. ARMY AND PEOPLE HAVE SAME OBJECTIVES, INSEPARABLE MORALE AND TOGETHER BUILDING THROUGH REVOLUTION SOCIETY TO GUARANTEE OPPORTUNITY FOR DEVELOPMENT AND SELF-DETERMINATION. COMMENDS ARMY FOR MILITARY DISCIPLINE, TURNING IN ANYTHING CAPTURED, TREATING CIVILIANS POLITELY, PAYING FOR ANYTHING THEY BUY AND RETURNING ANYTHING BORROWED. COOPERATION BETWEEN PEOPLE AND ARMY WILL LEAD TO SUCCESS QUOTE IN THWARTING EVIL MACHINATIONS OF ENEMY WHO IS SO LAVISHLY SUPPLIED BY IMPERIALIST COLLABORATORS UNQUOTE.

3. COMMENT: STATEMENT STRONGEST TO DATE IN IDENTIFYING U.S. AS COMMON ENEMY OF BIAFRA ALONG WITH FMG, BRITISH AND SOVIETS WITHOUT DISTINCTION BETWEEN OUR POLICIES. STATEMENT FURTHER DEVELOPMENT OF LINE REPORTED IN REFTEL.

EXEMPT

MATHEWS

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Authority	VND959503
By	MM/ARA Date 10/5/03

ORIGIN/ACTION

RM/R	REP	AF
1	5	
ARA	EUR	FE
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NEA	CU	INR
		5
E	P	IO
	2	5
L	FBO	AID
3		20
GRM	SIP	SY
1	1	1
AGR	COM	FRB
INT	LAB	TAR
TR	XMB	AIR
		5
ARMY	CIA	NAVY
5	20	5
OSD	USIA	NSA
34	10	3
		NSC
		6

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

AIRGRAM

Pol 17-8 US

MR 1027 BIAFRA-NIG

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A-767

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HANDLING INDICATOR

TO : Department of State

INFO : IBADAN, KADUNA, MOSCOW

FROM : Amembassy LAGOS

DATE: August 10, 1968

SUBJECT: Contact with Soviet Ambassador

REF

Enclosed is a memorandum from The Ambassador concerning recent contact with the Soviet Ambassador, A. I. ROMANOV, in Lagos.

MATHEWS

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Drafted by: POL:GF Carrjr:mjr 8/9/68

Contents and Classification Approved by: POL:EE Ramsaurjr

Clearances:

0490

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Authority: VND 959503
By: MN NARA Date: 10/5/05

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Page 1 of 1
Encl. No. 1
A- 767 from Lagos

Contact with Communist Diplomat

At the Senegalese reception on July 12, I joined the Liberian and Soviet Ambassadors and the Acting High Commissioner of Sierra Leone who were discussing the Nigerian situation. We all agreed that Ojukwu was risking the lives of his people for political reasons and deplored his unwillingness to agree to receive relief supplies by land.

Romanov spoke scornfully of Ojukwu's refusal to accept British relief supplies unless HMG stopped selling arms to the FMG. It would make no difference if HMG stopped selling arms, said Romanov, as the FMG would have no trouble getting arms elsewhere. He made a flash review of that comment and added that the FMG could always obtain arms from the same irregular sources as the rebels.

The Ambassador

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By	MV NARA Date 10/5/05



Pol 27 Biafra - Nigeria
Department of State **TELEGRAM**

SECRET 235

PAGE 01 LAGOS 11570 101239Z

54

ACTION AF 15

INFO EUR 15, IO 1, CIAE 00, DODE 00, GPM 04, H 02, INR 07, L 03, NSAE 00,

NSC 10, P 04, RSC 01, SPI 02, SS 20, SR 01, ORM 03, SCS 04, SCA 02, AID 28,

CCO 00, SSO 00, NSCE 00, USIE 00, RSR 01, /135 W

O R 101210Z AUG 68 ZFF-4

FM AMEMBASSY LAGOS

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1934

AMEMBASSY ADDIS ABABA

INFO AMEMBASSY LONDON

AMEMBASSY PARIS

AMEMBASSY ACCRA

AMEMBASSY MONROVIA

AMEMBASSY YAOUNDE

AMEMBASSY KINSHASA

AMEMBASSY NIAMEY

USMISSION USUN NY

USMISSION GENEVA

SECRET LAGOS 11570

REF: STATE 218847 *li*

I STRONGLY URGE DEPT RECONSIDER CONTINGENT INSTRUCTIONS TO
AMB. HALL TO DELIVER MESSAGE FROM SECRETARY TO REBEL
DELEGATION ADDIS. THIS MESSAGE WOULD BE INTERPRETED BY
MANY AFRICAN STATES AS U.S. STEP TOWARD RECOGNITION
"BIAFRA" AND WOULD CERTAINLY BE THOROUGHLY EXPLOITED BY
REBELS AS SUPPORT AND EVEN DE FACTO RECOGNITION. PURPOSE
OF MESSAGE COULD BE SERVED AS WELL BY PUBLIC STATEMENT
ADDRESSED TO CONFEREES. MATHEWS

1

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SECRET

0492

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By: MVA Date: 10/5/05



POL 27 BIAFRA-NIGERIA
XK POL 15-1 ETH
Department of State **TELEGRAM**

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PAGE 01 ADDIS 05112 101634Z

5 41

ACTION: AF 15

INFO: SS: 20, NSC: 10, RSR: 01, RSC: 01, /047 W

R: 101045Z AUG 68

FM: AMEMBASSY ADDIS ABABA

TO: SECSTATE WASHDC 6544

INFO: AMEMBASSY LAGOS

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE: ADDIS ABABA 05112

1. PALACE REQUESTED EMB AUG 9 PASS TO ADDRESSEES LISTED
PARA 3 FOLLOWING MESSAGE FROM H.I.M., WHICH IS IN REPLY TO
RECENT JOINT TELEGRAM TO H.I.M. FROM THEM.

2. "I AM DEEPLY GRATEFUL FOR YOUR MESSAGE IN WHICH YOU
HAVE EXPRESSED DEEP CONCERN REGARDING THE NIGERIAN CRISIS,
A MATTER WHICH HAS PRE-OCCUPIED THE THOUGHTS OF MEN AND
WOMEN EVERYWHERE. THE OAU HEADS OF STATE CONSULTATIVE COM-
MITTEE ON NIGERIA WHICH I AM CHAIRING HAS AND WILL CONTINUE
TO DO ITS UTMOST IN FINDING WAYS AND MEANS OF ALLEVIATING THE
PRESENT SUFFERING IN NIGERIA AND IN BRINGING ABOUT LASTING
PEACE IN THIS SISTER AFRICAN COUNTRY SO THAT A NEW ERA WILL
EMERGE WHERE ALL NIGERIANS COULD WORK TOGETHER IN LOVE AND
HARMONY. I FURTHER WISH TO SAY THAT THE PRESENT CRUCIAL TALKS
ON NIGERIA WHICH ARE BEING HELD IN ADDIS ABABA COULD BEAR
FRUITFUL RESULTS ONLY IF THE ALMIGHTY GOD GUIDES THE DELIBERATIONS
IN THIS REGARD WHICH ARE BEING FOLLOWED WITH GREAT CONCERN
AND DEEPEST HOPES BY ALL. REMEMBER US ALL IN YOUR PRAYERS."


HAILE SELASSIE I, EMPEROR"

3. ADDRESSEES:

- A) MORRIS B. ABRAH, PRESIDENT, AMERICAN JEWISH COMMITTEE
B) ROGER N. BALDWIN, HON. PRESIDENT, INTERNATIONAL LEAGUE
FOR THE RIGHT OF MAN
C) BISHOP JOHN J. DOUGHERTY, CHAIRMAN OF U.S. CATHOLIC
BISHOPS COMMITTEE FOR WORLD JUSTICE AND PEACE
D) RABBI MAURICE N. EISENDRATH, PRESIDENT UNION OF

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Department of State

TELEGRAM

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PAGE 02 ADDIS 05112 101634Z

- AMERICAN HEBREW CONGREGATIONS:
E) JAMES FARMER, CHAIRMAN, NATIONAL ADVISORY BOARD CONGRESS
OF RACIAL EQUALITY
F) DOROGHTY HEIGHT, PRESIDENT, NATIONAL COUNCIL OF NEGRO WOMEN
G) GEORGE M. HOUSER, EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR, AMERICAN COMMITTEE
ON AFRICA
H) DR. DAVID R. HUNTER, DEPUTY GENERAL SECRETARY, NATIONAL
COUNCIL OF CHURCHES IN UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
I) JAMES MACCRACKEN, DIRECTOR, CHURCH WORLD SERVICE
J) RABBI JACOB P. RUDIN, PRESIDENT SYNAGOGUE, COUNCIL OF AMERICA
K) A. PHILIP RANDOLPH, PRESIDENT OF THE BROTHERHOOD OF
SLEEPING CAR PORTERS AND VICE PRESIDENT OF THE AMERICAN
FEDERATION OF LABOR CONGRESS OF INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATIONS
L) BAYARD RUSTIN, EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR, A. PHILIP RANDOLPH
INSTITUTE
M) BISHOP EDWARD E. SWANSTROM, EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR,
CATHOLIC RELIEF SERVICES USCC
N) NORMAN THOMAS
O) ROY WILKINS, EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, NATIONAL ASSOCIATION
FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF COLORED PEOPLE


4. APPRECIATE DEPT TRANSMITTING MESSAGE AND CONFIRMING DELIVERY
SO WE CAN INFORM PALACE

HALL

NOTE: NOT PASSED LISTED ADDRESSEES BY OC/T.

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POL 27 BIAFRA-NIGERIA
Department of State **TELEGRAM**

CONFIDENTIAL 350

PAGE 01 ADDIS 05114 101607Z

52

ACTION AF 15

INFO EUR 15, IO 13, CIAE 00, DODE 00, GPM 04, H 02, INR 07, L 03, NSAE 00,

NSC 10, P 04, RSC 01, SP 02, SS 20, USIA 12, SR 01, ORM 03, ACDA 16,

SCA 02, SCS 04, PC 04, AID 28, RSR 01, SSO 00, /167 W

P R 101425Z AUG 68
FM AMEMBASSY ADDIS ABABA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 6546
INFO AMEMBASSY ABIDJAN
AMEMBASSY ACCRA
AMEMBASSY KINSHASA
AMEMBASSY LAGOS
AMEMBASSY LONDON
AMEMBASSY MONROVIA
AMEMBASSY NIAMEY
AMEMBASSY PARIS
AMEMBASSY YAOUNDE
USMISSION GENEVA
USMISSION USUN NEW YORK

C O N F I D E N T I A L ADDIS ABABA 5114

SUBJ: NIGERIAN PEACE TALKS

1. BRITISH CHARGE SWANN CALLED THIS MORNING TO EXCHANGE VIEWS ON NIGERIAN SITUATION. HE AGREES BIAFRAN STATEMENT AUG 9 DID NOT RPT NO MORE TALKS AHEAD AND PROSPECTS FOR SETTLEMENT POOR. UNLESS NEW DEVELOPMENTS OCCUR WE AGREED CURRENT TALKS TO BREAK UP FAIRLY SOON, PROBABLY BY END OF NEXT WEEK, ALTHOUGH AT MOMENT NEITHER SIDE PREPARED ACCEPT ONUS BREAKING OFF DISCUSSIONS. AGREES ALSO BIAFRANS PROBLEY WANT TO SPIN TALKS OUT UNTIL ALGIERS OAU SUMMIT IN SEPT IN HOPE MORE AFRICAN STATES WILL RECOGNIZE BIAFRA IN INTERIM, WORLD PUBLIC OPINION WILL STRENGTHEN IN SUPPORT BIAFRAN CAUSE, AND BROADER FORUM WITH OAU HEADS OF STATE AT ALGIERS WILL SOMEHOW FORESTALL QTE MILITARY SOLUTION UNQTE BY FMG AND OPEN WAY FOR CEYCZTION

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272
8-10-68
Africa Ababa 5114

0495

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By: MNARA Date: 10/5/05



Department of State **TELEGRAM**

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PAGE 02 ADDIS 05114 101607Z

HOSTILITIES WITH SOME KIND OF BIAFRAN SEPARATE STATUS.

2. SWANN (PROTECT SOURCE) TOLD US RECENT BRITISH ASSESSMENT NIGERIAN MILITARY SITUATION INCLUDED INFORMATION FMG PLANNING TOP-LEVEL MILITARY CONFERENCE AUG 13 TO COMPLETE PLANS FOR POSSIBLE MILITARY OFFENSIVE COMMENCING AUG 20-21.

3. FOREIGN PRES. SOURCES ADDIS REPORT QTE SEVERAL UNQTE MEMBERS FMG DEL. INTEND DEPART ADDIS TODAY AND TOMORROW. NO IDENTIFICATION YET AVAILABLE, BUT NOT BELIEVED THEY ARE RANKING MEMBERS DEL. PRESS OBSERVERS ACCEPT THIS AS EVIDENCE FMG INTENTION PHASE DOWN TOWARD END OF TALKS.

4. COMMENT: IT IS PREMATURE PREDICT NEXT STEPS IN TALKS, SINCE HIM REPORTEDLY PLANS TO TRY AGAIN THIS WEEKEND TO BRING TWO SIDES CLOSER TO REALISTIC NEGOTIATING POSTURES BEFORE MONDAY'S MEETING (ADDIS 5113). EVERY LOCAL SIGN SEEMS TO INDICATE, HOWEVER, TALKS PROBABLY WILL NOT RPT NOT GO BEYOND NEXT WEEKEND.

GP-3. HALL

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By: MNA Date: 10/3/05



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Department of State **TELEGRAM**

SECRET 263

PAGE 01 LAGOS 11539 091220Z

46

ACTION SS 70

INFO CCO 00,SSO 00,NSCE 00,USIE 00,CIAE 00,1070 W

O 091200Z AUG 68 ZFF-4

FM AMEMBASSY LAGOS

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1917

INFO AMEMBASSY LONDON IMMEDIATE

S E C R E T LAGOS 11539

LIMDIS

REF: STATE 216985

1. I TOLD ARIKPO THAT I HAD BEEN INSTRUCTED TO REMIND HIM OF SECRETARY'S STATEMENT OF JULY 30 AND PARTICULARLY SENTENCE CONCERNING RESTRAINT IN MILITARY OPERATIONS WHICH I READ TO HIM. I ADDED THAT AS I WAS SURE HE REALIZED FMG INVASION REMAINING REBEL TERRITORY WOULD PRODUCE SEVERE PUBLIC REACTION IN US WITH CONSEQUENCES WE COULD NOT FORESEE.

2. ARIKPO RESPONDED HE AWARE VIEWS USG. AS HE HAD TOLD ME PREVIOUSLY (LAGOS 11302) FMG WOULD LIKE TO FOLLOW POLICY OF RESTRAINT BUT REBELS' CONTINUED INTRANSIGENCE IN NEGOTIATIONS AND RENEWED AGGRESSIVENESS (COUNTER-ATTACKS AND GUERRILLA TACTICS) ON BATTLEFIELDS LEFT FMG LITTLE CHOICE.

3. DEPT PERMSEC ENAHORO WHO WAS ALSO PRESENT COMMENTED TO ME AS WE LEFT ARIKPO'S OFFICE THAT IN HIS VIEW POLICY OF MILITARY RESTRAINT AND DELAY WAS MISTAKE AND HAD HARMED FMG'S INTERNATIONAL STANDING.

GP-3. MATHEWS.

SECRET

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0497

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By MVA/ARA Date 10/5/03

L I M D I S
I N C O M I N G

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SERIAL 11539

1968 AUG 9 AM 8 41

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MONTHLY COUNT 236

Secretariat

S/S-S 1
S/S-O 1
S/S-Screener 3
S/S-EX 3
S/S-CMS 3
S/S-O DIR 1
MilRep 1
Summary 1
Task Force 1

Principals

ES2 1
S 1
U 1
M2 1
G 1
SIG 1
S/AH3 1
S/AL 1
SA 1
S/CPR 1
S/GOV 1
S/IL 1
S/P 1
S/R 1
S/FW 1
S/PM 1
M/WP 1
G/PM 1

Geographic

AF5 5
ARA9 5
EA11 5
EUR9 5
NEA7 5

Functional

CU 1
E2 1
H 1
IGA 1
INR6 1
IO4 1
L2 1
O3 1
OPR 1
OC 1
SY 1
WLG 1
P2 1
SCA 1
SCS 1
SCI 1

OTHER AGENCIES

WH10 10
CIA P
DOD P
USIA4 P1
NSA P1

Other

ACDA5 5
AID/EXSEC3 3
AA/AFR2 2
AA/VN2 2
AA/EA3 3
AA/NESA2 2

PC 1
VP 1
AEC3 3
ACR3 3
COM2 2
EXIM 1
FRB 1
LAB 1
NASA 1
NIC 1
STR 1
TRANS 1
TRSY6 6
JUS 1
IRS 1
INT 1
BOB 1
FBI 1
CEA 1
FAA 1
File 1
Burned 1

0498

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By M/NARA Date 10/5/03



POL 27 BIAFRA-NIGERIA
Department of State **TELEGRAM**

31

SECRET 509

PAGE 01 LONDON 11651 091411Z

49

ACTION SS 70

INFO SSO 00, NSCE 00, USIE 00, CIAE 00, /070 W

O 091337Z AUG 68
FM AMEMBASSY LONDON
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 5385
INFO AMEMBASSY LAGOS IMMEDIATE

S E C R E T LONDON 11651

REF: STATE 217255 NC

1. POL COUNSELOR TODAY CALLED ON SIR LESLIE MONSON AND ERIC NORRIS, ASSISTANT UNDERSECRETARY, AS INSTRUCTED REFTEL.

2. MONSON SAID CO HAD YESTERDAY URGENTLY REQUESTED VIEWS HIGH COMMISSION IN LAGOS AS TO WHETHER THERE ANY POSSIBLE WAY UK MIGHT USEFULLY INTERVENE IN NIGERIAN CONFLICT WHILE ADDIS TALKS PROCEEDING. HE SAID TELEGRAM FROM HUNT WAS EXPECTED LATER TODAY AND UK WOULD THEN REVIEW MATTERS IN LIGHT HIS REPLY AND OUR REPRESENTATIONS. BUT BOTH MONSON AND NORRIS SEEMED VERY SKEPTICAL THAT UK INTERVENTION AT THIS POINT WOULD SERVE USEFUL PURPOSE AND NORRIS EVEN SPECULATED IT MIGHT BE COUNTER-PRODUCTIVE. THEY NOTED SOVIET WILLINGNESS GIVE FULL SUPPORT FMG AND DETERMINATION OF FMG OFFICIALS TO DEFEAT SECESSION. BUT THEY ADDED THEY WERE EMPHASIZING TO NIGERIANS, AS WAS AMB MATHEWS, IMPORTANCE OF ADEQUATE RELIEF MEASURE THROUGH ICRC, AND TROOP DISCIPLINE IN EVENT FMG WENT AHEAD WITH INVASION PLANS.

① 3. MONSON SAID HE WOULD REPEAT OUR CONVERSATION TO LORD SHEPHERD, WHO IS SEEING NIGERIAN HIGH COMMISSION REPRESENTATIVES THIS AFTERNOON. BRUCE

HANDLED LIMDIS PER S/S-0.

London 11651
8-9-68

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SECRET

0499

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By: MVA Date: 10/5/05

L I M D I S
I N C O M I N G

TOP SECRET

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POST London

(Time Received)

SERIAL 11651

1968 AUG 9 AM 10 53

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MONTHLY COUNT

235

Secretariat

S/S-S 1
S/S-O 1
S/S-Screener 3
S/S-EX 1
S/S-CMS 1
S/S-O DIR 1
MilRep 1
Summary 1
Task Force 1

Principals

ES2 4
S 1
U 1
M2 1
G 1
SIG 1
S/AH3 1
S/AL 1
SA 1
S/CPR 1
S/GOV 1
S/IL 1
S/P 1
S/R 1
S/FW 1
S/PM 1
M/WP 1
G/PM 1

Geographic

AF5 5
ARA9 1
EA11 1
EUR9 1
NEA7 1

Functional

CU 1
E2 1
H 1
IGA 1
INR6 1
IO4 1
L2 1
O3 1
OPR 1
OC 1
SY 1
WLG 1
P2 1
SCA 1
SCS 1
SCI 1

OTHER AGENCIES

WH149 10
CIA 1
DOD 1
USIA4 1
NSA 1

Other

ACDA5 1
AID/EXSEC3 1
AA/AFR2 1
AA/VN2 1
AA/EA3 1
AA/NESA2 1

PC 1
VP 1
AEC3 1
AGR3 1
COM2 1
EXIM 1
FRB 1
LAB 1
NASA 1
NIC 1
STR 1
TRANS 1
TRSY6 1
JUS 1
IRS 1
INT 1
BOB 1
FBI 1
CEA 1
FAA 1
File 1
Burned 1

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POL 27 BIAFRA-NIGERIA

Department of State

TELEGRAM

*11534
8-9-68*

SECRET 097

PAGE 01 LAGOS 11534 081038Z

16

ACTION SS: 70

INFO CIAE: 00, 7070 W

R 091015Z AUG 68
FM AMEMBASSY LAGOS
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 1914

SECRET LAGOS 11534

LIMDIS:

REFR STATE 217255

LAGOS 11504 HAS BEEN REPEATED LONDON.

GP-3. MATHEWS:

①

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SECRET

0501

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By: MVA/NARA Date: 10/5/05

L I M D I S
I N C O M I N G

TOP SECRET

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SERIAL 11534

1968 AUG 9 AM 7 23

DISTRIBUTION

MONTHLY COUNT

231

Secretariat

Geographic

Other

S/S-S 1
S/S-O 1
S/S-Screener 3
S/S-EX 3
S/S-CMS 3
S/S-O DIR 3
MilRep 3
Summary 3
Task Force 3

AF5 X 5
ARA 9
EA 11
EUR 9 ✓ 9
NEA 7

ACDA 5
AID/EXSEC 3
AA/AFR2 3
AA/VN 2
AA/EA 3
AA/NESA 2

Functional

Principals

ES2 ✓ 3
S ✓
U ✓
M2 ✓
G ✓

CU 2
E 2
H 2
IGA 2
INR 6 ✓ 6
IO4 2
L2 2
O3 2
OPR 2
OC 2
SY 2
WLG 2

PC 2
VP 2

SIG 2
S/AH 3
S/AL 2
SA 2
S/CPR 2
S/GOV 2
S/IL 2
S/P 2
S/R 2
S/FW 2
S/PM 2
M/WP 2
G/PM ✓ 1

P2 2
SCA 2
SCS 2
SCI 2

AEC 3
AGR 3
COM 2
EXIM 2
FRB 2
LAB 2
NASA 2
NIC 2
STR 2
TRANS 2
TRSY 6
JUS 2
IRS 2
INT 2
BOB 2
FBI 2
CEA 2
FAA 2

OTHER AGENCIES

WH 10 ✓ 10
CIA 2
DOD 2
USIA 4
NSA 2

File 2
Burned 2

0502

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POL 27-BIAFRA-NIGERIA
Department of State **TELEGRAM**

CONFIDENTIAL 399

PAGE 01 LAGOS 11541 091313Z

49

ACTION AF 15

INFO EUR 15, ID 13, SSO 00, CIAE 00, DODE 00, GPM 04, H 02, INR 07, L 03,

NSAE 00, NSC 10, P 04, RSC 01, SP 02, SS 20, USIA 12, SAH 02, AID 28,

NIC 01, RSR 01, /140 W

P R 091240Z AUG 68

FM AMEMBASSY LAGOS

TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 1919

AMEMBASSY LIBREVILLE

INFO AMEMBASSY YAOUNDE

AMEMBASSY PARIS

AMEMBASSY LONDON

C O N F I D E N T I A L LAGOS 11541

1. COMMISSIONER EXTAFF ARIKPO ASKED ME TO CALL THIS MORNING TO INFORM ME OF REPORT RECEIVED LAST NIGHT FROM NIGERIAN EMBASSY YAOUNDE TO EFFECT THAT 800 PARATROOPERS OF FRENCH, GERMAN AND DUTCH ORIGIN WERE ASSEMBLED IN LIBREVILLE FOR PURPOSE OF ASSISTING REBELS TO RECAPTURE PORT HARCOURT.

2. ARIKPO INDICATED FMG DID NOT TAKE REPORT AT FACE VALUE BUT TAKING NO CHANCES IN PRESENT CIRCUMSTANCES. FMG WOULD APPRECIATE ANY INFORMATION USG COULD PROVIDE CONCERNING CONCENTRATION SUSPICIOUS FOREIGNERS IN GABON.
GP-3. MATHEWS.

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0503

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By: MM NARA Date: 10/5/03



POL 23-8 NIGERIA

Department of State **TELEGRAM**

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Xc POL 27 BIAFRA-NIGERIA

CONFIDENTIAL 783

PAGE 01 KADUNA 1256 091556Z

4
ACTION AF 15

INFO EUR 15, IO 13, SR 01, ORM 03, SCA 02, SCS 04, RSR 01, NSA 02, CIAE 00,

DODE 00, GPM 04, H 02, INR 07, L 03, NSC 10, P 04, RSC 01, SP 02, SS 20,

USIA 12, CU 04, AID 28, IGA 02, ACDA 16, OPR 02, /173 W

R 091430Z AUG 68
FM AMCONSUL KADUNA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 841
INFO AMEMBASSY LAGOS
AMEMBASSY LONDON
AMEMBASSY PARIS
AMEMBASSY ROME
AMCONSUL IBADAN

C O N F I D E N T I A L KADUNA 1256

SUBJECT: NORTHERN CATHOLICS AND CRITICISM OF PAPAL
STAND ON BIAFRA

REF KADUNA 1250

1. FATHER BURKE (IRISH) CATHOLIC SECRETARIAT KADUNA
(PROTECT SOURCE), SAYS HE AND HIS SUPERIORS HAVE BEEN
TAKING INITIATIVE TO CHANNEL DEVELOPMENT OF KADUNA PRO-
TEST AGAINST POPE'S STATEMENT ON RELIEF FOR BIAFRA. IN
CONJUNCTION WITH NIGERIAN CATHOLICS INCLUDING COLONEL
MARTIN ADAMU, COMMANDER, 1 DIVISION REAR, A PROTEST LETTER
HAS BEEN PREPARED AND SIGNED BY NIGERIAN CATHOLICS IN
KADUNA. LETTER WHICH ORIGINALLY DRAFTED BY FATHER BURKE
AND REVISED BY NIGERIANS IS MODERATE IN TONE AND WILL BE
DELIVERED TO APOSTOLIC DELEGATE LAGOS BY DELEGATION OF
NIGERIAN CATHOLIC LAYMEN WHO LEFT KADUNA AUGUST 7. LED BY
VICTOR GWANI, NORTH-CENTRAL STATE CHIEF EDUCATION OFFICER.
COPY WILL ALSO BE PROVIDED TO GOWON PRIVATELY THROUGH
HIS SECRETARY. FATHER BURKE HOPES PUBLIC DEMONSTRATION
IN KADUNA MAY HAVE BEEN HEADED OFF BY HIS INITIATIVE.
AS REPORTED REFTEL, CONSULATE HAS REPORT THAT ATTEMPT TO
ORGANIZE DEMONSTRATION IN KADUNA WAS MADE BUT PERMISSION

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0504

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Authority: VND 959503
By: MNARA Date: 10/5/05

AF:CRM Moore:smf:ehd 8/14/68
(Drafting Office and Officer)

SECRET

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Memorandum of Conversation

Friday
DATE: August 9, 1968

SUBJECT: Soviet-Arab Assistance to the FMG.

PARTICIPANTS: Mr. Eli Nevo, Counselor, Israeli Embassy
Ambassador C. Robert Moore, Deputy Assistant Secretary for
African Affairs

COPIES TO: AF
AFW
Department of Defense
American Embassy, Lagos, Nigeria
American Embassy, Tel Aviv, Israel

In the course of Mr. Nevo's call on me some days ago regarding Soviet-Arab assistance to the FMG, I asked if he had any details on the extent of this assistance. Mr. Nevo queried Tel Aviv and brought me their reply as follows:

1. The Soviets have supplied an estimated 12-20 MIG-15s and 17s. They are based in Kano, Kaduna and Makurdi. There are an estimated 50-80 Russian and Czech advisors in the fields of maintenance and tactics. They are located in Kaduna and Kano.
2. The UAR sold the FMG two -- or possibly three -- Ilyushin medium range bombers plus 140 tons of ammunition in early 1968. Two of these bombers were seen in Nigeria in February 1968 when they flew to Calabar with an Egyptian Air Force Captain. There are an estimated 15-20 Egyptian pilots in Nigeria and possibly as many as ten Algerian pilots. In addition there are also experts for maintenance and repairs -- an estimated 50 Egyptians. (In mid-June, 48 UAR Air Force personnel arrived in Lagos to relieve Egyptians already there and to man additional aircraft.)

4
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FORM DS-1254
3-61

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DEF 19-6 USSR-Nigeria
RE DEF 19-6 UAR-Nigeria
RE DEF 27 Republic-Nigeria

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Authority VND959503
By MNA Date 10/5/05



POL 17 ETH-US
TRPOL 27 BIAFPA-NIGERIA
Department of State **TELEGRAM**

CONFIDENTIAL 768

PAGE 01 ADDIS 05093 091614Z

4.
ACTION AF 15

INFO CIAE 00, DODE 00, GPM 04, H 02, INR 07, LI 03, NSC 10, P 04, RSC 01, SP 02,

SS 20, USIA 12, NSA 02, AID 28, EUR 15, IO 13, SA 01, RSR 01, 140 W

R 091540Z AUG 68
FM AMEMBASSY ADDIS ABABA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 6528

C O N F I D E N T I A L ADDIS ABABA 5093

AMBASSADOR-DESIGNATE TO US MINASSIE HAILE, WHO WITH FONMIN KETEMA IS HIM'S PRINCIPAL ADVISER IN NIGERIAN NEGOTIATIONS, TOLD ME AT LUNCH YESTERDAY HIM EXTREMELY GRATEFUL FOR PUBLIC AND PRIVATE SUPPORT HE HAS RECEIVED FROM PRESIDENT AND SECRETARY. MINASSIE SAID HIM IN PRIVATE CONVERSATION HAS CONTRASTED THIS WITH FRENCH ACTION AND LACK SUPPORT HIS OAU COLLEAGUES.

HALL

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0506

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Authority: VMD 950503
By: MVA Date: 10/5/05



Pol 27 Biafra - Nigeria
Department of State **TELEGRAM**

CONFIDENTIAL 636

PAGE 01 LUSAKA 02379 091514Z

46

ACTION AF 15

INFO EUR 15, SR 01, ORM 03, IO 13, AID 28, NSA 02, CIAE 00, DODE 00, GPM 04,

H 02, INR 07, L 03, NSC 10, P 04, RSC 01, SP 02, SS 20, USIA 12, SA 01,

RSR 01, SCS 04, SCA 02, 150 W

R 090944Z AUG 68
FM AMEMBASSY LUSAKA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 3052
INFO AMEMBASSY LAGOS
AMEMBASSY LONDON

C O N F I D E N T I A L LUSAKA 2379

SUBJECT: NIGERIAN POLICY

1. DURING LONG CONVERSATION YESTERDAY WITH PRES KAUNDA'S SPECIAL ASSISTANT FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS, MARK CHONA, HE RAISED AFTER LONG LAPSE QUESTION OF NIGERIAN POLICY. ZAMBIAN VIEW, IF ANYTHING HELD WITH GREATER ARDOR THAN EVER, IS THAT IBO FEAR OF FEDERAL GOVERNMENT PRECLUDES POSSIBILITY OF REUNIFYING COUNTRY WITHIN ANY MEANINGFUL FRAMEWORK, THAT OJUKWU CANNOT CONCEIVABLY AGREE TO RELIEF OPERATION STAGED THROUGH ENEMY TERRITORY, THAT THERE IS EVIDENCE (UNSPECIFIED) OF FOOD HAVING BEEN POISONED, THAT BRITISH ARE HOPELESSLY HYPOCRITICAL SENDING FOOD TO FATTEN BIAFRANS BEFORE THEY ARE KILLED WITH BRITISH WEAPONS, AND THAT TIME HAS COME FOR US TO BREAK WITH BRITISH AND USE EVERY INFLUENCE FORCE GOWON TO RECOGNIZE BIAFRAN REALITY.

① 2. I RESPONDED SITUATION DEMANDED NO LESS THAN MUTUAL PRESSURES AS OJUKWU SEEMED EVEN FARTHER REMOVED FROM REALITY THAN GOWON. GIVEN FACT NIGERIANS APPEARED TO HAVE ON HAND MILITARY CAPABILITY FINISH OFF BIAFRA AND FACT THAT SYMPATHETIC COUNTRIES FACE INSURMOUNTABLE LOGISTICAL PROBLEMS FEEDING BIAFRANS VIA AIRLIFT. I THEN NOTED I WAS NOT ENTIRELY UP TO DATE AND WOULD ADVISE DEPT OF OUR CONVERSATION ASKING FOR URGENT ASSESSMENT AND POLICY POSITION. CHONA ASKED ME TO CALL HIM THE MOMENT THIS WAS RECEIVED.

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Authority: VND959503
By: MNARA Date: 10/5/05



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TELEGRAM

28

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PAGE 02 LUSAKA 02379 091514Z

3. I HAVE LITTLE HOPE WE CAN GET ZAMBIANS TO CHANGE THEIR VIEWS AND EVEN LESS THEIR ACTIONS, BUT BELIEVE IT USEFUL CONTINUE THIS DIALOGUE. PLEASE ADVISE. INCLUDE ASSESSMENT FOOD POISONING THEME AND DETAILS CONCERNING LOGISTICAL PROBLEMS INVOLVED IN DELIVERING RELIEF SUPPLIES.

GP-3
GOOD

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0508

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By	MV NARA Date 10/5/03

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EUR-L				Original to be Filed in _____ Decentralized Files.		Pol 23-8 Can			
RS/R	REP	AF	ARA	UNCLASSIFIED		XR Pol 24 Biafran Nigeria A-247			
EUR	FE	NEA	CU	HANDLING INDICATOR		RECEIVED SEC 10 Biafran			
5	4	2	3	TO : Department of State					
5	4	2	3	INFO : OTTAWA, LAGOS		Aug 15 10 35 AM '68			
3	12	1	1	FROM : Amconsul MONTREAL		DATE: August 9, 1968			
3	1	2	1	SUBJECT : Biafrans Demonstrate in Montreal					
3	1	2	1	REF :					
3	1	2	1	<p>On August 8 about one hundred people, according to press reports here, participated in a demonstration protesting the indifference of Western powers towards the besieged population of Biafra and the inadequacy of Canadian efforts to provide assistance. Organized by the Canadian Association of Biafrans, the demonstrators marched about six blocks in downtown Montreal to be addressed in Dominion Square by Sylvester OKEREKI, who had just arrived from Biafra, and Rex ARAH, a Biafran student at the University of Brussels passing through Montreal. The two Biafrans denounced British, Soviet, and Egyptian support of the Nigerian government and deplored the latter's attitude in depriving the starving Ibos of relief supplies. They urged Canadians to pressure their government to undertake a unilateral effort of direct aid to the Biafrans and to put pressure on the British government to discontinue its arms support of the Nigerian government.</p> <p>Following the talks by the two Biafrans, the demonstrators delivered a letter of protest at the office of the British Trade Commissioner in Montreal. The latter has told us that there were in fact two letters, delivered at his ninth-story office downtown by four representatives of the demonstrators. One letter was from the "Biafran Association of Canada, Montreal Chapter" and the other from a Canadian committee to aid victims of the struggle there. Advance arrangements for presentation of the letters were made by telephone from individuals at McGill University.</p>					
3	1	2	1						
3	1	2	1						
3	1	2	1						
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Date:									
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Drafted by:				Drafting Date:		Phone No.:		Contents and Classification Approved by:	
MDSmith:RHHawkins:fs									
Clearances:									

0509

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Authority: VNP 959503
By: MVA Date: 10/5/05

ACTION			DEPARTMENT OF STATE			POL FR - USSR		
EUR-6			AIRGRAM			XR POL 27 BIAFRA-NIGER		
RM/R	REP	AF	A-2525			CONFIDENTIAL		
1			NO.			FOR RM USE ONLY		
ARA	EUR	FE				XR POL 15-1 USSR		
NEA	CU	INR				HANDLING INDICATOR		
E	P	IO	TO : DEPARTMENT OF STATE			RECEIVED		
L	FBO	AID	INFO : MOSCOW			AUG 12 8 26 AM 1968		
S/S	S/P	G/M	FROM : Amembassy PARIS			DATE: August 9, 1968		
10	1	1	SUBJECT : Remarks by Quai Official on Franco-Soviet Matters					
ACR	COM	FRB	REF :					
INT	LAB	TAR						
TR	AMB	AIR						
ARMY	CIA	NAVY						
3	20	5						
OSD	USIA	NSA						
34	10	3						
		NSC						

During a luncheon conversation with the reporting officer on August 7, the Deputy Director for Soviet-East European Affairs, Jacques Andréani (please protect) made the following comments of interest, some of them personal:

He said the French Embassy in Moscow had reported today that so far the Soviet press had not attacked the French for the stand they had taken on Biafra, but from the way Andréani discussed the differences between France and the USSR on Biafra he obviously would not be surprised to see the Soviets make a public attack.

Discussing the differences among the Soviet leaders about Czechoslovakia, Andréani said he thought the press had overplayed this aspect. In this connection, he mentioned that the French were aware that Brezhnev had never had any good word to say publicly about France. Askey why, he said he could only suppose that Brezhnev still thought in classical terms of the class struggle, just as did Soviet Ambassador Zorin. He said he could say little about Brezhnev personally because the French knew little, having had extremely little contact. De Gaulle had met with him, of course, and had been poorly impressed; but otherwise there had been little contact.

Speaking of Zorin, Andréani said there was no reason to think he had changed his old habits of thought. He said the French had reason to believe that Zorin and his staff were in considerable disagreement during the French crisis of May and June, and the French assumed that Zorin had sent inaccurate assessments to Moscow (that is, about the balance of forces against De Gaulle), and that therefore he had not helped his position in Moscow by this performance. During the crisis,

FORM 4-62 DS-323

GROUP 3
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Drafted by: POL:JPerry:ias:8/8/68

Contents and Classification Approved by: POL:RFunkhouser

Clearances:

0510

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Authority: VND 959503
By: MVA Date: 10/5/05

CONFIDENTIAL

Paris A- 2525

2

he said, Zorin talked in terms of the demands of the workers that had to be met by the government; Andréani had spoken to Zorin at the Soviet Embassy reception on May 30, just after the turning-point speech by General de Gaulle, and Zorin had said the workers' demands still had to be met, that the speech did not solve the problem, etc. The reporting officer mentioned having heard the same line that night from First Secretary Bogomolov, who had changed his tune completely by lunch time next day. Andréani said he did not think Bogomolov was always reliable. He had better words to say about Dubynin, former Counselor now returned to Moscow, who he said probably judged the situation better during May; and Oberemko, present Minister-Counselor. Commenting on the inaccuracy of Soviet diplomatic reporting to Moscow during the Stalin period, and even now if one judged by the Czechoslovak misjudgments made by Moscow, Andréani observed that he would love to know what the Soviet Embassy sent in from Paris.

SHRIVER

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0511

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By	MM NARA Date 10/5/05



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TELEGRAM

Pol 27 Biafra-Nigeria 1

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ACTION COPY

RR RUEHC
DE RUQMVL 4841 2220820
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
R 090800Z AUG 68
FM AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 4409
STATE GRNC
BT
SECRET TEL AVIV 4841

024580

AUGUST 9, 1968
6:25 A.M.

~~NODIS~~

1. AUG 8 ASST DIR GEN FONMIN BITAN TOLD ME THAT ISRAELI EMBASSY WASHINGTON HAD ABOUT A WEEK AGO PASSED TO DEPT MESSAGE FROM HOUPHET-BOIGNY OF IVORY COAST SAYING HE DESIRED DIALOGUE WITH US ON BIAFRA QUESTION, WHICH HE SAW AS WEDGE BEING DRIVEN BY SOVS BETWEEN US AND AFRICANS. IN VIEW ISRAELI CONCURRENCE WITH HOUPHET'S VIEWS, ISRAEL HAD DECIDED TO SUPPORT HIS IDEA IN WASHINGTON. AS RESULT, BITAN SAID, LETTER HAD GONE FROM PRESIDENT JOHNSON TO HOUPHET. BITAN EXPRESSED SOME SURPRISE WLQN I HAD TO SAY I WAS UNINFORMED ON MATTER.

2. WOULD APPRECIATE BEING KEPT INFORMED AS MUCH AS POSSIBLE ON SUCH MATTERS, EVEN WHEN PRIMARILY CONCERNED WITH OTHER AREAS, AS THEY FORM PART OF TOTAL PATTERN OF ISRAEL GOVT OPERATIONS AND ATTITUDES.

GP-1. BARBOUR
BT

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Cat. A	Copy removed: transferred to O/FADRC
Cat. B	Transferred to O/FADRC with additional access controlled by S/S
Cat. C	Copy and custody retained by S/S
Reviewed by: Ambassador W. Witman, II	
Date: 3/1/75	

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12 AUG 68 23 00

Origin

ACTION: Amembassy ABIDJAN

Info:

NODIS

CODE ROOM: Please repeat Tel Aviv's 4841, August 9, 1968 to

Abidjan.

~~NODIS~~

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AUGUST 9:

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Date: 3/12/75

RUSK.

Drafted by: *WJ*
AF/AFW:WESchaufele:lsr 8/12/68

Tel. Ext.
3203

Telegraphic transmission and
classification approved by:

S/S - John P. Walsh

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8-65 *WJ*

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Department of State TELEGRAM

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POL 7 ISR

OO RUENC
DE RUEHCR 6036 3170905
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
O 120837Z NOV 68
FM AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 4985
STATE GRNC
BT
① SECRET TEL AVIV 6036

3033Q
November 12, 1968
4:18 A.M.

ACTION COPY

~~NO DIS~~

DELIVER OPENING OF BUSINESS

REF: STATE 269999 - DEF 18-6
RR POL 7 ISR

1. NEWSPAPERS THIS MORNING REPORT ESHKOL HAS POSTPONED
OFFICIAL VISIT TO SOUTH AMERICA BUT NEVERTHELESS INTENDS
MAKE BRIEF VISIT TO US IN DECEMBER TO MEET PRESIDENT
AND ALSO HOLD TALKS WITH PRESIDENT-ELECT.

2. BEFORE DELIVERING LETTER CONTAINED REFTEL, I THOUGHT
IT BEST TO CHECK WITH DEPARTMENT WHETHER FIRST SENTENCE
OF PRESIDENT'S LETTER WELCOMING ESHKOL'S VISIT WAS
WRITTEN WITH KNOWLEDGE THAT HIS VISIT WOULD BE TO
WASHINGTON ONLY AND NOT EN ROUTE TO SOUTH AMERICA. IF NOT,
WOULD THIS CHANGE ATTITUDE TOWARDS HIS VISIT?

GP-3. BARBOUR

NODS R-VIEW	
Cat. A - Information removed;	
information sent to C/FADRC	
and information sent to C/FADRC	
with additional access	
controlled by S/S	
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Reviewed by: Ambassador W. Wilman, II	
Date: 11/12/68	

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By	MVA
Date	10/5/05

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8 Aug 68 19 30z
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Origin ACTION: Amembassy LONDON IMMEDIATE

Info: INFO: Amembassy LAGOS

STATE

LIMDIS

REF: State 216985; Lagos 11469^{NC}

1. State reftel being repeated London.
2. Embassy should at high level consult appropriate HMG officials, inform ^{urge} them of USG actions reported State reftel and ~~make demarche~~ UK ~~make~~ make parallel demarche on urgent basis.

END

RUSK

2
MICROFILMED BY 10/1

Drafted by: AF/AFW:RPSmith:ncs:8/8/68
Tel. Ext. 6402
Telegraphic transmission and classification approved by: AF - Joseph Palmer 2nd
Clearance: EUE/BMI - M. Seasword (subs)

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FORM DS-322
8-65

0517

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By: MN/ARA Date: 10/5/03

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POL *to CST - US*
 XR POL 7 *to CST*
 Department of State **TELEGRAM**
 XR
 POL 27 BIAFRA-NIGERIA

CONFIDENTIAL 103

PAGE 01 ABIOJA 03987 081832Z

51

ACTION: SS 70

INFO: CIAE 00,SSO 00, /070 W

R 081715Z AUG 68
 FM AMEMBASSY ABIOJAN
 TO SECSTATE WASHDC 2802

C O N F I D E N T I A L ABIOJAN 3987

LIMDIS

REF: STATE 212058, ABIOJAN 3505

1. MEMCONS OF USHER VISIT NOT RPT NOT RECEIVED.

2. WITHOUT REFERRING TO WASHINGTON: DEMARCHE, ISRAELI AMB MINERBI GAVE ME SIMILAR ACCOUNT OF HOUPHOUET'S VIEWS, WHICH ALSO SIMILAR MY TALK WITH HOUPHOUET JUNE 21. ADDED THAT HOUPHOUET NOW FAVORING FINANCIAL AND MILITARY AID TO BIAFRA, THOUGH DID NOT INDICATE GOIC PREPARED PARTICIPATE.

3. RE COMMUNIST/ARAB SUBVERSION, MINERBI SAID HOUPHOUET INCREASINGLY DISTURBED BY POSSIBILITY OF TROUBLE WITH MUSLIMS IN IVORY COAST, LINKING THIS TO RUMORS THAT ALGERIANS HAVE BEEN CRITICIZING HIS REGIME IN TALKS WITH MUSLIMS HERE.

4. COMMENT: WE HAVE NO RPT NO OTHER INDICATION OF MUSLIM-RELATED TROUBLE HERE, BUT ISRAELI SYMPATHY WITH HOUPHOUET'S STAND ON BIAFRA, AS WELL AS WITH HIS COMMUNIST/ARAB RATIONALE, WAS FULLY EVIDENT. MINERBI IMPRESSED ON ME REPEATEDLY THE IMPORTANCE OF CHANGING U.S. NIGERIA POLICY IN ORDER NOT DAMAGE OUR RELATIONS WITH HOUPHOUET. I DO NOT RPT NOT BELIEVE OUR RELATIONS IN GENERAL ARE IN SERIOUS DANGER, BUT RATHER THAT BOTH HOUPHOUET AND ISRAELIS ARE USING THIS THEME TO INFLUENCE OUR NIGERIA POLICY. HOUPHOUET IS OF COURSE VERY UNHAPPY THAT WE DO NOT BACK HIM ON BIAFRA, BUT HE HAS BEEN UNHAPPY WITH US BEFORE, E.G., OVER TSWOMBE AND OVER GUINEA. EACH OF THESE SHARP DIFFERENCES, OF COURSE, MAKES HIM THINK SOMEWHAT LESS HIGHLY OF US, AND VICE VERSA, BUT HE IS MUCH TOO SENSIBLE AND WELL-BALANCED TO LET THEM PERMANENTLY IMPAIR THE POSITIVE ASPECTS OF OUR RELATIONS.

(3) GP-3. MORGAN.

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Abiojan 3987
8-8-68

0518

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 Authority: VND 959503
 By: MN NARA Date: 10/5/05



POL 27 BIAFRA-NIGERIA
Department of State **TELEGRAM**

SECRET 591

PAGE 01 LAGOS 11504 081210Z

50
ACTION SS 70

INFO CIAE 00,SSO 00, /070 W

P 081145Z AUG 68
FM AMEMBASSY LAGOS
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 1901

SECRET LAGOS 11504

LIMDIS

REF STATE 216985

1. I SHALL CARRY OUT INSTRUCTIONS REFTEL FIRST OPPORTUNITY. ARIKPO IS, HOWEVER, IN NO DOUBT AS TO USG OPPOSITION TO FMG INVASION REMAINING REBEL TERRITORY (SEE LAGOS 11302). AS I TRIED INDICATE BY PHRASE QTE AGAINST FERVENT HOPES USG UNQTE DISCUSSION REPORTED PARAGRAPH 7 REFTEL WAS IN CONTEXT DECLARED USG POSITION ON MILITARY SOLUTION.

2. I AM SURE DEPARTMENT APPRECIATES THAT UNLESS MIRACLE OCCURS AT ADDIS, FMG SEES NO ALTERNATIVE TO INVASION REMAINING REBEL TERRITORY TO PRESERVE NIGERIAN UNITY. IT WILL NOT BE DISSUADED FROM INVASION BY FOREIGN EXHORTATIONS OR CONCERN AT FOREIGN REACTION, PARTICULARLY AS IT IS FEAR OF FOREIGN INTERVENTION THAT IMPELS FMG TO MILITARY SOLUTION. WHILE MAINTAINING OUR OPPOSITION TO MILITARY SOLUTION, I BELIEVE WE MUST AS PRACTICAL MATTER ALSO UNDERTAKE TO MITIGATE WORST ASPECTS OF FMG INVASION REMAINING REBEL TERRITORY IF IT COMES.
GP-3 MATHEWS

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S/PM 1
M/WP 1
G/PM 1

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ARA9 1
EA11 1
EUR9 1
NEA7 1

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H 1
IGA 1
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OC 1
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SCA 1
SCS 1
SCI 1

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AA/EA3 1
AA/NESA2 1

PC 1

VP 1

AEC3 1
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(11)



Department of State

POL 27 BIAFRA-NIGERIA

TELEGRAM

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PAGE 01 NIAMEY 02352 081040Z

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ACTION AF 15

INFO EUR 15, IO 13, NSA 02, CIAE 00, DODE 00, GPM 04, H 02, INR 07, L 03,

NSC 10, P 04, RSC 01, SP 02, SS 20, USIA 12, SAH 02, RSR 01, SA 01, /114 W

R 081450Z AUG 68
FM AMEMBASSY NIAMEY
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 2143
INFO AMEMBASSY ACCRA
AMEMBASSY ADDIS ABABA
AMEMBASSY KINSHASA
AMEMBASSY LISBON
AMEMBASSY LAGOS
AMEMBASSY LONDON
AMEMBASSY MONROVIA
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
AMEMBASSY PARIS
AMEMBASSY YAOUNDE
USMISSION GENEVA

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REF: LAGOS 11387 - POL 27 BIAFRA-NIGERIA

SUBJ: BIAFRAN ATTACK ON US, BRITAIN, USSR

1. RE PARA 3 REFTTEL, DURING NIAMEY TALKS I HAD NO CONTACTS WHATSOEVER WITH ANY OF THE PARTICIPANTS IN THE TALKS EXCEPT PRESIDENT DIORI. I DID SEE THE NIGERIAN CHARGE AT THE AIRPORT DURING SEVERAL COMINGS AND GOINGS BUT AS I REPORTED NOTHING OF SUBSTANCE RESULTED FROM ANY OF MY CONVERSATIONS WITH HIM.

2. INDEED, WE WERE SO CIRCUMSPECT IN NOT RPT NOT APPROACHING DELS DURING NIAMEY TALKS THAT WE HAD TO RELY HEAVILY ON PRESS CORRESPONDENTS FOR INFO ON TALKS.

RYAN

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Niamey
2352

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0521

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ACTION				AIRGRAM		SOC 10 NIGERIA	
RS/R	REF	AF	ARA	Original to be Filed in _____ Decentralized Files.		FILE DESIGNATION	
1		5		8 PWS ENCL(3) REPTED IN PBR 8-9-68		A-2130	
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5				HANDLING INDICATOR		NO.	
INR	E	P	IO	TO : Department of State			
5	4	2	X	INFO: American Embassy Addis Ababa			
L	FBO	AID		American Embassy Lagos			
		12		American Embassy London			
				US Mission Geneva			
AGR	COM	FRB	INT	FROM : USUN		DATE: August 8, 1968	
10				SUBJECT : Biafra			
LAB	TAR	TR	XMB	REF : USUN 6150			
AIR	ARMY	NAVY	OSD				
USIA	NSA	CIA	HEW				
10	3	20	7	USUN believes INFO Addressees would be interested in three UNICEF background papers attached:			
SUGGESTED DISTRIBUTION				(a) Letter, EXD-2327 from Heyward (UNICEF) to Ambassador Finger;			
				(b) Nigerian Relief Analysis;			
				(c) Nigeria - Food Requirements.			
POST ROUTING				BALL			
TO: Action Info. Initials							
AMB							
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DCM							
POL							
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Date:				LIMITED OFFICIAL USE			
Initials:				For Department Use Only			
Drafted by: DSquire: jr				In <input type="checkbox"/> Out <input type="checkbox"/>			
Drafting Date: 8/8/68				Contents and Classification Approved by:			
Clearances: WEE							
ECOSOC							

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Authority: VNP 959503
By: MVA Date: 10/5/05

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POL 27 BIAFRA-NIGERIA
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OUTGOING TELEGRAM Department of State

INDICATE: ☐ COLLECT
☐ CHARGE TO

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Origin
Info:

ACTION: Amembassy LAGOS IMMEDIATE

STATE

REF: Lagos 11469 ✓

LIMDIS

1. Department appreciates strong effort you made with Arikpo. Re para 7 reftel, however, you should make clear that effect FMG invasion remaining rebel territory, even if Addis talks fail, would likely produce severe public reaction in US and possibly far-reaching consequences we are not now in position to predict. USG continues support peaceful, negotiated settlement and cannot be in position of condoning or appearing condone military solution. You should take earliest opportunity to stress following passage in Secretary's statement of July 30: "We hope that both sides will show the utmost restraint in their military operations so that the peacemakers will have a full opportunity to find a basis for agreement in this tragic fratricidal strife."

MODIFIED BY 5012

END

RUSK

Drafted by: *AFW*
AF/AFW:RPSmith/M:EGrey:jd

Tel. Ext.
6402

Telegraphic transmission and
classification approved by:

EVR
M - Eugene V. Rostow

Cleances:

SS
S/S - Mr. Houdek

AF - Mr. Palmer

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FORM DS-322
8-65

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By: MNARA Date: 10/5/05



POL 23-8 NIGERIA
Department of State **TELEGRAM**

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X POL 27 BIAFRA-NIGERIA

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PAGE 01 KADUNA 01250 071622Z

45
ACTION AF 15

INFO EUR 15, SCS 04, SCA 02, CU 04, CIAE 00, DODE 00, GPM 04, H 02, INR 07,

L 03, NSAE 00, NSC 10, P 04, RSC 01, SP 02, SS 20, USIA 12, SIL 01,

LAB 06, E 15, COM 08, AID 28, IGA 02, SR 01, IO 13, ACDA 16, RSR 01,

OPR 02, O 02, SY 03, OC 06, CCO 00, /209 W

R 071515Z AUG 68 ZFF RUFNCR RUFHRD
FM AMCONSUL KADUNA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 839
INFO AMEMBASSY LAGOS
AMEMBASSY LONDON
AMEMBASSY PARIS
AMEMBASSY ROME
AMCONSUL IBADAN

C O N F I D E N T I A L KADUNA 1250

SUBJECT: ANTI-CATHOLIC-FRENCH DEMONSTRATIONS IN JOS

1. ANTI-CATHOLIC AND ANTI-FRENCH DEMONSTRATIONS TOOK PLACE IN JOS AUGUST 6 AND 7. ACCORDING W.G. CROUCH (AMCIT) DIRECTOR SUDAN INTERIOR MISSION (SIM) JOS 400 PERSONS DEMONSTRATED AUGUST 6 IN MARKET AREA CARRYING BOTH ANTI-FRENCH AND ANTI-PAPAL PLACARDS. AUGUST 7 NEW NIGERIAN, WHICH REPORTED NUMBER DEMONSTRATIONS AT 900, SAID THEY WERE WORKERS AND YOUNG PEOPLE. DEMONSTRATION WAS PEACEFUL. CROUCH SAYS THAT MUCH LARGER DEMONSTRATION BEGAN MID-MORNING AUGUST 7 AND STILL GOING ON AS OF NOON. TODAY'S DEMONSTRATION APPEARS HAVE LOST ANTI-FRENCH TONE AND IS COMPLETELY ANTI-CATHOLIC. ONE SIGN READ "WHITE CATHOLIC PRIESTS MUST GO." FRENCH-OWNED SCOA TRADING COMPANY CLOSED DOWN AUGUST 6 AND IS NOW PROTECTED BY SQUAD OF POLICE.

2. AUGUST 7 NEW NIGERIAN REPORTS THAT DURING YESTERDAY'S DEMONSTRATIONS DR. ALEXANDER FOM, PHYSICIAN, AND PRESIDENT NEWLY-FORMED BENUE-PLATEAU STATE YOUTH COUNCIL, PRESENTED NOTE TO BENUE-PLATEAU MILGOV GOMWALK CALLING ON FMG TO

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PAGE(S) MISSING IN ORIGINAL

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Department of State **TELEGRAM**

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PAGE 01 LAGOS 11478 072035Z

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ACTION AF 15

INFO EUR 15, IO 13, AID 28, SR 01, ORM 03, SCS 04, SCA 02, RSR 01, CIAE 00,

GPM 04, H 02, INR 07, L 03, NSAE 00, NSC 10, P 04, RSC 01, SP 02, SS 20,

USIA 12, E 15, DOT 10, /172 W

R 071705Z AUG 68
FM AMEMBASSY LAGOS
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 1888
INFO AMEMBASSY ADDIS ABABA
AMEMBASSY LONDON
AMEMBASSY PARIS
USMISSION GENEVA
USMISSION USUN
CINCSRIKE/CINCMCAFSA
DIA
AMCONSUL IBADAN
AMCONSUL KADUNA

Pol 27 Biafra Nigeria

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SUBJECT: NIGERIAN RELIEF: BIAFRAN PROPAGANDA

REF: STATE 215247

1. EMBASSY NOTES FROM PRESS SUMMARY IN REFTEL TAHT GARRISON
OF NYTIMES CLAIMS LINDT HAS PRODUCED FORMULA, APPROVED BY
OUUKWU, WHICH WILL PERMIT RELIEF SUPPLIES REACH REBELS.

2. RANISON FURTHER CLAIMS IT WAS BIAFRANS WHO "PROPOSED
RELIEF BE FLOWN BY RED CROSS TO ENUGU WHZRE IT WOULD BE
INSPECTED BY NEUTRAL BODY AT AIRFIELD AND THEN TRUCKED
DOWN DEMILITARIZED CORRIDOR." SAYS NIGERIANS REJECTED THIS
AS WELL AS FOLLOW-UP PROPOSAL PLANES FLY FROM ENUGU TO
DEMILITARIZED AIRPORT IN BIAFRA SET ASIDE FOR SOLE USE RED
CROSS.

3. COMMENT: IN FACT, FMG HAVE BEEN PUBLICLY ON RECORD

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
PAGE 02 LAGOS 11478 072035Z

SINCE MAY 25 AS WILLING ASSIST AIRLIFT TO ENUGU AND THEN LET
RED CROSS MOVE SUPPLIES BY LAND ROUTE. FMG FOLLOWED THIS UP
BY DESIGNATING SPECIFIC ROAD (AWGU TO OKIWI) SHORTLY
BEFORE NIAMEY CONFERENCE. EMBASSY CONTINUES BELIEVE
STRONGLY THIS ONLY FEASIBLE WAY MOVE SUFFICIENT SUPPLIES. THAT
FMG OFFER IS REASONABLE IN POLITICAL TERMS. THAT FEARS OF
"POISONING" BASELESS, AND THAT OJUKWU BEARS HEAVY RESPONS-
IBILITY FOR MANEUVERING ON THIS ISSUE FOR OVER TWO MONTHS WHILE
HIS PEOPLE UNNECESSARILY SUFFERING.

4. WE ALSO CONTINUE BELIEVE CAUSE OF THOSE SUFFERING BEST
BE ADVANCED IF ICRC COULD AGAIN SET RECORD STRAIGHT AS THEY
DID FOLLOWING OUR LAST SUGGESTION THIS BE DONE (LAGOS 10052).
DECON ONE YEAR.
MATHEWS

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POL 27 BIAFRA-NIGERIA

Department of State

TELEGRAM

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PAGE 01 LAGOS 11476 071756Z

47
ACTION: AFI 15

INFO: EUR 15, IO 13, SSO 00, NSCE 00, USIE 00, CCO 00, CIAE 00, GPM 04, H 02,
INR 07, LI 03, NSAE 00, NSC 10, PI 04, RSC 01, SP 02, SS 20, AID 28, SRI 01,
ORM 03, SCA 02, SCS 04, RSRI 01, 135 W

O R 071635Z AUG 68 ZFF 4
FM AMEMBASSY LAGOS
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1886
INFO AMEMBASSY ACCRA
AMEMBASSY ADDIS ABABA
AMEMBASSY KINSHASA
AMEMBASSY LONDON
AMEMBASSY MONROVIA
AMEMBASSY NIAMEY
AMEMBASSY PARIS
AMEMBASSY YOAUNDE
USMISSION GENEVA
CINCS TRIKE/CINCEAFSA
DIA
AMCONSUL IBADAN
AMCONSUL KADUNA

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SUBJECT: RIFT BETWEEN NIGERIAN RED CROSS AND ICRC DENIED


1. AUGUST 7 REUTERS FILE REPORTED NIGERIAN RED CROSS NATIONAL SECRETARY TIMOTHY UDONDEKI HAD CHARGED ICRC WITH INEFFICIENCY, LAXNESS AND IMPROPER MAKEUP AND LOCATION OF TEAMS IN THE FIELD.

2. NIGERIAN RED CROSS PRESIDENT, CHIEF JUSTICE ADEMOLA, PROMPTLY CALLED PRESS CONFERENCE TO DENY THAT THERE WAS ANY DISAGREEMENT BETWEEN NIGERIAN RED CROSS AND ICRC. UDONDEKI WAS PRESENT AND DENIED STATEMENTS ATTRIBUTED TO HIM.

3. ICRC AT SAME PRESS CONFERENCE CONFIRMED SOME TEAMS

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Department of State **TELEGRAM**

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PAGE 02 LAGOS 11476 071756Z

WITHDRAW FROM CERTAIN AREAS OSTENSIBLY UNDER FMG CONTROL BUT ONLY FOR SAFETY REASONS. ICRC POINTED OUT TWO TEAM MEMBERS KILLED RECENTLY NEAR AWGU BY LANDMINE.

4. ICRC NOTED RELIEF ACTIVITY BEING HEAVILY EXPANDED IN SAFE AREAS AND ANNOUNCED AIR SHUTTLE ESTABLISHED BETWEEN LAGOS AND ENUGU TO CARRY UP TO 27 TONS RELIEF SUPPLIES DAILY. SIMILAR LIFT TO CALABAR SCHEDULED START BY END OF WEEK.

5. OTHER POINTS MADE BY ICRC WILL HAVE FOUR AIR TRANSPORTS ON CHARTER SOON AND WILL BUILD UP LARGE STOCKPILES ENUGU AND CALABAR BY END AUGUST. AT THAT TIME SIXTEEN TEAMS WILL BE OPERATING IN NIGERIA AND DOUBLE THAT NUMBER BY END SEPTEMBER. 3,000 TONS SUPPLIES IN FERNANDO PO AWAITING CHARTER OF SUITABLE VESSEL.

6. ICRC ADMITTED SOME PROBLEMS BOTH IN LAGOS AND IN THE FIELD BUT NOTED THIS FIRST TIME ICRC HAS OPERATED ON SUCH A SCALE.

7. ADEMOLA NOTED HE IS ATTEMPTING PERSUADE FMG TO PERMIT DAYLIGHT FLIGHTS TO EAST-CENTRAL STATE FROM FERNANDO PO.

8. COMMENT: UDONDEK, A NOTABLY INEPT PERFORMER, MAY WELL HAVE EXAGGERATED STATEMENTS ATTRIBUTED TO HIM. HIS SUBSEQUENT DENIAL UNDOUBTEDLY RESULT OF PRESSURE BY ADEMOLA WHO WOULD UNDERSTAND DAMAGE THIS COULD DO TO IMAGE RELIEF EFFORT WHICH ALREADY BEING CRITICIZED OVERSEAS.

DECON 9/7/68. MATHEWS

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By	MV NARA Date 10/5/03

ORIGIN ACTION

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

AIRGRAM

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AGR	COM	FRB
INT	LAB	TAR
TR	XMB	AIR
ARMY	CIA	NAVY
OSD	USIA	NSA
	NSC	HEW

A-111
NO.

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AR Pol 27-9 Biafra
HANDLING INDICATOR
AR Pol 18 Nigeria

TO : Department of State

INFO : KADUNA, LAGOS

FROM : Amconsul IBADAN

DATE: August 7, 1968

SUBJECT: WESTERN NIGERIA: Assemblies of God Missionary Again
Visits Enugu.

REF : Ibadan's A-137; A-110

AR Pol 18 Nigeria
AR Pol 27 Biafra Nigeria

SUMMARY

On August 7, 1968, the reporting officer spoke to the Rev. Gerald L. Falley (Ancit) of the Assemblies of God Mission about his trip to Enugu last week. This airgram reports in topical form Falley's comments on road conditions, ICRC activities, conditions in Enugu, Assemblies of God Mission role in relief, and the future of the East.

The Trip: Falley in the company of the Rev. William Sikes of the Anglican All Saint's Church in Ibadan left for Enugu on July 29 in a Peugeot 404 "Citcar." They went to Ilorin and took the road east through Ajasse, Ossi, Kabba to the Lokoja ferry. It took them nine hours over a road which was mostly unpaved, hilly and washed out due to heavy rains. They arrived at the Lokoja ferry a little after two, but were too late to make arrangements to get on the last ferry for the day. They spent the night at the catering rest house. He found out that the ferry is currently making three trips a day: 6:30, 10:00, and 3:00 from the Lokoja side and then return. The trip takes 30 minutes to go east and 70 minutes (against current) to return. The ferry engine is not working, so a tug boat is used to move the ferry across the river. The one ferry now running usually carries four trucks and two cars, but when there are larger trucks, such as oil tankers, one car is carried.

He was told that there is still no ferry at Idah, but that parts had arrived and they hoped to fix the Idah ferry and have it back in operation shortly.

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FORM 4-62 DS-323

Dated by: WCMithoefer, Jr.:gor 8/7/68

Contents and Classification Approved by: CCStrong

Clearances:

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By: MN NARA Date: 10/5/05

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Both coming and going he estimated the line-up at 25 trucks on each side. Both times military convoys came and took priority over the lined up trucks, so he estimated the delay in crossing for civilian trucks as a minimum of three days. He saw only two Red Cross 1 1/2-ton lorries. These were carrying wounded from the front and came over on the first ferry load on July 30. He did not think that any of the private lorries carried Red Cross supplies as they were loaded with local cargo such as kola nuts which were in either sacks or locally made baskets; there were no trucks filled with cardboard cartons. When they arrived at Otukpa (on the Otukpa-Enugu road), they inquired if the road to Enugu was open and were answered in the affirmative. So, they did not bother to go to Makurdi to get a pass. They were waved through all roadblocks and were not asked for a pass until they got to Enugu itself. Then they told the guard that they were going to report in at headquarters and they were allowed to pass.

Conditions in Enugu: Falley said that the army was much more in evidence than on his previous visit. He estimated the total number of troops at about 3,000. He confirmed that First Division headquarters had moved to Enugu. He said that the Federal forces had constructed a series of trenches surrounding various key sites such as Ekulu Layout, the Presidential Hotel, the university campus, the Parliament and the barracks. However, the rest of the town is, as far as he could tell, wide open to infiltrators. He noted that the grass had not been cut and was now shoulder high. He still had the feeling that the Federal forces controlled the road junctions and a few of the larger cities, but that the people were not returning to areas under Federal control.

Conditions at Enugu Ngwo: On their way into Enugu, Falley and Sikes stopped at Enugu Ngwo to drop off their supplies of about a half a ton of salt and powdered milk to the Assemblies of God Church people. They are all Ibos and they reported that since his last trip several of their leaders were picked up by Federal forces and accused of being "Biafran" soldiers. They were severely beaten, but after a few days detention they were released. They said that the Federal forces did not start moving on the roads before 8 a.m. each morning, so they held daily prayer meetings at 5 a.m. They held their Sunday church meeting between 6 a.m. and 7:30. The Federal forces in the area were stationed at a school outside the village, so they were relatively free from being interfered with at night and until 8 a.m.

Availability of Food and Costs: Falley said that he had the impression that no one was starving in the Enugu area though they are short of protein foods. He saw signs that the farms were being cultivated and that crops would be harvested later this month. However, salt, milk and meat were difficult to obtain. There were no cattle coming down from the North. He saw some Hausa men with small tables selling goods to the army at nine-mile corner. They had salt, powdered milk and cigarettes. At the China-town market in Enugu there was salt for sale, but it cost £1:10 (\$1.20)

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for a five-pound bag, which is the same price he paid for 140 pounds in Ibadan. Abakaliki rice was for sale at £9 (\$25.20) a bag. He saw several Ibo men with one-third of a bag of rice who told him that they were taking it into the bush and that in three days trading they hoped to make five to ten shillings profit. However, all the people he spoke to told him that the real difficulty with trade was not only a shortage of goods, but an acute lack of money. There was very little paper money circulating and little change. There were practically no opportunities to earn additional money as there was no employment.

Relief Supplies: As far as Falley could tell, there were few relief supplies in Enugu. He saw trucks coming from the North, but they had Dawa (guinea corn) for the Northern troops. He went by the ICRC headquarters in Enugu and spoke to an American team that was there. It was composed of one doctor, one nurse and two CEM missionaries. They had only about eight to ten bags of salt and some powdered milk for distribution. They said that they went out for medical clinics each day and distributed what supplies they could. They told him that there was an American in Nsukka who had been much more successful in distributing supplies, as more people had returned to the villages in that area. They had recently had a visit from a Swiss Red Cross official from Lagos who told them that supplies had arrived by rail in Oturkpo. However, they did not have any transport to get them and they did not think that anything could be done about transporting or distributing supplies unless expatriates did it. One American missionary working with the Red Cross said that he had been with Mr. Birch of a British relief organization when he visited Ikot Ekpene; there were relief supplies at Oron, but the military refused to offer any assistance in transporting the goods. While he was in Enugu the bodies of the two British relief workers killed by a landmine outside Awgu were brought in for burial. Most of the Red Cross people were badly shaken by the experience. The British team at Awgu was considered to be doing a good job in an area where people were starving, yet they had to go into the bush in order to do their work effectively, thereby exposing themselves to ambush.

Looting Continues: Falley spent two nights in Enugu in his old house. He noted that several portable electric fans and children's books had been taken since his last visit. He also saw a number of soldiers taking things from the Barclays Bank manager's house which is located nearby. He noted that almost every patrol that came through the area carried off goods of one kind or another. He was able to take out some personal effects, an electric dishwasher and his damaged stereo set. All of his religious phonograph records were left behind, but all popular and classical records had been taken. His freezer, refrigerator, stove, washer and dryer were still in the house. He left them there in the belief that they were safer in the house than being left with the police.

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* Save the Children Fund.

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A Non-Commissioned Officer's Opinion: Falley picked up a non-commissioned officer who had been on 20 days leave when he came through Otukpa. The soldier said that he had been with the First Division, then the Second Division and finally had returned to the First Division. Almost all of his fighting experience had been in the Nsukka and Onitsha fronts. He said that the road had been cleared of rebel troops from Enugu to a point past Awka, but that the bottleneck which the FMG had been unable to clear was at Abagana. The Eastern forces had been able to maintain control of the crossroads at that point and were using it to infiltrate troops over to the Niger River to a point north of Onitsha from which they shell Asaba. He said that the Easterners were "masters at ambush." He reported that they would set a trap, leave a man in a tree to signal when to explode the trap and then catch convoys going down the road. The Federal forces would spray the surrounding area with gunfire, but the Easterners would be gone.

A Hausa Lieutenant: On the return trip Falley met a Hausa Lieutenant at Icheu who had a convoy of four trucks and a landrover on the Eastern side of the Niger. They spent the night waiting for the ferry the next morning so he got to know the officer fairly well. The lieutenant confided that he was going to Lagos to pick up "40" armored cars. He said that they were Saladins and he had the crews with him to take them to Awgu. This was in preparation for the final push into the Ibo heartland. The lieutenant said that he thought some pretty bloody fighting would take place before the war was brought to a close but estimated that organized resistance would be over in two and a half to three months. The next morning the lieutenant did not pay to use the ferry, but he did have a bottle of whiskey which he passed among the crew.

The Return Trip: Falley had to obtain a pass from the army to take his goods out of Enugu. He said that he was questioned quite closely by the officer before the pass was granted. The officer was very touchy on whether or not the goods belonged to Falley personally or were the property of the Assemblies of God Mission. The officer accused Falley of taking out mission property because the mission was closing up shop. The officer said that the army did not want anyone to close down their operations in Enugu. Falley used a different route when he returned to Ibadan. He came by way of Ikene and Ikare. The route was mostly paved (except between Ikene and Ibillo) and the journey only took him seven hours. He arrived back in Ibadan on August 2.

Assemblies of God Mission at Ogoja: Falley amended his previous report (Ibadan's A-137) on the reopening of the mission in Ogoja. He said that Miss Martha Jacobson and Miss Maude Florida (both AmCits) have returned to Ogoja. However, Miss Bach, who has just come out from the States, was denied a permit to go to the mission. He therefore thought that the Southeastern State government was permitting only former expatriate residents to return and not allowing new people to go into the area.

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Assemblies of God Mission Involvement in Relief Work: Falley said that the Nigerian superintendent of the Assemblies of God National Church, an Ibo, who is now located in Umuahia had written to the U.S. headquarters of the church. The superintendent said that they were not discouraged and that the people of the church in Umuahia were well. However, displaced persons were dying by the hundreds. The superintendent did not make a direct appeal for help, but some time ago "Radio Biafra" did broadcast an appeal in the name of the Assemblies of God national church (Nigerian) addressed to T.F. Zimmerman, the U.S. Superintendent. He said that Zimmerman had been in touch with the State Department to try to work out some program for getting assistance to the displaced persons behind the lines. Falley observed that the majority of their denomination lived in Nigeria in the area between Port Harcourt and Umuahia and his church felt very strongly that they should do all that they could to assist them. The Assemblies of God hoped to work through the National Association of Evangelical Churches, the ICRC and other instrumentalities. However, if nothing could be worked out to get food behind the rebel lines, then out of a sense of responsibility to their people, the mission would have to consider organizing flights from San Tomé or other alternatives. Falley said that Ralph Cimino (an Italian Assemblies of God missionary who used to be stationed at Umuahia) and Andrew Hargreaves (an American Assemblies of God missionary who used to be stationed at Aba) had been asked to head up the relief work of the mission. Both are temporarily stationed at Jos.

Overall Impressions and Prospects for the Future: Falley said that even if the opportunity arose he would not under the present circumstances return to Enugu. From the practical point of view, he felt that since his house was not located behind any of the trenches, it would be unwise to reoccupy it as infiltrators could come back to Enugu at any time they wished. From the psychological viewpoint he was convinced from his two trips to the East and from having lived in the area for a number of years, that the idea of "Biafra" would live on regardless of whether or not the "Biafrans" were militarily defeated and that as a result, there would be years of unrest in the area. He felt that the Ibos would follow Ojukwu to the end. If Ojukwu died, then another Ibo leader would take his place. However, he did not see the "Biafrans" ever giving up. He expected guerrilla warfare to continue for some time. He said that the Federal government may physically defeat the "Biafrans" but they will never control their minds or hearts. He thought that the fact that so few Ibos had drifted back to Enugu, which had been captured last October, or into Nsukka, which had been under Federal control for even a longer period of time, supported his view that the Ibos would not easily accept defeat. His impression was that the Ibos would rather stay in the bush and/or face starvation than accept "Northern" domination.

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By	MV NARA Date 10/5/05

Ibadan A-111

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Conclusion: Falley returns to the United States for a year's leave of absence at the end of August. While the Consulate has no way of checking the accuracy of the information contained in this report, it can be anticipated that the Rev. Falley may use his leave to share his impressions of the Nigerian crisis with others.

STRONG 

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POL 27 BIAFRA-NIGERIA
Department of State **TELEGRAM**

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ACTION: AFI 15

INFO: EUR 15, IO 13, SSO 00, CIAE 00, DODE 00, GPM 04, H 02, INR 07, LI 03,

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ORM 03, SAH 02, RSRI 01, 143 W

P R 071330Z AUG 68

FMI AMEMBASSY ADDIS ABABA

TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 6491

INFO AMEMBASSY ABIDJAN

AMEMBASSY ACCRA

USMISSION GENEVA

AMEMBASSY KINSHASA

AMEMBASSY LAGOS

AMEMBASSY LONDON

AMEMBASSY MONROVIA

AMEMBASSY NIAMEY

AMEMBASSY PARIS

USUN 326

AMEMBASSY YAOUNDE

C O N F I D E N T I A L ADDIS ABABA 5041

SUBJ: NIGERIAN PEACE TALKS

DECISION ANNOUNCED AFTERNOON TO HOLD CLOSED SESSION NIGERIA
PEACE TALKS IN AFRICA HALL AT 4 PM LOCAL TODAY.

GP-4. HALL

MICROFILMED BY 104

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0536

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Authority: VMD 950503
By: MM NARA Date: 10/5/03

(11)



Department of State

POL 27 BIAFRA-NIGERIA

TELEGRAM

XR POL 16 BIAFRA

XR POL 7 NIGER

47

SECRET 446

PAGE: 01 NIAMEY 02345 071901Z

44

ACTION: AFI 15

INFO: EUR 15, IO 13, CIAE 00, DODE 00, GPM 04, HI 02, INR 07, LI 03, NSAE 00,

NSC 10, PI 04, RSC 01, SPI 02, SS 20, USIA 12, AID 28, SR 01, ORM 03, SA 01,

CPR 02, RSRI 01, 144 W

PI 071600Z AUG 68

FMI AMEMBASSY NIAMEY

TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 2136

INFO AMEMBASSY ABIDJAN PRIORITY

AMEMBASSY ACCRA

AMEMBASSY ADDIS ABABA

AMEMBASSY GENEVA

AMZ BASSY KINSHASA 134

AMEMBASSY LAGOS

AMEMBASSY LIBREVILLE

AMEMBASSY LONDON

AMEMBASSY MONROVIA

AMEMBASSY PARIS

AMEMBASSY YAOUNDE

SATE GRNC

SECRET NIAMEY 2345

SUBJ: NIGERIA

1. IN MEETING WITH PRESIDENT DIORI AUGUST 7, I ASKED WHETHER CONSULTATIVE COMMITTEE CHIEFS OF STATE WOULD ATTEND ADDIS TALKS. DIORI REPLIED QTE: OUR PRESENCE THERE WILL NOT RPT NOT CHANGE THINGS UNQTE. HEI ADDED: PERHAPS ONLY GENERAL ANKRAH MAY ATTEND.


2. DIORI HIGHLY CRITICAL OF FRENCH SUPPORT BIAFRA. SAID RECOGNITION BIAFRA BY FOUR AFRICAN STATES PRIOR NIAMEY TALKS HAD COMPLICATED HIS TASK HERE. FRENCH SUPPORT BIAFRA CERTAINLY COMPLICATES HIM'S TASK IN ADDIS AND ADDS FUEL TO FIRE. HEI BELIEVES FRENCH SUPPORT HAS HARDENED BIAFRAN POSITION.

3. HEI OPINED ALLEGED RELIGIOUS ASPECT OF CONFLICT WAS MERE "PRETEXT" SINCE HE SAID MORE CHIRSTIANS IN FEDERATION THAN IN

SECRET

(3)

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Department of State **TELEGRAM**

SECRET

PAGE 02: NIAMEY 02345 071901Z

BIAFRA.

4. DIORI AGAIN EXPRESSED APPRECIATION FOR ASSISTANT SECRETARY PALMER'S

SUGGESTIONS RE CONTROL AND SURVEILLANCE AIR RELIEF SHIPMENTS. HE REITERATED THAT MOST OF THOSE SUGGESTIONS HAD BEEN DISCUSSED IN ONE WAY OR ANOTHER AT NIAMEY BUT HAD BEEN TURNED DOWN BY BIAFRANS. (COMMENT: I GOT IMPRESSION DIORI HAD NOT RPT NOT COMMUNICATED SUGGESTIONS OUTSIDE NIAMEY).

5. I TOLD HIM SIMILAR SUGGESTIONS WERE PASSED TO APPROPRIATE U.S. OFFICIALS IN OUR EFFORT BE HELPFUL BREAK IMPASSE. I RESTATED U.S. POSITION THAT WE REGARD CONFLICT AS AFRICAN PROBLEM TO BE SETTLED BY AFRICANS BUT SAID THAT HUMANITARIAN ASPECTS NATURALLY OF CONCERN TO ALL AND GAVE HIM COPY PRESIDENT JOHNSON'S MESSAGE TO HIM AS WELL AS SECRETARY RUSK'S STATEMENT.

6. COMMENT: DIORI, WHO IN RELAXED BUT PENSIVE MOOD, WAS PESSIMISTIC ANYTHING FRUITFUL MAY RESULT ADDIS TALKS AND HE PROBABLY LEAVING ON SCHEDULED VACATION TO FRANCE LATER THIS WEEK.

GP-3 RYAN

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By	MNARA Date 10/5/05

11

To: RS/AN-C:
Original (with courtesy
copy of the correspondence
was signed, dated & dispatched
direct from "H".

✓

August 7, 1968

Honorable Bob Casey
House of Representatives
Washington, D. C. 20515

Dear Congressman Casey:

my phone to Barbara O'Neal

I have received your recent inquiry requesting information regarding the situation in Nigeria.

In May, 1967, after two military coups and the killing of several thousand Eastern Nigerians resident in the Northern Region of Nigeria, the former Eastern Region seceded and proclaimed itself independent Republic of Biafra. Two months later the present civil war broke out. This conflict has its roots in tribal and regional animosities on both sides. In September 1967, the Organization of African Unity said the conflict was an internal matter which only the Nigerians themselves could resolve.

We have not intervened or interfered in Nigeria and continue to recognize the Federal Military Government as the only legal government. We have refused to license export of arms to either side. Believing that the Organization of African Unity and the Commonwealth Secretariat have more influence than any other mediators, we have quietly and consistently encouraged their efforts to bring both sides together.

Because tribal feeling runs so high and because most of the fighting has been in the secessionist areas, there has been great international concern about the fate of Eastern Nigerian civilians. During the course of normal diplomatic activity, we and other nations friendly to Nigeria have made clear our concern for the lives of Eastern civilians.

We want this tragic war to stop. We hope that the negotiations now in progress under the auspices of the Organization of African Unity will soon lead to a peaceful settlement.

We believe that the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) an impartial and non-political body, is best able to coordinate relief distribution to both Nigeria and Biafra. It has the confidence of both the Federal Military Government of Nigeria and the Biafran authorities. According to a press report of July 10, 1968, after conferring with the President of the ICRC, U.N. Secretary General U Thant appealed to Biafran leaders to accept Nigeria's offer to open a land corridor under ICRC auspices for relief supplies, which we think is a commendable initiative. Negotiations now in progress between the two sides may soon result in agreement on this matter.

P/PS/PCD: J. H. Rushfield

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- 2 -

Although reliable figures are unavailable, we are sure there is a desperate need for much food and other relief supplies in the civil war area of Nigeria. In this regard, President Johnson said on July 11, 1968 that the American people have watched with growing grief and horror the terrible loss of life and suffering in Nigeria. He said that "mass starvation that can be prevented must not be allowed to go on." Relief needs seem greatest in the area under control of the Biafran regime, but thousands of people in Federal-occupied areas also need assistance.

The U. S. contribution to Nigerian relief, including estimated donations of \$2 million from private sources, has now reached \$7 million, including a Government donation of 5500 tons of food worth \$2.7 million to UNICEF approved on July 12. In addition, Secretary Rusk has informed the ICRC that we are providing a reserve fund of \$1 million for that body to draw on in meeting Nigerian relief needs. This contribution should be particularly useful in giving the ICRC flexibility to procure vehicles, charter ships and aircraft, and purchase or lease other equipment for rapid deployment to the areas of need.

I hope the foregoing information will be helpful to you.

Sincerely yours,

GW

William B. Macomber, Jr.
Assistant Secretary for
Congressional Relations

P/PS/PCD:LHRushfield:pj

H Special request

8/2/68

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Am

A- J. S. G. W.

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By	MMARA Date 10/5/05

CONFIDENTIAL ATTACHMENTS

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT

August 6, 1968

S - Mr. Shlaudeman

Subject: Memoranda of Conversation between the Secretary
and H. E. Arsene Assouan Usher, Minister of
Foreign Affairs, Republic of Ivory Coast, July 24

For approval prior to distribution.

The Secretary's remarks are sidelined in red.

The memcons were drafted in AFCW by Mr. Reed and LS
by Mrs. Porson and have been reviewed in AF by Mr. Palmer.

Benjamin H. Read
Benjamin H. Read for
Executive Secretary

Attachments:

Tab A - Pt. I of VI - Memcon re Nigerian Conflict
Tab B - Pt. II of VI - Memcon re Infiltration into
Africa by Moslem Pan-Arabs and Chinese Communists
Tab C - Pt. III of VI - Memcon re US Relations with Ivory
Coast
Tab D - Pt. IV of VI - Memcon re European Relations with
Africa
Tab E - Pt. V of VI - Memcon re Relations between the
US and the Soviet Union
Tab F - Pt. VI of VI - Memcon re United States AID

POL 23-7AFR
X POL 27 BIAFRA-NIGERIA

POL IV CST-US
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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
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8/7/68
DATE

MEMORANDUM FOR: RS/AN - Mrs. Swartz

SUBJECT: Processing of Memoranda
of Conversation

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Harry C. Brock
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PAGE 01 LIBREV 01589 061150Z

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ACTION SS 70

INFO CIAE 00, /070 W

R 061015Z AUG 68
FM AMEMBASSY LIBREVILLE
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 1843
INFO AMEMBASSY LAGOS
AMEMBASSY LISBON
AMEMBASSY PARIS
USMISSION GENEVA

C O N F I D E N T I A L LIBREVILLE 1589

LIMDIS

SUBJECT: BIAFRA

REF: LISBON 1763

1. ALTHOUGH WE HAVE SPECULATED IN PREVIOUS MESSAGES ON POSSIBILITY FRENCH USING GABON AS COVER AND STAGING POINT BUY ARMS BIAFRA AND WHILE WE INCLINED BELIEVE THIS MAY BE CASE, WE HAVE NO RPT NO EVIDENCE WHATSOEVER TO SUPPORT. WE KNOW THAT OJUKWU ENTERS AND DEPARTS BIAFRA AT NIGHT BY UNMARKED FRENCH-OPERATED TRANS-GABON DAKOTAS AND WE HAVE ASSUMED THAT FRENCH AS WELL AS QTE GABONESE UNQTE RELIEF SUPPLIES ARE LIKELY MOVING IN THIS FASHION AND ON REGULAR BASIS FROM GABON TO BIAFRA.

① 2. GIVEN ENTHUSIASM WITH WHICH PRES BONGO HAS EMBARKED ON BIAFRAN CAPER (IN RESPONSE IN OUR VIEW FRENCH INSPIRATION), WE WOULD NOT BE AT ALL SURPRISED BUT WOULD CONSIDER IT LIKELY THAT BONGO WOULD RESPOND TO AND COLLABORATE FULLY WITH ANY POSSIBLE FRENCH PLAN OR MOVE USE GABON AS STAGING POINT FLY ARMS BIAFRA. HOWEVER WE WOULD NOT EXPECT BONGO OR GOG UNDER- TAKE ANY SUCH INITIATIVE ON OWN.
GP-3 BANE

EXTRACTED BY 45/2

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Libreville 15-89
8-6-68

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Geographic

AF5 5
ARA 9
EA 11
EUR 9
NEA 7

Other

ACDA 5
AID/EXSEC 3
AA/AFR2 1
AA/VN 2
AA/EA 3
AA/NESA 2

Functional

CU
E2
H
IGA
INR 6
IO4
L2
O3
OPR
OC
SY
WLG
P2 2
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SCS
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AEC 3
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Principals

ES2 4
S
U
M2
G
SIG 1
S/AH 3
S/AL
SA
S/CPR
S/GOV
S/IL
S/P
S/R 1
S/FW
S/PM
M/WP
G/PM

OTHER AGENCIES

WH 10
CIA
DOD
USIA 4
NSA

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POL 27 BIAFRA-NIGERIA
Department of State **TELEGRAM**

KN POL 1 NIGERIA- USSR ²⁵

CONFIDENTIAL 541

PAGE 01 LONDON 11536 061709Z

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ACTION EUR 20

INFO AF 09, IO 13, CIAE 00, DODE 00, GPM 04, H 02, INR 07, LI 03, NSC 10, PI 04, ¹¹⁵³⁶

RSC 01, SP 02, SS 20, USIA 12, NSA 02, AID 28, SR 01, ACDA 16, SAH 02,

SAL 01, RSRI 01, /158 W

R 061626Z AUG 68
FM AMEMBASSY LONDON
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 5306
INFO AMEMBASSY ABIDJAN
AMEMBASSY ADDIS ABABA
AMEMBASSY ACCRA
USMISSION GENEVA
AMEMBASSY KINSHASA
AMEMBASSY MONROVIA
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
AMEMBASSY PARIS
AMEMBASSY YAOUNDE
USMISSION USUN NEW YORK

MICROFILMED BY RS/R

CONFIDENTIAL LONDON 11536

SUBJECT: SOVIET VIEWS ON NIGERIAN CONFLICT

1. COMMONWEALTH OFFICE'S MOBERLY (ACTING HEAD, WEST AND GENERAL AFRICAN DEPT) TELLS US THAT WITHIN PAST FEW DAYS HE RECEIVED VISIT FROM SOVIET FIRST SECTY NIKOLAI I. MAKAROV, SOVIET EMBASSY'S AFRICAN SPECIALIST. THIS WAS FIRST TIME MAKAROV HAD BEEN IN TO DISCUSS NIGERIAN SITUATION WITH CO OFFICIALS. MOBERLY WAS IMPRESSED BY CLARITY AND VIGOR WITH WHICH HE LAID DOWN SOVIET LINE.

2. MAKAROV EMPHASIZED TO MOBERLY THAT SOVIETS WOULD CONTINUE SUPPLYING ARMS TO LAGOS AS LONG AS FMG NEEDED THEM. HE SAID SOVIETS SUPPORTED NIGERIAN UNITY AND THOUGHT THAT IF BIAFRANS WERE PERMITTED TO SECEDE, DANGEROUS PRECEDENT WOULD BE CREATED AND OTHER AFRICAN STATES WOULD SUFFER CONSEQUENCES. MAKAROV WAS CRITICAL OF FRENCH "SELF-DETERMINATION" STATEMENT AND THOUGHT IT HAD HARMED PROSPECTS FOR SUCCESS AT ADDIS. HE

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PAGE 02 LONDON 11596 061709Z

THOUGHT FMG WOULD BE JUSTIFIED IN FINISHING OFF JOB MILITARILY IF ADDIS TALKS BROKE DOWN DUE TO BIAFRAN INTRASIGENCE.

3. MOBERLY IS NOT SURE HOW TO INTERPRET MAKAROV'S VISIT. SOVIETS MAY BE WORRIED ABOUT POSSIBILITY THAT BRITS WILL STOP ARMS SHIPMENTS AND LEAVE THEM IN EXPOSED POSITION. IF SO, IT WOULD BE IN THEIR INTERESTS TO HELP HMG COUNTER MP'S AND LEADER WRITERS WHO ARGUE THAT SOVIETS WOULD CERTAINLY STOP ARMS SHIPMENT IF BRITISH DID. ON OTHER HAND, MOBERLY THINKS SOVIETS MIGHT WELCOME OPPORTUNITY TO BE SOLE SUPPLIERS OF ARMS TO FMG AND THEREBY INCREASE THEIR INFLUENCE ON WINNING SIDE AT BRITISH EXPENSE. ON BALANCE MOBERLY CONCLUDES PURPOSE OF MAKAROV'S VISIT WAS PROBABLY TO PROBE BRITISH INTENTIONS AND SET STAGE FOR MORE FREQUENT EXCHANGES IN FUTURE.
BRUCE

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PAGE 01 LONDON 11544 061755Z

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ACTION AF 15

INFO EUR 15, IO 13, SSO 00, CIAE 00, DODE 00, GPM 04, H 02, INR 07, L 03,

NSC 10, P 04, RSC 01, SP 02, SS 20, USIA 12, NSA 02, SAH 02, ACDA 10,

AID 28, RSR 01, PC 04, /161 W

R 061645Z AUG 68
FM AMEMBASSY LONDON
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 5314
INFO AMEMBASSY ABIDJAN
AMEMBASSY ADDIS ABABA
AMEMBASSY ACCRA
AMEMBASSY KINSHASA
USMISSION GENEVA
AMEMBASSY MONROVIA
AMEMBASSY NIAMEY
AMEMBASSY PARIS
AMEMBASSY YAOUNDE
USMISSION USUN NEW YORK

SECRET NOFORN LONDON 11544

1. IN PAST FEW DAYS WE HAVE EXCHANGED VIEWS WITH COMMONWEALTH OFFICE'S ERIC NORRIS (ASS'T UNDER SECRETARY) AND OTHER BRITISH OFFICIALS CONCERNED WITH NIGERIAN SITUATION AND FOUND THEM WITHOUT EXCEPTION EXTREMELY PESSIMISTIC ABOUT PROSPECTS FOR NEGOTIATED SETTLEMENT.

2. THEIR DEPRESSION IS PRINCIPALLY INDUCED BY FRENCH "SELF-DETERMINATION" STATEMENT WHICH THEY, LIKE EVERYONE ELSE, FEAR HAS DESTROYED ANY POSSIBILITY OJUKWU WILL SHOW FLEXIBILITY ON SOVEREIGNTY QUESTION AT ADDIS. BRITISH ARE AWARE THAT FMG IS PREPARING THREE-DIVISION OPERATION INTO IBO HEARTLAND AND ARE CONVINCED IT WILL PROCEED AS SOON AS STOCKPILES HAVE BEEN BUILT UP AND ADDIS TALKS EITHER BREAK DOWN OR BECOME STALE-MATED. FROM PURELY MILITARY STANDPOINT, BRITISH DOUBT FMG COULD BEGIN MAJOR OFFENSIVE BEFORE AUG 10 AT EARLIEST. UNUSUALLY HEAVY RAINS IN FORMER EASTERN REGION HAVE FURTHER COMPLICATED THEIR TIME-TABLE. NEVERTHELESS, ONCE FMG IS READY TO GO

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BRITISH BELIEVE IT WILL BE IMPOSSIBLE TO HOLD FEDERAL FORCES
BACK IF NO PROGRESS IS VISIBLE IN ADDIS.

3. IF FMG DOES UNDERTAKE THREE-DIVISION OFFENSIVE BRITISH EXPECT
IT TO BE BLOODY AND PROTRACTED. THIS IN TURN WILL LEAD TO
RENEWED PARLIAMENTARY AND PRESS PRESSURE ON GOVT TO HALT
ARMS SHIPMENTS. FOR ALL THESE REASONS BRITISH OFFICIALS ARE
GLUM ABOUT FUTURE AND ARE PRAYING FOR EMPEROR TO REAR BACK
AND CREATE A MIRACLE IN ADDIS.
BRUCE

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XR POL 27 BIAFRA-NIGERIA
Department of State TELEGRAM

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PAGE 01 KADUNA 01244 061508Z

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ACTION AF 15

INFO EUR 15, CU 04, IO 13, NSA 02, CIAE 00, OOOE 00, GPM 04, H 02, INR 07,

L 03, NSC 10, P 04, RSC 01, SP 02, SS 20, USIA 12, SA 01, RSR 01, 116

R 061425Z AUG 68
FM AMCONSUL KAOUNA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 834
INFO AMEMBASSY LAGOS
AMEMBASSY LONDON
AMCONSUL IBADAN

C O N F I D E N T I A L KAOUNA 1244

SUBJECT: BRITISH MPS VISIT CONSULATE

1. BRITISH MPS JAMES JOHNSON AND NIGEL FISHER CALLED BRIEFLY AT CONSULATE AUGUST 5 FOLLOWING CALL AT BRITISH HIGH COMMISSION KAOUNA. THEY POSED FEW HASTY QUESTIONS AND EXPRESSED SOME IDEAS OF THEIR OWN BEFORE DASHING OFF TO ZARIA FOR BRIEF VISIT TO UNIVERSITY AND DEPARTURE FOR LAGOS LATER IN THE DAY.

2. OPENING QUESTION PUT BY JOHNSON WAS WHETHER I WOULD CARE TO COMMENT ON RECENT STATEMENT BY ASST SECY PALMER ON NIGERIA SITUATION. I SAID I DID NOT CARE TO EXPAND ON WHAT MR. PALMER HAD SAID AND LIMITED MYSELF TO OBSERVATION THAT STATEMENT WAS WITHIN CONTEXT OF PREVIOUSLY ENUNCIATED U.S. POLICY.

3. MPS, AND JOHNSON IN PARTICULAR, WERE INTERESTED IN QUESTION HOW AMERICAN-BRITISH NATIONALS HAD BECOME INVOLVED IN PARTISAN ADVANCEMENT OF BIAFRAN POINT OF VIEW WHICH JOHNSON ATTRIBUTED IN CASE OF U.K. LARGELY TO THE MANY BRITISH NATIONALS WHO HAD SERVED OR WORKED IN FORMER EASTERN REGION. WHEN ASKED ABOUT INVOLVEMENT OF AMERICANS, I TOLD THEM I FELT PART OF PROBLEM OF UNDERSTANDING THE NIGERIAN SITUATION IN U.S. WAS THAT AMERICANS FORMERLY ASSOCIATED WITH EASTERN REGION ARE NOW ALMOST ALL BACK IN UNITED STATES AND, UNDERSTANDABLY, VIEW

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Kaduna 1244
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5 Aug 68 21 33Z
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Origin ACTION: AMEMBASSY LAGOS

Info: INFO: Amembassy Addis Ababa
Amembassy London
Amembassy Paris
US Mission Geneva
US Mission New York
GINGSTRIKE
Amconsul Ibadan
Amconsul Kaduna

STATE

SUBJ: Nigerian Press Summary: Aug 4-5

1. Christian Science Monitor carries Aug 2 editorial headed Qte
For Parleying, Not Killing Unqte, which calls Secretary's July 30
statement timely and says anybody involved Nigerian tragedy will
have understood what he meant and why he chose this moment express
himself on eve Addis talks. Essential there be no resumption full-
scale fighting which might dash already tattered hopes (1) relief
might reach encircled Ibos before more succumb and (2) out of Addis
talks some settlement might emerge. FMG leadership has its hawks
contend with, not least Col Adekunle. On Ibo side may be desperate
men who would prefer provoke further federal offensive in hope
discrediting FMG before world opinion. Militarily there little
doubt FMG has upper hand. Thus it primarily to FMG that appeals
for generosity, continued patience should be addressed. Any unnecessary
slaughtering of innocent now would leave stain on Nigeria's good name

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Drafted by:

AF:AF/P:RLPerkins:kmd

Tel. Ext.

Telegraphic transmission and
classification approved by:

AF/P:RLPerkins

Clearence:

AFW - Mr. Smith RPS/RP

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FORM DS-322
8-65

0550

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By MNA Date 10/5/05

Page 2 of telegram to AMEMBASY LAGOS AND ADDRESSEES

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it would take long to expunge. At same time, major share responsibility prolonging slow starvation women and children in surrounded Ibo heartland would seem lie on shoulders present Ibo leadership. Both sides have been playing politics with human suffering; but even allowing for Ibos' conviction Feds set on wiping them out by sword or poison - Ibo leadership's resistance to mercy-corridor proposal looks very much like trying put off cruel day facing up to need settling for something less than first asserted.

2. Monitor Aug 3 carries David Winder story from London assessing impact French statement. Says Biafra may be on verge greatest diplomatic breakthrough. French statement coming very close to recognition will be great psychological boost on eve Addis talks. One consequence could be softening FMG position less failure reach settlement bring full French recognition. On the other hand, French statement may only stiffen resolve federal hawks. As major power France may be prepared give some military assistance as well as urging broader international action end the war. New French gesture not likely have taken Lagos by complete surprise. Exclusive Monitor article May 18 disclosed Rothschild's bank of France had made equivalent \$72 million loan Biafran government. Financial broker involved in early stages of deal said in exchange bank given mineral concessions in hitherto unexploited areas of Biafra. Early interest French oil company in Biafra fields recalled.

3. WashPost Aug 4 reports Ojukwu order unilateral truce before departure for Addis talks. Fed position restated by Arikpo that Nigeria unwilling call truce until Biafrans end secession. Other Nigerian leaders assailed

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FORM DS-322A
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CONTINUATION SHEET

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Ojukwu statement as propaganda move. How can losing side call a cease fire, snapped Chief of Staff Brig. Hassan Usman Katsina. Some observers (Lagos) believed hopes for settlement Addis slim. In New York, Post reports eight religious, civil rights leaders cabling President urging massive helicopter list of food and medicine to Biafra. Telegram signed by: Morris B. Abram, President, American Jewish Committee; Bishop John J. Dougherty, Chairman, US Catholic Bishops' Committee for World Justice and Peace; Dr. David R. Hunter, Deputy General Secretary, National Council Churches; James McCracken, Director, Church World Service; Rabbi Jacob P. Rudin, President, Synagogue Council of America; A. Philip Randolph, President, Brotherhood Sleeping Car Porters; Bayard Rustin, Director, A. Philip Randolph Institute; and Bishop Edward E. Swannstrom, Director, Catholic Relief Services.

4. Post carries from Lagos ~~Anthony~~ Anthony Astrachan piece under head '66 Massacre Still Haunts Biafra Ibos. Article recounts killings on both sides before and in course of war, concluding prejudice is what made 1966 killings seems still be present. possible and/~~xxxxxxxxxxxx~~

5. Sunday NYTimes carries Lagos story datelined Aug 2 on FMG statement deploring French announcement. FMG said crisis was internal affair and recognized as such by OAU. FMG considered statement unfortunate coming just before Addis talks. ~~Afx~~ Alfred Friendly Jr. reports Nigerians pessimistic as they leave for Biafra peace talks. Member delegation which basically same as that for Kampala said they would stay in Addis until

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Biafrans break off negotiations as they did May 31. Arikpo pointed out Ojukwu is one man who could, if he wished, renounce secession and thus end war on terms acceptable to Lagos. Three divisions poised for attack on heartland. FMG commanders at front confident takeover could be accomplished within few weeks. Knowledgeable analysts Lagos, including some Nigerian soldiers, more doubtful. Military drive on Aba, Umuahia and Owerri would encounter stiffest resistance of war and could bog down in logistic deficiencies that have time and again slowed federal advance. Even with three towns captured, little likelihood overextended Fed forces could quickly pacify surrounding forest. However, Lagos authorities increasingly believe military solution will be necessary to end conflict costing them \$6 million in foreign exchange per month. Times week in review section carries Garrison piece headed Qte and then the children die...Unqte. After detailed description effects malnutrition on children, refers to permanent brain damage even for survivors. Little optimism for Addis talks. Biafrans under heavy and continuous attacks past ten days. Now Radio Nigeria announces all municipal buses Lagos commandeered to carry reserves to front. Same broadcast says foreign newsmen henceforth barred from front. Final push with all that implies appears to be on.

6. NYTimes Aug 5 carries editorial headed Qte the children are dying Unqte. This week 400,000 Biafran children expected pass point of no return toward death through starvation. Innocent victims Nigerian civil war, their hair turning reddish-yellow from malnutrition, bellies distended, arms and legs

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0553

Page 5 of telegram to AMEMBASSY LAGOS AND OTHER ADDRESSEES

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like pipecleaners. Every day vultures circle over open graves into which bodies of dead lowered wrapped in straw mats. First order Addis peace talks must be agreement both sides on clearance for large-scale movement food and medical supplies to Biafra's famine-ridden refugee camps. ICRC and agencies of mercy all over world eager help. They have funds and resources but so far only aid getting in is trickle over hazardous airlift by night. Hatreds too intense to make outlook speedy progress in peace talks very bright. But bleakness prospect must not be translated into decision fight interference to the last child through ~~interference~~ with movement food and medicine. Each day's delay condemns thousands to death. Slaughter of innocents must end.

7. Garrison reports from Umuahia on Lindt mission, says he has produced formula which could permit much-needed food and medical supplies arrive Biafra. ICRC plan approved by Ojukwu, awaits Lagos agreement, to be announced later this week in Geneva. Final Lagos endoresement still uncertain according Biafran sources. Most Biafran officials concede their position on relief has failed generate sympathy aboard and they stung by editorials foreign press accusing them of stalling on relief to gain sympathy for Biafran ~~own~~ cause. Biafra's relief stand has changed radically in past two weeks as full dimension famine crisis has become apparent. At first Biafrans insisted aid be sent direct; Lagos countered insisting on federal inspection. Many Biafrans ~~objected any plan would make it appear they accepting Inner Qte Charity End~~ objected any plan would make it appear they accepting Inner Qte Charity End Inner Qte through hands of enemy. Fear poison also widespread. But at Niamey talks Biafrans dropped objection overland route. They proposed relief be

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0554

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Authority VND 954503
By MVA Date 10/5/03

Page 6 of telegram to AMEMBASSY LAGOS AND OTHER ADDRESSEES

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flown by Red Cross to Enugu where it would be inspected by neutral body at airfield and then trucked down demilitarized corridor. According Biafrans, Nigerians not only rejected this overland plan, but also follow-up proposal planes fly from Enugu to demilitarized airport in Biafra set aside for sole use Red Cross. In short, Biafrans convinced FMG deliberately trying starve them out.

8. Times carries separate story on medical effects malnutrition, relating it to Biafra.

END

RUSKI

FORM DS-322A
8-63
CONTINUATION SHEET

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0555

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Authority VND 954503
By MVA Date 10/5/03

34



Pol 27 Biafra Nigeria
XR PPB 7 US
 Department of State **TELEGRAM**
XR Org CIA

CONFIDENTIAL 851

PAGE 01 LISBON 01763 051618Z

49
 ACTION SS 70

INFO CIAE 00, /070 W

R 051550Z AUG 68
 FM AMEMBASSY LISBON
 TO SECSTATE WASHDC 2330
 INFO AMEMBASSY LAGOS
 AMEMBASSY LIBREVILLE
 USMISSION GENEVA
 AMEMBASSY PARIS

CONFIDENTIAL LISBON 1763

SUBJECT: POSSIBLE TIME MAGAZINE STORY ON BIAFRA

LIMDIS

1. REUTERS REPRESENTATIVE LISBON (PROTECT SOURCE) INFORMED EMBASSY OFFICER THAT TIME CORRESPONDENT JAMES WILDE, RECENTLY RETURNED FROM BIAFRA IN VERY PRO-BIAFRAN FRAME OF MIND, HAD STATED HE HAD SEEN CONCLUSIVE EVIDENCE THAT FRENCH ARMS BEING SUPPLIED TO BIAFRA FROM GABON.
2. ACCORDING TO SAME SOURCE, WILDE ALSO STATED OJUKWU INFORMED HIM THAT HENRY WARTON WAS BEING FINANCED BY THE CIA.
3. CURT PRENDERGAST, TIME-LIFE PARIS BUREAU CHIEF NOW IN NEW YORK PREPARATORY TO TAKING OVER LONDON BUREAU, HAD EARLIER INFORMED EMBASSY OFFICER THAT WILDE WITH LISBON TIME-LIFE STRINGER, MARVINE HOWE, WOULD BE WRITING STORY ON WARTON AND BIAFRAN AIRLIFT. PRENDERGAST INTERVIEWED WARTON DURING HIS STAY IN LISBON AND TOLD EMBASSY OFFICER HE LEFT WITH IMPRESSION OF WARTON AS "COLORFUL BUCCANEER".

BENNETT

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0556

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By	MM NARA Date 10/5/05

Lisbon 1763
8/5/68

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I N C O M I N G

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Screener 243

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SERIAL 1763

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MONTHLY COUNT 138

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Other

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MilRep
Summary
Task Force

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EA 11
EUR 9 9
NEA 7

ACDA 5
AID/EXSEC 3
AA/AFR2
AA/VN 2
AA/EA 3
AA/NESA 2

Functional

Principals

ES2 ✓
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G ✓
SIG ✓
S/AH 3
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OTHER AGENCIES

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CIA 9
DOD ✓
USIA 4 ✓ 4
NSA

0557

DECLASSIFIED
Authority VND 959/503
By M/MARA Date 10/5/05

59 *Pol 15-1 SV CST*
x R Pol 27 Biafra Nigeria 214887
OUTGOING TELEGRAM Department of State

INDICATE: ☐ COLLECT
☐ CHARGE TO

CONFIDENTIAL

Classification

Origin

ACTION: Amembassy ABIDJAN PRIORITY

Info

LIMDIS

5 AUG 68 03 13Z

FOR OC/USE ONLY

PLEASE PASS FOLLOWING MESSAGE FROM THE PRESIDENT TO
 PRESIDENT HOUPHOUET-BOIGNY

1. QTE Dear Mr. President: I want you to know how much my government valued the recent talks with Foreign Minister Usher. His visit proved once again the strength of our friendship and the depth of our common commitment to peace and human dignity.
2. I certainly share your concern, Mr. President, over the tragic strife in Nigeria. We also see an urgent need for resolution of the conflict and a peaceful settlement. My statement of July 11 stressed our conviction that innocent people should not be made the victims of political maneuvering. Secretary Rusk re-emphasized that view last week. And, as you know, the United States is fully cooperating in the relief effort of the Red Cross.
3. We have publicly urged both sides to exercise the utmost restraint pending the opening of talks in Addis Ababa. You should know also, Mr. President, that we are most vigorously urging the same counsel in private with the Federal Military Government--as we have been doing for some time.

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(3)

Drafted by

TEXT AS RECEIVED FROM THE

Clearance

WHITE HOUSE

Tel. Ext.

Telegraphic transmission and

classification approved by

S/S-O: C.A. Gendreau


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FORM DS-322
 8-65

0558

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 By: MVA Date: 10/5/05



POL 27 BIAFRA-NIGERIA
Department of State **TELEGRAM**

XR DEF 19-6 USSR-NIGERIA

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PAGE 01 LAGOS 11387 051437Z

46

ACTION: AFI 15

INFO: EUR 15, IO 13, AID 28, NSA 02, CIAE 00, GPM 04, H 02, INR 07, L 03,

NSC 10, PI 04, RSC 01, SPI 02, SS 20, USIA 12, NIC 01, SA 01, SAH 02,

RSR 01, 143: W

R 051300Z AUG 68
FM AMEMBASSY LAGOS
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 1837
INFO AMEMBASSY ACCRA
AMEMBASSY ADDIS ABABA
AMEMBASSY KINSHASA
AMEMBASSY LISBON
AMEMBASSY LONDON
AMEMBASSY MONROVIA
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
AMEMBASSY NIAMEY
AMEMBASSY PARIS
AMEMBASSY YAOUNDE
USMISSION GENEVA
CINCSRIKEY/CINCEAFSA
DIA
AMCONSUL IBADAN
RUTAKA/AMCONSUL KADUNA 2799

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE LAGOS 11387

SUBJECT: BIAFRAN ATTACK ON UNITED STATES, BRITAIN AND SOVIET UNION

1. REBEL RADIO BROADCAST STATEMENT BY INFORMATION COMMISSIONER EKE ON JULY 31ST (RECEIPT DELAYED LAGOS) IN WHICH HE APPEALED TO "THOSE INTERESTED IN PEACE SETTLEMENT TO GIVE OAU A CHANCE" RESOLVE NIGERIAN CONFLICT.

2. EKE SAID "THAT THE CONDUCT OF THREE POWERS DURING NIAMEY TALKS TENDED TO DESTROY OR RENDER IMPOTENT EFFORTS OF OAU." HE THEN AMED BRITAIN, UNITED STATES AND SOVIET UNION WHO HE SAID DURING THE TALKS MADE STRONG STATEMENT IN SUPPORT

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By: MVA Date: 10/5/05



Department of State **TELEGRAM** 23

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PAGE 02 LAGOS 11387 051437Z

OF FMG. EKE CLAIMED "RUSSIA EVEN PROMISED CONTINUE SUPPLY ARMS TO LAGOS UNTIL BIAFRA CRUSHED. DEBATE IN BRITISH PARLIAMENT DURING NIAMEY TALKS REJECTED THIS ATTITUDE, SO TOO DID STATEMENTS BY AMERICAN OFFICIALS."

3. EKE ALSO SAID "AMERICAN AND BRITISH (SIC) EMBASSIES IN NIAMEY TRIED TO INFLUENCE DELIBERATIONS" WHICH ALLEGEDLY STIFFENED FMG BELIEF IN MILITARY SOLUTION.

4. COMMENT: BIAFRAN LINE SEEMS TO HAVE SHIFTED SOMEWHAT IN THAT WE ARE AGAIN LUPED TOGETHER WITH BRITISH AND SOVIETS WITHOUT ANY DISTINCTION BEING MADE AS TO REAL DIFFERENCES IN POLICIES. THIS LINE HAS BEEN TAKEN SEVERAL TIMES IN RECENT REBEL BROADCASTS.
DECON ON RECEIPT.
MATHEWS

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Department of State **TELEGRAM**

Pol 27 Biafra - Nigeria
42

43

CONFIDENTIAL 517

PAGE 01 USUN: NI 06118 060020Z

88

ACTION: IO: 15

INFO: EUR 15, AF 09, CIAE 00, DODE 00, GPM 04, H 02, INR 07, L 03, NSC 10, P 04,

RSC 01, SP 02, SS 20, USIA 12, NSA 02, SR 01, ORM 03, RSR 01, ACDA 16,

AID 28, /155 W

R 052335Z AUG 68
FM USMISSION: USUN NY
TO SECSTATE: WASHDC 2759
INFO /USMISSION: GENEVA 2570
AMEMBASSY LAGOS
AMEMBASSY LONDON
AMEMBASSY VIENNA

CONFIDENTIAL USUN: 6118

BIAFRA

1. BACKES, AUSTRIAN CHARGE, TODAY INFORMED FINGER GOA HAS DESIGNATED BREYCHA-VAUTHIER, FORMER AMBASSADOR TO LEBANON, AS SPECIAL REP TO EXPEDITE RELIEF FOR BIAFRANS AND FACILITATE END OF FIGHTING IN NIGERIA. BACKES SAID PUBLIC OPINION IN AUSTRIA DEEPLY CONCERNED ABOUT BIAFRAN VICTIMS, RECALLING AUSTRIA'S OWN EXPERIENCE IN TWO WORLD WARS AND A CIVIL WAR.
2. BREYCHA-VAUTHIER SENT FIRST TO LONDON, AND MAY ALREADY BE THERE. DEPENDING ON DEVELOPMENTS HE WILL NEXT PROCEED TO LAGOS, THEN GENEVA TO CONFER WITH ICRC AND NY TO SEE SYG.
3. BACKES ASKED TO BE INFORMED OF ANY NEW STEPS TAKEN OR CONTEMPLATED BY US RE BIAFRA.

GP-3.

BALL

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MSUN

6/18/5/68

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Authority: VND 959503
By: MVA Date: 10/5/05

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Pol 27 Biafra - Nigeria

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XR Pol 16 Biafra

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3 AUG 68 23 23Z

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Origin
Info:

ACTION: ~~CIRCULAR~~
ALL AFRICAN POSTS
ALL EUROPEAN POSTS
Amconsul *Iyunda*
Amconsul SALISBURY
Amembassy MOSCOW POUCH *me*

INFORM CONSULS

SUBJ: Nigerian Summary

1. Posts may draw on following and earlier summary (State 207721) as appropriate in discussions with host government officials.
2. On eve of August 5 peace talks at Addis Ababa under OAU auspices both sides skeptical of outcome. In effort sharpen image of Biafra as peace-loving underdog, Ojukwu Aug 3 announced unilateral truce for duration of talks. Prompt FMG response rejected truce and stressed demand for renunciation of secession by Biafra in public display of pessimism about Addis talks. Gowon will probably not attend.
3. Expected Biafran insistence on some degree independence as condition for settlement probably stiffened by French announcement July 31 that conflict should be settled "on basis of right of peoples to self-determination and should entail putting into action appropriate international procedures." We not certain that French planning to go so far as recognize Biafra yet, but a few other African countries might now do so. In any case, Addis talks have been further imperiled.

MICROFILMED BY 854

Drafted by: *RS* Tel. Ext. 5374 Telegraphic transmission and classification approved by: Nigerian Task Force *RS* Robert Smith
AFW:RWach/RPSmith/ab 8/3/68
Clearances:

AF - Ambassador Moore (subs) *RS*

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FORM 8-65 DS-322

0562

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Authority: VND 959503
By: MN NARA Date: 10/5/05

Page 2 of telegram to CIRCULAR TO ALL AFRICAN POSTS

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Classification

4. AFP report indicates Ojukwu already en route to Addis to lead Biafran delegation. FMG delegation to be headed by Anthony Enahoro, Commissioner for Information. Upon recommendation President of Niger, no heads of state now expected to attend except Emperor who will preside. In event talks are successful, it possible other heads of state will arrive in Addis to lend their ~~weight~~ ^{to} weight and prestige/agreement.
5. While some fighting continuing Nigerian Army continues prepare for "final" all-out assault on last remaining Biafran territory should talks collapse. Earlier fears that some FMG field commanders might launch major attack prior Addis talks now lessened by reports that FMG troops not yet ready and in position.
6. Aroused public concern in America generated by press stories and pictures ~~on~~ starvation ~~and~~ reflected in demands for rapid US action to resolve crisis and feed starving Biafrans. Presidential candidate Senator McCarthy has called for temporary division of Nigeria and Biafra while political arrangements are worked out, "urgent appeal" to UK to stop arms shipment to Nigeria, and appeal to UN to coordinate relief action. Campaign headquarters of Vice President and of Senator McGovern have called for humanitarian relief in more general terms. Large volume of mail to Department and Congress is at least partly organized by Biafran reps although most reflects genuine concern of individuals.
7. USG hopes for some success at Addis and is continuing push both sides in attempt open relief corridors into Biafra. We are meanwhile working closely with ICRC to intensify relief activities.

RUSK

END

FORM DS-322A
8-63
CONTINUATION SHEET

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0563

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Authority: VND 954503
By: MNARA Date: 10/5/05



POL 27 BIAFRA- NIGERIA
TR AID (ER) BIAFRA
Department of State **TELEGRAM**

CONFIDENTIAL 844

PAGE 01 LAGOS 11375 031438Z

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ACTION AF 15

INFO EUR 15, IO 13, CIAE 00, DODE 00, GPM 04, H 02, INR 07, L 03, NSAE 00,

NSC 10, P 04, RSC 01, SPI 02, SS 20, USIA 12, AID 28, SR 01, ORM 03,

SCA 02, SCS 04, RSR 01, 147 W

P R 031211Z AUG 68
FM AMEMBASSY LAGOS
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 1828
INFO AMEMBASSY ACCRA
AMEMBASSY ADDIS ABABA
AMEMBASSY KINSHASA
AMEMBASSY LONDON
AMEMBASSY MONROVIA
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
AMEMBASSY NIAMEY
AMEMBASSY PARIS
AMEMBASSY YAOUNDE
USMISSION GENEVA
USMISSION USUN NEW YORK

CONFIDENTIAL LAGOS 11375

REF: STATE 212182

1. ARIKPO ASKED ME TO CALL AT 10:00 LOCAL TODAY AND RECEIVED ME WITH PERM SEC AND DEPUTY PERM SEC ENAHORO IN ATTENDANCE. HE SAID HE WISHED TO INFORM ME OFFICIALLY AND FORMALLY THAT FMG DEEPLY CONCERNED AT PROSPECT INCREASE FRENCH MILITARY ASSISTANCE TO REBELS. FMG BELIEVES THIS ALREADY UNDER WAY.

2. ARIKPO STATES THAT FLIGHTS INTO REBEL TERRITORY HAVE INCREASED IN FREQUENCY IN PAST FEW DAYS. THERE ARE NOW FOUR FLIGHTS EACH NIGHT FROM SAO TOME AND ADDITIONAL FLIGHTS FROM GABON. FMG HAS INTELLIGENCE REPORTS THAT ARMS FROM FRANCE ARE AIRLIFTED TO IVORY COAST WHERE THEY ARE TRANSHIPPED TO SAO TOME OR GABON FOR FINAL LIFT TO REBEL AIRSTRIPS. ALSO DURING PAST FEW DAYS PORT HARCOURT HAS BEEN VISITED BY UN-IDENTIFIED AIRCRAFT WHICH CIRCLED CITY. FMG DOES NOT ACCEPT

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0564

DECLASSIFIED
Authority: VMD 950503
By: MVA Date: 10/5/05



Department of State

TELEGRAM

29

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 LAGOS 11375 031438Z.

FRENCH DENIAL THAT FRENCH TROOPS IN GABON HAVE BEEN PUT ON ALERT.

3. ARIKPO ASKED WHAT USG WOULD DO IF FRENCH INTERVENED IN NIGERIAN CIVIL WAR. I RESPONDED THAT I THOUGHT IT HIGHLY UNLIKELY THAT FRANCE WOULD BE SO FOOLISH AS TO INTERVENE. IF THEY DID, USG WOULD OF COURSE DEPLORE INTERVENTION. AS TO POSSIBLE USG ACTION IN SUCH SITUATION, I COULD ONLY REFER HIS QUERY TO WASHINGTON. ARIKPO SAID HE WISHED I WOULD DO SO AS HE WANTED WASHINGTON TO KNOW DEPTH OF FMG CONCERN.


4. IN RESPONSE MY QUERY, ENAHORO SAID SIMILAR DEMARCHES BEING MADE TO REPRESENTATIVE, "OTHER MAJOR POWERS".

5. I TOOK OCCASION TO COMPLIMENT ARIKPO ON RESTRAINT AND DIGNITY OF FMG REACTION TO FRENCH ANNOUNCEMENT, REFERRING PARTICULARLY TO FMG STATEMENT OF AUGUST 2.
MATHEWS

CONFIDENTIAL

0565

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Authority: VND959503
By: MNARA Date: 10/5/05



POL 16 BIAFRA
POL 27 BIAFRA-NIGERIA
Department of State TELEGRAM

CONFIDENTIAL 275

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45
ACTION AF 15

INFO EUR 15, SR 01, ORM 03, IO 13, ACDA 16, SCS 04, SCA 02, AID 28, CIAE 00,
DOOE 00, GPM 04, H 02, INR 07, L 03, NSC 10, P 04, RSC 01, SP 02, SS 20,
USIA 12, NSA 02, RSR 01 / 165 W

R 021440Z AUG 68
FM AMEMBASSY LIBREVILLE
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 1834
INFO RUQSDA/AMEMBASSY ADOIS ABABA 10
AMEMBASSY ABIDJAN
AMEMBASSY DAR ES SALAAM
AMEMBASSY KINSHASA
AMEMBASSY LAGOS
AMEMBASSY LONDON
AMEMBASSY LUSAKA
AMEMBASSY PARIS

CONFIDENTIAL LIBREVILLE 1574A

1. OFFICIAL DAILY NEWS BULLETIN GABON MATIN THIS MORNING AUG 2 CARRIES EDITORIAL BY RADIO-TV DIRECTOR KIKI ON JUSTIFICATION AND FRUITS OF "COURAGEOUS, SPECTACULAR" BONGO DECISION RECOGNIZE BIAFRA AND COME TO AID OF "OUR BROTHERS, WHO FIGHTING FOR THEIR LIBERTY." EDITORIAL STATED THAT IN WAKE GABONESE RECOGNITION "IVORY COAST HAS JOINED ITS ACTION TO OURS. UNIVERSAL CONSCIENCE HAS BEEN AROUSED. NUMBER OF LARGE COUNTRIES HAVE SPOKEN OUT. UN AND ITS SECGEN HAVE BEEN MOVED BY THIS SITUATION. ICRC HAS UTTERED CRY OF ALARM. AND ABOVE ALL AFRICAN WISDOM HAS BEEN MANIFESTED IN OAU OF WHICH GABON IS ACTIVE AND DYNAMIC MEMBER. DIFFICULT NIAMEY CONVERSATIONS HAVE PROMOTED CONTACT BETWEEN ENEMIES AND PREPARED NEGOTIATIONS WHICH WILL OPEN IN ADDIS. VOILA, THE POSITIVE CONTRIBUTION OF GABON IN AFRICAN POLITICS." EDITORIAL CONTINUES THAT UNFORTUNATELY BIAFRANS STILL DYING AND THAT IS REASON FOR MRS BONGO'S RELIEF CAMPAIGN. "A COUNTRY IS JUDGED BY ITS ACTS, RESULTS OF ITS POLICY."

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Libreville 1574
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By: MVA Date: 10/5/05



DEPARTMENT OF STATE

RS/R FILES

Washington, D.C. 20520

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Attention *Mrs. Mullett*
Keep this study together.

S/S Pending

August 2, 1968

S/S 10845

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. WALT W. ROSTOW
THE WHITE HOUSE

COPIES TO:"

RF
AF
AF/AFCW
M
P/C

Subject: Suggested Message from President
Johnson to President Houphouet-Boigny
of Ivory Coast

Enclosed is a suggested message from President Johnson to President Felix Houphouet-Boigny of Ivory Coast. Its timing is particularly appropriate now inasmuch as Ivory Coast's Foreign Minister recently visited the United States and met with the Secretary and Assistant Secretary Palmer. The French statement of July 31 with respect to Biafra has added a new element of urgency.

During his talks in Washington, Foreign Minister Usher expressed President Houphouet-Boigny's concern regarding his relations with the United States. It is apparent that Houphouet feels somewhat isolated by the stand which he has taken on the Nigerian conflict and is preoccupied by internal problems in Ivory Coast. President Houphouet's anxiety was subsequently further confirmed by a conversation which the Israeli Minister had with Under Secretary Rostow on July 26 (telegram enclosed).

In view of the strong support which Ivory Coast has given to United States foreign policy in the past, it is important that the Ivoirians be reassured of our friendship. A message from President Johnson should go a long way to alleviate some of President Houphouet-Boigny's misapprehensions. It is our hope, moreover, that it may elicit an increased effort on Houphouet's part to bring this influence to bear on Colonel Ojukwu looking toward an early solution of the Nigerian tragedy. The Under Secretary for Political Affairs has approved the draft message.

Benjamin H. Read
Executive Secretary

Enclosures:

MICROFILMED
BY S/S: CMS

1. Suggested Message
2. Telegram 212058
AF/AFCW/RRead/EJNadelman
Retyped S/S:hbb 8/2/68

CONFIDENTIAL

Clearances:

AF - Mr. Palmer
M - Mr. Rostow
Mr. Grev

0567

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Authority: VND 959503
By: MVA Date: 10/5/05

ORIGIN/AC.TION

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OSO	USIA	NSA
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		46

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

AIRGRAM

PL 27 BIAFRA-NIGERIA

XR PL 18 NIGERIA

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A-747

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XR PL 27-9 BIAFRA

HANDLING INDICATOR

TO : Department of State

INFO : Amembassy ADDIS ABABA, LONDON
Amconsul IBADAN, KADUNA

FROM : Amembassy LAGOS

DATE: August 1, 1968

SUBJECT: Current Situation in and around Ikot-Ekpene

REF :

The attached memorandum of conversation covers the current situation in the Ikot-Ekpene area as related by two American missionary teachers who lived in Ikot-Ekpene until July 15.

Miss Arnie and Miss Royal discussed such practical and urgent issues as food shortage and the need for relief supplies. They gave their opinions on Biafran morale and on the views of the minority tribes to the Ibos and secession. Finally the ladies presented an account of life in Ikot-Ekpene, first when the town was in Biafra and then when the town was in a war zone. They gave details on currency, the advance of the Nigerian army, the sense of betrayal felt by the Ibos towards the minority tribes and the destruction of life, property and crops caused by both sides in Ikot-Ekpene and vicinity.

Exempt

MATHEWS

Enclosure: *all m.m.*
Memorandum of Conversation,
July 20, 1968

FORM 4-62 DS-323

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Drafted by: *AD*
POL:Rd Daley:sc 7/30/68
Clearances:

Contents and Classification Approved by:
POL:ERRamsaur *SR*

0568

DECLASSIFIED
Authority: VND 959503
By: MVA Date: 10/5/05

Lagos A-747
Enclosure

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Memorandum of Conversation

Date: July 20, 1968

SUBJECT: Current Situation in and around Ikot-Ekpene

PARTICIPANTS: Miss Stella Royal, Miss Blanche Mae Arnie and Mr. and Mrs. Leonard Kirby, Mr. Rodolfo Keil, Embassy official, Mr. Roger J. Daley, Third Secretary, Embassy Reporting Officer

Miss Stella Royal and Miss Blanche Mae Arnie are American citizens from Camden, New Jersey who returned to Lagos on July 18 after three and one-half years in Ikot-Ekpene. They had left Ikot-Ekpene less than a week before their arrival in Lagos. During their stay in Ikot-Ekpene they were missionary teachers. They arrived in Nigeria under the sponsorship of Worldwide Missions. After the two officials of that group in Nigeria left the country, they were affiliated with the Apostolic Church mission. Although they are both in their late fifties they are very hardy individuals who showed little sign of exhaustion.

The reporting officer considers their account to be reliable. They were not emotionally involved on either side of the Nigerian conflict. Both ladies could give impressive details, such as the names of the Nigerian commanders and units in the Ikot-Ekpene area, which lend credence to their general accuracy.

Mr. and Mrs. Leonard Kirby are Salvation Army officials who had arrived in Eastern Nigeria about 16 months ago and lived at Eket and Abak until March, 1968 when the Nigerian army arrived in those towns. Mr. and Mrs. Kirby who had met Miss Royal and Miss Arnie in the East corroborated much of what they had to say. They were all present at a luncheon with the reporting officer on the above date.

Ikot-Ekpene is a predominantly Ibibio town, although the population included a considerable number of Ibos who occupied many of the higher positions in the community. Miss Royal and Miss Arnie taught in a mission school which continued to function after the government schools were closed a year ago. After the declaration of Biafran independence, they were told that all expatriates were advised to leave Biafra, but feeling in no danger and being completely removed from the war front, they decided to stay and continue their work at the school. They held classes until June 12 when seven of an original thirty pupils received their certificates. Both believe that their presence in the town was appreciated by the citizenry.

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After the proclamation of Biafran independence, life proceeded in a normal fashion for several months. In early January after Biafra issued its own paper money the two ladies withdrew their funds from the bank and were fortunate enough to obtain some 100 pounds in Nigerian coinage which had remained acceptable throughout the war. The Biafran currency was not accepted by traders in Ikot-Ekpene for a couple of weeks before the Nigerian army arrived. The old Nigerian bank notes, while legal, are not considered reliable by the traders so that what little trade exists is carried on in coinage.

Biafran morale remained high until the arrival of the Nigerian army in Calabar. From that time onwards the Ibos openly accused the minority tribes of aiding the Nigerian army. Mr. and Mrs. Kirby stated that after the invasion at Calabar, the Efik area around Eket and Abak was in fact occupied by Biafran troops because of the feeling of support for Nigeria in the area. When the Nigerian forces arrived in the Efik area, they were greeted as liberators; the Biafran army and Ibo civilians quickly fled northwards. The Kirbys believe that the Nigerians have been favorably disposed towards the Eket area because the local population was known to be friendly. Traders are active there and food is available. The Ikot-Ekpene area and the Annang district generally were much more mixed in their loyalties. The federal air attacks antagonized many of the Ibibios of Ikot-Ekpene. According to the missionary teachers most of the area's residents favored the winning side. Thus before the invasion of Calabar the Biafran cause received strong support while after the invasion loyalties began to waver so that when the Nigerians arrived most of the residents were ready to welcome them. The ladies stated that the people were "full of fear" of both sides.

The home of Miss Royal and Miss Arnie was located about one mile from the center of Ikot-Ekpene on a road parallel to the Itu Road which was used by the Nigerian army in their first attack of Ikot-Ekpene. Several days prior to the attack the town was evacuated by all its residents. Miss Arnie and Miss Royal were apparently the only people in the town when it was captured. The Ibibios had fled to the bush and the Ibos had retreated chiefly along the Aba Road. The Ibos before leaving took vengeance on the minority tribesmen whom they believed had betrayed them. All food was taken from Ikot-Ekpene by the Biafrans and everything that was removable was carried off. The retreating Biafrans uprooted or burned the crops which were not yet ready for harvest. The Biafran police who retreated along the Itu Road were caught by the advancing Nigerians. According to Miss Royal and Miss Arnie many of the local leaders in the villages along the path of retreat were killed by the Biafrans. Crops were destroyed and buildings burned. Mr. and Mrs. Kirby stated that their experience was similar.

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After the Nigerians arrived (March 30-31) in Ikot-Ekpene they were fairly well received by the Ibibio population once they returned from the bush. The town and its surrounding area remained the scene of fighting for weeks. Afterwards, Miss Arnie and Miss Royal believe that the Biafrans recaptured Ikot-Ekpene (June 20) only because the Nigerians had exhausted their ammunition and were compelled to withdraw. It was during the Nigerian counter attack that Miss Arnie was hit slightly by a bullet that came through the roof of a back room in the house. Life in Ikot-Ekpene has been completely disrupted since March. The townsmen have deserted the town on several occasions when the fighting became intense. The Nigerian commander is encouraging the people to return to the town and villages but as long as Biafran forces remain in the area he can only be expected to meet with limited success. Miss Royal and Miss Arnie reported that on July 14, the day before they left Ikot-Ekpene, there had been considerable fighting close to the town.

Even before Ikot-Ekpene became a war zone food supplies had become very short. There were small amounts of garri and some plantain and paw paw available at the market. Bananas were out of season and the yam harvest, when there is one, does not take place before the end of September. There were a few onions available in the markets and a very small amount of stockfish. In May the avocado pear was in season but it is not a food liked by the population. As the war approached Ikot-Ekpene the local markets were totally disrupted and ceased to function to any meaningful degree. Several days after the Nigerian forces occupied the town small scale trade resumed but is often completely disrupted since the Biafrans often attack the outlying areas. Very little food is presently being brought in from the South because the soldiers at the check points demand their share of what meager amounts the traders bring. It is Miss Royal's and Miss Arnie's opinion, having witnessed swellings and other evidence of malnutrition, that it is correct to state that all people living in the Ikot-Ekpene area or more broadly speaking in the Annang district are in need of relief assistance. In addition to the native population there are many other refugees who have fled through the Biafran lines to the areas occupied by Nigerian forces.

Miss Royal and Miss Arnie commented on the relief activity which they had witnessed. They noticed no bad effects from powdered milk which the Red Cross had made available in small amounts. The Red Cross also had a supply of beans but the Ibibios preferred their traditional foods, garri and rice. For protein value, stockfish appears to be the best possibility, since the ladies stated this is already a part of the diet. Powdered milk when mixed with other foods is acceptable to adults.

Miss Royal and Miss Arnie said that there had been considerable supplies of gasoline stocked before the war and of shipments from the Port Harcourt area. Mr. and Mrs. Kirby agreed with them that during the Biafran control

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of Abak and Ikot-Ekpene there had been rationing of gasoline but never any drastic shortage. After the loss of the oil fields there was little gasoline available at Ikot-Ekpene but Biafran vehicles never seemed to be unsupplied.

Throughout the past year Miss Royal and Miss Arnie said they were treated very well by both sides. The Biafran soldiers were always correct in their behavior. Their house was never broken into during the attacks and counter attacks; it was searched by the Nigerians for Biafran currency and for weapons. The commander of the Nigerian 8th Battalion provided the ladies with four guards to insure their safety. Although the soldiers were noisy, they were also effective and cooperative. Once when soldiers wished to "borrow" the ladies' car, the commander reprimanded the soldiers for disturbing them.

Miss Royal and Miss Arnie spent their last week at Ikot-Ekpene moving their household belongings to a school near Abak. They made some five trips between the two towns, and passed eight roadblocks each way. The ladies either knew the soldiers from afternoon teas held on the veranda of their house or else were waved through as familiar residents of the area. On July 15 the ladies left Ikot-Ekpene for Abak. From Abak they travelled on to Uyo where the Commander gave them a pass to Calabar and Lagos. On July 18 they flew from Calabar to Lagos in a military plane. Considering the difficulties they encountered during the past few weeks, Miss Royal and Miss Arnie were in excellent physical condition when they arrived in Lagos. They were quite willing to discuss what they had seen in the East. Both ladies showed goodwill to the individuals on the Nigerian and Biafran sides of the conflict.

Exempt

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U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DIRECTOR OF INTELLIGENCE AND RESEARCH

*Research
Memorandum*

REU-44, August 1, 1968

To : The Secretary
Through: S/S
From : INR - Thomas L. Hughes *Thomas L. Hughes*
Subject: Western European and Canadian Attitudes
Toward Nigerian-Biafran Conflict

As the most recent attempt to bring an end to the fighting in Nigeria (the Addis Ababa conference scheduled to open August 5) approaches, we thought it would be helpful to review the official positions of the governments of Western Europe and of Canada, their unofficial sympathies, their policies on arms supplies, their economic interests, and their humanitarian aid efforts.

ABSTRACT

Of the 16 countries surveyed in this Memorandum,* all except Portugal continue to maintain diplomatic relations with the FMG or to recognize it as the sole legal government of Nigeria. Portugal recognizes neither the FMG nor Biafra, but Lisbon's sympathies are clearly with Biafra.

A number of West European governments, despite their official pro-FMG positions, make a special point of stressing their non-involvement in the Nigerian-Biafran conflict. Thus, Finland has emphasized that it is maintaining a position of scrupulous neutrality, and Sweden, Norway, Denmark and Iceland have avoided taking a formal position on the merits of either side in the conflict.

On the other hand, France, which has until recent days characterized the conflict as "essentially an African problem," issued a statement on July 31

* Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Iceland, Italy, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, the UK, and West Germany.

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GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

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which said that, in view of the Biafrans' demonstration of their will to assert themselves as a people, the French Government believed that the conflict "should be settled on the basis of the right of peoples to self-determination and should entail the putting into action of the appropriate international procedures." This statement has led some observers to speculate that France might be considering formal recognition of Biafra.

In a number of countries, even though the official policy is pro-FMG, government and public sympathies have increasingly been drawn to the Biafran cause. For example, the French press and the government-controlled radio and television have been strongly pro-Biafran, and, as noted above, a change in the French Government position may be in the offing. Furthermore, the Italian Government has tended to be more sympathetic to the Biafran cause than to the Nigerian. Among Scandinavians, sympathy has shifted from the FMG to the Ibos.

The UK has from the beginning upheld the FMG and continues to be a principal supplier of arms to it. Despite heavy attacks on this policy, London has defended it as a means of influencing the FMG to seek a settlement of the conflict. Belgium, France, and the Netherlands have in the past sold arms to the FMG, but all three have stopped within the last few months. Other states--among them Italy, Portugal, Spain, West Germany--reportedly allowed arms to be supplied to one or both sides in the past, but it has not always been clear whether these sales were handled strictly by private dealers or, possibly in some cases, by private dealers with government acquiescence. Canada

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Switzerland, and the five Scandinavian countries have not sold, and do not sell, arms to either the FMG or Biafra.

Only the Netherlands and the UK have substantial economic interests in Nigeria--and in both parts. Iceland, surprisingly, has a serious economic involvement because its sales of stockfish to Nigeria have amounted to about 5 percent of all Icelandic exports. Canada allocated C\$7 million to Nigeria in 1967-68 through the Special Commonwealth African Assistance Program. All 16 countries surveyed in this Memorandum have been showing increasing concern about the suffering of the Biafrans, and nearly all are stepping up, or considering stepping up, their humanitarian aid efforts.

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Austria

The Austrian Government from the beginning has viewed the Nigerian-Biafran conflict as a civil war and has continued to recognize the Federal Government's sovereignty over all Nigeria. The Austrian public in recent weeks has become concerned over reports of starvation and civilian casualties in Biafra, and the government has followed public opinion in exhibiting humanitarian concern. The Austrian Government has not supplied arms to either Biafra or the Federal Government, but it has not prohibited private sales, and some Austrian dealers reportedly have sold arms to both the FMG and Biafra.

Belgium

Belgium has maintained diplomatic relations with the FMG and does not seem likely to recognize Biafra. Even if the Belgians were so inclined, their experience with Katanga would probably mitigate against their becoming involved with another breakaway government. Until the middle of July, Belgium sold large amounts of arms to the FMG. These sales were finally stopped as the Belgian parliament and press became increasingly critical. The government announced a suspension of shipments on July 5 but then learned that it did not have the statutory authority to take such action. Thus, the government was considerably embarrassed when a Sabena 707 jet carrying arms crashed near Lagos on July 13. Final cessation of the arms trade did not come until July 17, when the Belgian parliament passed appropriate legislation. Belgium's interest in the Biafran question is now mainly humanitarian; and on July 12 the government announced a contribution of one million Belgian francs (\$20,000) for Biafran relief.

Canada

Canada considers the FMG the sole legal government in Nigeria, but from the outbreak of hostilities has sought to avoid direct involvement in the conflict. Canada's membership in the Commonwealth and its earlier enthusiasm for peace-keeping would seem to have dictated a more active role but the Canadians have eschewed such a role. Without rejecting the idea of a Commonwealth peace force as an ultimate possibility, Canadian defense officials expressed last May their apprehension over the likely size, complexity, and cost of such an operation. Pressure for a greater Canadian initiative has mounted in the press. A prominent Presbyterian official has long been active in lobbying for Biafra. One of the more extreme editorials suggested on July 11 that Canada join the US in organizing a peace force to land in Biafra.

Canada has provided no arms to either side, and the Canadian press has criticized Britain for providing arms to Lagos. However, the Canadian Government has evidently declined to press London for an embargo, despite the appeals of a Biafran mission to Canada last winter that it should do so.

Canada's Commonwealth ties invoke a political-economic responsibility beyond mere humanitarian concern. Canada allocated C\$7 million to Nigeria in 1967-69 through the Special Commonwealth African Assistance Program. The outbreak of hostilities caused a suspension of new capital projects in early

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1967, but some ongoing projects have been reactivated since then. Canada is now considering what it can do to help in reconstruction once the war is over. Prompted by the current starvation crisis, Canada has provided C\$60,000 for food relief both to the FMG and to Biafra, and External Affairs Minister Mitchell Sharp promised "many times" more on July 12. Canada is also prepared to help airlift the food.

Finland

The Finnish Government maintains an Embassy in Lagos and recognizes only the FMG. However, Finland took no position toward the outbreak of hostilities, and it has maintained a position of scrupulous neutrality toward the conflict. Finland has not provided, nor will it provide, arms to either the Federal Government or to Biafra. Finland's concern over the Nigerian-Biafran conflict is almost entirely humanitarian; it has plans to contribute upwards of \$75,000 through the ICRC for relief activities in both parts of Nigeria. Finland's trade with Nigeria is small, its investment in Nigeria is almost nonexistent, and its aid to Africa is concentrated in East Africa.

France

French-Nigerian diplomatic relations were broken off by Nigeria in 1960 over the issue of French nuclear weapons tests but were resumed in 1966. An official French policy clarification carried by AFP, July 16, 1968, expressed the government's concern over the "serious and bloody quarrel", but characterized it as "essentially an African problem." However, the French press and the government-controlled radio and television (ORTF) have remained strongly pro-Biafra.

In a surprise move on July 31, the French Government issued a statement expressing its belief that, in view of the Biafrans' demonstration of "will to assert themselves as a people," the conflict "should be settled on the basis of the right of peoples to self-determination." The statement then called for "the putting into action of the appropriate international procedures"--a formulation that led some observers to speculate that France might be considering formal recognition of Biafra.

With the outbreak of fighting in Nigeria, France in June 1967 banned all new arms contracts with either side. However, in January 1968, the government admitted that it had been shipping to the FMG arms (Panhard armored cars and 90 mm. ammunition) contracted for before the outbreak of hostilities. It was only on June 12, 1968, that France ordered a "total embargo" on arms deliveries, including contracts concluded prior to June 1967. There have also been reports that there were approximately 40 French mercenaries in Biafra during the latter part of 1967 and early 1968. Colonel Ojukwu stated in January that the French mercenary groups were being phased out and returned to Europe.

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In its July 16 AFP policy clarification, the French Government also announced it has made money available to the French Red Cross to enable it to begin delivering food and medication to Biafra in June. The French Red Cross is also currently negotiating with the International Red Cross with respect to placing surgeons, public health, and other medical personnel at the disposition of Biafra.

Italy

The Italian Government recognizes the FMG, but both the government and public opinion (as reflected in press accounts and editorials) have become increasingly concerned with the deteriorating situation in Biafra. Italy has not been involved, militarily or economically, in the Nigeria-Biafra conflict (though at one time there were reportedly private sales of 105 mm. ammunition to the FMG). There is little doubt, however that the government, dominated by the ruling Christian Democratic Party, has tended to be much more sympathetic to the Biafran side. The Christian Democrats seem inclined to view the Nigerian-Biafran strife as a religious war of which the starving and "oppressed Christian" Biafrans are the victims. This attitude reflects to a larger extent the views of the Vatican, which in turn are undoubtedly influenced by the large number of Catholic priests and missionaries in eastern Nigeria.

The Italian Foreign Office told Embassy Rome recently that it is following a policy "similar to that of the United States." At the same time, however, it registered concern over its ability to "avoid any initiative" in favor of either side in light of the pressures that are likely to be brought to bear in behalf of the Biafrans by the Christian Democratic Party. The Foreign Office hinted that the government might seek to "buy off" the Christian Democrats by offering to contribute as much as \$500,000 to the International Red Cross for emergency relief in Biafra.

The Vatican. On July 15, Pope Paul VI, in a moving speech to a general audience at Castelgandolfo (his summer residence), expressed great concern for the sufferings of the Biafrans and revealed that the Vatican had sent emergency food and medicines in an effort to alleviate the hardship in "Biafra, the beautiful region of East Nigeria."

The Netherlands

The Dutch Government from the beginning has viewed the hostilities in Nigeria as a civil war and has continued to recognize the FMG as the only government in Nigeria. The Dutch Government has maintained this view, which is consistent with that of its NATO allies, despite strong public opinion pressures for it to take an active role in pressuring Lagos for an armistice.

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After the outbreak of hostilities, the Dutch Government allowed the export to the FMG of significant quantities of small arms and artillery ammunition. Public and parliamentary pressures arising out of reports of civilian casualties in Biafra became so great in June, however, that the government was glad to seize the opportunity afforded by the initiation of negotiations to suspend shipments of such arms and ammunition. The suspension will probably remain in effect indefinitely, negotiations or no.

Dutch concern over events in Nigeria is largely humanitarian, but the Netherlands has a substantial economic stake in Nigeria also. Dutch investment in Nigeria is estimated at about \$500 million, and Nigeria is the Netherlands' second largest trading partner in Africa. Dutch officials have indicated that concern over the Netherlands' economic interests played a role in the decision to permit arms shipments to the Federal Government. Dutch leaders feel that the Netherlands is, ironically, now in a worse position because of the suspension of shipments than it would have been had it never helped Nigeria.

Portugal

Foreign Minister Franco Nogueira recently told Ambassador Bennett that Portugal had "no direct interest" in the Biafra-Nigeria conflict and that it was a matter of "indifference" to Lisbon how the conflict was resolved. Portugal has never recognized Biafra, but Franco Nogueira noted that it was widely known that Biafran representatives maintain an office in Lisbon. As for the well-known use of metropolitan Portugal, Bissau in Portuguese Guinea, and the island of Sao Tome for flights of equipment and supplies to the Biafrans, he contended that Portuguese territory was equally open for flights to the FMG. (Arms are included in these cargoes, but are not necessarily of Portuguese origin.)

Nevertheless, Franco Nogueira's statements are misleading. For a variety of political, psychological and religious reasons, Lisbon's sympathies are with Biafra. Portugal has few friends in black Africa, and Lisbon's policies have been designed to ingratiate it with the Biafrans in the event that they succeeded in winning independence from Nigeria, which broke diplomatic relations with Portugal over the latter's African policy some years ago.

In commenting on the human misery in Biafra, Franco Nogueira said that the strongest pressure for Portuguese relief to help the Biafrans had come from the Vatican. Actually, Henry A. Warton, representative of North American Aircraft Trading Corporation, claims that the C-46's he seeks to register will be used only to ship food and medical supplies to Biafra. Warton has said that he now has a three-month contract with the ICRC for 25 flights per month from Fernando Poo to Biafra carrying food and medicines to Biafra. He assured US officials that he had not carried munitions to Biafra "for some months."

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Spain

Despite Spain's close official relations with Portugal, Madrid has maintained a "hands-off" policy on the Nigeria-Biafra conflict. (In general, Madrid tends to be far more circumspect on African matters than does Lisbon.)

Spain has diplomatic relations only with the FMG, but the partially controlled Spanish press has devoted coverage to the conflict and described the plight of the Biafrans in such a way as to elicit sympathy from readers. Spain has little in economic or military resources to give or lend, but there have been reports that in recent months it has sold rifles and ammunition to the FMG (and, according to one, possibly to Biafra as well). Spain is probably too preoccupied, with the renewal of its defense agreement with the US, the Gibraltar situation, the future of its possessions in or near Morocco, and the approach of independence for Equatorial Guinea to devote much energy to Biafra. Some humanitarian ICRC flights pass through Fernando Poo (part of Equatorial Guinea). So far, however, there has been no policy of either omission or commission so far as Spanish aid for Biafra is concerned.

Sweden, Norway, Denmark, Iceland


Sweden, Norway, and Denmark all maintain embassies in Lagos, and Iceland has a consulate. None of the four Scandinavian governments, however, has taken a formal position on the merits of either side in the Nigerian conflict. Generally, these Scandinavian countries do not allow sales of arms to countries engaged in conflicts (Iceland does not even have an armaments industry). The Swedish Government formally announced a ban on exports of arms to Nigeria shortly after the outbreak of civil strife.

The Nigerian civil conflict has aroused particular concern in Scandinavia because of the general belief that Nigeria was something of a model for the peaceful and democratic development of the African peoples and because of a widespread desire among Scandinavians to aid the less developed countries. Under the auspices of the Nordic Council, an African Institute has been established at the University of Uppsala in Sweden. The amount of Scandinavian aid has been small and has come mainly from Sweden and Denmark; Swedish grants, for instance, have been in the neighborhood of US\$100,000 per year. Nevertheless, this aid has been steady and has concentrated on certain key areas; Sweden, for example, maintains veterinary and forestry experts in Nigeria. In view of these involvements, the present situation in Biafra has caused considerable reaction among Scandinavians, and efforts are under way in all four countries to collect funds and rush aid to the stricken people. Former sympathy for the Federal Military Government has now shifted to the Ibos.

Surprisingly, tiny and remote Iceland has been the scene of some of the greatest concern. The chief reason for this is that Nigerian purchases of Icelandic stockfish have grown in recent years until, prior to the civil war, they amounted to about 5% of all Icelandic exports. Current Icelandic efforts to aid the Ibos would no doubt be greater still if it were not for the fact that a drop during 1967 in fish catches and in prices for fish products on the international market, together with the loss of the Nigerian market, have caused serious damage to the Icelandic economy.

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Switzerland

Since the outbreak of the Nigerian-Biafran conflict, the Swiss Government has regarded it as a civil war and has continued to consider the Federal Government as the sole legal authority for the entire country. Switzerland has refused to supply arms to either side. There has been, however, some activity involving the use of Swiss banks by both sides for the transfer of funds for arms procurement. The Swiss have considered this activity consonant with their interpretation of neutrality. The Swiss Government has recently become concerned over civilian casualties and starvation in Biafra. The recent appointment of Swiss Ambassador to Moscow Lindt as coordinator of International Red Cross relief activities will perhaps occasion an even greater public and government response in Switzerland.

United Kingdom

As the former colonizing power which gave Nigeria its initial unity and independence and as the leader of the Commonwealth of which Nigeria is an important African member, the UK deplored the secession of Biafra at the outset and has continued to support the Federal Military Government as the sole legal government of Nigeria. Although initially supporting this view, the British public and press have become more sympathetic to the Ibos and have called upon the UK Government to play a mediating role to end the conflict. In recent months, in addition to urging the FMG to improve its public image, the UK Government has responded to public pressure in a number of ways: Prime Minister Wilson has written to General Gowon urging greater flexibility; British officials have met (separately) with FMG and Biafran representatives in London; and HMG has sent a mission to Lagos under Lord Shepherd, Commonwealth Office Minister of State, to urge peace talks. The British have encouraged negotiations under Commonwealth, rather than under UN, auspices and have indicated their willingness to participate in a Commonwealth peacekeeping force if that were acceptable to both sides.

The UK has long been a principal arms supplier to Nigeria. Its policy after the outbreak of hostilities was, and ostensibly remains today, to supply only replacements and selected defensive weapons. Embassy London has noted, however, that the British have edged toward a policy of greater support and arms supply to the FMG and have promised to train Nigerian military forces after the war. The UK Government has been under heavy domestic attack for its arms supply policy from the press and from Conservative, Liberal, and back-bench Labor MP's. It has defended its policy as a means of influencing the FMG to seek a settlement of the conflict. In recent weeks Parliamentary pressure for the cessation of arms supply has increased, but the government has weathered critical debate for this session at least.

The British have heavy commercial and industrial investments in Nigeria, and the problems of their oil companies with the FMG and Biafrans have been of particular concern. UK humanitarian organizations and church groups have been active in Nigeria. The government has been involved in international relief efforts and recently sent a mission to Nigeria to assess the needs on both sides for a £250,000 relief grant.

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West Germany

The FRG has remained neutral on the civil war, but it continues to favor a settlement within the framework of the Nigerian Federation and to maintain an Embassy in Lagos. West German policy prohibits shipments of military equipment--whether privately or government procured--to either party in the conflict, but there were reports last year of some private sales of arms to the FMG. Furthermore, it was reported in late 1967 that the Biafran Ministry of Defense maintained a weapons procurement representative permanently in Germany under an arrangement whereby import licenses and end-user certificates are allegedly supplied by Portugal, but we have had no further information on this point.

There is strong public revulsion in West Germany against the violence in Nigeria, and accordingly some pressure on the FRG to "do something." Since the greatest suffering is in Biafra, and a powerful feeling exists in West Germany that something must be done to end it, German public opinion may at times have appeared to favor the Biafran cause. Biafra, according to Der Spiegel, has had some success in influencing public opinion by using the Geneva public relations firm of H. Wm. Bernhardt.

Foreign Minister Brandt raised the Nigerian issue both at the NATO Council of Ministers meeting at Reykjavik in June and at the Bonn conference of the Western European Union in early July. In the latter forum he asked for the member countries to issue a joint statement calling for a cease-fire, but this was opposed by the British and the French. He also stressed the need for land access to Biafra to make humanitarian assistance available to the beleaguered area.

In a July 5 press conference, Chancellor Kiesinger announced that the FRG would increase its humanitarian aid to Nigeria from 200,000 DM to 1,000,000 DM. On July 11, Count Posadowsky-Wehner, Chief of the Africa Section in the Foreign Office and formerly Ambassador to Nigeria, flew to Lagos to discuss with the FMG the question of humanitarian aid for the victims of the conflict. In addition, German church organizations are actively involved in arranging humanitarian assistance. Foreign Minister Brandt told a press conference, July 31, that the FRG cabinet had decided on additional aid to victims of the Nigerian-Biafran conflict, and he appealed for the opening of a land corridor to enable the suffering peoples to be supplied with food and medicine.

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Department of State **TELEGRAM**

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PAGE 01 AODIS 04960 012032Z

81
ACTION AF 15

INFO SS 20,SSO 00,NSC 10,NSCE 00,INR 07,OC 06,CCO 00,GPM 04,RFR 01,

RSC 01,1064 W

O P 012230Z AUG 68
FM AMEMBASSY AODIS ABABA
TO AMEMBASSY LAGOS IMMEDIATE
INFO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 6430

C O N F I D E N T I A L ADDIS ABABA 4960

IN FORAFF. ON BEHALF HIM REQUESTS FOR MESSAGE BE DELIVERED TO
ETHIOPIAN AMBASSADOR FOR GENERAL GOSU.

"H.E. GENERAL JACOB GOWAN, HEAD FEDERAL MILITARY GOVERNMENT
FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF NIGERIA, LAGOS NIGERIA YOUR EXCELLENCY:
I REFER TO MESSAGES REQUESTING YOU TO LEAD YOUR DELEGATION AT THE
PEACE NEGOTIATIONS IN ADDIS ABABA STOP IN LIGHT OF THE SUCCESS AT
NIAMEY AND THE GREAT IMPORTANCE OF ATTAINING A SOLUTION TO THE CRISIS
I WISH TO APPEAL TO YOUR EXCELLENCY TO COME TO ADDIS ABABA AND TO
LEAD YOUR DELEGATION IN PERSON STOP I CANNOT FAIL TO EMPHASIZE
THAT YOUR PERSONAL GUIDANCE OF THE NEGOTIATIONS WILL HELP US ATTAIN
THE GOAL WHICH WE ALL SEEK SO FERVENTLY. STOP YOUR EXCELLENCY
PLEASE ACCEPT MY HIGHEST CONSIDERATION AND FRATERNAL ESTEEM STOP
YOUR GOOD FRIEND
HAILLIE SELAISSIE
EMPEROR"

VICE MIN TESSOFIE INFORMS US DIRECT TELEX TO BE INSTALLED SATURDAY
FOR MESSAGES AODIS LAGOS AND IT WILL NO LONGER BE NECESSARY
IMPOSE ON EMBASSY. HE ASKS IEG AND HIS PERSONAL THANKS BE
CONVEYED TO DEPT AND EMBASSY LAGOS FOR HANDLING THIS EARLIER
MESSAGE.
HALL

CONFIDENTIAL

0583

DECLASSIFIED
Authority: VMD 959503
By: MVA Date: 10/5/05

20

OUTGOING TELEGRAM Department of State

INDICATE: ☐ COLLECT
☐ CHARGE TO

UNCLASSIFIED
Classification

212835

1 AUG 68 00 25Z

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Origin

ACTION:

Info:

Mr. Jim Larkin
20 Alden Road
Larchmont, New York

Wish assure you that we and many others all over world doing everything possible relieve suffering in all parts Nigeria. I think you know me well enough to realize my heart aches as strongly and agonizingly as yours. Problem is not protocol, procedural or diplomatic. It is practical, stubborn and so far governed by geography, psychology and inflexibility deriving from fear. We continue to try our utmost ^{help} to remove these obstacles.

Joseph Palmer 2nd
Assistant Secretary of State
for African Affairs

Pol 27 BIAFRA - NIGERIA

RECEIVED BY 12.2

Drafted by: AF:JPalmer 2nd:apg
7/31/68

Tel. Ext.

Telegraphic transmission and
classification approved by:

Joseph Palmer 2nd

Clearance:

UNCLASSIFIED

Classification

FORM 8-65 DS-322

0584

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Authority: VND 954503
By: MVA Date: 10/5/03

OUTGOING TELEGRAM Department of State

INDICATE: ☐ COLLECT
☐ CHARGE TO

UNCLASSIFIED
Classification

POL 27 BIAFRA-NIGERIA
TR POL 3 ORUL 21337.1

1 AUG 68 21 46 Z

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Origin ACTION: Amembassy LAGOS PRIORITY

Info: RPTD INFO: Amembassy LONDON
Amembassy PARIS
Amembassy ADDIS ABABA
Amembassy NIAMEY
Amconsul IBADAN
Amconsul KADUNA

STATE

1. Following excerpt Department spokesman noon briefing August

1:

Question:

QUOTE/The French Govt. came out for Biafran self-determination.

Do you have any comment on this latest development?

Answer: Well, not specifically on what the French have done or said. But our position on this whole question was pretty fully outlined by the Secretary in his press conference two days ago. I want to emphasize that we do very much hope that negotiations, which are due to open Monday in Addis Ababa, under the auspices of the Organization of African Unity, will be productive, both as to the humanitarian problem of relief and the more fundamental question of ending the war.

— Question: Neither the Secretary nor you today mentioned the

Drafted by: AF:AF/P:RLPerkins:al 8/1/68 Tel. Ext. 2105 Telegraphic transmission and classification approved by: AF:AF/P-Raymond L. Perkins

Clearances: AFW - Mr. Smith RPS/RSS

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FORM DS-322
8-65

0585

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Authority: VND 954503
By: MVA Date: 10/5/05

Page 2 of telegram to LAGOS

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[the question of self-determination, which means, I think, the secession of Biafra. Could you tell us what the crystallized US position is on this.

Answer: Well, of course our position is, and has been, that we recognize the Federal Government of Nigeria.

Question: And do not recognize Biafra?

Answer: That's right. There has been no change in that. But our main emphasis right now is on the more positive look toward peace through the conference which is to take place, or to begin, next Monday. UNQUOTE

END

RUSK

FORM DS-322A
8-63
CONTINUATION SHEET

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Classification

0586

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Authority VND 954503
By MV NARA Date 10/5/05

66

POL 27 BIAFRA-NIGERIA
213191

OUTGOING TELEGRAM Department of State

INDICATE: ☐ COLLECT
☐ CHARGE TO

UNCLASSIFIED *pk*
Classification

A
1 Aug 68 20 27Z
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Origin: ACTION: AMEMBASSY LAGOS
Info: INFO: AMEMBASSY ADDIS ABABA
AMEMBASSY LONDON
AMEMBASSY PARIS
AMEMBASSY NIAMEY
USMISSION GENEVA
USMISSION NEW YORK
CINCSTRIKE
AMCONSUL IBADAN
AMCONSUL KADUNA

SUBJ: NIGERIA PRESS SUMMARY: July 31, 1968

1. No summary prepared July 30. Secretary's statement of July 29 buried generally under reports his remarks on Viet Nam except in separate Benjamin Welles story NYTimes, which gave it full treatment.
2. July 31 WashPost carries editorial headed Biafra has lost. Central fact Nigerian civil war that Biafra has failed in yearlong effort set up viable secessionist regime. Tragically Biafra does not accept this fact. It holds on, mistaking Nigeria's military moderation for weakness and hoping spectacle its starving citizenry will attract world sympathy and political support. This hope cynical as well as illusory; rests on deliberate manipulation suffering for political ends. Real issue before Biafra no longer independence or reintegration. It is whether reintegration which cannot be prevented will be done with more or less sacrifice and death. If Biafra fights on, there will be more. If it accepts reality Nigerian victory, there will be less. Leading

MICROFILMED BY 123/3

Drafted by: AF:AF/P:RLPerkins:kmd 8/1

Tel. Ext.

Telegraphic transmission and classification approved by:

AF/P:RLPerkins

Clearances:

AFW - Mr. Smith *RR/RL*

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FORM DS-322
8-65

0587

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Authority: VND 959503
By: MVA Date: 10/5/05

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purpose would statecraft now should be bring Biafra accept its loss and remove from Ibo leadership all grounds expecting it will succeed if it will only endure. First responsibility falls on Lagos government which must be willing in fact as well as word consider serious Ibo proposals for re-entering Nigeria on basis self-respect. Then international agencies must make available observers see Ibos in retaken areas fed and treated well. It is Ibos' fear poisoning and genocide that in large measure makes them fight on.

3. Post reports from Paris that France supports Biafra, Quotes in full Secstate for Information Joel Le Theule statement after cabinet meeting yesterday. Asked if announcement meant France recognizes Biafra, Le Theule said Qte this is an interpretation which is not false Unqte. Told another questioner that Qte France wished to be able to recognize Biafra Unqte although appropriate procedures leading formal recognition would not necessarily follow immediately. Statement termed Qte unfortunate and grave Unqte by Okoi Arikpo, FMG Commissioner for External Affairs. Post also cites reports right-wing London Evening Standard that France making last minute bid stop Biafran oilfields from reverting UK hands.

4. NYTimes has front page Garrison story from Uturu, Biafra, with three photos of starving children and Brother Aloysius, Irish seminarian of Marist order. Story contains long heartrending quotations from Brothers/~~XXXXXXXX~~ Aloysius and James,

latter American. Sample: Aloysius: In this district alone we could fill 20 hospitals with starving children. Out in villages they're dying by scores.

Even here we've buried 32 in last 11 days. 33, says Brother James. Who was it?

Johnny, the little one we had on intravenous. We just buried him. Both men fall silent.

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Page #3 of telegram to AMEMBASSY LAGOS AND OTHER ADDRESSEES

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5. Times also reports French statement, Arikpo reaction, and Reuters report from Biafra on heavy fighting in area north of Igrita, which on road to Owerri, 70 miles north Port Harcourt. From Geneva Times reports press conference Dr. Holgar Wricke, German WGC doctor just back from Federally-occupied area in Anang province near Calabar. Situation there comparable to inside region held by Biafrans. As many as 30 to ~~40 per cent~~ 40 per cent of children trapped in famine areas will die, he said. Doctors with more experience than he with malnutrition say mortality rate could climb even much higher. Rev. Dr. Eugene Carson Blake, General Secretary WGC said he apportioned blame equally on both sides for failure rival Nigerian forces permit emergency food, other supplies team to stricken areas. ICRC announced two British members relief ~~team~~ killed when car blown up by mine at Awgu in FMG-held territory

6. BaltSun carries AP despatch Lagos on Biafra hints corridor may be opened, quoting Biafran radio report Ifeagwe Eke, information ~~commissioner~~ ~~commissions~~ as saying Biafra might reconsider policy if foreign relief workers agree take risks operating on routes not demilitarized. Biafrans claim heavy fighting north Port Harcourt on Owerri road. Informed sources Lagos said only fighting was east of Onitsha where FMG trying clear road to Enugu.

7. AP carries wire story morning Aug 1 from New York that Americans responding with emotion and cash to plight of starving children of Biafra. Three girls who had been PCVs Nigeria teamed with a young Britisher, formed committee, rented Manhattan store front, soon had donations coming in off street for Biafrans. In Chicago young West Indian woman whose writer husband now in

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FORM DS-322A
8-63
CONTINUATION SHEET

0589

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Authority	VND 954503
By	MM NARA
Date	10/5/05

Page 4 of telegram to AMEMBSSY LAGOS AND OTHER ADDRESSEES

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Biafra, enlisted aid of 30 other women, Negro and white, and they invaded Loop in African tribal dress collecting cash on street corners for Biafrans. Dr. Nwonye Otue, head of Biafran New York office, get numerous offers of aid for his countrymen. Otue refers would-be contributors to groups which have been helping Biafra all along - WCC, Catholic Relief and Red Cross, or to UNICEF which has started Biafran relief program.

END

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POL 27 BIAFRA-NIGERIA

213370

OUTGOING TELEGRAM Department of State

INDICATE: ☐ COLLECT
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Classification

1 AUG 68 21 46Z

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Origin

ACTION: AMEMBASSY LAGOS
INFO: AMEMBASSY PARIS

Info:

STATE

SUBJECT: French Statement on Biafra

1. Embassy may have seen an Agence France Presse story in FBIS one or two days ago recounting an interview with Akekunle. Department observes with some interest that Le Monde of July 31, morning of day of French cabinet statement on Biafra carried Adekunle interview under head Qte federal offensive against separatist state of Biafra Unqte.

2. Introduction reads Qte Although Lagos denies that order given their forces hold positions has been lifted, Biafra radio announces FMG troops have launched offensive in Biafran territory. According communique of FMG HQ in Lagos which contradicts above denial, FMG forces/ have taken Ahoda (sic), last important town held by Biafrans in Rivers State, At moment when Biafrans preparing to make peace offers for Nigerian-Biafran talks which will open in early August in Addis, senior officers of Federal army seem to have decided to finish military operations as rapidly as possible. This is at least evidenced by the following interview accorded by Colonel Akekunle to Claude Brovelli, AFP correspondent

213370

2

Drafted by: AF:AF/P:RLPerkins:kmd 8/1

Tel. Ext.

Telegraphic transmission and classification approved by:

AF/P:RLPerkins

Clearances:

AFW - Mr. Smith

RPS/RJG

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FORM 8-65 DS-322

0591

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Authority: VND 954503
By: MNARA Date: 10/5/05

Page 2 of telegram to AMEMBASSY LAGOS AND PARIS

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On the Biafran Front Unqte

3. In event Embassy missed FBIS item, following is gist of interview:

4. Port Harcourt, July 30. As far as I'm concerned, war is finished. I am only waiting for order and in two weeks I'll capture OAU. It is thus Col. Benjamin Adekunle, calls three towns held by Biafrans: Owerri, Aba, Umuahia. For Adekunle invasion Biafran bastion seems inevitable. Qte I prefer to do it to end the war and assure the security of the civilian population. The longer we wait, the more ~~suffering of population will increase~~ ~~Unqte~~ ~~Suddenly he takes off on international~~

relief organizations. Qte The Red Cross is on the way to turning Nigeria into an international colony. The army is already having enormous difficulties feeding camps of refugees isolated in large towns. What can the Red Cross do? Nothing.

It doesn't even have trucks...I don't want to see a single representative of the Red Cross in my sector. One of them came to see me a few days ago. I sent him back to Lagos...If they really want to help the refugees, let them give us foodstuffs.

We'll distribute them Unqte The Qte Scorpion Unqte believes the unity of Nigeria an essential element to stability French-speaking states around it. He stresses severe

economic repercussions, especially in Niger, since the Biafran secession. Admirer of General de Gaulle, Qte who has saved his country several times and who has

preserved its unity Unqte, Col. Adekunle is very unhappy with French position

favorable to Biafra. Qte It is doubtless a consequence of the bad French-British

relations Unqte He doesn't want to be a politician. Qte If we march on Aba, I

will be with my men. Unqte The relative inaction seems to weigh on him. Qte

During the night of Saturday to Sunday, three planes full of arms and munitions flew over my sector to Biafra Unqte he told me with anger. END

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FORM D5-322A
8-63
CONTINUATION SHEET

RUSK!

0592

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By MVA/ARA Date 10/5/05



POL 27 BIAFRA-NIGERIA
Department of State **TELEGRAM**

SECRET 114

PAGE 01 ADDIS 05107 100922Z

18

ACTION AF 15

INFO EUR 15, IO 13, CIAE 00, DODE 00, NSAE 00, NSCE 00, SSO 00, USIE 00,

CCO 00, GPMI 04, H 02, INR 07, LI 03, NSC 10, P 04, RSC 01, SP 02, SS 20,

SR 01, ORM 03, SCS 04, SCA 02, AID 28, RSR 01, /135 W

O R 100900Z AUG 68
FM AMEMBASSY ADDIS ABABA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 6540
INFO AMEMBASSY ABIDJAN
AMEMBASSY ACCRA
AMEMBASSY KINSHASA
AMEMBASSY LAGOS
AMEMBASSY LONDON
AMEMBASSY MONROVIA
AMEMBASSY NIAMEY
AMEMBASSY PARIS
AMEMBASSY YAOUNDE
USMISSION GENEVA
USMISSION USUN NEW YORK

SECRET ADDIS ABABA 5107

REF: STATE 218847

1. SECOND SENTENCE OF SECOND PARA OF TEXT CONTINGENCY MESSAGES TRANSMITTED REFTEL READS AS RECD: QTE FOR TOO LONG NOW, THE EFFORTS OF THE ICRC AND OTHER HUMANITARIAN AGENCIES HAVE BEEN FRUSTRATED IN THEIR EFFORTS TO REACH THE SUFFERING CIVILIAN VICTIMS OF THE WAR WITH...UNQTE QUERY: SHOULD SENTENCE READ: QTE FOR TOO LONG NOW, THE ICRC AND OTHER HUMANITARIAN AGENCIES HAVE BEEN FRUSTRATED IN THEIR EFFORTS TO REACH...UNQTE OF HAS MATTER BEEN OMITTED.

2. RQST CLARIFICATION WORDING URGENTLY, AS I HOPE DELIVER SECRETARY'S MESSAGE TO KETEMA TODAY AND WISH DISCUSS PROPOSED TEXTS.

GP-4. HALL

SECRET

0593

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Authority: VND 959503
By: MNARA Date: 10/5/05

ORIGIN/ACTION

AF-5

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

AIRGRAM

POL 7 NIGERIA
XR POL 27 BIAFRA-
NIGERIA
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RM/R	REP	AF
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ARA	EUR	FE
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NEA	CU	INR
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S/S	S/R	S/R
10	1	1
AGR	COM	FRB
INT	LAB	TAR
TR	XMB	AIR
ARMY	CIA	NAVY
3	20	5
OSO	USIA	NSA
34	10	3
NSC		
6		

A-749

UNCLASSIFIED

HANDLING INDICATOR

TO : Department of State
 INFO : Addis Ababa, Moscow, Warsaw

RECEIVED
 DEPT. OF STATE
 AUG 5 8 24 AM 1968

FROM : Amembassy LAGOS
 DATE: August 1, 1968

SUBJECT: Arikpo Returns from Poland and Russia

REF :

An FMG press release of July 25 contained several comments made by Dr. Okoi Arikpo upon his sudden return from a trip to Poland and the Soviet Union. Whether Arikpo was called back to Lagos or whether he wished to return to keep abreast of Nigerian developments is not clear. It is possible that Arikpo will continue his Eastern European tour after consultation in Lagos.

Arikpo accused those who support an airlift to Biafra of wishing to give Ojukwu "another fighting chance." He added that an airlift could not carry sufficient supplies in any event and that the land corridor offered by the FMG was the best solution to the movement of relief supplies.

The Commissioner expressed satisfaction with his visits in Moscow and Warsaw in which he had discussed civil war issues. He said "there was public understanding of the issues involved in the present crisis" and an awareness that the conflict had nothing to do with religion. He also stated that he had informed the countries visited of Nigeria's "commercial potentialities and development programs."

MATHEWS *Sm*

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Drafted by: *RD*
 POL: RJDaley: sc 7/29/68
 Clearances:

Contents and Classification Approved by:
 POL: EERamsaur: sc *Sm*

0594

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 Authority: VND 959503
 By: MVA Date: 10/5/05



POL 27 BIAFRA NIGERIA
Department of State **TELEGRAM**

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PAGE 01 LAGOS 11291 011454Z

47
ACTION AF 15

INFO EUR 15, IO 13, AID 28, SR 01, ORM 03, SCA 02, RSR 01, CIAE 00, GPM 04,
H 02, INR 07, L 03, NSC 10, P 04, RSC 01, SP 02, SS 20, USIA 12, NSA 02,
/145 W

R 011152Z AUG 68
FM AMEMBASSY LAGOS
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 1785
INFO AMEMBASSY LONDON
US MISSION GENEVA 318
CINCSRIKE/CINCEAFSA
DIA
AMCONSUL IBADAN
AMCONSUL KADUNA

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SUBJ: NIGERIAN RELIEF: BRITISH RELIEF WORKERS KILLED IN EAST

1. BRITISH HIGH COMMISSION HERE CONFIRMS STORY APPEARING
IN MORNING POST TODAY THAT TWO BRITISH MEMBERS OF RELIEF
TEAM SPONSORED BY "SAVE THE CHILDREN" FUND WERE KILLED
JULY 29.

2. NIGERIAN ARMY TOLD BRITISH THAT RELIEF WORKERS WERE
KILLED WHEN THEIR LAND ROVER HIT A MINE ON ROAD NORTHEAST
OF AWGU IN EAST-CENTRAL STATE WHERE TEAM BASED. NIGERIANS
SAY THEY WARNED THE RELIEF WORKERS NOT TO PROCEED IN THAT
DIRECTION AS IT NOT YET CLEARED OF REBELS. BRITISH UN-
CERTAIN WHETHER THIS TRUE, BUT THINK THEY HAVE TO ACCEPT
NIGERIAN EXPLANATION.

DECON. ON RECEIPT

MATHEWS

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By: MN NARA Date: 10/5/05



POL 27 BIAFRA-NIGERIA
TR POL 16 BIAFRA
Department of State **TELEGRAM**

CONFIDENTIAL 564

PAGE 01 LAGOS 11297 012108Z

83

ACTION AF 15

INFO EUR 15, IO 13, AID 28, PC 04, NSA 02, CIAE 00, GPM 04, H 02, INR 07, L 03,

NSC 10, P 04, RSC 01, SP 02, SS 20, USIA 12, RSC 01, 143 W

R 011425Z AUG 68
FM AMEMBASSY LAGOS
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 1786
INFO AMEMBASSY ACCRA
AMEMBASSY ADDIS ABABA
AMEMBASSY KINSHASA
AMEMBASSY LONDON
AMEMBASSY MONROVIA
AMEMBASSY NIAMEY
AMEMBASSY PARIS
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
SUBJ: FRENCH POLICY STATEMENT ON BIAFRA

REF: STATE 212182

1. BRITISH HERE SPOKE TO FEDERAL COMMISSIONER OF WORKS OKUNNU AND DEPUTY PERM SEC EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, ENAHORO LAST NIGHT. THEY TOLD BRITISH THAT FRENCH CHARGE WAS SUMMONED TO EXTAFF DURING LUNCHEON AT WHICH CHARGE HOST, DESPITE HIS INITIAL REQUEST TO COME LATER. AT MINISTRY HE WAS BLUNTLY TOLD THAT IF FRENCH THOUGHT THEIR STATEMENT WOULD CAUSE FMG TO MAKE CONCESSIONS TO OJUKWU "THEY COULDN'T BE MORE MISTAKEN."

CONFIDENTIAL

0596





Department of State **TELEGRAM**

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PAGE 02 LAGOS 11297 012108Z

2. DAILY PAPER WITH LARGEST CIRCULATION IN LAGOS CARRIED
HEADLINE "FRANCE NOW BACKS THE REBELS" WITH SUBHEAD "FRANCE'S
INTEREST IS OIL."

GP-3

MATHEWS

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0597

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Authority	VND 959503
By	MMARA Date 10/5/05